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Projecting Enterprise Security
Requirements on the Cloud
Case Study-




                                                             Cloud

Presented by:
Billy Cox– Director Cloud Computing Strategy, Intel
Blake Dournaee– Product Manager & Author- SOA Demystified, Intel
Topic Agenda




•   Enterprise Risk Factors & Criteria
•   What can Enterpise Control             Enterprise
                                          Requirements
•   Emerging Standards & Models
•   What Can be Done Today
•   Summary of Intel Cloud Capabilities
Potential Risk- Illustrated




                                                   Amazon Ec2
             Keys to the Castle




Basic Auth Enterprise
Credentials
Compromised For Access




                            Enterprise VM Images
Potential Risk- Illustrated




                                           Amazon Ec2




Rogue Image Trojan
Injected Amongst
Enterprise VMs
Potential Risk- Illustrated

     Virus replayed back
     in Enterprise



                                      Amazon Ec2




              Data sent and lost to
              unknown source
Enterprise Risks & Security Interests

Risk                         Enterprise     Provider

Insecure, Porous APIs        Major Risk     Man in the middle, content threats, code injection, DoS attacks

                                            Don’t care. API security converges along with market price
Logical Multi-Tenancy        Unknown Risk   Virtual machine attacks, malicious code, comingled data

                                            Don’t care. Security of the multi-tenant architecture is a problem for [Insert Hypervisor Vendor
                                            Name] to solve. Oh, and trust us that your data is separate from your neighbor

Data Protection and          Major Risk     Reduced confidentiality for private data stored in the clear at the cloud provider
Leakage
                                            Opposite incentive. Clear text data allows me to provide increased functions based on search

Data Loss and Reliability    Major Risk     Unavailability or loss of critical enterprise data

                                            Care a little. Infrastructure reliability is guaranteed according to my SLA, plus you get a refund if
                                            we mess up ☺
Audit and Monitoring         Major Risk     Rogue uses of cloud services in Enterprise

                                            Care a little. I will provide basic monitoring of infrastructure but the rest is up to you

Cloud Provider Insider       Unknown Risk   Mismatched security practices at CSP creates a weak link for attackers
Threats
                                            Don’t care. We are secure enough. Just trust us.
Account Hacking, Access      Major Risk     Coarse access control at CSP increases the value of a stolen account
Control, and Authorization
                                            Care a little. AAA mechanisms must be good enough to support my SaaS app. It’s your job to
                                            map to our way of handling identities.
Where does Control Lie?

                                         Provider
                                                         Enterprise




Four of the seven risks are directly under the enterprise control
•   Insecure, Porous APIs
•   Data Protection and Leakage
•   Audit and Monitoring
•   Account Hacking, Access Control, and Authorization



Short of a boycott, the remaining 3 are largely out of control…
•   Logical Multi-Tenancy
•   Data Loss and Reliability
•   Cloud Provider Insider Threats
DMTF Cloud Standards
SNIA Cloud Standards
Cloud -                   Eucalyptus
                                                             Cloud Client
             Customer                                        (consumer)
             Network


     Lab Infrastructure               Eucalyptus Cloud                  Bulk Storage
                                       Infrastructure
                                                                             iSCSI
                                                   Walrus
        Caching        Router      Cloud           Storage                  Storage
         Proxy                    Controller       Service                  Server


Cluster block storage
and compute                       Block                      Block
                                                                         Power
managers           Cluster       Storage      Cluster
                                                            Storage
                                                           Controller
                                                                                      Power
                  Controller    Controller
                                             Controller                 Manager       Management

            Node                                            Node
          Controller                                      Controller

            Node                                            Node
          Controller                                      Controller                   KA3
            Node                                            Node
          Controller                                      Controller

            Node                                            Node
          Controller       Compute Clusters               Controller

            Node                                            Node
          Controller                                      Controller
Slide 10

KA3        Fix box titles
           Kelly Anderson, 21/05/2010
Basic Model

                                                                                Cloud Provider



                        Web Service Request
                                                                                      UDDI or Resource

Enterprise
                                                                       Credentials
                                                                        & Policies
                 User
                                             User
                                          Credentials
                                           & Policies

       IdM
                                                        Security Profile




                                                                                     Internal IdM
    • Authentication token
    • Customer access control policies
    • Customer data protection policies
Cloud Access through a Broker

                                                                                                                   Cloud Service
                                                          Cloud Broker                                                Provider
                                                                                                      Broker Token

                     Web                                                                                                          UDDI or
                    Service                                          UDDI or Resource
                                                                                                                                  Resource
Enterprise          Request
                                                       Credentials                                                 Broker
                                                        & Policies                                               Credentials
             User                                                                         Broker
                                 User                                                                             & Policies
                                                                                        Credentials
                              Credentials                                                & Policies
                               & Policies

