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Combating Fraud :
Putting in Place an Effective Audit System to
          Detect and Prevent Fraud


 The 9th - Cyber Defense Initiative Conference 2009 - (CDIC 2009)
  10th-11th November 2009 Queen Sirikit National Convention Center

                                      By
           Pairat Srivilairit, CIA, CISA, CBA, CCSA, CFSA, CISSP, CFE

               Tuesday, 10 November 2009 15:15-16:00 hrs




                                                                        1
About Speaker

   Mr Pairat Srivilairit received a bachelor of engineering from Chulalongkorn
    University and a MBA from Thammasat University. He is a certified internal
    auditor (CIA), certified information systems auditor (CISA), certified bank
    auditor (CBA), holder of certification in control self-assessment (CCSA), certified financial service
    auditor (CFSA), certified information systems security professional (CISSP), and a certified fraud
    examiner (CFE).
   He is chairman of the Bank and Financial Institution Internal Auditors Club (BFIA) and past director
    of ISACA Bangkok chapter. He is also a member of The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), The
    Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), The Information Systems Audit and Control
    Association (ISACA), The International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium
    (ISC)² and The Institute of Internal Auditors of Thailand (IIAT).
   He is a known lecturer on operational auditing and information system auditing courses at IIAT and
    ISACA Bangkok Chapter. He is also a special lecturer of the IIA’s Internal Auditing Education
    Partnership Program (IAEP) at Chulalongkorn University, and represented IIAT speaking to
    students at several universities to disseminate the internal auditing profession.
   Mr Pairat Srivilairit is associated with finance and banking industry for over 18 years with rich
    experiences in the area of management consulting, planning, research, investment,
    operation and audit. He is now with TISCO Bank Public Company Limited as head of
    internal audit and secretary to the audit committee.




                                                                                         2
Outline

Combating Fraud: Putting in Place an Effective Audit
  System to Detect and Prevent Fraud
(45 min)
   Key Indicators of Fraud
   Types of Fraud in Activities Reviewed
   Prevention Aids by Internal Auditors
   Detection and Investigation Techniques
   Summary




                                              3
ตัว อย่า งกรณีท ุจ ริต
  โจรไฮเทคแฮ็กข้อมูลเชิด 200 ล้าน
  – เดือนสิงหาคม 2548 ตัวแทนผู้ให้บริการเครือข่ายโทรศัพท์
     เคลื่อนที่ สังเกตเห็นความผิดปกติใน traffic ของลูกค้า
     ประเภทบัตรเติมเงิน
  – สืบพบรหัสข้อมูลของบริษัทถูก hack แล้วนำาไป load เงิน
     จำานวนเกินจริงใส่บัตรเติมเงิน เอาไปขายผ่าน Internet ใน
     ราคาพิเศษ หรือตั้งโต๊ะให้บริการตามชุมชน
  – บริษัทพยายามบล็อกรหัสของบัตรที่ผิดปกติ แต่ก็ยังเสียหาย
     เป็นค่าเสียโอกาสรายได้ สูงถึง 200 ล้านบาท
  – จับกุมผู้ต้องหาได้ 4 คน เป็นพนักงานของบริษัทเอง คดียังอยู่
     ในระหว่างอุทธรณ์.

                                               (ผู4 ัดการ 27 ส.ค.48)
                                                  ้จ
ตัว อย่า งกรณีท ุจ ริต
  ผีพนันสิงหนุ่มแบงก์แสบโกง 400 ล้าน
  – เดือนพฤษภาคม 2552 ธนาคารตรวจพบสมุห์บัญชีสาขา
      หนึ่งโอนเงินจากบัญชีดอกเบี้ยที่ธนาคารเตรียมไว้จ่ายลูกค้า
      เข้าบัญชีตัวเองตามธนาคารต่าง ๆ
  – ผู้ต้องหาจนมุมคารถขณะกำาลังหนีไปเขมร สารภาพทำามาต่อ
      เนื่องนานกว่า 1 ปี เพราะทำาง่ายและไม่เคยถูกตรวจสอบ เงิน
      ที่ยักยอกนำาไปซื้อบ้าน รถยนต์ เครื่องประดับ ซื้อกองทุน
      เล่นพนันฟุตบอล ซื้อสลากกินแบ่ง รวมกว่า 499 ล้านบาท
  – เริ่มทำางานในธนาคารเมื่อปี 2542 ได้รบรางวัลเป็นพนักงาน
                                           ั
      ดีเด่น และไม่เคยมีประวัติการทุจริต
  – พบสาเหตุระบบ Core Banking System มีข้อบกพร่อง.

                                                  5
                                               (ฐานเศรษฐกิจ 6 พ.ค.52)
Occupational Fraud

   “The use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment
    through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the
    employing organization’s resources or assets.”

   All occupational fraud have 4 things in common
     – Clandestine
     – Violate the perpetrator’s fiduciary duties to the victim
        organization
     – Committed for direct or indirect financial benefit to the
        perpetrator, and
     – Cost the employer assets, revenue or reserves


                                                    6
How Fraud is Committed

 Three categories of occupational frauds :
    Asset Misappropriations
     Involve theft or misuse of organization’s assets i.e.
     skimming revenues, stealing inventory and payroll fraud.
    Corruption
     Wrongfully use influence to gain personal benefit contrary
     to duty to employer or the rights of another i.e. accepting
     kickbacks, conflicts of interest.
    Fraudulent Statements
     Falsification of organization’s financial statements i.e.
     overstating revenues and understating liabilities or
     expenses.


                                                   7
How Fraud is Committed

   Asset misappropriations were most common but low
    loss. Fraudulent statements were least common with
    highest loss.
      Breakdown of All Occupational Fraud Schemes — Median Loss




                                                        8
Bank Most Common Fraud

   Greatest percentage (15%) of fraud occurred in banking
    and financial services sector.




                                                9
How Fraud is Detected

   It takes 24 months on average to catch employee fraud
               Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds 4




                                                            10
Key Indicators of Fraud

   Tips / Complaints
   Missing / Alteration of documents
   Duplicate / Unreasonable expenses or reimbursements
   Failure of certain employees to take vacations
   Failure to follow up on past-due receivables
   Unusual write-offs of receivables
   Employees on the payroll not sign up for benefits
   Excessive purchase of products or services
   Common phone numbers / addresses of payees or
    customers


                                              11
Key Indicators of Fraud

(Continued)
 Cash shortages / overages
 Stale items on bank reconciliations
 Unexplained adjustments / Journal entries
 Unusual financial statement relationships i.e.
   – Increased revenue vs. decreased receivable
   – Increased revenue vs. decreased inventory purchase
   – Increased inventory vs. decreased purchase or A/P
 Significant increases or decreases in account balances
 Significant changes in liquidity, leverage,
  profitability or turnover ratios


                                              12
Limiting Fraud Losses
   Surprise audit and job rotation are still overlooked by many organizations.




                                                                                  13
Limiting Fraud Losses
   Surprise audit, job rotation, and anonymous reporting showed the greatest impact on fraud
    losses.




                                                                              14
Bank Case Symptoms
   Supervisory override, unusually large transactions or
    with no apparent business purpose
   Journal voucher contain only one signature, containing
    incorrect information, fund transfer between different
    customers' accounts
   Deposit slip with missing information, depositor names
    incomplete or not match with passbook or acct name.
   Frequent, large deposit/withdrawal in Executive account
   Deposits and withdrawals on same account on same day
    or in a short period of time
   Bank checks used to transfer between accounts /
    checks with altered date.

                                                15
Symptoms ... More
   Purported customer signature on withdrawal voucher and
    checks
   Large negative balances in slush accts or customer accts
   Deposit slip of customer funds between accts of different
    customers
   Deposits of customer check where cash was received
    back
   CDs closed prematurely with proceeds put into low
    interest account, sometimes with penalty
   Customer not presented when account was opened,
    closed or transacted
   Mailing of customer statement to Executive address

                                                 16
Bank Fraud Trend

   Fraud financial cost may be three or more times the
    value of loss amount
   Fraud is not static. It evolves with each new measures
    implemented
   New opportunities for employee fraud are emerging
   Criminals thwart rules-based systems
   “Silo” mentality weakens fraud detection
   Top management are moving toward an enterprise
    focus on anti-fraud systems
   Regulatory expectations are increasing
   Solutions require commitment, investment, and talent


                                                17
Insider Threat

   “Deliberate misuse by those who are authorized to use
    computer and networks.”
   Insiders include employees, contractors, consultants,
    temporary helper, personnel from third-party business
    partner, etc.




                                                18
Facts about Insider Misuses

   Most were not technically sophisticated or complex
   Most were thought out and planned in advance
   Most were motivated by financial gain
   Most perpetrators of banking and finance incidents
     – Not hold technical position
     – Never engage in technical attack or hacking
     – Not necessarily perceived as problem employees
   Executed at workplace during normal business hours
   Detected by various channels and methods.


