3. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief
Many local and international NGOs already active in Haiti
Substantial UN presence, including 9,000 members of
MINUSTAH, plus multilateral agencies
Major international relief efforts:
Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (16,000 US military personnel)
Operation HESTIA (2,000 Canadian military personnel)
relief supplies and rescue teams from dozens of countries,
NGOs, and UN agencies
Efforts of Haitian government, local communities, and
people
5. The Game Lab Challenge
Design a game of military and civilian relief operations
during the 2010 Haiti earthquake.
The game should cover approximately the first month or two
of relief operations. It should address the role of US and
Canadian military personnel, UN peacekeepers and
agencies, international NGOs, and the Haitians themselves.
The game should be intended for use in professional military
education classes dealing with disaster assistance and
humanitarian relief operations; for similar use by UN agencies
and non-governmental organizations; and in relevant
university courses. The game may, or may not, have a
commercial ―hobby‖ application.
6. The Game Lab Challenge
Conference participants will be divided into three teams,
and given about three hours for the task (Thursday 1620-
1900).
We don’t expect a prototype game. Rather, we would ask
each group to come up with the basics of a design concept
and approach.
The game may, or may not, have a commercial ―hobby‖
application.
Later, the Game Lab Working Group will meet (Wednesday
1410-1700) to prepare a brief-back that examines the various
design choices taken by the different groups.
The brief-back will be presented at the end of the conference
(Thursday 0910-1000)
7. The Game Lab Challenge
Key considerations:
Keep in mind the intended audiences and purposes of the
game.
Develop a game system that generates understanding of the
capabilities, constraints, and perspectives of each major set of
actors.
Highlight key operational priorities and pressing humanitarian
needs.
Encourage the development of assessment, coordination, and
planning skills that would be useful in future joint humanitarian
operations.
Assure that the player(s) do not lose sight of the fact most
disaster relief is undertaken by disaster-affected populations
themselves.
8. The Game Lab Challenge
Resources:
Subject-matter expertise
David Becker (US State Department, retired)
Maj Tyrell Mayfield (USAF)
CPT Joshua Riojas (US Army)
others
Reports, studies, briefings, and maps
Available online at the Wargaming Connection blog:
http://wargamingcommunity.wordpress.com/2012/07/09/co
nnections-game-lab-2012-haiti-earthquake-scenario/
No wifi in conference room (but some printed copies of the
material will be available)
9. The Game Lab Challenge
After the conference:
Volunteer group to work out a design, with the intention of
having a playable prototype ready for Connections 2013.
possible online collaboration via MMOWGLI
11. Key Issues
David Becker
Spent three years at the US Embassy in Haiti serving as Stabilization
Coordinator and Political Counselor to the US Ambassador, leading an
experimental interagency DOD-funded program to restore Haitian
government control to ungoverned violent urban slums by integrating
security and development programs.
In the aftermath of the earthquake, he served as the Political Advisor to
the commander of US military relief efforts in Haiti, encouraging and
shaping emergency relief efforts that would benefit Haiti over the long
term.
Spent 21 of the last 27 years overseas in some of the world's most under-
developed countries supporting security sector reform and local
development efforts, most particularly in Guatemala and Colombia.
Prior to Haiti, he served as the Political Advisor to the 4-star Commander
of US Transportation Command from 2004-2006 supporting US forces
deployed around the world, including military support for two other
major disasters.
12. Key Issues
The Decapitation Problem
Haiti was an extreme example, virtually unique... up to now.
Loss of government, loss of UN leadership, loss of
communications, electricity, water, roads closed, port and
airport closed, etc.
Led to greater than usual confusion, even for a big disaster.
Usually the local government is merely overwhelmed—not
buried.
This is almost a nuclear attack scenario, not the ―usual‖
natural disaster scenario.
13. Key Issues
Is there an adversary in this game? Perhaps it’s us.
Many different viewpoints on needs and priorities.
People are people. Some looting. Hoarding, resale and
waste are common.
Local officials may jostle to increase power or position
themselves for future elections.
Smaller NGOs may arrive to help without funding or
capacity, and needing publicity to generate resources.
Donors need to justify their funding, which leads to concern
with publicity and metrics.
Military has its own shortcomings.
14. Key Issues
Urban disasters are different.
Many responders had experience in other locations such as Sudan,
or Chad, or Congo.
Rural areas often have large camps, with entry controls and
registration, approved by host govt.
PAP: camps sprang up everywhere, vacant lots, blocked streets
Camp shopping : People registered early and often, spread
survivors out over several sites
NGO shopping: People would move to wherever an NGO was
offering better services (free school, solar lights, etc).
15. Key Issues
Becker’s Second Law of Disaster Dynamics: For every positive
action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.
Emergency response: First responders hire many locals to strengthen
their capacity and save lives
Hire skilled people to do the best job – thus undermined the local
health system, making it harder to rebuild the local system.
More than 30% of local doctors and medical administrators
moved to work for NGOs in the month after the quake.
SPHERE standards: Set minimums for refugee/displaced treatment –
meters of space, liters of water, etc.
Standards were often higher than what existed before the
quake. (Porta potty syndrome)
Encouraged people to move to camps, rather than fix houses
16. Key Issues
Those who get aid often need it least.
Women, children, elderly, disabled are often the least able
to show up at distribution points, or otherwise are not easy to
find.