    IdM
                                            Security                                                  Security
                                            Profile                                                    Profile




                                                              Internal IdM                                                Internal IdM
                    External IdM
#1 – Broker as Management Entry Point


                                                                         Cloud
                                                                         Provider


                                                             Cloud Mgr              Cloud Site 1

Enterprise
Consumer           Request
                                           Service Gateway


                                                                                    Cloud Site 2
  IdM

                  Identity
                  Reference
                                                                                    Cloud Site 3
             • Entry point for cloud management (not
               data, only mgmt)
             • Single point of entry and validation for
               all sites and Cloud Consumers
             • Consistent credentials validation
#2 –Broker as Outbound PEP

                             Dynamic
Enterprise                   Perimeter
Consumer


                                       Private
                                        Cloud                  Cloud Provider 1
  User




  User




                                                                Cloud Provider 2
  User



                                                    UDDI or
                                                    Resource
    • Cloud customer accesses multiple clouds
    • Internal users don’t want to see that
      complexity
    • Broker directs based in policy and converts
      protocols as necessary
    • Secures provider access credentials
Public Cloud & SaaS
Private Cloud Virtual Gateway Usage Model

                                                                                    Private
                                           3. SOAP, REST or JSON
                                               SAML Response
                                                                                    Cloud 1



       Enterprise                                                   Service Virtualization
                                              2. Virtualize, Load
                                               Balance, Firewall,
                                             Generate SAML Token


           Portal & CRM App
                                                                                              Partner
                                                                                    Private
                                                                                    Cloud 2


  IdM , Active                                                      API & Token Broker
Directory, ABAC
                      1. User AuthN/Auth-
                         SOAP/REST, Kerberos, Basic
                         Auth, Siteminder, X.509




                                              Dynamic Enterprise
                                              Perimeter


                              In VPDC, Service Gateway protects access to
                               Services, maps credentials, enforces ABAC,
                                      brokers protocols & formats
CloudBurst Security Using Virtual Gateway

  3. Local
     Authentication
                                                             4. Mapped to an AWS
                                                                Credential in Request
                                                                for Resource

                               2. Locate
                                  Resource(s)                                            Amazon EC2
     Enterprise                                                                           Storage
                                                                                         Public Cloud

                                             Private
  IdM or                                      Cloud
  Active
 Directory

             UDDI or                        API & HSM
             Resource
                                                                                         Force.com Apps
Portal or Web                                                                             Public Cloud
                                   Dynamic
  Service                          Enterprise
                                   Perimeter                  5. Generate SAML
                                                                 Request with Request
                                                                 for Resource to Force




                 1. Request with
                    Credentials to Access
                    a Resource



                                Manage, secure, hide Cloud brokering complexity.
                                    Convert formats. Provide access control
More Information on Intel SOA Expressway & Cloud
                                                        w
                                           er brings ne
                           T his Intel pap
                                         ud Security
                           detail to Clo
                                         t practices”
                           Alliance bes      vis
                                  – Jim Rea
                                                irector,
                                    Executive D
                                                  ty Alliance
                                     Cloud Securi
www.dynamicperimeter.com
Questions?



Click on the questions tab on your screen, type in your question, name
                   and e-mail address; then hit submit.

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Projecting Enterprise Security Requirements on the Cloud