                                              19
Misuse of Applications
Applications            Legitimate Use                            Misuse
Client/Server      Message exchange              Unusual exchange to degrade
                                                   performance
                 Connectivity to server          Exceedingly connection (DOS)
                 Execution of tasks              Execute privileged procedure


Mail Clients       Send and receive e-mails        Illegal content / remote attack /
                                                     private use / overload network
Browsers /       Browse Internet / play files    View illegal content
Multimedia       View cached file and            Display other users’ viewed files
player            history                          and accesses

Programming      Develop program                 Create malware
Tools            Display memory segment          Access memory segment with
                                                   sensitive information

General-           Read / write                  Access temp file for sensitive
purpose                                            information / modify temp file to
Applications                                       change program flow
                   Input strings                 Buffer overflow
                                                                   20
Universal of
  Internal Computer Fraud
                                                   Data Capture
     Billing Schemes                                                                                Errors
                                                        Spyware &&
    Forged     Corruption &&    Ghost                    Spyware                    Duplicate           Over
     Forged     Corruption       Ghost                  Key loggers                  Duplicate           Over       Payment to
Endorsement Price initiation Vendor                      Key loggers                                                 Payment to
  Endorsement Price initiation Vendor                                               Payments          Payments       Erroneous
                                                                                     Payments          Payments       Erroneous
Accomplice Quid Pro Quo && Return                                                    Early        Missing or Bad    Employees
 Accomplice Quid Pro Quo        Return                                                                                Employees
   Vendor
    Vendor Barter Schemes && Voids
             Barter Schemes      Voids             Fund Transfer                      Early
                                                                                   Payments
                                                                                                   Missing or Bad & Vendors
                                                                                                   Information        & Vendors
                                                                                    Payments        Information
 Personal Passing of Payment of Invoices                Unauthorized
  Personal                                                                                              Duplicate Information
Purchase Passing of Payment of Invoices
             for Non-existing Suppliers
                                                         Unauthorized
                                                      Transfer of Funds
                                                                                                         Duplicate Information
  Purchase    for Non-existing Suppliers               Transfer of Funds


                                                                                           Program Altering Schemes
  Manipulation of Data Input                           Computer
                                                       Computer                             Changing Program Setting Improper
                                                                                             Changing Program Setting Improper
  Data
   Data      Falsification of
              Falsification of Data
                                Data
                                                        Fraud
                                                         Fraud
                                                                                           and Data Ownership
                                                                                            and Data Ownership     Parameter
                                                                                                                    Parameter
Integrity     Stock Record Suppression                                                     Use of Malware Alteration of Program
 Integrity     Stock Record Suppression
 Attack      to Cover Theft                                                                 Use of Malware Alteration of Program
   Attack     to Cover Theft                                                                (e.g. Trojans)     and Data File
                of Stocks                                                                    (e.g. Trojans)     and Data File
                 of Stocks
                                              Information Privacy Risk
                                            Loss of                         Employee
     Payroll Schemes                          Loss of Transmission of
                                                         Transmission of     Employee
                                          Intellectual Confidential Data Downloading
                                                                                                     Check Tampering
                                           Intellectual Confidential Data Downloading
    Ghost        False                     Property       (i.e. TCP/IP)    Hacker Tools
     Ghost        False                      Property       (i.e. TCP/IP)   Hacker Tools       Forged Endorsement
  Employee Communication                   Through                         For ID Theft         Forged Endorsement Skimming
   Employee Communication                    Through                        For ID Theft                             Skimming
                                              Fraud           Employee       Purpose
                                               Fraud            Employee      Purpose            Forged Checks Write-off of
    Worker’s    Falsified                                       Posting                           Forged Checks Write-off of
     Worker’s    Falsified                 Peer-to-peer          Posting    Employee
  Compensation   Wages                      Peer-to-peer Confidential        Employee                            Money Due
   Compensation   Wages                   Filing Sharing      Confidential Downloads                Alter Payee   Money Due
    Scheme                                 Filing Sharing Company           Downloads                Alter Payee to Company
     Scheme                                                     Company    && Nefarious
                                                                             Nefarious                            to Company
                                                             Information
                                                               Information Applications
                                                                            Applications
  09/10/12                                                                                           21                   21
Types of Application Controls

 Access Controls                                               Data Origination / Input Controls
                                                            Check Integrity       Check whether sources           Check ifif data
                  Authorization
                   Authorization
                                                              Check Integrity
                                                            of Data entered        Check whether sources           Check data
Identification &&                                             of Data entered      from staff direct input,         is within
 Identification                                              Into Business           from staff direct input,         is within
 Authentication Accountability Audit                           Into Business    remote by business partner,         specified
  Authentication Accountability Audit                           Application      remote by business partner,         specified
                                                                 Application      or through web-enabled           parameter
                                                                                   or through web-enabled            parameter
                                                                                         application
   Physical Devices (i.e. biometric                                                        application
    Physical Devices (i.e. biometric
   scan, metal locks, hidden path,                      Ensure accuracy, completeness and           Ensure accuracy with optimum
    scan, metal locks, hidden path,                       Ensure accuracy, completeness and          Ensure accuracy with optimum
    digital signatures, encryption,                     timeliness of data during conversion           computerized validation
      digital signatures, encryption,                     timeliness of data during conversion          computerized validation
social barriers, human and automated                     from original sources into computer                and editing,
 social barriers, human and automated                      from original sources into computer               and editing,
       monitoring systems etc.),                        data or entry to computer application
        monitoring systems etc.),                         data or entry to computer application
                                                         either manual, online input or batch.        Error handling procedure
                                                           either manual, online input or batch.       Error handling procedure
    Permit or deny use of an object                                                                         facilitate timely
     Permit or deny use of an object                                                                         facilitate timely
                                                                                                     and accurate resubmission
                                                                                                      and accurate resubmission
                                                                                                         of all corrected data
                                                                                                          of all corrected data
                                                    Application
                                                    Application
                                                     Controls
                                                     Controls
  Data Processing
                                                                                       Output Control
Ensure accuracy, completeness
 Ensure accuracy, completeness
 and timeliness of data during         Ensure data is accurately                  Ensure integrity of output and the correct
  and timeliness of data during         Ensure data is accurately                   Ensure integrity of output and the correct
   either Batch or real-time              processed through                       and timely distribution of output produced
     either Batch or real-time             processed through                        and timely distribution of output produced
   processing by application.               the application                      either in hardcopy, files to be used as input
    processing by application.               the application                      either in hardcopy, files to be used as input
                                                                                       for other system, or information
 No data is added, lost or altered during processing                                     for other system, or information
  No data is added, lost or altered during processing                                      available for online viewing
                                                                                            available for online viewing

09/10/12                                                                                                 22                         22
Example of Detection System
                                                   General
                                                   Ledger
                                                                            XBRL Business
                                                                             XBRL Business
                                                                            Report Engine
                                                                             Report Engine
                                                  Business
                                                   Report                                            XSLT
            Branch
             Branch                                                                               Spreadsheet
                         Loan Application
                             Dataset


                                                                   Web                   Application
           Main Office
           Main Office        Web Browser
                              Web Browser                         Server                   Server
                                                           XML                 XML
                                                       document               document


            Branch
             Branch                                                                            XML
                                              SYSLOG                                     Key Fraud Signature
                                                                                          Misuse detection
                                                                           Rules          data & metadata
                                                 IDS                       Engine
                                            Firewall and
                                             Router Log            Event Correlation
                                                                       Database
09/10/12                                                                            23                    23
Other Analytical Tools

                       Use of Benford's Law as fraud detection tool


                                  Theoretic
                                   al Line              Fraudulent
Frequencies (percent)




                                                       Transactions




09/10/12                                                               24   24
Managing Insider Threat

   Strong authentication / biometric technologies
   Role-based access granted on a need-to-have basis
   Rotate job function / event log reading
   Place server and sensitive equipment in secured area
   Restrict physical access / lock / alarm test
   Wear badge / background check
   Default password / unused port / log-off on absence
   Encrypt sensitive data stored on user hard drives
   Store sensitive document in secured space
   Never issue password over unsecured channels


                                              25
Aware of Warning Signs

   Rogue access point / wireless / remote
   Disgruntled employee
   A user accesses database or area of network they
    have never accessed before
   Download spike




                                             26
Fraud Prevention Checklist

   Good internal control
   Employee fraud awareness training / hotline
   Analytical review / surprise fraud audits
   Review company contracts
   Perception of detection / management oversight
   Proactive fraud policy and program / prosecution
   Mandatory vacations / periodic job rotation
   Screen job applicants
   Information security review / limit access / audit trail
   Management climate / employee support program


                                                     27
Summary

Auditor's roles in combating fraud
   Promote culture of honesty and high ethics
   Assess and mitigate the risk of fraud
   Ensure control adequacy and effectiveness
   Use data mining and statistical analysis tools
   Analyze financial statements reports
   Being alert on predication of fraud
   Ensure investigations are properly conducted
   Ensure proper follow-up actions are taken
   Develop your anti-fraud knowledge and skills


                                                     28
About the ACFE

   The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
   Start 1988
   Provide anti-fraud training and education
   Over 50,000 members in 125 countries
   Administrate the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE)
    designation- a certification program for fraud practitioners
    recognized by U.S. Department of Defense and FBI
   More than 20,000 CFE’s worldwide (5 Thais)
   $55 Membership Fee
   More information about ACFE
    http://www.acfe.com


                                                   29
About CFE Exam
   Covers 4 areas
     – Criminology & Ethics
     – Financial Transactions
     – Fraud Investigation
     – Legal Elements of Fraud
   4 Exam sections of 125 questions each (75%)
   Administered via computer / must complete each
    section in one sitting (2.6 hr)
   Complete all and return to ACFE in 30 days
   Must pass Qualifying Points System (40/50)
   $250 Application Fee

                                              30
Q&A

            Pairat Srivilairit
CIA, CCSA, CFSA, CISA, CISSP, CBA, CFE
       Internal Audit Department
  TISCO Bank Public Company Limited
     Mobile   : +668 1903 1457
     Office   : +66 2633 7821
     Email    : pairat@tisco.co.th




                                         31

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Cdic 2009 fraud audit pairat 4

