1. Economic Outlook for the
Asia Pacific Region and the Global
Financial Crisis
Reza Baqir
IMF Resident Representative
22nd CACCI Conference
Manila Hotel, October 23, 2008
2. Overview
The bad news
The world economy is entering a major
downturn in the face of the most dangerous
financial shock in mature financial markets
since the 1930s.
Risks may still be tilted to the downside
The good news
To date, Emerging Asia has led global growth
Nevertheless, Asia is also exposed to global
economic conditions, and perhaps more so now
than before
2
3. An extraordinary, banking-sector shock is
striking advanced economies
Interbank Markets Bank CDS Spreads
(3-month LIBOR minus T-bill rate; in percent) (10-years; median; in basis points)
4.0 400
350
3.0 300
United
States
250 United States
Euro area
2.0 Euro 200
area
150
Japan
1.0 100
50
0.0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Oct. 0 3
2007 08 Oct.
2006 2007 2008 08
4. Overnight developments
Markets sold off sharply and on a broad basis today,
including equities, emerging market assets and
commodities.
Global recession fears continue to grip markets while
deleveraging pressures appear to be becoming broader
The selloff in emerging market debt is gaining pace, with
the EMBIG selling off 5.5% amid spread widening of 69 bps
to 783 bps, the highest level since 2002. Selling is across
the board in the most liquid names, with the exception of
the highest-rated sovereigns.
Emerging market equities also plunged, with major bourses
in the EMEA region off 3 to 9%, and Latin stock markets
losing 5 to 10%, except Argentina’s Merval, which has lost
over 14%.
Emerging market currencies are selling off sharply virtually
across the board against the dollar, and even more against
the yen.
4
5. The financial sector shock comes on the heels
of, until recently, a major commodity price shock
Real Oil, Metals and Food Prices
(1970 = 100)
250 1400
Food (LHS)
1200
200
Oil (RHS) 1000
150
800
600
100
400
50
Metals (LHS) 200
0 0
5
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05 Q3
08
6. As a result, advanced economies to
come close to or move into recession
Real GDP Growth Rates
(percent change) 4
Growth
Potential
April 2008 WEO 3
July 2008 WEO
2
1
0
2007 08 09 10 2007 08 09 10 2007 08 09 10
United States Euro area Japan 6
7. Outlook for advanced economies
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2008, available at 7
www.imf.org
9. …and Asia has led growth in emerging
economies
Real GDP Growth Rates
(percent change)
10
Growth
HP Trend Growth
April 2008 WEO 8
July 2008 WEO
6
4
2
0
07 08 09 10 07 08 09 10 07 08 09 10 07 08 09 10 07 08 09 10 9
Africa Emerging Latin America Middle East Emerging
Asia Europe & CIS
10. A note on country groupings
Emerging Asia:
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies: Hong
Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province
of China
Developing Asia: Afghanistan, Rep. of,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam2,
Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia,
Kiribati, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives,
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of,
Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam.
10
11. Emerging economies account for a rising share
of global growth
14 Contributions to Global Growth
(percent change)
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
Other Developing
India
-4 China
Advanced economies
11
-6
12. In general, the resilience in emerging and
developing economies has grown, notably
since the Asia crisis...
Emerging and Developing Economy External Indicators
(percent of total GDP)
45 8
External Debt
40 (left scale) 6
35 4
Change in
30 reserves 2
25 0
20 -2
Current account
12
15 -4
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
13. ...but countries with vulnerabilities
are feeling the pressure
Emerging Economies: Credit Default Swap Spreads, 2004–08
(In basis points, July 2007 = 100)
1600
1400
1200 Countries with current account deficits > 5%
Countries with current account surpluses (or small
1000
deficits)
800
600
400
200
0 13
Sep.
2004 05 06 07
08
14. Risks to global growth are to the downside
Global GDP Growth 6.0
(percent change, ppp-GDP weighted average)
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
90% Confidence interval
2.5
70% Confidence interval
50% Confidence interval 2.0
1.5
1.0
14
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
15. According to one indicator, a global
recession is more likely than not
15
16. Major down side factors include potential further
deterioration in financial conditions and domestic
demand in the US.
16
19. Trade exposure to the US has risen
Export Exposure to the United States
(In percent of GDP)
Direct Tot al
1994 2006 1994 2006
Japan 2.5 3.4 3.0 4.4
Aust ralia 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.1
New Zealand 2.8 3.0 3.7 4.0
China 5.6 9.6 7.6 12.2
India 1.7 2.4 2.0 3.1
Hong Kong SAR 16.7 14.8 20.0 21.8
Korea 4.9 5.1 6.1 8.7
Singapore 23.9 17.3 31.9 30.8
Taiwan PO C 10.4 9.9 12.9 15.5
Indonesia 3.3 3.5 4.5 5.6
Malaysia 18.0 22.7 25.0 31.7
Philippines 8.8 8.0 9.8 12.0
Thailand 7.0 10.5 8.9 15.1
Viet nam 1.4 15.2 2.8 18.5
Asia 7.7 9.0 10.0 13.3
Industrial Asia 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.5
Emerging Asia 9.2 10.8 12.0 15.9
19
Sources: UN COMTRADE Dat abase; and IMF st af f calculat ions.