Should you distribute quickly to those you can see, or
distribute slowly but more carefully?
17. Key Issues
Assistance potentially undermines stability and development
In PAP, some zones that suffered little destruction were the poorest –
they had little to lose, and a tin shack withstands an earthquake
better than a cement building. Yet the people there were already
desperate, and any disturbance in the economy affects them
quickly.
Yet those who had lost homes, family members and possessions feel
they have a claim on incoming resources that the others do not.
Once lower middle class, they are now impoverished.
This problem increases social tensions in an already tense and
unstable society . Misguided aid efforts can lead to a new explosion
18. Key Issues
Assistance potentially undermines stability and development
Many poor neighborhoods had local assistance organizations, or
resilience networks established long before the quake (school food
systems, local self help work parties, local NGOs, leaders with
contacts).
First responder NGOs often bypassed those networks
From ignorance
Unwilling to support local patronage systems,
NGO needed publicity (funding) that would not be available
by working with locals.
This undermined the networks that in some cases were crucial to
maintaining order and stability, as well as providing sustainable
social services.
19. Key Issues
Migration: a problem or a solution?
One US priority was to prevent Haitian boat departures
Population movement out of PAP was large – 500,000 left in
the first 2 weeks. The government and the donors wanted to
keep them out of PAP, but never delivered significant
support for them to the countryside. Focus was on capital.
People returned over time, when jobs and assistance began
to appear in PAP. Probably a lost opportunity.
20. Key Issues
Coordination
The cluster coordination system of the UN and HADR NGOs is
designed to be suboptimal. It is designed to ensure that even the
least NGO will have a seat at the table, regardless of efficiency or
effectiveness. In Haiti, it was so unwieldy that separate informal
coordination systems were designed to get around the cluster
system. Yet it is considered the best system that anyone can devise.
One positive aspect of the military presence was the number of
skilled staff officers that were able to contribute by simply being
available 24/7. Most NGO and organizations are not staffed to work
the 24/7 coordination issues that come UN up, yet the US military
was able (despite inexperience, lack of languages, etc) to staff
rotating schedules and distribute information regularly.
21. Key Issues
The CNN Effect
Live TV looked for and found problems
DC policymakers were watching from their desks
Haitians watch TV too
Generated a constant stream of requests for information,
demands and orders from DC, at highest levels.
Senior civilian staff in Haiti had to respond, rather than
focus on overall effort
Military did better, Pentagon did not micromanage
23. Design Considerations
What requirements and constraints are generated by the
game’s (educational) purpose?
content
time and complexity
varied, multiple users
Format
Manual? Digital? TERP?
Boardgame? Card game? RPG?
24. Design Considerations
Level of analysis.
National? PAP? variable depth?
How many players? Who are they?
What are they key objectives? Resources? Dilemmas and
Trade-offs?
What sectors to represent? (rescue, medical, food, WASH, shelter..
others?)
25. Design Considerations
Representing the synergies and the benefits of coordination—in
game terms.
How does one depict this? Spatially? Abstracted system?
Importance of logistics.
Political constraints.
Introducing uncertainty. Modeling confusion.
Immersion and engagement.
Notes de l'éditeur
At 1653 on Tuesday, 12 January 2010 a devastating Magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit the impoverished country of Haiti. Between 100,000 and 300,00 people died in the quake and its aftermath, a quarter of a million buildings were destroyed, and over 1 million were made homeless. that haiti was already a very poor country with weak government capacity only compounded the problem.
At 1653 on Tuesday, 12 January 2010 a devastating Magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit the impoverished country of Haiti. Between 100,000 and 300,00 people died in the quake and its aftermath, a quarter of a million buildings were destroyed, and over 1 million were made homeless. that haiti was already a very poor country with weak government capacity only compounded the problem.
Scrounging is not the same as looting, although the press called it that. Very little looting. Very little crime, at first. Typical for disasters. But fear of breakdown in Haiti was very high. Some areas got lots of help, some got little. Cynics attributed it to location and profile of the zone. Attention driven. Unlike some NGOS, US military is able to support itself, but in doing so, takes up space on the runway or port that might be used for “real relief.” Some Latin foreign militaries discovered they could not support themselves. Never deployed outside of their country without UN support as UN peacekeeper troops.Military created certain expectations – “82 Airborne effect.” Lot of NGO and UN resistance at first, great suspicion at US takeover of disaster. Early on, “dueling org charts phenomenom.” Later, really just trying to chart what was already happening on the ground.
NGOs saw the disaster-affected count climbing unstoppably, reaching 2 million. Everyone knew that was too many, but no one could come up with a way to sort out the duplicates. (Visit camp at 5am, tear down the empty tents – was seen as too brutal.) Some camps shrank as people saw that NGOs were ignoring them. (Out of sight, poor access) Some moved to worse locations, but got attention at least. Issue of unequal services, goods, and even unequal pay was a problem in many ways. Some NGOs expect camp occupants to clean their own areas, others pay people to do it.
This was the first disaster where I had ever experienced this to this degree. Live TV coverage drove incessant requests for information from DC and other capitals, and required inordinate amounts of time to respond to whatever immediate problem appeared on the screens in the US. Journalists were constantly looking to find something that was not working well and expose it “so it could be fixed.” That is their job. However, it also meant that senior leadership (US Ambassador, etc) was constantly fielding a barrage of orders to “do something,” rather than being able to focus on the overall effort.