SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  26
Owning Windows 8
         with
Human Interface Devices
  Nikhil “SamratAshok” Mittal




                                1
About Me
• SamratAshok
• Twitter - @nikhil_mitt
• Blog – http://labofapenetrationtester.blogspot.com
• Creator of Kautilya and Nishang
• Interested in Offensive Information Security, new
  attack vectors and methodologies to pwn systems.
• Previous Talks
    – Clubhack’10, Hackfest’11, Clubhack’11, Black hat Abu
      Dhabi’11, Black Hat Europe’12, Troopers’12, PHDays’12,
      Black Hat USA’12, RSA China’12


                                                               2
Overview
•   A typical Penetration Test
•   Using HIDs in Penetration Tests
•   HID of choice – Teensy++
•   Kautilya
•   Windows 8
•   Attacks Demo
•   Comparison
•   Limitation
•   Defence
•   Conclusion
                                      3
A typical Penetration Test
• A client engagement comes our way with
  some details.
• We need to complete the assignment in very
  restrictive time frame.
• Pressure is on us to deliver a “good” report
  with some high severity findings. (That “High”
  return inside a red colored box)


                                                   4
How the threats are Tested



Vuln
         Exploit     Report
Scan


                              5
Best Scenario
• Previous one was a best case scenario.
• Only lucky ones find that.
• Generally legacy Enterprise Applications or
  Business Critical applications are not upgraded
  and are the first and easy targets.
• There is almost no fun doing it that way.



                                                6
Some of us do it better




Enum       Scan     Exploit   Report




                                       7
Some of us do it even better



Enum
                            Post
  +        Scan   Exploit          Report
                            Exp
Intel




                                            8
Why do we need to exploit?
• To gain access to the systems.
• This shows the real threat to clients that we
  can actually make an impact on their business.
  No more “so-what” 
• We can create reports with “High” Severity
  findings which bring $$$



                                               9
What do we exploit?
• Memory Corruption bugs.
    – Server side
    – Client Side
•   Mis-configurations
•   Open file shares.
•   Sticky slips.
•   Man In The Middle (many types)
•   Unsecured Dumpsters
•   Humans
•   <Audience>
                                     10
Worse Scenario
• Many times we get some vulnerabilities but
  can’t exploit.
  – No public exploits available.
  – Not allowed on the system.
  – Countermeasure blocking it.
  – Exploit completed but no session was generated
    :P                                           http://g
                                                   oo.gl/N
                                                   dvE3




                                                       11
Worst Scenario
• Hardened Systems
• Patches in place
• Countermeasures blocking scans and exploits
• Security incident team monitoring and
  blocking attacks.
• No network access

• We need alternatives.
                                    http://goo.gl/8EFfc
                                                   12
Need for new methods to break into
              systems
• Breaking into systems is not as easy as done in
  the movies.
• Those defending the systems have become
  smarter (at many places :P) and it is getting
  harder to break into “secured” environments.
• Everyone is breaking into systems using the
  older ways, you need new ways to do it better.


                                                13
Best Alternatives




                                          http://goo.gl/8LpoL



http://goo.gl/bkUWG




                                                           14
HID anyone?
• Wikipedia – “A human interface device or HID
  is a type of computer device that interacts
  directly with, and most often takes input
  from, humans and may deliver output to
  humans.”
• Mice, Keyboards and Joysticks are most
  common HID.
• What could go
  wrong?
                                                 15
                           http://goo.gl/uniYB
HID of Choice – Teensy++
• A USB Micro-controller device.
• Storage of about 130 KB.
• We will use Teensy ++ which is a better version
  of Teensy.
• Available for $24 from pjrc.com
• Can be used as a Keyboard, mouse and much
  more.


                                                16
From pjrc.com




                17
How we will use Teensy?
• As a programmable keyboard.
• We will program the device to do a defined set
  of activities when it is connected to a system.
• We will utilise the privileges of the currently
  logged in user and any higher privileges
  accessible to the user.
• Aim is to mimic a user sitting in front of the
  target.

