Por estos dos motivos, defensa de JOH solicita repetir juicio
Kalanduse probleemid ja reformid. Ragnar Arnason
1. Ragnar Arnason*
Fisheries Problems and Reforms
A presentation at
The Fisheries Conference
Tallin, Estonia
November 27, 2013
* Professor
University of Iceland
3. The Fisheries Problem
Found in ocean fisheries all around the world!
Appears generally as:
1. Excessive fishing effort and fleets
2. Depressed fish stocks and falling yield
3. Low incomes of fishers and fishing
communities
4. High level of biological ...and social risk
4. The Fisheries Problem (…cont.)
Often accompanied by :
•
•
•
•
•
High level of fish discarding
Low quality of landings
Poor access to financial capital
Distorted and often little technical progress
Economic and social stagnation
Very important
Fisheries management (attempts at “fisheries
reforms”) frequently makes the situation worse!!
5. This state of affairs is caused by the
Common Property Problem (CPP)!
The CPP implies absence of private property rights
Markets cannot exist
No market guidance toward the common good
Overexploitation and waste !
6. Common property
• Assets, resources, property held in common by
a group of people
– Held in common
equal rights of use
– The group can be small (2 people) or large ( nation)
• Examples
– Ozone layer, atmosphere, the environment, wild
animals, fish stocks
7. Aristotle (Politics, book II. ca. 350 BC)
“the greater the number of owners, the less the respect
for common property. People are much more careful of
their personal possessions than of those owned
communally; they exercise care over common property
only in so far as they are personally affected.”
Garret Hardin (Science 1968)
“Tragedy of the Commons”
Under the CP-arrangement individual users are forced
to overexploit. Otherwise they get nothing!
8. • The common property arrangement is a social
organization
• It is a man-made institution (nothing natural
about it)
• Other terms for common property fisheries
– Common pool fisheries
– Open access fisheries
– Competitive fisheries
9. The common property problem
• An error of social organization
– Forces individual users to compete for available
resources (wrong incentives)
• The CPP does is not caused by
(1) Lack of understanding
(2) Lack of (biological) data
Even with perfect knowledge and data the problem
would persist!
The common property problem is caused by
lack of individual fishers’ rights in the fishery!
11. Nota Bene
1. It is the MEY-point (maximum economic yield )
that is socially optimal
2. MSY is not socially optimal
3. MEY
– implies greater biomass than MSY
– is sustainable
– entails little risk of stock collapse
– usually generates substantial profits (rents)
13. The Empirical Evidence:
Evolution of the global fishery
• Evidence from various FAO, World Bank,
OECD and academic publications
• Since the end of WW-II
1.
2.
3.
4.
Fishing fleets: Huge increase
Net economic returns: Decline
Fish stocks: Drastic decline
Global ocean catches: Stagnated (even declined)
15. The Economics of Global Fishing
• Not only has there been a dramatic biological
mismanagement of the global fishery, the
economic mismanagement is even worse
• The global landed value is about USD 90 b. per
year
• Profits are insignificant, perhaps USD 5 b.
• Subsidies are high, perhaps USD 10 b.
(EU, Japan, China)
16. Empirical evidence: The global fishery
(Sunken Billions; World Bank and FAO 2009; data 2004)
120.0
Revenues and costs (B.US$)
100.0
80.0
Actual
profits
Potential
profits
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
Fishing effort (index)
Optimal
Actual
17. Global Fishery: Economic waste
(Sunken Billions, 2009)
Sustainable global fishery:
Current (2004) and profit maximizing outcomes
Current
Optimal
Difference
(optimal –current)
Fishing effort
13.9 m. GRT
7.3 m. GRT
-6.6 m. GRT
Harvest
85 m. mt
81 m. mt.
-4 m. mt.
Biomass
148 m. mt
314 m. mt.
+165 m.mt.
Profits
-5 b. USD
44 b. USD
49 b. USD
50 b. USD
Global Development Assistance in 2004
19. Fisheries reforms attempt to:
Alleviate the ravages of the CPP
Move the fishery toward the optimal point
Nota bene
This is human management!
- Get people to act in the collectively “best” manner
Fishers act according to the
Prevailing Fisheries Management Regime (FMR) i
20. Fishers act according to the
Fisheries Management Regime
• The fisheries management regime (FMR):
– The institutional framework under which the
fishing activity operates
• FMR may be set by
(a) Social custom and tradition
(b) The government (the fisheries authority)
(c) The association of fishermen
(d) Other means
• It may be explicit or implicit
• Fisheries reforms must alter the FMR!
23. Key Property Rights in Fisheries
Territorial
user rights
TURFs
Individual
quotas
IQs/ITQs
Rarely
used
Mainly
sedentary
species
Widely
applicable;
very common
Fairly
common
Effective
Effective if
applicable
Effective if
enforceable
Mixed
evidence
Sole
ownership
Community
rights
24. Individual Transferable Quotas: ITQs
• The most widely applied rights-based fisheries
management system in the world
• Adopted as a major part of the FMS by at least
22 major fishing nations
─ NewZealand, Australia, Mexico, USA, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Holland,
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Estonia, Germany, UK, Portugal, Spain, Rus
sia, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, Chile, Peru, Falkland
• Close to 25% of global catch taken under ITQs!
