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Course 1: Overview of  Secure Programming, Section 4 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Course 1 Learning Plan ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Learning objectives ,[object Object]
Security Assessment and Testing: Outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Architecture ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Discussion ,[object Object],(Instructor: Limit this discussion to less than 10 minutes)
Discussion examples ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Assurance ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Other Assurance Considerations ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Assessment and Testing: Outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Code Analysis ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Reference: Engler and Musuvathi 2003
Code Analysis: Definitions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Code Analysis: Code and Design Reviews ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Costs of Reviews ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Code Analysis: Automated Code Checkers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Automated Code Checkers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Assessment and Testing: Outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Code Complexity ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Assessment and Testing: Outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Style:  Cognitive Science ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Style ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ambiguous Coding Style ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ambiguous Coding Style ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Exercise ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],(exercise inspired by Hallem, Park and Engler 2003)
Exercise Sample Answer ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Exercise Alternate Answer ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Style:  Conclusion ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Assessment and Testing: Outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
History of Vulnerabilities and Patches ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Assessment and Testing: Outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Scenario Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Specification Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
In-line Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Disadvantages of Inline Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Exercises ,[object Object],[object Object]
Exercises ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Unit Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Human Interaction Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Integration Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Acceptance Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Final Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object]
Question Sample Answers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Question ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
About These Slides ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Pascal Meunier [email_address] ,[object Object],[object Object]

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4.Security Assessment And Testing

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Notes de l'éditeur

  1. The 90 minute sessions with three people is what Microsoft reports as being effective. After 90 minutes, productivity drops sharply. With too many reviewers, productivity also drops. Code reviews and fixes must be timed at the appropriate stage of the development lifecycle. Waiting until code complete will likely frustrate QA and product management.
  2. An example of scenario testing is the recent 802.11 wireless vulnerability announced by the Australians (RTS DoS). It usually starts by saying "What if I do this instead of what's expected?" What if I try to enter more numbers than a PIN is supposed to have? What if I keep punching keys on the ATM while it is counting money? What if I insert an oversized card or envelope, or insert them sideways, or insert something made of another material than the expected plastic (e.g. to jam and disable a competitor's ATMs)? Do the requirements deal with or expect these situations (abuse cases)? If I'm designing a network, what if a user sends a ping to a broadcast address? What if I send SYN packets without completing the connection? etc... Most of the 802.11 and TCP/IP vulnerabilities were found by scenario testing, just using the researchers' imagination with the high-level description of the mechanism or protocol. The requirements didn't capture or address malicious users; benevolent users, or users incapable of interacting with the networks at those levels, were assumed.
  3. Specifications testing is what the Finland Codenomicon/OUSPG/PROTOS specialize in; their formal work resulted in the flood of vulnerability announcements for SNMP, etc... Some findings from specifications testing are usually less obvious than those of scenario testing. They overlap -- specifications testing should a) report all the vulnerabilities found in scenario testing and b) be comprehensive and exhaustive.
  4. Definition of invariant: an assertion that must be true both before and after the execution of each operation (e.g., application use case, class method). See also postcondition and precondition. An assertion that should always be true for a specified segment or at a specified point of a computer program. From [IEEE90].
  5. Symantec calls this ET for external testing. There are tiers of customers, Tier1 ET customers promise to interact at a much higher level than Tier 3 testers. We expect low rates of feedback from most testers because they are busy people with their own agendas and time pressures.