20. …as has exposure to financial assets
Financial Exposure to the United States
(In percent of GDP)
U.S. Holdings of Asian Asian Holdings of U.S.
Port f olio Securit ies Port f olio Securit ies
Dec-94 Dec-06 Dec-94 Jun-06
Japan 2.5 13.0 4.4 25.0
Aust ralia 6.8 20.4 2.6 15.0
New Zealand 10.5 9.3 2.9 12.7
China 0.3 2.2 2.3 28.8
India … 5.5 … 2.5
Hong Kong SAR 12.6 42.2 14.8 61.3
Korea 1.4 12.4 1.2 14.2
Singapore 8.6 35.8 42.9 129.2
Taiwan PO C 0.2 19.4 13.1 39.8
Indonesia 1.2 3.7 1.0 3.4
Malaysia 11.5 9.2 6.8 10.5
Philippines 3.1 7.9 3.3 7.9
Thailand 3.1 5.7 4.4 8.2
Viet nam … 0.1 … 4.1
Asia 5.1 13.3 8.3 25.9
Industrial Asia 6.6 14.2 3.3 17.6
Emerging Asia 4.6 13.1 10.0 28.2
Sources: U.S. Depart ment of t he Treasury, Treasury Int ernat ional Capit al
Syst em; CE Dat a Company Lt d.; Haver Analyt ics; and IMF, Inf ormat ion
IC 20
Not ice Syst em, and st af f calculat ions.
21. Perhaps due to higher exposure, growth in Asia is now
more correlated with U.S. growth than in the 1990s.
Growth Correlation with the United States
1990-96 2000-07
Japan -0.06 0.41
Australia 0.74 0.38
New Zealand 0.28 0.23
China … 0.08
India … 0.14
Hong Kong SAR 0.16 0.61
Korea -0.32 0.30
Singapore 0.31 0.62
Taiwan POC 0.24 0.61
Indonesia 0.06 0.05
Malaysia -0.26 0.52
Philippines 0.28 0.47
Thailand -0.20 0.47
Vietnam … 0.20 21
Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; and IMF staff calculations.
22. Financial correlations have also increased over time
Correlations in Stock Market Returns
1990-96 2000-07
Japan 0.26 0.52
Australia 0.52 0.71
New Zealand … 0.49
China … 0.08
India -0.01 0.45
Hong Kong SAR 0.35 0.69
Korea 0.12 0.59
Singapore 0.49 0.61
Taiwan POC 0.16 0.49
Indonesia 0.26 0.43
Malaysia 0.37 0.30
Philippines 0.34 0.45
Thailand 0.38 0.43
Vietnam … 0.10
Asia 0.29 0.45
High financial exposure 0.35 0.57
Low financial exposure 0.23 0.34 22
Sources: Bloomberg LP.; and IMF staff calculations.
23. Key results from investigating spillovers
from US to Asia:
On average over the last fifteen years, a one
percentage point slowdown in the U.S. has
led to an estimated ¼ percentage point
slowdown in Japan, and a ¼-½ point
slowdown in emerging Asia.
The average spillover for emerging Asia
masks wide cross-country variation within the
region, with particularly large spillovers for
the most-trade/financially exposed countries.
These long-sample estimates of spillovers
may understate current vulnerabilities. 23
24. Estimated spillovers show large variations
within the region
Summary of Results: Impact of one percentage point U.S. Slowdown
(In percentage points)
Cross-Country VAR with Financial
Regressions Variables
Japan 0.3 0.2
Australia 0.7 0.5
New Zealand 0.9 0.3
China 0.1 0.0
India -0.2 0.0
Hong Kong SAR 1.0 0.8
Korea 0.1 0.1
Singapore 1.1 0.9
Tawan POC 1.2 0.9
Indonesia 0.2 0.4
Malaysia 0.5 0.7
Philippines 0.6 0.4
Thailand 1.0 0.5
Asia 0.3 0.2
Emerging Asia 0.2 0.2
Emerging Asia
(excl. China and India) 0.5 0.5
24
Source: IMF staff estimates.
25. Key results (cont’d)
Why might long-sample estimates understate
spillovers at the current juncture?
→ Reestimating our regressions over shorter samples
suggests that spillovers have increased over time, not least
for China, consistent with our finding of growing trade and
financial integration with the United States.
