$17.4 billion financial lifeline extended to the big three united states automakers, ford, gm, and chrysler

1. Over the past ten years, America has had many historic moments. With
planes flying into the World Trade Center to the election of our first
African-American president, the American public has had much to be
excited about and to fear. In more recent history, the American economy
has been the main topic. From the Fall of Wall Street, crashing of the
housing market, to the fall of the American Automakers. The government
has stepped in to save the private market and attempt to restore life to
what was once a corner stone in America. Chrysler was one of many
companies to be bailed out by the government during 2008. This is a
look at where Chrysler started to where they are today.
The Chrysler name doesn’t mean much to residents of Kenosha. The
auto plant has been called by many names since 1900, when Thomas
Jeffery bought a bicycle factory and started mass-producing vehicles.
These vehicles had two groundbreaking innovations: steering wheels
and front-mounted engines. Historians say it was in Kenosha, not Detroit
that cars began “to look like cars.” Vehicles jokingly referred to as
Kenosha Cadillacs, were small, inexpensive, and sometimes, homely
looking Ramblers. (Nichols, 2009)
The company originally started out as the Thomas B. Jeffery Company,
then as Nash Motors, next as the Nash-Kelvinator Company, and then
the American Motors Company (AMC). AMC partnered with the French
firm Renault in the 1970s. They sold out to Chrysler in 1987. (Nichols,
2009)
In 1987, American Motors Company was the number four automaker.
After the consolidation, Chrysler encountered a financial crisis, which led
to a restructuring of the company. In the 1990s, Chrysler came back with
the powerful Dodge Viper sports car and its jeep lineup. In 1998,
Chrysler was acquired by Daimler-Benz of Germany and spent the next
eight years as a part of Daimler Chrysler. (Maynard, 2009)
Daimler’s inconsistent financial results and pressure from German
shareholders prompted them to seek a buyer in 2007. It sold the
company to Cerberus Capital Management, an investment fund, which
installed Robert L. Nardelli as its chief executive. Nardelli was the former
chief executive of Home Depot. Nardelli vowed that Chrysler would
make a comeback as an American-owned company. Unfortunately the
automaker was battered by a sales slump as a recession took hold.
(Maynard, 2009)

2. In late 2008, Chrysler joined General Motors in seeking assistance from
Congress. Congress rejected the company’s bid, forcing the Bush
administration to step in with a financial lifeline. In January 2009,
Chrysler announced it had reached a tentative deal with Fiat, the Italian
automaker. In March, President Obama gave the companies 30 days to
conclude the transaction. (Maynard, 2009)
This culminated in a restructuring plan with Fiat taking a major role in the
company’s management. The United Automobile Workers (UAW) and
major lenders agreed to concessions. The Obama administration was
unable to get support from all of the bondholders for the plan. This lead
to Chrysler filing for bankruptcy on April 30, 2009. (Maynard, 2009)
At the end of January 2009, Chrysler secured Fiat as a partner. Fiat will
share its small-car platforms and fuel-efficient engines with Chrysler. The
deal is supposed to give the U.S. automaker access to new markets and
cheaper, more environmentally friendly technologies. Fiat is just one of
many new partnerships Chrysler has recently formed. Hyundai builds
compact cars in Korea for the Dodge brand in Mexico while China Motor
Corporation (CMC) produces the Chrysler Town & Country and cargo
vans for the Dodge brand in Taiwan. Developing new partnerships is
part of Chrysler’s strategy. (Fugazy, 2009)
Chrysler will be hiring local retirees to help train about 85 new temporary
workers at the Kenosha Engine Plant in 2010, a union official said.
Glenn Stark, United Auto Workers Local 72 president, said the retirees
would teach new employees about machines they operated at the plant.
The teaching process might take several weeks. About half the
workforce retired in May. Currently there are not enough workers to train
the temporary employees. Hiring of temporary workers is necessary to
meet the company’s 30 percent boost in production, which starts next
month, Stark said. (Krerowicz, 2009)
Some of the potential temporary workers were concerned that the
jobless, rather than those retired, should be hired. But Stark said training
needed to be done by someone with expertise. “Some jobs have critical
things, and you don’t want someone just walking in off the street to do
it.” The retirees will receive the wages paid when they left. Production of
the 2.7- and 3.5-liter engines built here should be finished by the end of
September 2010. That is sooner than the December 2010 date the