18
Kautilya
• It’s a toolkit which aims to make Teensy more
  useful in Penetration Tests.
• Named after Chanakya a.k.a. Kautilya, an Indian
  Teacher, Strategist and Politician (370-283 BC)
• Written in Ruby.
• It’s a menu drive program which let users select
  and customize payloads.
• Aims to make Teensy part of every Penetration
  tester’s tool chest.

                                                     19
Windows 8
• Latest in Desktop family of Windows.
• Got praise for improved security in numerous
  tech articles and researches.
• Some fantastic research was presented at
  BHUS’12 “Windows 8 Heap Internals” by Chris
  Valasek and Tarjei Mandt.
• What will happen to our
  Pen Tests?
                               http://goo.gl/4xr81
                                                     20
Windows 8
• What about HIDs?
• Are there any improvements how Windows 8
  handle HID input?
• Doesn’t seem so :)




                                             21
Payloads and Demo
• Payloads are written for teensy without SD
  Card.
• Pastebin is extensively used. Both for uploads
  and downloads.
• Payloads are commands, powershell scripts or
  combination of both.
• Payload execution of course depends on
  privilege of user logged in when Teensy is
  plugged in.

                                            22
Limitations with Teensy
• Limited storage in Teensy. Resolved if you
  attach a SD card with Teensy.
• Inability to “read” from the system. You have
  to assume the responses of victim OS and
  there is only one way traffic.
• Target system should be unlocked.



                                                  23
Limitations with Kautilya
•   Many payloads need Administrative privilege.
•   Lots of traffic to and from pastebin.
•   Inability to clear itself after a single run.
•   For payloads which use executables you
    manually need to convert and host them.




                                                    24
Defence
• Use the Group Policy to “Prevent Installation
  of Removable Devices”.
• Physically lock the USB ports.




25
Thank You

• Questions?
• Insults?
• Feedback?
• Kautilya is available at
  http://code.google.com/p/kautilya/
• Follow me @nikhil_mitt
• http://labofapenetrationtester.blogspot.com/

                                                 26

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Ultimate pen test compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)
Ultimate pen test   compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)Ultimate pen test   compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)
Ultimate pen test compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)ClubHack
 
PSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShell
PSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShellPSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShell
PSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShellWill Schroeder
 
Automating Post Exploitation with PowerShell
Automating Post Exploitation with PowerShellAutomating Post Exploitation with PowerShell
Automating Post Exploitation with PowerShellEnclaveSecurity
 
PowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple TeamingPowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple TeamingNikhil Mittal
 
PowerShell for Penetration Testers
PowerShell for Penetration TestersPowerShell for Penetration Testers
PowerShell for Penetration TestersNikhil Mittal
 
Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)
Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)
Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)RGKelley5
 
Continuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friends
Continuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friendsContinuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friends
Continuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friendsNikhil Mittal
 
PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016
PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016
PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016Russel Van Tuyl
 
Hacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShell
Hacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShellHacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShell
Hacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShellNikhil Mittal
 
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationEvading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationNikhil Mittal
 
Building an Empire with PowerShell
Building an Empire with PowerShellBuilding an Empire with PowerShell
Building an Empire with PowerShellWill Schroeder
 
Obfuscating The Empire
Obfuscating The EmpireObfuscating The Empire
Obfuscating The EmpireRyan Cobb
 
Adventures in Asymmetric Warfare
Adventures in Asymmetric WarfareAdventures in Asymmetric Warfare
Adventures in Asymmetric WarfareWill Schroeder
 
Power on, Powershell
Power on, PowershellPower on, Powershell
Power on, PowershellRoo7break
 
Forging Trusts for Deception in Active Directory
Forging Trusts for Deception in Active DirectoryForging Trusts for Deception in Active Directory
Forging Trusts for Deception in Active DirectoryNikhil Mittal
 
Creating Havoc using Human Interface Device
Creating Havoc using Human Interface DeviceCreating Havoc using Human Interface Device
Creating Havoc using Human Interface DevicePositive Hack Days
 
SANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMI
SANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMISANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMI
SANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMIJoe Slowik
 
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItAMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItNikhil Mittal
 

Tendances (20)

Ultimate pen test compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)
Ultimate pen test   compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)Ultimate pen test   compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)
Ultimate pen test compromising a highly secure environment (nikhil)
 
PSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShell
PSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShellPSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShell
PSConfEU - Building an Empire with PowerShell
 
Automating Post Exploitation with PowerShell
Automating Post Exploitation with PowerShellAutomating Post Exploitation with PowerShell
Automating Post Exploitation with PowerShell
 
PowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple TeamingPowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
 
PowerShell for Penetration Testers
PowerShell for Penetration TestersPowerShell for Penetration Testers
PowerShell for Penetration Testers
 
Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)
Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)
Harness: PowerShell Weaponization Made Easy (or at least easier)
 
Continuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friends
Continuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friendsContinuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friends
Continuous intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker’s best friends
 
PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016
PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016
PowerShell for Cyber Warriors - Bsides Knoxville 2016
 
Hacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShell
Hacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShellHacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShell
Hacked? Pray that the Attacker used PowerShell
 
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationEvading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
 
Building an Empire with PowerShell
Building an Empire with PowerShellBuilding an Empire with PowerShell
Building an Empire with PowerShell
 
Defending Your "Gold"
Defending Your "Gold"Defending Your "Gold"
Defending Your "Gold"
 
Obfuscating The Empire
Obfuscating The EmpireObfuscating The Empire
Obfuscating The Empire
 
Adventures in Asymmetric Warfare
Adventures in Asymmetric WarfareAdventures in Asymmetric Warfare
Adventures in Asymmetric Warfare
 
Pwnstaller
PwnstallerPwnstaller
Pwnstaller
 
Power on, Powershell
Power on, PowershellPower on, Powershell
Power on, Powershell
 
Forging Trusts for Deception in Active Directory
Forging Trusts for Deception in Active DirectoryForging Trusts for Deception in Active Directory
Forging Trusts for Deception in Active Directory
 
Creating Havoc using Human Interface Device
Creating Havoc using Human Interface DeviceCreating Havoc using Human Interface Device
Creating Havoc using Human Interface Device
 
SANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMI
SANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMISANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMI
SANS DFIR Prague: PowerShell & WMI
 
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItAMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
 

Similaire à Owning windows 8 with human interface devices

Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015
Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015
Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015Zoltan Balazs
 
Nomura UCCSC 2009
Nomura UCCSC 2009Nomura UCCSC 2009
Nomura UCCSC 2009dnomura
 
LST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, Touch
LST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, TouchLST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, Touch
LST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, TouchDimitry Snezhkov
 
Mastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
Mastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsMastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
Mastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsBert Jan Schrijver
 
Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...
Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...
Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...AI Frontiers
 
Networking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin Dunn
Networking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin DunnNetworking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin Dunn
Networking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin DunnNorth Texas Chapter of the ISSA
 
Zero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is king
Zero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is kingZero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is king
Zero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is kingplumbee
 
Defending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricality
Defending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricalityDefending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricality
Defending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricalityClaus Cramon Houmann
 
Super Easy Memory Forensics
Super Easy Memory ForensicsSuper Easy Memory Forensics
Super Easy Memory ForensicsIIJ
 
Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation
Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and ExploitationSmart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation
Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and ExploitationSecureState
 
Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015
Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015
Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015Claus Cramon Houmann
 
Defcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confused
Defcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confusedDefcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confused
Defcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confusedFelipe Prado
 
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2Claus Cramon Houmann
 
JavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
JavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsJavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
JavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsBert Jan Schrijver
 
GOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
GOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsGOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
GOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsBert Jan Schrijver
 
Enter The back|track Linux Dragon
Enter The back|track Linux DragonEnter The back|track Linux Dragon
Enter The back|track Linux DragonAndrew Kozma
 
Open source doesn’t always represent best value
Open source doesn’t always represent best valueOpen source doesn’t always represent best value
Open source doesn’t always represent best valueJanus Boye
 
The_Pentester_Blueprint.pdf
The_Pentester_Blueprint.pdfThe_Pentester_Blueprint.pdf
The_Pentester_Blueprint.pdfgcara4
 
Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...
Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...
Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...EC-Council
 

Similaire à Owning windows 8 with human interface devices (20)

Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015
Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015
Sandbox detection: leak, abuse, test - Hacktivity 2015
 
Nomura UCCSC 2009
Nomura UCCSC 2009Nomura UCCSC 2009
Nomura UCCSC 2009
 
LST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, Touch
LST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, TouchLST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, Touch
LST Toolkit: Exfiltration Over Sound, Light, Touch
 
Mastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
Mastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsMastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
Mastering Microservices 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
 
Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...
Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...
Rajarshi Gupta at AI Frontiers : Security is AI’s biggest challenge, AI is Se...
 