  • 1. Combating Fraud : Putting in Place an Effective Audit System to Detect and Prevent Fraud The 9th - Cyber Defense Initiative Conference 2009 - (CDIC 2009) 10th-11th November 2009 Queen Sirikit National Convention Center By Pairat Srivilairit, CIA, CISA, CBA, CCSA, CFSA, CISSP, CFE Tuesday, 10 November 2009 15:15-16:00 hrs 1
  • 2. About Speaker  Mr Pairat Srivilairit received a bachelor of engineering from Chulalongkorn University and a MBA from Thammasat University. He is a certified internal auditor (CIA), certified information systems auditor (CISA), certified bank auditor (CBA), holder of certification in control self-assessment (CCSA), certified financial service auditor (CFSA), certified information systems security professional (CISSP), and a certified fraud examiner (CFE).  He is chairman of the Bank and Financial Institution Internal Auditors Club (BFIA) and past director of ISACA Bangkok chapter. He is also a member of The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), The Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), The International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC)² and The Institute of Internal Auditors of Thailand (IIAT).  He is a known lecturer on operational auditing and information system auditing courses at IIAT and ISACA Bangkok Chapter. He is also a special lecturer of the IIA’s Internal Auditing Education Partnership Program (IAEP) at Chulalongkorn University, and represented IIAT speaking to students at several universities to disseminate the internal auditing profession.  Mr Pairat Srivilairit is associated with finance and banking industry for over 18 years with rich experiences in the area of management consulting, planning, research, investment, operation and audit. He is now with TISCO Bank Public Company Limited as head of internal audit and secretary to the audit committee. 2
  • 3. Outline Combating Fraud: Putting in Place an Effective Audit System to Detect and Prevent Fraud (45 min)  Key Indicators of Fraud  Types of Fraud in Activities Reviewed  Prevention Aids by Internal Auditors  Detection and Investigation Techniques  Summary 3
  • 4. ตัว อย่า งกรณีท ุจ ริต โจรไฮเทคแฮ็กข้อมูลเชิด 200 ล้าน – เดือนสิงหาคม 2548 ตัวแทนผู้ให้บริการเครือข่ายโทรศัพท์ เคลื่อนที่ สังเกตเห็นความผิดปกติใน traffic ของลูกค้า ประเภทบัตรเติมเงิน – สืบพบรหัสข้อมูลของบริษัทถูก hack แล้วนำาไป load เงิน จำานวนเกินจริงใส่บัตรเติมเงิน เอาไปขายผ่าน Internet ใน ราคาพิเศษ หรือตั้งโต๊ะให้บริการตามชุมชน – บริษัทพยายามบล็อกรหัสของบัตรที่ผิดปกติ แต่ก็ยังเสียหาย เป็นค่าเสียโอกาสรายได้ สูงถึง 200 ล้านบาท – จับกุมผู้ต้องหาได้ 4 คน เป็นพนักงานของบริษัทเอง คดียังอยู่ ในระหว่างอุทธรณ์. (ผู4 ัดการ 27 ส.ค.48) ้จ
  • 5. ตัว อย่า งกรณีท ุจ ริต ผีพนันสิงหนุ่มแบงก์แสบโกง 400 ล้าน – เดือนพฤษภาคม 2552 ธนาคารตรวจพบสมุห์บัญชีสาขา หนึ่งโอนเงินจากบัญชีดอกเบี้ยที่ธนาคารเตรียมไว้จ่ายลูกค้า เข้าบัญชีตัวเองตามธนาคารต่าง ๆ – ผู้ต้องหาจนมุมคารถขณะกำาลังหนีไปเขมร สารภาพทำามาต่อ เนื่องนานกว่า 1 ปี เพราะทำาง่ายและไม่เคยถูกตรวจสอบ เงิน ที่ยักยอกนำาไปซื้อบ้าน รถยนต์ เครื่องประดับ ซื้อกองทุน เล่นพนันฟุตบอล ซื้อสลากกินแบ่ง รวมกว่า 499 ล้านบาท – เริ่มทำางานในธนาคารเมื่อปี 2542 ได้รบรางวัลเป็นพนักงาน ั ดีเด่น และไม่เคยมีประวัติการทุจริต – พบสาเหตุระบบ Core Banking System มีข้อบกพร่อง. 5 (ฐานเศรษฐกิจ 6 พ.ค.52)
  • 6. Occupational Fraud  “The use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets.”  All occupational fraud have 4 things in common – Clandestine – Violate the perpetrator’s fiduciary duties to the victim organization – Committed for direct or indirect financial benefit to the perpetrator, and – Cost the employer assets, revenue or reserves 6
  • 7. How Fraud is Committed Three categories of occupational frauds :  Asset Misappropriations Involve theft or misuse of organization’s assets i.e. skimming revenues, stealing inventory and payroll fraud.  Corruption Wrongfully use influence to gain personal benefit contrary to duty to employer or the rights of another i.e. accepting kickbacks, conflicts of interest.  Fraudulent Statements Falsification of organization’s financial statements i.e. overstating revenues and understating liabilities or expenses. 7
  • 8. How Fraud is Committed  Asset misappropriations were most common but low loss. Fraudulent statements were least common with highest loss. Breakdown of All Occupational Fraud Schemes — Median Loss 8
  • 9. Bank Most Common Fraud  Greatest percentage (15%) of fraud occurred in banking and financial services sector. 9
  • 10. How Fraud is Detected  It takes 24 months on average to catch employee fraud Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds 4 10
  • 11. Key Indicators of Fraud  Tips / Complaints  Missing / Alteration of documents  Duplicate / Unreasonable expenses or reimbursements  Failure of certain employees to take vacations  Failure to follow up on past-due receivables  Unusual write-offs of receivables  Employees on the payroll not sign up for benefits  Excessive purchase of products or services  Common phone numbers / addresses of payees or customers 11
  • 12. Key Indicators of Fraud (Continued)  Cash shortages / overages  Stale items on bank reconciliations  Unexplained adjustments / Journal entries  Unusual financial statement relationships i.e. – Increased revenue vs. decreased receivable – Increased revenue vs. decreased inventory purchase – Increased inventory vs. decreased purchase or A/P  Significant increases or decreases in account balances  Significant changes in liquidity, leverage, profitability or turnover ratios 12
  • 13. Limiting Fraud Losses  Surprise audit and job rotation are still overlooked by many organizations. 13
  • 14. Limiting Fraud Losses  Surprise audit, job rotation, and anonymous reporting showed the greatest impact on fraud losses. 14
  • 15. Bank Case Symptoms  Supervisory override, unusually large transactions or with no apparent business purpose  Journal voucher contain only one signature, containing incorrect information, fund transfer between different customers' accounts  Deposit slip with missing information, depositor names incomplete or not match with passbook or acct name.  Frequent, large deposit/withdrawal in Executive account  Deposits and withdrawals on same account on same day or in a short period of time  Bank checks used to transfer between accounts / checks with altered date. 15
  • 16. Symptoms ... More  Purported customer signature on withdrawal voucher and checks  Large negative balances in slush accts or customer accts  Deposit slip of customer funds between accts of different customers  Deposits of customer check where cash was received back  CDs closed prematurely with proceeds put into low interest account, sometimes with penalty  Customer not presented when account was opened, closed or transacted  Mailing of customer statement to Executive address 16
  • 17. Bank Fraud Trend  Fraud financial cost may be three or more times the value of loss amount  Fraud is not static. It evolves with each new measures implemented  New opportunities for employee fraud are emerging  Criminals thwart rules-based systems  “Silo” mentality weakens fraud detection  Top management are moving toward an enterprise focus on anti-fraud systems  Regulatory expectations are increasing  Solutions require commitment, investment, and talent 17
  • 18. Insider Threat  “Deliberate misuse by those who are authorized to use computer and networks.”  Insiders include employees, contractors, consultants, temporary helper, personnel from third-party business partner, etc. 18
  • 19. Facts about Insider Misuses  Most were not technically sophisticated or complex  Most were thought out and planned in advance  Most were motivated by financial gain  Most perpetrators of banking and finance incidents – Not hold technical position – Never engage in technical attack or hacking – Not necessarily perceived as problem employees  Executed at workplace during normal business hours  Detected by various channels and methods. 19
  • 20. Misuse of Applications Applications Legitimate Use Misuse Client/Server  Message exchange  Unusual exchange to degrade performance  Connectivity to server  Exceedingly connection (DOS)  Execution of tasks  Execute privileged procedure Mail Clients  Send and receive e-mails  Illegal content / remote attack / private use / overload network Browsers /  Browse Internet / play files  View illegal content Multimedia  View cached file and  Display other users’ viewed files player history and accesses Programming  Develop program  Create malware Tools  Display memory segment  Access memory segment with sensitive information General-  Read / write  Access temp file for sensitive purpose information / modify temp file to Applications change program flow  Input strings  Buffer overflow 20