3. company announced in bankruptcy papers earlier this year. It is possible
that the timeline could change during the year. (Krerowicz, 2009)
“The earlier closing might work in Kenosha’s favor,” stated Stark. He
continues to meet with Fiat, Chrysler’s new owner, and city officials
about the factory’s viability. “We are still pursuing work for the plant after
it officially closes,” said Stark. Stark recently sent a message to the
membership outlining Kenosha’s tumultuous 2009. “I know times are
tough and morale is low, but don’t give up, give in, or lose hope,” he
wrote. (Krerowicz, 2009)
On top of many job cuts that took place at Chrysler, Cerberus had to cut
nearly 10 percent of its staff due to the difficulties in the environment. At
the end of 2008, Chrysler reported sales had dropped 53 percent from
year-ago levels. Ford and General Motors posted drops in same-month
sales of 32 percent and 31 percent. Chrysler borrowed at least $12
billion in fresh loans to back the Cerberus buyout, approximately $10
billion in the form of two term loans due November 2013. Chrysler
already had a two billion dollar delayed-draw term loan, which matures
November 2014. The car company received a four billion dollar loan
from the government. David Elsboff, a spokesperson for Chrysler,
believes this will be re-paid in 2012.
(Fugazy, 2009)
Chrysler will return to the Super Bowl for the first time since 2004. They
will be the first U.S. automaker to advertise at the Super Bowl in two
years. Auto advertising has been a staple of the Super Bowl mix for
years. All three Detroit automakers pulled out in 2009 because of the
auto market crash and to conserve cash. (Cawthon, 2010)
The 60-second ad will air in the first half to promote the Dodge Charger.
The ad may be criticized because it will cost $5.2 million. (Advertising’s
big game, 2010) The company believes it is important to have a high-
profile event raise public awareness of the new Chrysler. “Most
American consumers do not realize we have emerged from bankruptcy,
so the Super Bowl is a great way to reach out to our consumers to let
them know we are still here,” said company spokeswoman Dianna
Gutierrez. (Cawthon, 2010)
Rudy Kuzel, a longtime worker on the line in the Kenosha plant asks: “If
we can’t save an engine plant that has won all the awards for quality and

4. efficiency, that has been modernized and supported by the city and the
state, that has workers who have been willing to cut their pay and
benefits and change their work rules in order to keep the work here,
what auto plant are you going to save?” Kuzel served as the president of
Local 72 in the 1980s and early 90s. “The government’s coming in,
saying we have to shape these companies up and providing the money
to do it. That’s good. That’s what we want. But if the companies use the
government support, the tax money, to shut factories and move the jobs
out of the country, what are we saving? The company name?” (Nichols,
2009)
Chrysler spokesman Max Gates said the eight plants could be sold to
another company or a new business or shut down entirely. The company
plans to sell or shut the Kenosha plant in 2010, Gates said. Union
leaders and state and local political leaders reacted with outrage,
particularly because the company has moved forward with plans to build
new engines at factories in Trenton, Michigan, and Saltillo, Mexico. “We
have been sold out by the president of the United States and his so-
called car czar,” said Kenosha Alderman Patrick Juliana. It should have
been up to them to make sure that every United States autoworker had
a shot at keeping their job.” (Content, 2009)
Kenosha union workers adopted concessions in 2006 to encourage
Chrysler to invest in Kenosha with a new, more fuel-efficient engine.
Union workers in Kenosha this week agreed to more concessions,
including a six-year wage freeze. Chrysler officials have previously said
plans to invest $450 million in Kenosha for a new engine line were on
hold because of sharply lower industry sales. (Content, 2009)
In a statement, Governor Jim Doyle called Chrysler’s plan “outrageous”
and “contrary to what Chrysler has been telling us all along.” U.S.
Representative Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) agreed. Ryan said in a statement
that he spoke to Chrysler executive earlier this year and as recently as
Wednesday evening. “I had been given assurances that this would not
occur,” Ryan said. (Content, 2009)
“Chrysler plans to offer jobs at other facilities to displaced workers,”
Gates said. The company is forecasting that its alliance with Fiat will
create 5,000 new jobs nationwide. Chrysler sales in April were 48
percent below a year ago, and the company already has investments in