Networking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin Dunn
Networking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin DunnNetworking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin Dunn
Networking 2016-06-14 - The Dirty Secrets of Enterprise Security by Kevin Dunn
 
Zero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is king
Zero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is kingZero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is king
Zero to ten million daily users in four weeks: sustainable speed is king
 
Defending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricality
Defending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricalityDefending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricality
Defending Enterprise IT - beating assymetricality
 
Super Easy Memory Forensics
Super Easy Memory ForensicsSuper Easy Memory Forensics
Super Easy Memory Forensics
 
Debugging distributed systems
Debugging distributed systemsDebugging distributed systems
Debugging distributed systems
 
Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation
Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and ExploitationSmart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation
Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation
 
Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015
Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015
Keynote at the Cyber Security Summit Prague 2015
 
Defcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confused
Defcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confusedDefcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confused
Defcon 23 - David Huerta - alice and bob are really confused
 
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
 
JavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
JavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsJavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
JavaLand 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
 
GOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
GOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systemsGOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
GOTO night April 2022 - Debugging distributed systems
 
Enter The back|track Linux Dragon
Enter The back|track Linux DragonEnter The back|track Linux Dragon
Enter The back|track Linux Dragon
 
Open source doesn’t always represent best value
Open source doesn’t always represent best valueOpen source doesn’t always represent best value
Open source doesn’t always represent best value
 
The_Pentester_Blueprint.pdf
The_Pentester_Blueprint.pdfThe_Pentester_Blueprint.pdf
The_Pentester_Blueprint.pdf
 
Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...
Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...
Hacker Halted 2018: From CTF to CVE – How Application of Concepts and Persist...
 

Dernier

08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 3652toLead Limited
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesSinan KOZAK
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationRadu Cotescu
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Paola De la Torre
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slidevu2urc
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhisoniya singh
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreternaman860154
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitecturePixlogix Infotech
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationSafe Software
 
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure serviceWhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure servicePooja Nehwal
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsMaria Levchenko
 
Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...
Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...
Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...gurkirankumar98700
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountPuma Security, LLC
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...HostedbyConfluent
 
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 SlidesSlack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 Slidespraypatel2
 
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘RTylerCroy
 
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024Results
 

Dernier (20)

08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
 
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure serviceWhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
 
Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...
Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...
Kalyanpur ) Call Girls in Lucknow Finest Escorts Service 🍸 8923113531 🎰 Avail...
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
 
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 SlidesSlack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
 