  • 21. Universal of Internal Computer Fraud Data Capture Billing Schemes Errors Spyware && Forged Corruption && Ghost Spyware Duplicate Over Forged Corruption Ghost Key loggers Duplicate Over Payment to Endorsement Price initiation Vendor Key loggers Payment to Endorsement Price initiation Vendor Payments Payments Erroneous Payments Payments Erroneous Accomplice Quid Pro Quo && Return Early Missing or Bad Employees Accomplice Quid Pro Quo Return Employees Vendor Vendor Barter Schemes && Voids Barter Schemes Voids Fund Transfer Early Payments Missing or Bad & Vendors Information & Vendors Payments Information Personal Passing of Payment of Invoices Unauthorized Personal Duplicate Information Purchase Passing of Payment of Invoices for Non-existing Suppliers Unauthorized Transfer of Funds Duplicate Information Purchase for Non-existing Suppliers Transfer of Funds Program Altering Schemes Manipulation of Data Input Computer Computer Changing Program Setting Improper Changing Program Setting Improper Data Data Falsification of Falsification of Data Data Fraud Fraud and Data Ownership and Data Ownership Parameter Parameter Integrity Stock Record Suppression Use of Malware Alteration of Program Integrity Stock Record Suppression Attack to Cover Theft Use of Malware Alteration of Program Attack to Cover Theft (e.g. Trojans) and Data File of Stocks (e.g. Trojans) and Data File of Stocks Information Privacy Risk Loss of Employee Payroll Schemes Loss of Transmission of Transmission of Employee Intellectual Confidential Data Downloading Check Tampering Intellectual Confidential Data Downloading Ghost False Property (i.e. TCP/IP) Hacker Tools Ghost False Property (i.e. TCP/IP) Hacker Tools Forged Endorsement Employee Communication Through For ID Theft Forged Endorsement Skimming Employee Communication Through For ID Theft Skimming Fraud Employee Purpose Fraud Employee Purpose Forged Checks Write-off of Worker’s Falsified Posting Forged Checks Write-off of Worker’s Falsified Peer-to-peer Posting Employee Compensation Wages Peer-to-peer Confidential Employee Money Due Compensation Wages Filing Sharing Confidential Downloads Alter Payee Money Due Scheme Filing Sharing Company Downloads Alter Payee to Company Scheme Company && Nefarious Nefarious to Company Information Information Applications Applications 09/10/12 21 21
  • 22. Types of Application Controls Access Controls Data Origination / Input Controls Check Integrity Check whether sources Check ifif data Authorization Authorization Check Integrity of Data entered Check whether sources Check data Identification && of Data entered from staff direct input, is within Identification Into Business from staff direct input, is within Authentication Accountability Audit Into Business remote by business partner, specified Authentication Accountability Audit Application remote by business partner, specified Application or through web-enabled parameter or through web-enabled parameter application Physical Devices (i.e. biometric application Physical Devices (i.e. biometric scan, metal locks, hidden path, Ensure accuracy, completeness and Ensure accuracy with optimum scan, metal locks, hidden path, Ensure accuracy, completeness and Ensure accuracy with optimum digital signatures, encryption, timeliness of data during conversion computerized validation digital signatures, encryption, timeliness of data during conversion computerized validation social barriers, human and automated from original sources into computer and editing, social barriers, human and automated from original sources into computer and editing, monitoring systems etc.), data or entry to computer application monitoring systems etc.), data or entry to computer application either manual, online input or batch. Error handling procedure either manual, online input or batch. Error handling procedure Permit or deny use of an object facilitate timely Permit or deny use of an object facilitate timely and accurate resubmission and accurate resubmission of all corrected data of all corrected data Application Application Controls Controls Data Processing Output Control Ensure accuracy, completeness Ensure accuracy, completeness and timeliness of data during Ensure data is accurately Ensure integrity of output and the correct and timeliness of data during Ensure data is accurately Ensure integrity of output and the correct either Batch or real-time processed through and timely distribution of output produced either Batch or real-time processed through and timely distribution of output produced processing by application. the application either in hardcopy, files to be used as input processing by application. the application either in hardcopy, files to be used as input for other system, or information No data is added, lost or altered during processing for other system, or information No data is added, lost or altered during processing available for online viewing available for online viewing 09/10/12 22 22
  • 23. Example of Detection System General Ledger XBRL Business XBRL Business Report Engine Report Engine Business Report XSLT Branch Branch Spreadsheet Loan Application Dataset Web Application Main Office Main Office Web Browser Web Browser Server Server XML XML document document Branch Branch XML SYSLOG Key Fraud Signature Misuse detection Rules data & metadata IDS Engine Firewall and Router Log Event Correlation Database 09/10/12 23 23
  • 24. Other Analytical Tools  Use of Benford's Law as fraud detection tool Theoretic al Line Fraudulent Frequencies (percent) Transactions 09/10/12 24 24
  • 25. Managing Insider Threat  Strong authentication / biometric technologies  Role-based access granted on a need-to-have basis  Rotate job function / event log reading  Place server and sensitive equipment in secured area  Restrict physical access / lock / alarm test  Wear badge / background check  Default password / unused port / log-off on absence  Encrypt sensitive data stored on user hard drives  Store sensitive document in secured space  Never issue password over unsecured channels 25
  • 26. Aware of Warning Signs  Rogue access point / wireless / remote  Disgruntled employee  A user accesses database or area of network they have never accessed before  Download spike 26
  • 27. Fraud Prevention Checklist  Good internal control  Employee fraud awareness training / hotline  Analytical review / surprise fraud audits  Review company contracts  Perception of detection / management oversight  Proactive fraud policy and program / prosecution  Mandatory vacations / periodic job rotation  Screen job applicants  Information security review / limit access / audit trail  Management climate / employee support program 27
  • 28. Summary Auditor's roles in combating fraud  Promote culture of honesty and high ethics  Assess and mitigate the risk of fraud  Ensure control adequacy and effectiveness  Use data mining and statistical analysis tools  Analyze financial statements reports  Being alert on predication of fraud  Ensure investigations are properly conducted  Ensure proper follow-up actions are taken  Develop your anti-fraud knowledge and skills 28
  • 29. About the ACFE  The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners  Start 1988  Provide anti-fraud training and education  Over 50,000 members in 125 countries  Administrate the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) designation- a certification program for fraud practitioners recognized by U.S. Department of Defense and FBI  More than 20,000 CFE’s worldwide (5 Thais)  $55 Membership Fee  More information about ACFE http://www.acfe.com 29
  • 30. About CFE Exam  Covers 4 areas – Criminology & Ethics – Financial Transactions – Fraud Investigation – Legal Elements of Fraud  4 Exam sections of 125 questions each (75%)  Administered via computer / must complete each section in one sitting (2.6 hr)  Complete all and return to ACFE in 30 days  Must pass Qualifying Points System (40/50)  $250 Application Fee 30
  • 31. Q&A Pairat Srivilairit CIA, CCSA, CFSA, CISA, CISSP, CBA, CFE Internal Audit Department TISCO Bank Public Company Limited Mobile : +668 1903 1457 Office : +66 2633 7821 Email : pairat@tisco.co.th 31