  • 1. Projecting Enterprise Security Requirements on the Cloud Case Study- Cloud Presented by: Billy Cox– Director Cloud Computing Strategy, Intel Blake Dournaee– Product Manager & Author- SOA Demystified, Intel
  • 2. Topic Agenda • Enterprise Risk Factors & Criteria • What can Enterpise Control Enterprise Requirements • Emerging Standards & Models • What Can be Done Today • Summary of Intel Cloud Capabilities
  • 3. Potential Risk- Illustrated Amazon Ec2 Keys to the Castle Basic Auth Enterprise Credentials Compromised For Access Enterprise VM Images
  • 4. Potential Risk- Illustrated Amazon Ec2 Rogue Image Trojan Injected Amongst Enterprise VMs
  • 5. Potential Risk- Illustrated Virus replayed back in Enterprise Amazon Ec2 Data sent and lost to unknown source
  • 6. Enterprise Risks & Security Interests Risk Enterprise Provider Insecure, Porous APIs Major Risk Man in the middle, content threats, code injection, DoS attacks Don’t care. API security converges along with market price Logical Multi-Tenancy Unknown Risk Virtual machine attacks, malicious code, comingled data Don’t care. Security of the multi-tenant architecture is a problem for [Insert Hypervisor Vendor Name] to solve. Oh, and trust us that your data is separate from your neighbor Data Protection and Major Risk Reduced confidentiality for private data stored in the clear at the cloud provider Leakage Opposite incentive. Clear text data allows me to provide increased functions based on search Data Loss and Reliability Major Risk Unavailability or loss of critical enterprise data Care a little. Infrastructure reliability is guaranteed according to my SLA, plus you get a refund if we mess up ☺ Audit and Monitoring Major Risk Rogue uses of cloud services in Enterprise Care a little. I will provide basic monitoring of infrastructure but the rest is up to you Cloud Provider Insider Unknown Risk Mismatched security practices at CSP creates a weak link for attackers Threats Don’t care. We are secure enough. Just trust us. Account Hacking, Access Major Risk Coarse access control at CSP increases the value of a stolen account Control, and Authorization Care a little. AAA mechanisms must be good enough to support my SaaS app. It’s your job to map to our way of handling identities.
  • 7. Where does Control Lie? Provider Enterprise Four of the seven risks are directly under the enterprise control • Insecure, Porous APIs • Data Protection and Leakage • Audit and Monitoring • Account Hacking, Access Control, and Authorization Short of a boycott, the remaining 3 are largely out of control… • Logical Multi-Tenancy • Data Loss and Reliability • Cloud Provider Insider Threats
  • 10. Cloud - Eucalyptus Cloud Client Customer (consumer) Network Lab Infrastructure Eucalyptus Cloud Bulk Storage Infrastructure iSCSI Walrus Caching Router Cloud Storage Storage Proxy Controller Service Server Cluster block storage and compute Block Block Power managers Cluster Storage Cluster Storage Controller Power Controller Controller Controller Manager Management Node Node Controller Controller Node Node Controller Controller KA3 Node Node Controller Controller Node Node Controller Compute Clusters Controller Node Node Controller Controller
  • 11. Slide 10 KA3 Fix box titles Kelly Anderson, 21/05/2010
  • 12. Basic Model Cloud Provider Web Service Request UDDI or Resource Enterprise Credentials & Policies User User Credentials & Policies IdM Security Profile Internal IdM • Authentication token • Customer access control policies • Customer data protection policies
  • 13. Cloud Access through a Broker Cloud Service Cloud Broker Provider Broker Token Web UDDI or Service UDDI or Resource Resource Enterprise Request Credentials Broker & Policies Credentials User Broker User & Policies Credentials Credentials & Policies & Policies IdM Security Security Profile Profile Internal IdM Internal IdM External IdM
  • 14. #1 – Broker as Management Entry Point Cloud Provider Cloud Mgr Cloud Site 1 Enterprise Consumer Request Service Gateway Cloud Site 2 IdM Identity Reference Cloud Site 3 • Entry point for cloud management (not data, only mgmt) • Single point of entry and validation for all sites and Cloud Consumers • Consistent credentials validation
  • 15. #2 –Broker as Outbound PEP Dynamic Enterprise Perimeter Consumer Private Cloud Cloud Provider 1 User User Cloud Provider 2 User UDDI or Resource • Cloud customer accesses multiple clouds • Internal users don’t want to see that complexity • Broker directs based in policy and converts protocols as necessary • Secures provider access credentials
  • 17. Private Cloud Virtual Gateway Usage Model Private 3. SOAP, REST or JSON SAML Response Cloud 1 Enterprise Service Virtualization 2. Virtualize, Load Balance, Firewall, Generate SAML Token Portal & CRM App Partner Private Cloud 2 IdM , Active API & Token Broker Directory, ABAC 1. User AuthN/Auth- SOAP/REST, Kerberos, Basic Auth, Siteminder, X.509 Dynamic Enterprise Perimeter In VPDC, Service Gateway protects access to Services, maps credentials, enforces ABAC, brokers protocols & formats
  • 18. CloudBurst Security Using Virtual Gateway 3. Local Authentication 4. Mapped to an AWS Credential in Request for Resource 2. Locate Resource(s) Amazon EC2 Enterprise Storage Public Cloud Private IdM or Cloud Active Directory UDDI or API & HSM Resource Force.com Apps Portal or Web Public Cloud Dynamic Service Enterprise Perimeter 5. Generate SAML Request with Request for Resource to Force 1. Request with Credentials to Access a Resource Manage, secure, hide Cloud brokering complexity. Convert formats. Provide access control
  • 19. More Information on Intel SOA Expressway & Cloud w er brings ne T his Intel pap ud Security detail to Clo t practices” Alliance bes vis – Jim Rea irector, Executive D ty Alliance Cloud Securi www.dynamicperimeter.com
  • 20. Questions? Click on the questions tab on your screen, type in your question, name and e-mail address; then hit submit.