Battle analysis made for MPCCC

1. The Russian Campaign in 1812 1
The Russian Campaign in 1812

2. The Russian Campaign in 1812 2
Abstract
In June of 1812, Napoleon began his fatal Russian campaign, a landmark in the history of
the destructive potential of warfare or history's first example of total war. It was a struggle
between Europe's most formidable armies, the French and Russian. They fought on an
unprecedented scale over vast expanses of territories, geographical complexity, and seasonal
climatic extremes. This Campaign began as the greatest Napoleon’s project, but due to
circumstances out of his control, a blind ambition to succeed, insufficient contingency planning
and great and unexpected Russian tactic it became his greatest disaster, finally finished on 15
December 1812 after 1100 miles long exhausted marching, trough terrain and weather
complexity.

3. The Russian Campaign in 1812 3
The Russian Campaign in 1812
At the beginning of nineteenth century, Napoleon’s power raised and almost all of
continental Europe was under his control. Part of his bid for supremacy involved destroying
Britain through a continental blockade, but the plan was stymied when Russia's Tsar Alexander
refused to comply and the invasion of Russia was an attempt to force Tsar Alexander to submit
once again to the terms of a treaty that Napoleon had imposed upon him four years earlier.
Differences between France and Russia over influence in Poland and the Balkans were also
reason for a war (Clausewitz). On June 23, 1812, Napoleon's Grande Armée, over 500,000 men
strong, poured over the Russian border. Once he sent his vast army eastward, there was no
turning back: he was sucked farther and farther into the one territory he could not conquer.
Trudging through a brutal climate in hostile lands, his men marched on toward distant Moscow.
The northern part of this hostile land form part of a glacial lakeland, stretching from
Polish Mazury to the region near Moscow. In the central part lie the Pripet Marshes. The
settlements were few, supplies sparse, and good roads almost nonexistent. On either side of the
Pripet Marshes run two upland zones with altitude not exceeding 300 metres. The lakelands and
marshlands were heavily wooded. Any army moving into Russia from western Europe (or
Russian army moving into Poland) preferred to march through one of the two uplands. The
immensity of the theater of war made garrisoning it almost impossible. The population of this
vast area was Lithuanians in the north, Byelorussians in the centre and Ukrainians in the south.
The towns were mostly Jewish. In this part of Eastern Europe, weather is characterized by
a short wet and hot summer, rainy autumn, long and very cold winter.
To overcome all these obstacles and beat the Russians, Napoleon organized his Army in
twelve Infantry Corps, Corps of Cavalry, Corps of Engineers and Imperial Guard (Old and
Young Guard) with 750,000 men under arms, 1800 cannon and 177,000 horses (Delderfield).
Only half of them were French, the rest were made up of Poles, Italians, Saxons, Bavarians,

4. The Russian Campaign in 1812 4
Swiss, Austrians, Prussians, Croats and Illyrians. About 450,000 soldiers were destined for the
actual invasion. In addition, it was the best-trained, organized and equipped army up to that time.
His Infantry used smoothbore musket Model 1777 Charleville, (a .69- caliber, 5-foot-long
, muzzle-loading). Besides guns, soldiers used a variety of swords, bayonets and pikes for close
range. Artillery had 12, 8, 6 and 4-pounders with 6- and 8-inch howitzers and vast quantities
of mortars, furnace bombs, grape and canister shots. Cavalry and Engineers used short muskets,
sabers with a 33 and 38-inch blade. Each of his Corps contained different branches, and was able
to fight independently or in interaction with other units, according two strategies developed by
Napoleon himself. Strategy of Indirect Approach, used when he had plenty of manpower and
maneuvering room and strategy of central position designed to place the army in such a position
that it could defeat detachments of the enemy in turn. To support this great army and its needs
Napoleon organized grandiose supply system composed by twenty-six battalions with 2016
wagons each drawn by horse or oxen, with depots established in rear and transportation between
depots and units. This system was dependent on the capabilities of the horses and oxen. The
French Army entered in Russia with twenty-four days worth of supplies (Nafziger); four on the
backs of the men and a further twenty days supplies in the wagons following the army. They also
developed a system of foraging.
On the opposite side, Russian Army headed by Tsar Alexander was organized in five
armies and four independent corps (Clausewitz). The irregular troops (Cossacks and militia)
were, also part of Russian Army. Strength of Russian Army involved in campaign was 220,000
(Clausewitz). The Russian Army was poor equipped, with a lack of all types of supply. Many of
young soldiers didn’t have proper training. The Army was divided, with low level of moral, but
during the campaign, the moral increased. Infantry went to war with twenty-eight different
calibers of infantry muskets with bayonets and eleven different short rifles. Artillery had 20, 12,
18 and 6-pounders cannon. Cavalry were equipped by short muskets and large range of sabers.