5. other engine plants – so the disclosure about the Kenosha plant was not
entirely unexpected. (Content, 2009)
“If they want America to bail them out of this, they should be made in
America, not in Mexico,” said Kathy Gelmi, 59 of Racine as she left
Tenuta’s Italian deli, a Kenosha institution. “Some of that money came
right out of the sweat and blood of the people in Kenosha,” said Michael
Rosen, an economist at Milwaukee Area Technical College, who has
studied the Chrysler assembly plant closing in Kenosha in 1988. “They
show no loyalty,” Rosen said of Chrysler. “They turn around and move
the engine plant to Mexico. People should really be outraged about that.
If you want to know why people in this country are getting upset about
these bailouts, this is why.” (Content, 2009)
Production of the current Dodge Viper will end in July 2010, and the car
will go out with a bang. Ralph Gilles, president and chief executive for
the Dodge brand, said there were plans to produce a limited, 500-car run
of special-edition Vipers. Meanwhile, an all-new sports car is in the
works with a projected introduction date of 2012. Naturally the new car
will be done in partnership with Fiat, which also owns Alfa Romeo,
Ferrari and Maserati. The death of the Viper could also herald the birth
of a better sports car. (Chang, 2009)
Fiat Chrysler merger officially confirmed – 35 percent initial stake. Fiat
will receive equity in Chrysler in exchange for investments in retooling a
Chrysler plant to make Fiat models for the U.S. (Content, 2009) The U.S.
Department of Treasury has stated it will divest their portion of Chrysler
to Fiat after major benchmarks have been reached. (Brown & Clowers
2009)
On January 16, 2010, retired Chrysler employee, William “Bill” B Finley
was interviewed to obtain an employees viewpoint of Chrysler. Bill Finley
worked ten years for Chrysler, and 25 years for American Motors
Corporation in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Finley’s 35 years of experience
includes 30 years as a Line Forman. Finley retired on January 1, 1997.
Finley was asked if his benefits have been affected when Chrysler filed
for bankruptcy. Finley explained, “When I retired I received 90 percent of
my pay and 90 percent of my benefits that included a 20 percent
discount on any Chrysler vehicle for me or any of my family members. I
also received a 15 thousand dollar vehicle voucher from Chrysler as an
incentive to retire before I turned 60 years old. My benefits now are

6. about half of the original dollar amount I received when I first retired. The
benefits were cut by over 35 percent in the last year alone. The benefit
cuts include retirement pay, health care coverage, and the vehicle
discount, which has been completely eliminated.” (personal
communication, January 16, 2010).
Finley spoke about his current viewpoint of Chrysler. “First of all, the
management was taken over by the Cerberus holding company and
from that point we were doomed. The employees and union had no say
in any type of decision. Obama and the Cerberus are to blame! Our jobs
are going to Mexico and you and I are paying for this bullshit! I am
thoroughly frustrated and sad! If we could have been better planners 20
years ago and started looking into developing Chryslers employees into
being more technologically advanced so we could compete with the
Japanese, and other countries. I would have to say it is strange that
when I started in the auto industry, there wasn’t a better paying job
around. Now that Japanese are the largest automakers in our country
and the largest employer of American autoworkers! They just know how
to produce quality, economical vehicles without having huge inventories
that kill your carrying costs. They (Toyota) employ more Americans than
the “Big Three” (Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford) in the United
States! That is sad! They do make a good vehicle, but as I said, if we
would have focused on the future 20 years ago, we would not be in this
mess. Our Union is partially responsible for this as well. The union was
more worried about getting us more money and benefits while the
Japanese were taking our market share. Giving your people the
knowledge as an investment may have fixed the issue instead of striking
for better benefits and money.” (personal communication, January 16,
2010).
Finley, “ As I stated earlier, our tax money is going to Mexico and you
can thank President Obama and Robert Nardelli from Cerberus for the
situation we are in today, Robert Nardelli got Home Depot in trouble and
then we hire him to screw up Chrysler! Also, our top-level union leaders
did a horrible job not seeing the writing on the wall years ago. Did we
need the large pay increases and added benefits years ago? Now look
at what we have? Very, very poor planning!” Finley’s final statement
summarizes where he believes Chrysler went wrong, “Cerberus
management, union greed, and government involvement, namely
President Obama! (personal communication, January 16, 2010)