Editor's Notes

  1. เทคนิคการตรวจสอบระบบและป้องกันระบบจากการโกงและการทุจริตในรูปแบบใหม่ ๆ
  2. TOPIC: Combating Fraud: Putting in Place an Effective Audit System to Detect and Prevent Fraud Ø Key indicators of fraud Ø Types of fraud associated with the activities reviewed Ø Prevention aids by internal auditors Ø Techniques for enabling the detection and investigation of fraudulent activities
  3. ตร . ลุมพินีบุกรวบพนักงานของบ . ทรูฯ สุดแสบร่วมกับพวกแฮ็กระบบคอมพิวเตอร์ของเครือข่ายออเรนจ์ โหลดข้อมูลใส่บัตรเติมเงิน ก่อนนำไปขายให้ลูกค้า ซึ่งจะนำไปเปิดบริการตั้งโต๊ะมือถือ สูญเงินไปกว่า 200 ล้าน วานนี้ ( 26 ส . ค .48) รายงานข่าวจากกองบัญชาการตำรวจนครบาลแจ้งว่า เจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่ายสืบสวนสน . ลุมพินี สามารถจับกุมผู้ต้องหาในคดียักยอกทรัพย์รายใหญ่ ได้ผู้ต้องหาทั้งสิ้นจำนวน 4 ราย หลังจากตัวแทน บริษัท ทรู คอร์ปอเรชั่น จำกัด ( มหาชน ) ซึ่งเป็นตัวแทนผู้ให้บริการเครือข่ายโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่ออเรนจ์ และบริการสื่อสารโทรคมนาคมครบวงจรของประเทศไทย เข้าร้องทุกข์ที่สำนักงานตำรวจแห่งชาติเมื่อวันพุธที่ 24 ส . ค . ที่ผ่านมา แหล่งข่าวแจ้งว่า คดียักยอกทรัพย์ดังกล่าวความเสียหายมีมูลค่ามากกว่า 200 ล้านบาท ทางสำนักงานตำรวจแห่งชาติ โดยพล . ต . อ . โกวิท วัฒนะ ผบ . ตร . จึงมีคำสั่งมายังพล . ต . อ . นพดล สมบูรณ์ทรัพย์ รองผบ . ตร . ให้ตั้งคณะกรรมการสืบสวนเฉพาะกิจในคดียักยอกทรัพย์ดังกล่าว โดยพล . ต . อ . นพดล สั่งการให้พ . ต . อ . สุวัฒน์ แจ้งยอดสุข ผกก . สน . ลุมพินีซึ่งเป็นท้องที่รับผิดชอบ ระดมเจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่ายสืบสวนออกคลี่คลายคดี นำโดยพ . ต . ท . โชติวัฒน์ เหลืองวิลัย สว . สส . ประสานการทำงานร่วมกับเจ้าหน้าที่กก . สส . บก . น . 5 กระทั่งเมื่อวันที่ 25 ที่ผ่านมา เจ้าหน้าที่สามารถติดตามคนร้ายที่ก่อเหตุได้จำนวนทั้งสิ้น 4 รายพร้อมแจ้งข้อกล่าวหายักยอกทรัพย์ แต่ขอปกปิดนามกลุ่มคนร้าย เนื่องจากต้องขยายผลต่อไปว่ามีผู้ใดเกี่ยวข้องอีกบ้าง โดยทราบเบื้องต้นว่า ในกลุ่มคนร้ายที่ก่อเหตุบางส่วนเป็นพนักงานของบริษัทผู้เสียหาย มีพฤติกรรมใช้คอมพิวเตอร์โน้ตบุ๊ค แฮ็กข้อมูลบริษัททีเอ ออเรนจ์จำกัด จากที่พักโดยนำข้อมูลที่สามารถเจาะเข้าไปได้ โหลดจำนวนเงินเกินจริงใส่บัตรเติมเงินที่เตรียมไว้ และจะนำไปขายให้ลูกค้าด้วยวิธีการตั้งจุดรับเติมเงินต่างๆ ตามห้างสรรพสินค้าและแหล่งชุมชน " กลุ่มคนร้ายจะทำงานจากที่บ้าน นำข้อมูลที่เจาะได้จากฐานข้อมูลโหลดใส่เครื่องคอมพิวเตอร์ของตนด้วยวิธีการไฮเทค ตัวอย่างเช่นบัตรเติมเงินที่มีราคาโทรออกหนึ่งร้อยบาท คนร้ายสามารถใส่ข้อมูลให้กลายเป็นหนึ่งหมื่นถึงแสนบาท เพื่อนำไปขายต่อด้วยวิธีการตั้งโต๊ะให้บริการขายซิมการ์ดแถมโปรโมชั่น วิธีการดังกล่าวเหมือนกับในภาพยนต์ฮอลลีวู้ด จากการจับกุมและตรวจสอบบัญชีรายรับ ทราบว่าขบวนการคนร้ายกลุ่มนี้มีรายได้มากกว่า 20 ล้านบาท หลังตรวจพบในสมุดบัญชีเกือบ 30 เล่ม " แหล่งข่าวกล่าว จากการสอบถามไปยังผู้เชื่ยวชาญเกี่ยวกับการเจาะข้อมูลอันดับต้นๆของเมืองไทย ซึ่งเป็นผู้เชี่ยวชาญในด้านตรวจสอบระบบ ทำให้ทราบว่า การเจาะระบบฐานข้อมูลของบริษัทมือถือ มีการกระทำมานาน โดยเฉพาะค่ายมือถือ 2 ยักษ์ใหญ่ ซึ่งสูญเงินไปกว่า 1,000 ล้านบาท ทั้งนี้ ทราบว่า ในขั้นตอนดังกล่าว ต้องมีพนักงานที่ทำงานในบริษัท รู้เห็นเป็นใจ และอยู่ในกลุ่มขบวนการ เพื่อคอยประสานงานด้านแก้ไขข้อมูล ยกตัวอย่างเช่น หากมีลูกค้า ซื้อบัตรเติมเงินไปจำนวน 1,000 บาท ขบวนการมิจฉาชีพนี้ ก็จะมีการแก้ไขในคอมพิวเตอร์ เพื่อหักเงินส่วนต่างไป ผู้เชี่ยวชาญคนเดิมกล่าวต่อว่า นอกจากนี้ จะมีการนำบัตรเติมเงินที่มีการคีย์ข้อมูลนั้น ไปตั้งโต๊ะประกาศขายในแหล่งชุมชนต่างๆ เช่นตามศูนย์การค้า หรือหน้ามหาวิทยาลัยแห่งหนึ่ง ที่มีคนพลุกพล่านมาก ซึ่งในตรงจุดนี้ ขบวนการมิจฉาชีพจะมีการใช้คอมพิวเตอร์แก้ไขข้อมูลในบัตรเติมเงินไว้เรียบร้อยแล้ว โดยจะหักเอาเงินส่วนที่เกินเข้ากระเป๋า และค่าความเสียหายที่เกิดขึ้นจะเกิดกับบริษัทเจ้าของมือถือ ส่วนกรณีซิมการ์ด จะมีหน้าม้าคอยเอาซิมไปตั้งโต๊ะให้ประชาชนเข้ามาใช้บริการโดยไม่ต้องเสียค่าจดทะเบียน ซึ่งในจุดนี้ ขบวนการมิจฉาชีพ จะหารายได้ ด้วยการแก้ไขโปรโมชั่นในซิมการ์ด และหักเงินค่าส่วนต่างเข้ากระเป๋า เช่นโปรโมชั่น 1,300 จะถูกแก้เป็น 1,000 บาทเป็นต้น นายยอธึก อัศวานันท์ รองประธานบริหารและหัวหน้าคณะกฏหมายบริษัท ทรูคร์ปอเรชั่นกล่าวว่าบริษัทได้เห็นความผิดปกติของทราฟิกมาระยะหนึ่งแล้วโดยที่การกระทำผิดจะเป็นการขายบัตรเติมเงินผ่านทางอินเทอร์เน็ตให้ลูกค้าในราคาพิเศษอย่างเติมเงิน 10 บาทแต่ใช้ได้ 100 บาทหรือมากกว่านั้นโดยลูกค้าต้องนำบัตรเติมเงินของออเร้นจ์มาเพื่อให้กอปปี้รหัสให้ อย่างไรก็ตามบริษัทได้พยายามบล็อครหัสของบัตรที่ผิดปกติเหล่านี้ทำให้ผู้ใช้บริการที่เติมเงินแบบผิดๆนี้ไม่สามารถใช้งานบัตรได้ตามจำนวนเงินที่มีการอ้างถึง แต่ความเสียหายที่เกิดกับบริษัท จะเป็นลักษณะค่าเสียโอกาสที่จะได้รับรายได้ซึ่งมูลค่าที่ฟ้อง 200 ล้านบาท อาจคิดอิงจากการป้อนข้อมูลที่เติมเงินเข้ามาเพราะมีอยู่รายหนึ่งป้อนเข้ามาในระบบถึง 100 ล้านบาท วันนี้ ( 15 พ . ค . 50) ที่กองบังคับการกองปราบปราม ตำรวจกองกำกับการ 1 กองปราบปราม แถลงการจับกุม นายทวีทรัพย์ หรือภูมิพัฒน์ ลลิตศศิวิมล อายุ 34 ปี ที่ห้องพักเลขที่ 2918 วงศ์เจริญแมนชั่น หรือแกรนด์ แมนดาริน ซอยลาดพร้าว 130 เขตบางกะปิ พร้อมของกลางคอมพิวเตอร์โน้ตบุ๊ก ฮาร์ดดิสก์ บัตรเอทีเอ็ม บัตรวีซ่า และสมุดบัญชีเงินฝากธนาคาร หลังได้รับการร้องเรียนจากบริษัท แอดวานซ์ อินโฟร์ เซอร์วิส จำกัด ( มหาชน ) หรือเอไอเอส ว่าถูกคนร้ายเจาะฐานข้อมูลระบบคอมพิวเตอร์ของบริษัทฯ เพื่อขโมยรหัสผ่านในการใช้เข้าไปแก้ไขวงเงินในบัตรเติมเงินโทรศัพท์มือถือให้กับลูกค้าผ่านทางอินเทอร์เน็ต โดยใช้วิธีจ่ายเงินผ่านบัญชีธนาคารในชื่อของบุคคลอื่น สร้างความเสียหายให้แก่เอไอเอสนับร้อยล้านบาท นอกจากนี้ จากการสืบสวนของเจ้าหน้าที่ยังเชื่อว่านายทวีทรัพย์น่าจะเป็นคนเดียวกันกับผู้ต้องหาที่เคยเข้าไปเจาะฐานข้อมูลของบริษัท ทรู คอร์ปอเรชั่น จำกัด ( มหาชน ) เมื่อปี 2548 จนทำให้ทรูฯ ได้รับความเสียหายมาแล้วเป็นมูลกว่า 100 ล้านบาท กระทั่งถูกเจ้าหน้าที่จับกุมได้และอยู่ระหว่างการประกันตัวต่อสู้คดี แต่กลับมาก่อเหตุซ้ำอีก
  4. Most White Collar Crime Results from a Simple Exploitation of an Obvious Weakness - Not a Clear or Ingenious Plan Objective of Internal Controls: Make the Risk of Being Caught So High a Thief Decides the Risk Exceeds the Gain Help Workers Avoid Making Bad Choices by Replacing the “I Will Not” With “I Can Not” กองปราบปรามบุกจับสมุหบัญชีธนาคารอาคารสงเคราะห์ยักยอกเงินกว่า 310 ล้านบาท ตะลึงเจอเงินสดในบ้าน 15 ล้าน เงินในบัญชี 400- 500 ล้านบาท เผยแอบโอนเงินเข้าบัญชีในตัวเองวันละ 700,000 บาทนานปีครึ่ง นายขรรค์ ประจวบเหมาะ กรรมการผู้จัดการธนาคารอาคารสงเคราะห์ ( ธอส .) เปิดเผยเมื่อเวลา 13.00 น . วันที่ 1 พฤษภาคมว่า ตนได้ให้แจ้งความดำเนินคดีเอาผิดข้อหาฉ้อโกงกับนายสมเกียรติ ปัญญาวรกุลเดช อายุ 33 ปี ผู้ช่วยผู้จัดการธอส . สาขาเซ็นต์หลุยส์ 3 โดยจะแถลงข่าวในเวลา 14.00 น . วันเดียวกัน ทั้งนี้ นายสมเกียริตได้ยักยอกเงิน ในส่วนของดอกเบี้ยจ่ายเป็นจำนวน 310 ล้านบาท กระทำมาเป็นเวลาปีครึ่ง เจ้าหน้าที่ตำรวจ จับกุมตัวได้ที่บ้านพัก พร้อมเงินสด 15 ล้านบาท และสมุดบัญชีเงินฝาก 400-500 ล้านบาท สอบปากคำเบื้องต้น ฉ้อโกงด้วยการโอนดอกเบี้ยวันละ 7 แสนบาท เนื่องจากนายสมเกียรติ ทำหน้าที่สมุหบัญชี สามารถที่จะโอนเงินได้ตามหน้าที่ ทั้งนี้ นายสมเกียรติ ได้รับรางวัลเป็นพนักงานดีเด่นของ ธอส . และเป็นที่ไว้วางใจของลูกค้าในสาขาดังกล่าวอย่างมาก ผู้สื่อข่าวรายงานว่า การยักยอกทรัพย์ดังกล่าวสร้างความตกตะลึงให้แก่นายขรรค์และผู้บริหารระดับสูงอย่างมากโดยเฉพาะนายสมเกียรติได้รับรางวัลพนักงานดีเด่นทำให้ไม่มีใครสงสัยในพฤติกรรมในช่วงแรก ยักยอก 400 ล้าน : ตำรวจกองปราบปราม ควบคุมตัว นายสมเกียรติ ปัญญาวรกุลเดช อายุ 33 ปี ผู้ช่วยผู้จัดการ ธอส . สาขาเซ็นต์หลุยส์ 3 หลังยักยอกเงินธนาคารไปกว่า 400 ล้านบาท โดยนำเงินไปซื้อบ้าน รถยนต์และเล่นการพนัน เมื่อวันที่ 1 พฤษภาคม ยักยอกเงินแบงค์ 400 ล . จนมุมคารถหนีไปเขมร ถลุงซื้อบ้าน - พนันบอล เมื่อวันที่ 1 พฤษภาคม นายขรรค์ ประจวบเหมาะ กรรมการผู้จัดการ ธนาคารอาคารสงเคราะห์ ( ธอส .) เปิดเผยว่า นายสมเกียรติ ปัญญาวรกุลเดช อายุ 33 ปี ผู้ช่วยผู้จัดการ ธอส . สาขาเซ็นต์หลุยส์ 3 ได้ยักยอกเงินในส่วนของดอกเบี้ยจ่ายไปหลายร้อยล้านบาท ซึ่งกระทำการต่อเนื่องมาเป็นเวลาปีกว่าโดย ธอส . เข้าแจ้งความดำเนินคดีข้อหาฉ้อโกงที่กองปราบปรามเรียบร้อยแล้ว ต่อมา เจ้าหน้าที่ตำรวจกองปราบปราม นำกำลังเข้าจับกุม นายสมเกียรติ ได้ที่บริเวณถนนสายนครราชสีมา - บุรีรัมย์ พร้อมของกลางรถยนต์บีเอ็มดับเบิลยู ป้ายแดงและเงินสด 15 ล้านบาท ขณะเตรียมเดินทางหลบหนีไปยังประเทศเพื่อนบ้านแถบ จ . ศรีสะเกษ หลังก่อเหตุยักยอกเงินของ ธอส . มูลค่ากว่า 400 ล้านบาท ซึ่งทางธนาคารตรวจสอบพบข้อมูลผิดปกติเกี่ยวกับการเคลื่อนไหวทางการเงินของ นายสมเกียรติ ที่มีการโอนเงินเข้า - ออก ผ่านบัญชีธนาคารต่างๆจำนวนมากและจากการตรวจสอบพบว่า ผู้ต้องหาใช้วิธีโอนเงินจากบัญชีดอกเบี้ย ที่ทางธนาคารฯ เตรียมไว้สำหรับจ่ายดอกเบี้ยให้กับลูกค้า ไปเข้าบัญชีตัวเองที่เปิดไว้ตามกับธนาคารต่างๆ โดยทำการยักยอกวันละ 30 รายการๆ ละ 3 หมื่นบาท ทำมานานกว่า 1 ปี โดยฉวยโอกาสหลังปิดบัญชีลูกค้าในแต่ละวัน เพราะรู้รหัสที่จะเข้าไปใช้ในการโอนเงิน จากการสอบสวน ผู้ต้องหาให้การรับสารภาพ ว่า ทำความผิดจริงและทำเพียงลำพัง เงินที่ยักยอกนำไปซื้อบ้านหรูในโครงการเดอะแลนด์มาร์ค เรสซิเดนซ์ ทาวน์โฮม ระดับไฮฮเอ็น มูลค่ากว่า 30 ล้านบาท ซื้อรถยนต์หรูและแคชเชียร์เช็ค มูลค่ากว่า 300 ล้านบาท พร้อมยอมรับว่าติดหนี้การพนันฟุตบอล ซึ่งเล่นได้เสียวันละกว่า 1 แสนบาท โดยเข้าทำงานในธนาคารแห่งนี้เมื่อปี 2542 และไม่เคยมีประวัติการทุจริต สาเหตุที่ทำมาอย่างต่อเนื่อง เพราะทำง่ายและไม่เคยถูกตรวจสอบ เบื้องต้นถูกตั้งข้อหาลักทรัพย์ที่เป็นของนายจ้าง หรืออยู่ในความครอบครองของนายจ้างตามกฎหมายอาญา มาตรา 335 ( 11 ) ระวางโทษจำคุกตั้งแต่ 1-5 ปีและปรับตั้งแต่ 2 พัน -1 หมื่นบาท ก่อนควบคุมตัวผู้ต้องหาไปค้นบ้านพักในโครงการดังกล่าวเพื่อหาหลักฐานประกอบสำนวนคดี ผู้สื่อข่าวรายงานว่า ที่ผ่านมา นายสมเกียรติ ทำหน้าที่สมุห์บัญชีจนได้รับรางวัลเป็นพนักงานดีเด่นของ ธอส . และเป็นที่ไว้วางใจของลูกค้าในสาขาดังกล่าวเป็นอย่างมาก นายขรรค์ ให้สัมภาษณ์อีกครั้งว่า ปัญหาพนักงาน ธอส . ทุจริตยักยอกเงิน 400 ล้านบาทและดำเนินการมาหลายปีติดต่อกัน จึงเตรียมเรียกประชุมผู้จัดการสาขาทั่วประเทศ เพื่อประเมินถึงช่องโหว่ของกฎระเบียบที่กำหนดไว้สำหรับพนักงานที่ทำงานอยู่กับการดูแลเงินของธนาคาร ไม่ให้มีปัญหาดังกล่าวเกิดขึ้นอีกในอนาคตและยืนยันว่า เงินที่พนักงานยักยอกไปนั้น เป็นเงินจากบัญชีดอกเบี้ยจ่ายของธนาคาร ซึ่งไม่ใช่เงินจากบัญชีของลูกค้า เพื่อไม่ให้ลูกค้าตื่นตระหนกจากปัญหาดังกล่าว ซึ่งจะหาแนวทางป้องกันปัญหาให้รัดกุมมากขึ้น