5. The Russian Campaign in 1812 5
Cossacks used Karamiltuk flintlock rifle and Cossack’s saber (shashka). Russian strategy was
based on strategic defense and attrition. They prepared Drissa camp for deliberate defense.
Tactics were based on scorched-earth tactics and using Cossacks to slow down and attrite the
enemy. Their supply system was well-organized for that time. They have depots in rear and
transportation between depots and units. The Russian infantrymen carried small amount of
ammunition and food in their backpacks, transports delivered larger amounts from magazines in
Russia. When the system crushed down, they simply took what they needed from the local
populace. The soldiers carried tools, which helped them during foraging and preparing the food.
Obviously, Russian army was in an inferior position; lack of supply, separation of the Army,
moral, etc. Knowing all of Russia's weaknesses and expecting a battle near Russian boundary,
the French plan was cross the Niemen, engage main body of Russian Army as soon as possible
and destroy it. After that destroy Russians flanks and force Tsar Alexander to accept Napoleon’s
peace proposal. According that plan, main body of French Army took position near Kovno, with
two corps in reserve and two corps as flanks guard (Nafziger).
Having in mind French advantages, Russian’s plan was back the struggle to a
considerable distance (entrenched Drissa camp) , thus approaching their reinforcements, gaining
time, weakening the enemy by means of detachments which he would be compelled to make, and
gaining space for strategical operations upon his flank and rear (Clausewitz). The Russian Army,
as mentioned before, was in inferior position without connection between armies, with First and
Second Army in the centre, Third Army in the north, Reserve Army in the south, Danube Army
in Moldavia and Finland Corps in Sweden.
The campaign finally started on 23 June when French Army crossed Niemen. Napoleon
sent his left flank to engage Russian’s Third Army and right flank to engage Russian’s Reserve
Army capture Minsk and establish depot in Minsk. Main body advanced to Vitepsk in order to
engage the enemy and prevent the merging of the Russian’s First and Second Army. The Russian

6. The Russian Campaign in 1812 6
Army retreated. The Second Army with Cossacks resisted the enemy in order to slow his
advancing. Napoleon’s Army, as given before, advanced and looked for decisive battle, but
Russian Army retreated and avoided to accept decisive battle. Coming to Drissa camp, Chief of
Staff of Russian Army De Tolly realized that this place is not good for defense and he ordered
retreating and meeting of First and Second Army. They met near Smolensk and he accepted
battle at Smolensk. Barkly de Tolly didn’t want to accept decisive battle, and because of that he
was under pressure. Russian’s generals hated him (he was Scot), they saw him as a foreigner and
spy. Tsar Alexander and Russian generals forced him to accept battle near Smolensk on
September 16. Of the French army, 50,000 men were engaged, on the Russian side only 30,000
men (Clausewitz). An initial probing force captured two suburbs but failed to bring the Russians
out to battle. Around dawn on the next day, Polish infantry successfully broke into the city, and
in a few hours, the main French forces entered Smolensk. Barclay retained forces on the other
side of the river preventing a crossing until the night of August 18. The French suffered 4,000-
12,000 casualties, while the Russians lost 4,500-16,000 killed, wounded and missing
(Clausewitz). Russian Army lost the battle and after that, Mikhail Kutuzov replaced de Tolly,
which is first key event- Changing in command. Kutuzov was Russian, strong character, he
continued avoiding of resistance because he was able to avoid pressure. He had a lot of
experience, he understood Russia better than any other Russian or French leader. His plan was to
sacrifice everything, use terrain and time advantages in order to save army, and win battle. On the
opposite side, Napoleon decided to rest his Army two weeks. His subordinate officers advised
him to not going deep in Russia. Firstly, he thought about retreating because in his plan,
Smolensk was designed as a farthest point in Russian depth, but his desire to succeed was
stronger then any advice, or reasonable thinking. Napoleon became over self-confident, and
forgot to have contingency plan. From this, we can learn that it is better to take the time to
imagine what can go wrong, and develop solutions to address it, and commanders must issue

7. The Russian Campaign in 1812 7
clear and concise orders so their junior leaders can understand the exact intent and what the end
state must be. Referring FM 5-0 and JP 5-0 commands have continued to develop their ability to
provide military options for contingencies. “Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise
orders to ensure thorough understanding”, (FM 3-0, Military Operations). Dissemination of
orders by de Tolly and later by Kutuzov probably surprised French and gave Russians needed
time to prepare themselves for future battles.
After Smolensk Kutuzov didn’t change anything in Russian’s tactics, his Army retreated
to Borodino (70 miles from Moscow) and he chose that place for decisive battle. The ground he
chose was excellent for defense, but he added to its strength by building centrally placed earthen
redoubts and arrow-head shaped fleches. He garrisoned his positions with some of the 640
cannons available to him and Kutuzov and his 120,000 men settled in to await the French.
Napoleon arrived with more men (133,000) but fewer guns (587) and while Marshal
Davout urged him to send in a strong flanking attack, he ignored the good advice and instead
embarked upon one of the most bloody frontal assaults of the era (Clausewitz, Nafziger). The
emperor's plan was to smash the Russians in one great battle, and so he threw his men at them
with little tactical thought (Clausewitz, Nafzger). Initially the attack went well, but as more
Russian reserves were committed, the French found themselves in a bloody battle of attrition.
Late in the morning, a bold attack by Marshal Murat's cavalry overwhelmed the fleches and
around 2 pm, a joint assault by Ney’s infantry and cavalry finally seized the crucial Raevski
Redoubt, but lacking reinforcements, they could not exploit their success. When Marshal Ney
finally broke Russian defense and asked for reinforcement, Napoleon didn’t want to risk his last
reserve and he didn’t send reinforcement which is second key event- Violation principles of war..
Delay gave Russians time to retreat, reconsolidate and reorganize. Napoleon missed chance to
convert victory into triumph and end war on the spot. He missed chance to change the course of
war and possibly the course of nineteenth century history. Exhaustion led to both sides winding