7. The Obama Administration’s auto task force is set to report by March 31,
2009, on the wisdom of continuing to bail out GM and Chrysler. Recent
reports suggest that the deadline may not be D-Day for Detroit, as some
have billed it. Instead, it may be the first step in a longer-term look at
troubled U.S. automakers and how much help they should get from the
federal government. The likelihood that Detroit will get more assistance
got stronger on March 19, 2009, when the Treasury Department
released a plan to offer five billion dollars in rescue money to auto-parts
suppliers. Meantime, a deal under consideration could give Fiat a 35
percent stake in Chrysler and perhaps open the way for a larger
ownership position later. This is a defining moment for Chrysler. Maria
Bartiromo interviewed Bob Nardelli, the Chief Operating Officer hired by
private equity owner Cerberus to turn around the struggling carmaker.
(Bartiromo, 2009)
The interview began with Bartiromo asking Nardelli, “How would you rate
the job the auto task force is doing?” Nardelli replies, “I certainly
understand the learning curve they are on, having gone through it myself
over the last 18 months. So I give them very high marks.” (Bartiromo,
2009)
The point men on that task force are Steve Rattner, a former journalist,
private equity firm partner, and Democratic activist; and Ron Bloom, a
labor-restructuring expert. Bartiromo asks, “Have they spent any time
with you, understanding the view from Chrysler’s corner office?” Nardelli
explains, “We have had two face-to-face meetings and countless
exchanges of phone calls and information. I would say those two
gentlemen are totally engaged. They bring unique experience, albeit
different experiences, to the table, which is very helpful to our
discussions.” (Bartiromo, 2009)
Bartiromo, “Do you truly believe that without Fiat, Chrysler has a long-
term future as an independent car company?” Nardelli states,
“We do. We have a viable standalone plan. And Fiat enhances the
viability of that plan. Fiat brings $8 billion to $10 billion of real product
advantage. We really need to change the perception out there that Fiat
is basically getting a free ride. They are bringing had technology. They
are bringing platforms with proven reliability and durability that not only
have a very high market value but will leapfrog Chrysler four to five

8. years. And most important, in regards to the environment, they have the
lowest-emission engine in Europe.” (Bartiromo, 2009)
Bartiromo, “If the Fiat deal does not go through, is there a chance there
could be some kind of merger with GM?” Nardelli,
“No. General Motors took that off the table, and I do not believe there is
any opportunity to reopen that decision. I do not mean to be a broken
record, but if a Fiat deal does not go through, we have a viable plan. And
we would still have the opportunity to do product alliances with Fiat like
we did with Volkswagen, Nissan, and Mitsubishi. But (the relationship
with Fiat) would be on a much smaller scale and would not enhance our
ability to pay back the government loan sooner.” (Bartiromo, 2009)
Bartiromo, “How much money does Chrysler need to survive?” Nardelli,
“If you will remember, when we submitted our original plan, we asked for
seven billion dollars. We received four billion dollars in early January.
From the time we made our original submission through February 17, we
saw unprecedented, continually downward-spiraling sales in the U.S.
market. As a result, we raised our overall request from seven billion
dollars to nine billion dollars—two billion of incremental dollars. If we
receive the five billion, which will take care of the financial needs of our
standalone plan.” (Bartiromo, 2009)
Bartiromo, “Chrysler is owned by Cerberus, a private equity firm. When a
private equity outfit wins bit, it does not share its profits with the
American taxpayer.
Why should taxpayers bail out a private equity firm that rolled the dice
and is losing fast?” Nardelli,
“You know, there is a lot of mystique about private equity and what it is
they do. But to a certain degree, private equity is no different than an
aggregator of investors. No different than Fireman’s Fund, mutual funds,
etc. They collect dollars from investors and are charged with making
those investments with a fiduciary responsibility. I think it is unfair to
misrepresent their commitment and intention. I think there is a little bit of
pent-up frustration about private equity that is being vented in this
particular situation.” (Bartiromo, 2009)
Bartiromo, “But people say, look, Cerberus has cut deeply at Chrysler.
Where is the growth strategy? How come Cerberus is not investing more