  5. This study covers 508 cases of occupational fraud totaling over $761 million in losses. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated these cases. • Organizations suffer tremendous costs as a result of occupational fraud and abuse. Participants in this study, anti-fraud specialists with a median 16 years’ experience in the fraud examination field, estimate that the typical U.S. organization loses 6% of its annual revenues to fraud. Applied to the US Gross Domestic Product for 2003, this translates to approximately $660 billion in total losses. • Our data strongly supports Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement for audit committees to establish confidential reporting mechanisms. Occupational frauds in our study were much more likely to be detected by a tip than through other means such as internal audits, external audits, and internal controls. Among frauds committed by owners and executives, which tend to be the most costly, over half of all cases were identified by a tip. • Confidential reporting mechanisms reduce fraud losses significantly. The median loss among organizations that had anonymous reporting mechanisms was $56,500. In organizations that did not have established reporting procedures, the median loss was more than twice as high. • While Sarbanes-Oxley only requires publicly traded companies to establish confidential reporting mechanisms for employees, our data strongly suggests that these programs should also embrace third-party sources such as customers and vendors. Among cases that were detected by a tip, 60% of the tips came from employees, 20% of the tips came from customers, 16% came from vendors, and 13% came from anonymous sources. Companies that have implemented basic employee hotlines to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance could detect significantly more frauds by making their hotlines available to third parties as well. • More effective internal controls are needed to detect fraud. Internal controls ranked fourth – behind By Accident – in terms of the number of frauds detected in our study. Furthermore, the frauds that were detected by internal controls tended to be relatively small, with a median loss of $40,000, which was by far the lowest of any detection method. More effective types of internal controls are needed to detect fraud, especially larger frauds that may involve senior personnel overriding or circumventing traditional internal controls. • Small businesses suffer disproportionately large losses due to occupational fraud and abuse. The median cost experienced by small businesses in our study was $98,000. This was higher than the median loss experienced by all but the very largest organizations. Small businesses are less likely to be able to survive such losses and should better protect themselves from fraud. • The loss caused by occupational fraud is directly related to the position of the perpetrator. Frauds committed by owners and executives caused a median loss of $900,000, which was six times higher than the losses caused by managers, and 14 times higher than the losses caused by employees. Despite this fact, organizations were less likely to take legal action against owners and executives who had committed fraud than they were against employees and managers. This may remove a useful deterrent and unnecessarily expose such organizations to additional high-dollar frauds. • Most occupational fraudsters are first time offenders. Only 12% of the fraudsters in our study had a previous conviction for a fraud-related offense. Criminal background checks can help organizations make informed hiring decisions, but they will not weed out all fraudsters because most frauds are committed by apparently honest employees. • The most cost-effective way to deal with fraud is to prevent it. According to our study, once an organization has been defrauded it is unlikely to recover its losses. The median recovery among victim organizations in our study was only 20% of the original loss. Almost 40% of victims recovered nothing at all.
  6. One of the major goals of this Report was to classify each fraud according to the methods used by the perpetrator. This gives us a better understanding of how fraud is committed and the types of schemes that tend to produce the largest losses. Also, by breaking down occupational frauds into distinct categories, we are better able to study their common characteristics, which in turn assists in the development of better anti-fraud tools. Accordingly, every fraud in our study was classified according to the Uniform Occupational Fraud Classification System (commonly known as the Fraud Tree), which is illustrated on the preceding page. As was first stated in the 1996 Report to the Nation, all occupational frauds fall into one of three major categories: • Asset Misappropriations, which involve the theft or misuse of an organization’s assets. (Common examples include skimming revenues, stealing inventory and payroll fraud.) • Corruption, in which fraudsters wrongfully use their influence in a business transaction in order to procure some benefit for themselves or another person, contrary to their duty to their employer or the rights of another. (Common examples include accepting kickbacks, and engaging in conflicts of interest.) • Fraudulent Statements, which generally involve falsification of an organization’s financial statements. (Common examples include overstating revenues and understating liabilities or expenses.) Asset misappropriations were by far the most common of the three categories, occurring in over 90% of the cases we reviewed. However, these schemes had the lowest median loss, at $93,000. Conversely, fraudulent statements were the least commonly reported frauds (7.9%) but they had the highest median loss at $1,000,000.* *It should be noted that a number of cases involved aspects of more than one type of occupational fraud. For instance, several schemes involved both corruption and asset misappropriation. We were unable to subdivide the losses in cases where there were multiple schemes to show exactly how much of the loss was attributable to each of the component schemes. The same is true for all charts in this report showing median loss based on scheme type.
  7. Cash Misappropriations Out of 508 cases in our study, 440 cases (87%) involved some form of cash misappropriation. According to the Fraud Tree, cash frauds fall into one of three categories: • Fraudulent Disbursements, in which the perpetrator causes his organization to disburse funds through some trick or device. Common examples include submitting false invoices or forging company checks. • Skimming, in which cash is stolen from an organization before it is recorded on the organization’s books and records • Cash Larceny, in which cash is stolen from an organization after it has been recorded on the organization’s books and records Approximately three-fourths of the cash frauds in our study involved some form of fraudulent disbursement, making this the most common category by far. Schemes that involved a fraudulent disbursement also had the highest median loss, at $125,000.
  8. Banking and Financial Services Not surprisingly, in the banking and financial services sector, misappropriations of cash on hand were much more common than among all cases. Cash on hand schemes involve the theft of cash maintained on the premises of a victim organization. Banks have significant stores of cash on their premises, which can make them targets for this type of fraud. Cash on hand schemes tend to be relatively low-cost, with a median loss of $35,000 among the cases in our study. Corruption cases, on the other hand, tend to be much more costly; their median loss was $375,000. We reviewed 132 cases that targeted financial institutions, and one-third of those frauds involved corruption, which was a higher rate than among all cases. Conversely, other common forms of occupational fraud like false billing, skimming, non-cash theft, and check tampering were much less common in banking institutions than among all cases reported.
  9. RELATED ARTICLE: Signals of Fraud * Alteration of documents. * Duplicate payments. * Second endorsements on checks. * Stale items on bank reconciliations. * Journal entries without supporting documentation. * Unexplained adjustments to accounts receivable, accounts payable, revenues, or expenses. * Failure of certain employees to take vacations. * Failure to follow up on past-due receivables. * Shortages in delivered goods. * Employees on the payroll who do not sign up for benefits. * Complaints by customers. * Significant increases or decreases in account balances. * Unusual financial statement relationships such as: * Increased revenues with decreased receivables. * Increased revenues with decreased purchases of inventory. * Increased inventory with decreased purchases or payables to vendors. * Unusual write-offs of receivables. * Products or services purchased in excess of needs. * Unreasonable expenses or reimbursements. * Cash shortages or overages. * Common names, telephone numbers, and addresses of payees or customers. * Missing documentation. * Excessive voids or credits. * Tips from employees. * Significant changes in liquidity, leverage, profitability, or turnover ratios.
  10. RELATED ARTICLE: Signals of Fraud * Alteration of documents. * Duplicate payments. * Second endorsements on checks. * Stale items on bank reconciliations. * Journal entries without supporting documentation. * Unexplained adjustments to accounts receivable, accounts payable, revenues, or expenses. * Failure of certain employees to take vacations. * Failure to follow up on past-due receivables. * Shortages in delivered goods. * Employees on the payroll who do not sign up for benefits. * Complaints by customers. * Significant increases or decreases in account balances. * Unusual financial statement relationships such as: * Increased revenues with decreased receivables. * Increased revenues with decreased purchases of inventory. * Increased inventory with decreased purchases or payables to vendors. * Unusual write-offs of receivables. * Products or services purchased in excess of needs. * Unreasonable expenses or reimbursements. * Cash shortages or overages. * Common names, telephone numbers, and addresses of payees or customers. * Missing documentation. * Excessive voids or credits. * Tips from employees. * Significant changes in liquidity, leverage, profitability, or turnover ratios.
  11. This study covers 508 cases of occupational fraud totaling over $761 million in losses. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated these cases. • Organizations suffer tremendous costs as a result of occupational fraud and abuse. Participants in this study, anti-fraud specialists with a median 16 years’ experience in the fraud examination field, estimate that the typical U.S. organization loses 6% of its annual revenues to fraud. Applied to the US Gross Domestic Product for 2003, this translates to approximately $660 billion in total losses. • Our data strongly supports Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement for audit committees to establish confidential reporting mechanisms. Occupational frauds in our study were much more likely to be detected by a tip than through other means such as internal audits, external audits, and internal controls. Among frauds committed by owners and executives, which tend to be the most costly, over half of all cases were identified by a tip. • Confidential reporting mechanisms reduce fraud losses significantly. The median loss among organizations that had anonymous reporting mechanisms was $56,500. In organizations that did not have established reporting procedures, the median loss was more than twice as high. • While Sarbanes-Oxley only requires publicly traded companies to establish confidential reporting mechanisms for employees, our data strongly suggests that these programs should also embrace third-party sources such as customers and vendors. Among cases that were detected by a tip, 60% of the tips came from employees, 20% of the tips came from customers, 16% came from vendors, and 13% came from anonymous sources. Companies that have implemented basic employee hotlines to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance could detect significantly more frauds by making their hotlines available to third parties as well. • More effective internal controls are needed to detect fraud. Internal controls ranked fourth – behind By Accident – in terms of the number of frauds detected in our study. Furthermore, the frauds that were detected by internal controls tended to be relatively small, with a median loss of $40,000, which