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
 
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
 

Owning windows 8 with human interface devices

  • 1. Owning Windows 8 with Human Interface Devices Nikhil “SamratAshok” Mittal 1
  • 2. About Me • SamratAshok • Twitter - @nikhil_mitt • Blog – http://labofapenetrationtester.blogspot.com • Creator of Kautilya and Nishang • Interested in Offensive Information Security, new attack vectors and methodologies to pwn systems. • Previous Talks – Clubhack’10, Hackfest’11, Clubhack’11, Black hat Abu Dhabi’11, Black Hat Europe’12, Troopers’12, PHDays’12, Black Hat USA’12, RSA China’12 2
  • 3. Overview • A typical Penetration Test • Using HIDs in Penetration Tests • HID of choice – Teensy++ • Kautilya • Windows 8 • Attacks Demo • Comparison • Limitation • Defence • Conclusion 3
  • 4. A typical Penetration Test • A client engagement comes our way with some details. • We need to complete the assignment in very restrictive time frame. • Pressure is on us to deliver a “good” report with some high severity findings. (That “High” return inside a red colored box) 4
  • 5. How the threats are Tested Vuln Exploit Report Scan 5
  • 6. Best Scenario • Previous one was a best case scenario. • Only lucky ones find that. • Generally legacy Enterprise Applications or Business Critical applications are not upgraded and are the first and easy targets. • There is almost no fun doing it that way. 6
  • 7. Some of us do it better Enum Scan Exploit Report 7
  • 8. Some of us do it even better Enum Post + Scan Exploit Report Exp Intel 8
  • 9. Why do we need to exploit? • To gain access to the systems. • This shows the real threat to clients that we can actually make an impact on their business. No more “so-what”  • We can create reports with “High” Severity findings which bring $$$ 9
  • 10. What do we exploit? • Memory Corruption bugs. – Server side – Client Side • Mis-configurations • Open file shares. • Sticky slips. • Man In The Middle (many types) • Unsecured Dumpsters • Humans • <Audience> 10
  • 11. Worse Scenario • Many times we get some vulnerabilities but can’t exploit. – No public exploits available. – Not allowed on the system. – Countermeasure blocking it. – Exploit completed but no session was generated :P http://g oo.gl/N dvE3 11
  • 12. Worst Scenario • Hardened Systems • Patches in place • Countermeasures blocking scans and exploits • Security incident team monitoring and blocking attacks. • No network access • We need alternatives. http://goo.gl/8EFfc 12
  • 13. Need for new methods to break into systems • Breaking into systems is not as easy as done in the movies. • Those defending the systems have become smarter (at many places :P) and it is getting harder to break into “secured” environments. • Everyone is breaking into systems using the older ways, you need new ways to do it better. 13
  • 14. Best Alternatives http://goo.gl/8LpoL http://goo.gl/bkUWG 14
  • 15. HID anyone? • Wikipedia – “A human interface device or HID is a type of computer device that interacts directly with, and most often takes input from, humans and may deliver output to humans.” • Mice, Keyboards and Joysticks are most common HID. • What could go wrong? 15 http://goo.gl/uniYB
  • 16. HID of Choice – Teensy++ • A USB Micro-controller device. • Storage of about 130 KB. • We will use Teensy ++ which is a better version of Teensy. • Available for $24 from pjrc.com • Can be used as a Keyboard, mouse and much more. 16
  • 18. How we will use Teensy? • As a programmable keyboard. • We will program the device to do a defined set of activities when it is connected to a system. • We will utilise the privileges of the currently logged in user and any higher privileges accessible to the user. • Aim is to mimic a user sitting in front of the target. 18
  • 19. Kautilya • It’s a toolkit which aims to make Teensy more useful in Penetration Tests. • Named after Chanakya a.k.a. Kautilya, an Indian Teacher, Strategist and Politician (370-283 BC) • Written in Ruby. • It’s a menu drive program which let users select and customize payloads. • Aims to make Teensy part of every Penetration tester’s tool chest. 19
  • 20. Windows 8 • Latest in Desktop family of Windows. • Got praise for improved security in numerous tech articles and researches. • Some fantastic research was presented at BHUS’12 “Windows 8 Heap Internals” by Chris Valasek and Tarjei Mandt. • What will happen to our Pen Tests? http://goo.gl/4xr81 20
  • 21. Windows 8 • What about HIDs? • Are there any improvements how Windows 8 handle HID input? • Doesn’t seem so :) 21
  • 22. Payloads and Demo • Payloads are written for teensy without SD Card. • Pastebin is extensively used. Both for uploads and downloads. • Payloads are commands, powershell scripts or combination of both. • Payload execution of course depends on privilege of user logged in when Teensy is plugged in. 22
  • 23. Limitations with Teensy • Limited storage in Teensy. Resolved if you attach a SD card with Teensy. • Inability to “read” from the system. You have to assume the responses of victim OS and there is only one way traffic. • Target system should be unlocked. 23
  • 24. Limitations with Kautilya • Many payloads need Administrative privilege. • Lots of traffic to and from pastebin. • Inability to clear itself after a single run. • For payloads which use executables you manually need to convert and host them. 24
  • 25. Defence • Use the Group Policy to “Prevent Installation of Removable Devices”. • Physically lock the USB ports. 25
  • 26. Thank You • Questions? • Insults? • Feedback? • Kautilya is available at http://code.google.com/p/kautilya/ • Follow me @nikhil_mitt • http://labofapenetrationtester.blogspot.com/ 26