9. to improve the product line and expand overseas faster?” Nardelli
responded,
“We have committed to 24 new products in the next 48 months, which
we showed the Washington auto team. We think we will be out there in a
very commanding way with multiple products, with all-electric and range-
extended electric vehicles (hybrids with a small gasoline-powered
engine). Also, Fiat has what we do not have, and they are where we are
not. They have 300 dealers in Brazil; we have 30. They have a joint
venture in Russia. They do not have competing products here in the
U.S. And I know there is a discussion about the U.S. not being
interested in small cars. But as the new guy on the block, I cannot let
Chrysler be in a position of not having products should fuel prices go
back up to four dollars a gallon. We cannot get caught in that vulnerable
position.” (Bartiromo, 2009)
Bartiromo, “As someone who has been at the top of other industries,
what do you think was the biggest mistake the U.S. auto industry
made?” Nardelli said,
“You are talking about 80 to 100 years of operation. This is a moment in
time when I think we all have to face the reality that the system is
broken, that we better all come to the party in a cooperative manner and
get on with developing a solution, because if we are not successful, the
result could be cataclysmic. If Chrysler does not survive, I am sure there
is not a domino effect that will plague the entire country.” (Bartiromo,
2009)
Bartiromo, “He begs to differ. Can Chrysler survive on its own?” Nardelli,
“In a March 20 interview on Bloomberg TV, Steve Rattner, Chief adviser
to the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry, said that from the
figures Chrysler has presented to the government, ‘there is no real
sense that the company would generate meaningful cash flow on a
standalone basis.’ Rattner also said the government is willing to consider
Chrysler’s proposal of a partnership with Fiat.’” (Bartiromo, 2009)
The decline of pickup trucks and sport utility vehicle sales forced the Big
Three automakers; Chrysler, Ford and General Motors; to Washington to
request federal loan guarantees. Under the condition to design more
fuel-efficient, smaller vehicles and cut management cost. The
government agreed to grant $25 billion in aid the Big Three vowed to

10. repay. (The auto industry bailout: When the Big Three went to
Washington, 2009) Unfortunately, $25 billion wasn’t enough to help the
automakers. The Big Three leaders, including Chrysler’s Jim Press, went
to Washington for a second time requesting financial assistance to
sustain what was going to be the worst reported quarter since 1983.
(Kiley & Welch, 2008) Again requesting $25 billion in assistance claiming
2.5 million jobs could be lost in 2009. Only 240,000 would come from the
automakers, another 800,000 from the suppliers for the automakers, and
an expected 1.4 million jobs lost as a ripple effect. (Cobb, 2009) With
Chrysler’s sales down 34 percent in October 2008, the country is asking
if it can survive the loss of Chrysler or any of the Big Three automakers.
(Kiley & Welch, 2008) The Center for Automotive Research (CAR)
released a report stating, “In economic terms, the rapid termination…
would reduce U.S. personal income by over $150.7 billion in the first
year, and generate a total loss of $398.2 billion over the course of three
years. Lost tax revenue between 2009 and 2011 would be an estimated
$156.4 billion.” (Kiley & Welch, 2008)
In an effort to save nearly three million jobs, the automakers claimed the
$25 billion was the last hope. Despite a compelling argument for the
need to save jobs and ultimately help the economy, the Big Three failed
to explain how the billions of dollars would be used. “Until they show us
the plan, we cannot show them the money,” explained House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi. (The auto industry bailout: When the Big Three went to
Washington, 2009) Chrysler and General Motors (GM) requested the
majority of funds while Ford announced it could survive 2009 without
assistance but requested access to nine billion dollars in loans. Chrysler
requested an emergency seven billion dollar loan to avoid bankruptcy.
After failed negotiations between the US House of Representatives and
US Senate, “President Bush promised GM and Chrysler $17.4 billion in
emergency loans but gave incoming president Barack Obama the
authority to demand repayment within 30 days if the companies failed to
show evidence of long-term profitability. Under the terms of the Bush
plan, the companies must reduce their debt obligations, negotiate wage
and benefit cuts with the auto unions, slash executive pay and sell all
their corporate jets.” (The auto industry bailout: When the Big Three
went to Washington, 2008)
After the wide spread financial crisis among the automotive industry
among other institutions, which required assistance from the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). The United States Government