25. Outcomes of ITQs
- General pattern around the world -
Economically very successful!
(1) Reduction in fishing effort (immediate)
(2) Fishing capital declines (but usually slowly)
(3) Biomass recovers (slowly)
(4) Unit price of landings quickly increases (often greatly)
(5) Quotas become valuable (quickly!)
(6) Enhanced resource stewardship by fishers
(7) Discarding often reduced
26. Examples of ITQ success
• British Columbia trawl fishery
– Great increase in profits, increased resource
stewardship, stock and environmental improvements.
• Icelandic demersal fisheries
– Great increase in profits (30-50% of revenues), stock
improvements, reduced discarding
• North Atlantic pelagic fisheries
– Very good profits ( 30%)
• New Zealand fisheries
– Very profitable. Stock stabilization,
27. Social impacts of fisheries reforms
• Reduces fishing effort
• Alters fishing and fish processing behaviour
• Leads to streamlined efficient operations
Substantial social impacts (inevitable)
Opposition
– Fishing communities
– Social conservationists
28. Who gains/who loses?
• Sensible reforms => net social gain (often substantial)
Possible to make everyone better off (Hicks-Kaldor
improvement)
• In reality not necessarily so
• In the short run
– Recipients of rights and retained fishers gain most
– Laid-off fishers and inhabitants of declining communities
may lose
Social opposition
• In the long run most people gain (gdp & employment )
30. The CFP
Fundamentally inappropriate !!
• Common fishing grounds
– Exacerbates the CPP
• National enforcement
– Inappropriate incentives
– Built in conflict of interest
– Unequal treatment of violations
The EU has been trying to deal with the resulting
problems ever since !
31. Conduct of the policy has been bad
Stocks:
Harvests:
Fleets:
Profits:
Subsidies:
Discards:
Heavily overfished
Declining
Hugely excessive
Very poor
Very high
High
Overall assessment
EU fisheries are the worst in the western world!
(Norway, Iceland, Greenland, Canada, USA and Russia are much better)
32. The EU’s own assessment of the situation
(Green paper on the reform of the CFP, 2009):
The EU fisheries are characterized by:
– Overfishing
–
–
–
–
Overcapacity
Heavy subsidies
Low economic resilience
Decline in the volume of fish caught
Conclusion (in the Green paper)
“The CFP is not achieving its objectives”
33. Evolution of catch volume
8
7
6
5
M.
mt.
4
3
2
1
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
EU catch volume
2006
2007
Trend
2008
2009
2010
Statistically significant
declining trend: -3%
per year
34. The EU excels only
in fisheries subsidies!
• The highest capacity enhancing subsidies in
the world !
• Major detrimental impact on fisheries
efficiency
• Really a negative reform
• Swamps the reforms (which are considerably
weaker)
35. EU fisheries subsidies
(According to a recent study for the EU parliament
(IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-146))
Capacity enhancing subsidies
(Billion US$ per year)
4.5
4
3.5
3
B.
US$
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
EU
Japan
China
Russia
USA
Indonesia
36. Subsidies per unit volume ofcatch
(US$/kg)
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
US$/kg
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
EU
Japan
China
Russia
USA
Indonesia
38. The actual decision
1. Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
Yes
2. Multiannual quota plans
Yes
3. Transferable fishing concessions (ITQs)
No
4. Decentralization (regionalization)
Yes
5. Discard ban
Yes
So the most important reform was rejected!
40. Impacts are probably not very great
• Estonia already has a fairly efficient fisheries
management regime (ITQs)
• The reforms adopted are not radical
• Potentially significant impacts:
– Ban on discards (Are discards in Estonian fisheries significant?)
– Stock rebuilding toward MSY (Estonia’s national quotas)
– Withholding of subsidies if excessive fleets are not reduced
(Does Estonia have significantly excessive fleets?)
– New opportunities for structural funds (Under the social
dimension of the CFP)
41. What should Estonia do?
• Do not wait for the EU
• Do your own fisheries reforms
– Strengthen your ITQ system
•
•
•
•
Move away from gear/effort quotas if possible
Strengthen property rights value of ITQs (duration, security)
Improve the enforcement of quotas
Support ITQ market and ITQ price listing (..if necessary)
– Promote business attitude in the fisheries sector
• Encourage investment in quality, processing and marketing
• Avoid detrimental taxation
• Allow ITQs as financial collateral
42. • Fisheries reforms (cont.)
– Be careful with vessel reduction/buy-back
programs
• Can easily be counter productive
• Use funds generated to improve the fisheries
– Press for sensible Baltic stock rebuilding
programme
• You have shared stocks
– Press for sensible Baltic marine protection policy
• Stocks, ecosystem, habitat
43. OECD report on Estonian fisheries (2009)
Title page photograph
Fake fish?