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Resource
Certification (RPKI)
Making BGP more secure
SEE2 - Macedonia
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
The RIPE NCC involvement in RPKI
• The authority on who is the registered holder of
an Internet Number Resource in our region
– IPv4 and IPv6 Address Blocks
– Autonomous System Numbers
• Information is kept in the Registry
• Accuracy and completeness are key
2
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Digital Resource Certificates
• Based on open IETF standards (sidr)
– RFC 5280: X.509 PKI Certificates
– RFC 3779: Extensions for IP Addresses and ASNs
– RFC 6481-6493: Resource Public Key Infrastructure
• Issued by the RIRs since 1 January 2011
• State that an Internet number resource has
been registered by the RIPE NCC
3
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Digital Resource Certificates
• Resource Certification is a free, opt-in service
– Your choice to request a certificate
– Linked to registration
– Renewed every 12 months
• Enhancement to our Registry
– Offers validatable proof of holdership
4
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Management: Your Choice
• Open Source Software to run a member CA
– Use the RIPE NCC as parent CA (trust anchor)
– Generate and publish Certificate yourself
• RIPE NCC Hosted Platform
– All processes are secured and automated
– One click set-up of Resource Certificate
– WebUI to manage Certificates in LIR Portal
5
Using RPKI for
BGP Origin Validation
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Certification to Secure Internet Routing
• Members can use their resource certificate to
make statements about their BGP Routing
• Also in the ROA: Maximum Prefix Length
– The smallest prefix the ASN may announce
7
Route Origin Authorisation (ROA):
“I authorise this Autonomous System
to originate these IP prefixes”
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Route Origin Authorisations
• A ROA affects the RPKI validity of a BGP route:
– VALID: ROA found, authorised announcement
– INVALID: ROA found, unauthorised announcement
– UNKNOWN: No ROA found (resource not yet signed)
8
Every operator is free to base any routing
decision on these three validity states
Demo
Using the hosted system...
Making routing
decisions
using the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Validation in Practice
• All certificates and ROAs are published in a
repository and available for download
• Software running on your own machine will
periodically retrieve and verify the information
– Cryptographic tools check all the signatures
• The result is a list of all valid combinations of
ASN and prefix, the “validated cache”
11
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator toolset
• http://ripe.net/certification/tools-and-resources
• Requires Sun Java 1.6 and rsync
• No installation required
– Unzip the package
– Run the program: ./bin/rpki-validator
• Web-interface available on localhost port 8080
12
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator toolset
13
Demo
Using the RPKI Validator...
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
RPKI support in routers
• The RPKI-RTR Protocol is an IETF Internet Draft
• Production Cisco Support:
– ASR1000, 7600, ASR903 and ASR901
in releases 15.2(1)S or XE 3.5
• Cisco Early Field Trial (EFT):
– ASR9000, CRS1, CRS3 and c12K (IOS-XR)
• Juniper has support since version 12.2
• Quagga has support through BGP-SRX
15
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Router Configuration – Cisco
!
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 10
match rpki invalid
set local-preference 90
!
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 20
match rpki not-found
set local-preference 100
!
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 30
match rpki valid
set local-preference 110
16
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
Public Testbeds
• RIPE NCC has a Cisco:
– Telnet to rpki-rtr.ripe.net
– Username: ripe, no password
• Kaia Global Networks have a Juniper:
– Telnet to 193.34.50.25
– Username: rpki, password: testbed
• http://ripe.net/certification/router-configuration
17
Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia
http://ripe.net/certification
#RPKI
Information and Announcements
18
Questions?
alexb@ripe.net
@alexander_band
certification@ripe.net

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RPKI Certification Tutorial

  • 1. Resource Certification (RPKI) Making BGP more secure SEE2 - Macedonia
  • 2. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia The RIPE NCC involvement in RPKI • The authority on who is the registered holder of an Internet Number Resource in our region – IPv4 and IPv6 Address Blocks – Autonomous System Numbers • Information is kept in the Registry • Accuracy and completeness are key 2
  • 3. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Digital Resource Certificates • Based on open IETF standards (sidr) – RFC 5280: X.509 PKI Certificates – RFC 3779: Extensions for IP Addresses and ASNs – RFC 6481-6493: Resource Public Key Infrastructure • Issued by the RIRs since 1 January 2011 • State that an Internet number resource has been registered by the RIPE NCC 3
  • 4. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Digital Resource Certificates • Resource Certification is a free, opt-in service – Your choice to request a certificate – Linked to registration – Renewed every 12 months • Enhancement to our Registry – Offers validatable proof of holdership 4
  • 5. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Management: Your Choice • Open Source Software to run a member CA – Use the RIPE NCC as parent CA (trust anchor) – Generate and publish Certificate yourself • RIPE NCC Hosted Platform – All processes are secured and automated – One click set-up of Resource Certificate – WebUI to manage Certificates in LIR Portal 5
  • 6. Using RPKI for BGP Origin Validation
  • 7. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Certification to Secure Internet Routing • Members can use their resource certificate to make statements about their BGP Routing • Also in the ROA: Maximum Prefix Length – The smallest prefix the ASN may announce 7 Route Origin Authorisation (ROA): “I authorise this Autonomous System to originate these IP prefixes”
  • 8. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Route Origin Authorisations • A ROA affects the RPKI validity of a BGP route: – VALID: ROA found, authorised announcement – INVALID: ROA found, unauthorised announcement – UNKNOWN: No ROA found (resource not yet signed) 8 Every operator is free to base any routing decision on these three validity states
  • 10. Making routing decisions using the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
  • 11. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Validation in Practice • All certificates and ROAs are published in a repository and available for download • Software running on your own machine will periodically retrieve and verify the information – Cryptographic tools check all the signatures • The result is a list of all valid combinations of ASN and prefix, the “validated cache” 11
  • 12. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator toolset • http://ripe.net/certification/tools-and-resources • Requires Sun Java 1.6 and rsync • No installation required – Unzip the package – Run the program: ./bin/rpki-validator • Web-interface available on localhost port 8080 12
  • 13. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator toolset 13
  • 14. Demo Using the RPKI Validator...
  • 15. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia RPKI support in routers • The RPKI-RTR Protocol is an IETF Internet Draft • Production Cisco Support: – ASR1000, 7600, ASR903 and ASR901 in releases 15.2(1)S or XE 3.5 • Cisco Early Field Trial (EFT): – ASR9000, CRS1, CRS3 and c12K (IOS-XR) • Juniper has support since version 12.2 • Quagga has support through BGP-SRX 15
  • 16. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Router Configuration – Cisco ! route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 10 match rpki invalid set local-preference 90 ! route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 20 match rpki not-found set local-preference 100 ! route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 30 match rpki valid set local-preference 110 16
  • 17. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia Public Testbeds • RIPE NCC has a Cisco: – Telnet to rpki-rtr.ripe.net – Username: ripe, no password • Kaia Global Networks have a Juniper: – Telnet to 193.34.50.25 – Username: rpki, password: testbed • http://ripe.net/certification/router-configuration 17
  • 18. Resource Certification (RPKI) – SEE2 Macedonia http://ripe.net/certification #RPKI Information and Announcements 18