11. Accountability Office (GAO) took an in depth look at the best methods to
manage the investment and ultimately the best time to divest. “The
Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) was created in
December 2008 to prevent a significant disruption of the U.S. automotive
industry. The United States Treasury (Treasury) has determined such a
disruption would pose a systemic risk to financial market stability and
have a negative effect on the US economy. The program requires
participating institutions to implement plans to show how they intend to
achieve long term viability.” (Brown & Clowers, 2009) Chrysler
participated in the AIFP.
This is not the first time Chrysler has had to be bailed out by the
government. In the 1970’s, Congress created financial assistance
programs worth over $12 billion to stabilize Chrysler and other
companies. The government will intervene in private markets when the
national interest is at stake. There are three fundamental principles that
serve as framework for large federal financial assistance. They include
identifying and defining the problem, determining the national interest
and setting clear goals and objectives that reflect the interest, and
protecting the government’s interest. (Brown & Clowers, 2009)
Identifying and defining the problem involves separating the issues that
require an immediate response from core challenges, which will result in
taking more time. The Treasury found Chrysler had a lack of liquidity that
needed immediate attention and provided the short term bridge loans as
part of the $17.4 billion in relief aid. It was also required of Chrysler to
develop a restructuring plan to outline how the company intended to
achieve long term financial viability. (Brown & Clowers, 2009)
Determining the national interest and setting clear goals and objectives
that reflect the interest required deciding if a legislative solution or other
intervention would best serve the national interest. After determining the
amount of jobs would be lost and the economic impact of the loss of
those jobs, Congress determined it was in the best interest of the nation
to provide assistance. Because large financial assistance is a significant
financial risk to the federal government, provisions must be in place to
protect tax payers. Four provisions include the following:
• “Concessions from others with a stake in the outcome.”
• “Controls over management, including the authority to approve
financial and operating plans and new major contracts, so that any

12. restructuring plans have realistic objectives and hold management
accountable for achieving results.”
• “Adequate collateral that, to the extent feasible, places the government
in a first-lien position in order to recoup maximum amounts of taxpayer
funds.”
• Compensation for risk through fees and/or equity participation, a
mechanism that has particularly important when programs succeed in
restoring recipients’ financial and operational health…In return for the
$62 billion in restructuring loans to Chrysler and GM, Treasury received
9.85 percent in equity in Chrysler, 60.8 percent equity and $2.1 billion in
preferred stock in GM, and $13.8 billion in debt obligations between the
two companies.” (Brown & Clowers, 2009)
GAO reported on challenges associated with the government taking
ownership in the private market. As such, there were guiding principles
for managing its TARP investment developed by the administration.
They include acting as a reluctant shareholder, not interfering in the day-
to-day management decisions of a company in which it is an investor,
ensuring a strong board of directors and exercising limited voting rights.
(Brown & Clowers, 2009)
Chrysler assumed responsibilities when accepting the TARP funds.
“Chrysler agreed to produce a portion of their vehicles in the United
States; report to US Treasury on events related to their pension plans;
and report to Treasury monthly and quarterly financial, managerial, and
operating information. Chrysler must manufacture 40 percent of its US
sales volume in the United States, or its US production volume must be
at least 90 percent of its 2008 US production volume. Chrysler’s
shareholders, including Treasury, have agreed Fiat’s equity stake in
Chrysler will increase if Chrysler meets benchmarks such as producing a
vehicle that achieves a fuel economy of 40 miles per gallon or producing
a new engine in the United States.” (Brown & Clowers, 2009) Along with
other provisions, there were major limits and stipulations to executive
pay. (Brown & Clowers, 2009)
While having the government regulate and hold an ownership interest in
Chrysler could create a conflict of interest and potentially expose the
government to external pressures. The GAO suggested having a trust
structure manage as a third party. The trust structure could hire

13. contractors with expertise in the automotive industry and could ultimately
offer a plan when to divest. (Brown & Clowers, 2009)
Residents will continue to question what could have been done to keep
Chrysler in Kenosha. Employee dedication to Chrysler apparently was
not enough. While the outlook for Fiat appears strong, the economic
impact on Kenosha has been devestating. The plan remains to eliminate
jobs at the Kenosha plant, moving them out of state and to Mexico by
the end of 2010. Kenosha residents will continue to struggle through
these difficult times.
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