was by far the lowest of any detection method. More effective types of internal controls are needed to detect fraud, especially larger frauds that may involve senior personnel overriding or circumventing traditional internal controls. • Small businesses suffer disproportionately large losses due to occupational fraud and abuse. The median cost experienced by small businesses in our study was $98,000. This was higher than the median loss experienced by all but the very largest organizations. Small businesses are less likely to be able to survive such losses and should better protect themselves from fraud. • The loss caused by occupational fraud is directly related to the position of the perpetrator. Frauds committed by owners and executives caused a median loss of $900,000, which was six times higher than the losses caused by managers, and 14 times higher than the losses caused by employees. Despite this fact, organizations were less likely to take legal action against owners and executives who had committed fraud than they were against employees and managers. This may remove a useful deterrent and unnecessarily expose such organizations to additional high-dollar frauds. • Most occupational fraudsters are first time offenders. Only 12% of the fraudsters in our study had a previous conviction for a fraud-related offense. Criminal background checks can help organizations make informed hiring decisions, but they will not weed out all fraudsters because most frauds are committed by apparently honest employees. • The most cost-effective way to deal with fraud is to prevent it. According to our study, once an organization has been defrauded it is unlikely to recover its losses. The median recovery among victim organizations in our study was only 20% of the original loss. Almost 40% of victims recovered nothing at all.
  12. This study covers 508 cases of occupational fraud totaling over $761 million in losses. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated these cases. • Organizations suffer tremendous costs as a result of occupational fraud and abuse. Participants in this study, anti-fraud specialists with a median 16 years’ experience in the fraud examination field, estimate that the typical U.S. organization loses 6% of its annual revenues to fraud. Applied to the US Gross Domestic Product for 2003, this translates to approximately $660 billion in total losses. • Our data strongly supports Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement for audit committees to establish confidential reporting mechanisms. Occupational frauds in our study were much more likely to be detected by a tip than through other means such as internal audits, external audits, and internal controls. Among frauds committed by owners and executives, which tend to be the most costly, over half of all cases were identified by a tip. • Confidential reporting mechanisms reduce fraud losses significantly. The median loss among organizations that had anonymous reporting mechanisms was $56,500. In organizations that did not have established reporting procedures, the median loss was more than twice as high. • While Sarbanes-Oxley only requires publicly traded companies to establish confidential reporting mechanisms for employees, our data strongly suggests that these programs should also embrace third-party sources such as customers and vendors. Among cases that were detected by a tip, 60% of the tips came from employees, 20% of the tips came from customers, 16% came from vendors, and 13% came from anonymous sources. Companies that have implemented basic employee hotlines to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance could detect significantly more frauds by making their hotlines available to third parties as well. • More effective internal controls are needed to detect fraud. Internal controls ranked fourth – behind By Accident – in terms of the number of frauds detected in our study. Furthermore, the frauds that were detected by internal controls tended to be relatively small, with a median loss of $40,000, which was by far the lowest of any detection method. More effective types of internal controls are needed to detect fraud, especially larger frauds that may involve senior personnel overriding or circumventing traditional internal controls. • Small businesses suffer disproportionately large losses due to occupational fraud and abuse. The median cost experienced by small businesses in our study was $98,000. This was higher than the median loss experienced by all but the very largest organizations. Small businesses are less likely to be able to survive such losses and should better protect themselves from fraud. • The loss caused by occupational fraud is directly related to the position of the perpetrator. Frauds committed by owners and executives caused a median loss of $900,000, which was six times higher than the losses caused by managers, and 14 times higher than the losses caused by employees. Despite this fact, organizations were less likely to take legal action against owners and executives who had committed fraud than they were against employees and managers. This may remove a useful deterrent and unnecessarily expose such organizations to additional high-dollar frauds. • Most occupational fraudsters are first time offenders. Only 12% of the fraudsters in our study had a previous conviction for a fraud-related offense. Criminal background checks can help organizations make informed hiring decisions, but they will not weed out all fraudsters because most frauds are committed by apparently honest employees. • The most cost-effective way to deal with fraud is to prevent it. According to our study, once an organization has been defrauded it is unlikely to recover its losses. The median recovery among victim organizations in our study was only 20% of the original loss. Almost 40% of victims recovered nothing at all.
  13. This study covers 508 cases of occupational fraud totaling over $761 million in losses. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated these cases. • Organizations suffer tremendous costs as a result of occupational fraud and abuse. Participants in this study, anti-fraud specialists with a median 16 years’ experience in the fraud examination field, estimate that the typical U.S. organization loses 6% of its annual revenues to fraud. Applied to the US Gross Domestic Product for 2003, this translates to approximately $660 billion in total losses. • Our data strongly supports Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement for audit committees to establish confidential reporting mechanisms. Occupational frauds in our study were much more likely to be detected by a tip than through other means such as internal audits, external audits, and internal controls. Among frauds committed by owners and executives, which tend to be the most costly, over half of all cases were identified by a tip. • Confidential reporting mechanisms reduce fraud losses significantly. The median loss among organizations that had anonymous reporting mechanisms was $56,500. In organizations that did not have established reporting procedures, the median loss was more than twice as high. • While Sarbanes-Oxley only requires publicly traded companies to establish confidential reporting mechanisms for employees, our data strongly suggests that these programs should also embrace third-party sources such as customers and vendors. Among cases that were detected by a tip, 60% of the tips came from employees, 20% of the tips came from customers, 16% came from vendors, and 13% came from anonymous sources. Companies that have implemented basic employee hotlines to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance could detect significantly more frauds by making their hotlines available to third parties as well. • More effective internal controls are needed to detect fraud. Internal controls ranked fourth – behind By Accident – in terms of the number of frauds detected in our study. Furthermore, the frauds that were detected by internal controls tended to be relatively small, with a median loss of $40,000, which was by far the lowest of any detection method. More effective types of internal controls are needed to detect fraud, especially larger frauds that may involve senior personnel overriding or circumventing traditional internal controls. • Small businesses suffer disproportionately large losses due to occupational fraud and abuse. The median cost experienced by small businesses in our study was $98,000. This was higher than the median loss experienced by all but the very largest organizations. Small businesses are less likely to be able to survive such losses and should better protect themselves from fraud. • The loss caused by occupational fraud is directly related to the position of the perpetrator. Frauds committed by owners and executives caused a median loss of $900,000, which was six times higher than the losses caused by managers, and 14 times higher than the losses caused by employees. Despite this fact, organizations were less likely to take legal action against owners and executives who had committed fraud than they were against employees and managers. This may remove a useful deterrent and unnecessarily expose such organizations to additional high-dollar frauds. • Most occupational fraudsters are first time offenders. Only 12% of the fraudsters in our study had a previous conviction for a fraud-related offense. Criminal background checks can help organizations make informed hiring decisions, but they will not weed out all fraudsters because most frauds are committed by apparently honest employees. • The most cost-effective way to deal with fraud is to prevent it. According to our study, once an organization has been defrauded it is unlikely to recover its losses. The median recovery among victim organizations in our study was only 20% of the original loss. Almost 40% of victims recovered nothing at all.