→ When U.S. demand shocks are accompanied by realistic
declines in global confidence, model simulations predict
substantially larger spillovers (0.7 percentage point growth
slowdown in Asia for a one percentage point slowdown in the
U.S.)
→ Specific U.S. recessions have in the past generated large
negative spillovers to Asia, as witnessed by the 2001
recession. 25
26. Finally, U.S. slowdowns can have very large impacts on
Asia, as evidenced by the 2001 recession.
Impact of 2001 U.S. Recession1
(In percent )
Hodrick-Prescot t Baxt er-King
Filt er Filt er
Unit ed St at es -1.90 -1.89
Japan -1.41 -1.49
Aust ralia -0.70 -0.92
New Zealand -0.04 -0.18
China -0.42 -1.53
India 0.16 -0.73
Hong Kong SAR -2.84 -3.39
Korea -0.94 -1.01
Singapore -7.80 -7.72
Taiwan POC -5.54 -5.59
Indonesia 0.48 0.61
Malaysia -3.41 -3.51
Philippines -1.17 -1.63
Thailand -0.98 -1.15
Viet nam -0.60 …
Asia2 -1.80 -2.17
High trade exposure2 -3.19 -3.83
Low trade exposure2 -0.41 -0.75
Sources: CE Dat a Company Lt d.; and IMF st af f calculat ions.
IC
1
Measured as t he average change in t he out put gap during t he recession 26
relat ive t o preceding f our quart ers.
2
Arit hmet ic nonweight ed average.
27. To conclude
The world is facing a major economic
shock
To date, Asia has held up better than the
rest of the world
But Asia is exposed and the spillover
effects could be larger than expected
27
28. Thank you
REZA BAQIR
IMF Office Manila
(02) 536 0785, 400 4985
28
Notes de l'éditeur
Source: CC Oct 2008.xls : Sheet [52]
CC Oct 2008.xls : Sheet [3]
CC Oct 2008.xls : Sheet [4]
Source: CC Oct 2008.xls: Sheets [25]
Source: CC Oct 2008.xls: Sheet [16]
Over the past two decades, Asian export growth has been driven by growth in intraregional trade. Intraregional exports now account for 41 percent of total emerging Asia exports, versus 23 percent in 1986. However, much of these intra-regional flows are occuring within vertically integrated supply chains aimed at final demand in industrial countries, which is why exposure to the U.S. (and EU) has increased over the last ten years despite rapid growth in intra-regional trade. See chapter’s appendix for details on how we computed measures of indirect trade exposure to the U.S. were computed.
These measures are based on data from U.S. Treasury’s International Capital System. See details in the chapter.
Note the strong correlation between a country’s trade exposure (measured by total trade exposure to the U.S.) and how correlated its GDP growth is with that of the U.S.
This is the 24-month rolling correlation between S&P 500 monthly returns and monthly returns in each country’s main stock index. Not surprisingly, correlations are highest in the two regional financial centers (and in Australia).
On the second bullet, long-sample estimates of spillovers (expressed here as ratio of percentage slowdown in the country to percentage slowdown in the U.S.) range from zero in China/India to about one in Singapore or Taiwan POC. In general, there’s a strong correlation throughout our study between the estimated spillover for a country and its trade/financial exposure to the U.S.
Estimates on the left column come from our country-specific regressions, and on the right from our vector auto-regressions, both estimated over the full sample period (see chapter’s appendix for details on each method). Note how close the estimates from the two methods are despite them being substantially different. Note the small spillovers for China and India, when the models are estimated over the full sample period. Because of the large weight of these two countries, the regional estimate obtained is also small.
On the second arrow, we simulate financial turbulence in GEM by assuming that consumption and investment decline globally in excess of the decline engendered by the U.S. slowdown. Such additional declines are caused by global declines in confidence, and can be seen to be proxying for current financial stress. (See chapter for how global declines in confidence were calibrated in the model). On the third arrow, note that while many commentators have pointed to the fact that the 2001 recession was concentrated on electronics, a key export for the region, and hence should be seen as an upper-bound estimate of spillovers, it is worth noting that the current slowdown in the United States is expected to be deeper and more prolonged than the 2001 recession, and is accompanied by substantial stress in money and credit markets.
The reasons why the 2001 recession had such a large impact on Asia have been discussed at length, and include the facts that the shock was concentrated on electronics, which is a key export for Asia; that Europe and Japan were not providing support for the global economy before and during the recession; and that domestic demand in Asia was still recovering from the 1997–98 financial crisis. While these facts may suggest that the 2001 recession provides an upper-bound estimate of spillovers, it is worth noting that the current U.S. slowdown is expected to be deeper and more protracted and, unlike the 2001 recession, is being accompanied by significant stress in money and credit markets around the world.