8. The Russian Campaign in 1812 8
down their efforts by 4 pm and the Russians retreated during the night having suffered 44,000
casualties. The French had 33,000 men killed and wounded but were only days off capturing the
enemy capital Moscow. Lesson learned: Commanders never leave any unit without a purpose
and when the time comes to execute, all units should have tasks to perform. According FM 3-0
there are nine principles of war but Napoleon violated one- offensive. “The surest way to achieve
decisive results is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Seizing the initiative dictates the
nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. Seizing the initiative compels an enemy to react.
Commanders use initiative to impose their will on an enemy or adversary or to control a
situation. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative are all essential to maintain the freedom
of action necessary to achieve success and exploit vulnerabilities”, FM 3-0 Military Operations.
After battle of Borodino, the Russian army could only muster half of its strength on
September 8 and was forced to retreat, leaving the road to Moscow open. Kutuzov also ordered
the evacuation of the city and took position in the south of Moscow. Population left city, took
and destroy all stuff that could be used by French This is third key events- Evacuation and
burning of Moscow. On September 14, 1812, Napoleon moved into the empty city that was
stripped of all supplies. Napoleon had expected Tsar Alexander I to offer his capitulation but the
Russian command did not think of surrendering. After entering Moscow, French Army, unhappy
with military conditions and no sign of victory, began looting what little remained within
Moscow. Already the same evening, the first fires began to break out in the city. The fires
destroyed Four-fifths of the city, depriving the French of shelter in the city (Clausewitz, Nafziger,
Delderfield). French and western historians assume that the fires were due to Russian sabotage,
but according Russian and eastern sources the fire was caused by French. Napoleon started his
long retreat by the middle of October 1812 with intention to use other way in the south, but
Russian retreat was significant for two reasons; firstly, the move was to the south and not the
east; Russians immediately began operations that would continue to deplete the French forces.

9. The Russian Campaign in 1812 9
At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov was able to force the French army into using the same
Smolensk road on which they had earlier moved East and which had been stripped of food by
both armies. This is another example of scorched-earth tactics. Continuing to block the southern
flank to prevent the French from returning by a different route, Kutuzov again
deployed partisan tactics to constantly strike at the French train where it was weakest. Light
Russian cavalry, including mounted Cossacks, together with winter and famine, assaulted and
broke up isolated French units, whose finally disaster was during crossing Berezina River. The
French Army lost the battle. French lost 370,000 dead, 200,000 POW, 1550 cannon, almost all
horses and vehicles. Russian lost 150,000 dead, 300,000 wounded (Clausewitz, Delderfield).
Contingency plan is very important part of every planning process. As we see, Russian Army
took position in the south of Moscow in order to prevent future French action. Know when to cut
losses, if Napoleon had left Moscow immediately, he may have returned with a salvageable
army. Nowadays, risk management/assessments is inseparable and mandatory part of any
Military Operations Plan.

10. The Russian Campaign in 1812 10
Summary
This campaign meet us with some new war’s characteristics; total war, combined arms
and especially importance of logistics. The Battle of Borodino was a slaughter the likes of which
would not be seen again until the first day of the Somme more than a century later. What
remained of Napoleon's army now had to endure a miserable retreat across the wintry wastes of
Russia, while his enemies aligned against him. The invasion of Russia was a turning point in the
Napoleonic Wars. The campaign reduced the French and allied invasion forces to less
than 2 % percent of their initial strength. This turned out to be a momentous turning point: not
only the beginning of the end for Napoleon's empire, but the rise of Russia's influence in world
affairs. Napoleon did his best to win this war. He didn’t lose any battle but he lost the war, due to
circumstances out of his control, partly due to a blind ambition to succeed, insufficient
contingency planning, logistics and arguably due to great Russian tactics and sacrifice.

11. The Russian Campaign in 1812 11
References
 Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, George F. Nafciger, 1963
 The retreat from Moscow, R.F. Delderfield, 1967
 Napoleonic Wars, Vincent J. Esposito and John Robert Elting, 1963
 "The Campaign of 1812 in Russia"- Karl von Clausewitz, 1843
 http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Invasion_of_Russia_1812.htm