  14. This study covers 508 cases of occupational fraud totaling over $761 million in losses. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated these cases. • Organizations suffer tremendous costs as a result of occupational fraud and abuse. Participants in this study, anti-fraud specialists with a median 16 years’ experience in the fraud examination field, estimate that the typical U.S. organization loses 6% of its annual revenues to fraud. Applied to the US Gross Domestic Product for 2003, this translates to approximately $660 billion in total losses. • Our data strongly supports Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement for audit committees to establish confidential reporting mechanisms. Occupational frauds in our study were much more likely to be detected by a tip than through other means such as internal audits, external audits, and internal controls. Among frauds committed by owners and executives, which tend to be the most costly, over half of all cases were identified by a tip. • Confidential reporting mechanisms reduce fraud losses significantly. The median loss among organizations that had anonymous reporting mechanisms was $56,500. In organizations that did not have established reporting procedures, the median loss was more than twice as high. • While Sarbanes-Oxley only requires publicly traded companies to establish confidential reporting mechanisms for employees, our data strongly suggests that these programs should also embrace third-party sources such as customers and vendors. Among cases that were detected by a tip, 60% of the tips came from employees, 20% of the tips came from customers, 16% came from vendors, and 13% came from anonymous sources. Companies that have implemented basic employee hotlines to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance could detect significantly more frauds by making their hotlines available to third parties as well. • More effective internal controls are needed to detect fraud. Internal controls ranked fourth – behind By Accident – in terms of the number of frauds detected in our study. Furthermore, the frauds that were detected by internal controls tended to be relatively small, with a median loss of $40,000, which was by far the lowest of any detection method. More effective types of internal controls are needed to detect fraud, especially larger frauds that may involve senior personnel overriding or circumventing traditional internal controls. • Small businesses suffer disproportionately large losses due to occupational fraud and abuse. The median cost experienced by small businesses in our study was $98,000. This was higher than the median loss experienced by all but the very largest organizations. Small businesses are less likely to be able to survive such losses and should better protect themselves from fraud. • The loss caused by occupational fraud is directly related to the position of the perpetrator. Frauds committed by owners and executives caused a median loss of $900,000, which was six times higher than the losses caused by managers, and 14 times higher than the losses caused by employees. Despite this fact, organizations were less likely to take legal action against owners and executives who had committed fraud than they were against employees and managers. This may remove a useful deterrent and unnecessarily expose such organizations to additional high-dollar frauds. • Most occupational fraudsters are first time offenders. Only 12% of the fraudsters in our study had a previous conviction for a fraud-related offense. Criminal background checks can help organizations make informed hiring decisions, but they will not weed out all fraudsters because most frauds are committed by apparently honest employees. • The most cost-effective way to deal with fraud is to prevent it. According to our study, once an organization has been defrauded it is unlikely to recover its losses. The median recovery among victim organizations in our study was only 20% of the original loss. Almost 40% of victims recovered nothing at all.
  15. This study covers 508 cases of occupational fraud totaling over $761 million in losses. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated these cases. • Organizations suffer tremendous costs as a result of occupational fraud and abuse. Participants in this study, anti-fraud specialists with a median 16 years’ experience in the fraud examination field, estimate that the typical U.S. organization loses 6% of its annual revenues to fraud. Applied to the US Gross Domestic Product for 2003, this translates to approximately $660 billion in total losses. • Our data strongly supports Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement for audit committees to establish confidential reporting mechanisms. Occupational frauds in our study were much more likely to be detected by a tip than through other means such as internal audits, external audits, and internal controls. Among frauds committed by owners and executives, which tend to be the most costly, over half of all cases were identified by a tip. • Confidential reporting mechanisms reduce fraud losses significantly. The median loss among organizations that had anonymous reporting mechanisms was $56,500. In organizations that did not have established reporting procedures, the median loss was more than twice as high. • While Sarbanes-Oxley only requires publicly traded companies to establish confidential reporting mechanisms for employees, our data strongly suggests that these programs should also embrace third-party sources such as customers and vendors. Among cases that were detected by a tip, 60% of the tips came from employees, 20% of the tips came from customers, 16% came from vendors, and 13% came from anonymous sources. Companies that have implemented basic employee hotlines to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance could detect significantly more frauds by making their hotlines available to third parties as well. • More effective internal controls are needed to detect fraud. Internal controls ranked fourth – behind By Accident – in terms of the number of frauds detected in our study. Furthermore, the frauds that were detected by internal controls tended to be relatively small, with a median loss of $40,000, which was by far the lowest of any detection method. More effective types of internal controls are needed to detect fraud, especially larger frauds that may involve senior personnel overriding or circumventing traditional internal controls. • Small businesses suffer disproportionately large losses due to occupational fraud and abuse. The median cost experienced by small businesses in our study was $98,000. This was higher than the median loss experienced by all but the very largest organizations. Small businesses are less likely to be able to survive such losses and should better protect themselves from fraud. • The loss caused by occupational fraud is directly related to the position of the perpetrator. Frauds committed by owners and executives caused a median loss of $900,000, which was six times higher than the losses caused by managers, and 14 times higher than the losses caused by employees. Despite this fact, organizations were less likely to take legal action against owners and executives who had committed fraud than they were against employees and managers. This may remove a useful deterrent and unnecessarily expose such organizations to additional high-dollar frauds. • Most occupational fraudsters are first time offenders. Only 12% of the fraudsters in our study had a previous conviction for a fraud-related offense. Criminal background checks can help organizations make informed hiring decisions, but they will not weed out all fraudsters because most frauds are committed by apparently honest employees. • The most cost-effective way to deal with fraud is to prevent it. According to our study, once an organization has been defrauded it is unlikely to recover its losses. The median recovery among victim organizations in our study was only 20% of the original loss. Almost 40% of victims recovered nothing at all.
  16. RELATED ARTICLE: Signals of Fraud * Alteration of documents. * Duplicate payments. * Second endorsements on checks. * Stale items on bank reconciliations. * Journal entries without supporting documentation. * Unexplained adjustments to accounts receivable, accounts payable, revenues, or expenses. * Failure of certain employees to take vacations. * Failure to follow up on past-due receivables. * Shortages in delivered goods. * Employees on the payroll who do not sign up for benefits. * Complaints by customers. * Significant increases or decreases in account balances. * Unusual financial statement relationships such as: * Increased revenues with decreased receivables. * Increased revenues with decreased purchases of inventory. * Increased inventory with decreased purchases or payables to vendors. * Unusual write-offs of receivables. * Products or services purchased in excess of needs. * Unreasonable expenses or reimbursements. * Cash shortages or overages. * Common names, telephone numbers, and addresses of payees or customers. * Missing documentation. * Excessive voids or credits. * Tips from employees. * Significant changes in liquidity, leverage, profitability, or turnover ratios.
  17. Fraud Prevention Checklist * Increase use of analytical review. * Review company contracts. * Conduct a threat analysis. * Consult a certified fraud examiner. * Create and maintain a fraud policy. * Create an employee fraud hotline. * Impose mandatory vacations. * Create periodic job rotation. * Check employee references twice. * Evaluate password system and use. * Track unsuccessful attempts to access a computer. * Encrypt data files and data transmissions. * Maintain appropriate backup of files. * Use the best virus protection. * Maintain a computer transaction log. * Scan files and diskettes for viruses. * Request an information system security review. * Perform surprise fraud audits.
  18. TOPIC: Combating Fraud: Putting in Place an Effective Audit System to Detect and Prevent Fraud Ø Key indicators of fraud Ø Types of fraud associated with the activities reviewed Ø Prevention aids by internal auditors Ø Techniques for enabling the detection and investigation of fraudulent activities
  19. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Department of the Navy and the Office of Inspector General of the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey recently recognized the CFE credential for hiring and promotional purposes. Both recognitions are part of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s (ACFE) Law Enforcement Partnership program and have plans to work toward having all current investigators achieve this valuable credential. They also join the ranks of government agencies such as the FBI, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Government Accountability Office and the Department of Defense.
  20. CFE Exam covers four areas Criminology & Ethics - The purpose of this section is to test your knowledge of criminological concepts and to evaluate your understanding of the underlying ethics of the fraud examination profession. This part includes administration of criminal justice, theories of crime causation, theories of fraud prevention, crime information sources, and ethical situations. Financial Transactions - This section tests your knowledge of the types of fraudulent financial transactions incurred in accounting records. To pass this section, you will be required to demonstrate knowledge of these concepts: basic accounting and auditing theory, fraud schemes, internal controls to deter fraud and other auditing and accounting matters. Fraud Investigation - This section includes questions in the following areas: interviewing, taking statements, obtaining information from public records, tracing illicit transactions, evaluating deception and report writing. Legal Elements of Fraud - This section ensures that you are familiar with the many legal ramifications of conducting fraud examinations, including criminal and civil law, rules of evidence, rights of the accused and accuser and expert witness matters.