Web 2.0 Human Contributions Incentives
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The document discusses human motivation and incentives for contributing to Web 2.0 platforms. It covers theories of motivation like need theories, job characteristics approach, and reinforcement theory. It also discusses intrinsic and extrinsic motivations as well as designing incentive systems using game theory and mechanism design. A case study is presented on designing incentives for semantic annotation at a research organization through workshops, interviews, and a lab experiment comparing incentive systems.
![Web 2.0 and incentives for human-driven contributions Roberta Cuel Univeristy of Trento and KIT roberta.cuel @unitn.it [email_address]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kit-111115141715-phpapp02/85/insemtives-at-the-kit-1-320.jpg)
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Web 2.0 Human Contributions Incentives
- 1. Web 2.0 and incentives for human-driven contributions Roberta Cuel Univeristy of Trento and KIT roberta.cuel @unitn.it [email_address]
- 10. Porter and Lawler model Value of rewards Perceived effort -reward probability Effort Performance Abilities Organizational context Extrinsic rewards Intrinsic rewards Satisfaction Equity perception
- 12. Intrinsic / Extrinsic motivations Kaufman, Schulze, Veit (Mannheim University)
- 15. The incentive context matrix
- 16. Motivations: another study In the case of MTurk
- 18. A procedural ordering of methods to develop incentive compatible applications
- 21. A CASE STUDY
- 22. Telefónica Investigación y Desarrollo (TID - Spain)
- 28. PD workshops and HCI analysis
- 31. The lab www.insemtives.eu 36
- 37. First results 2/23/11 www.insemtives.eu 42
- 38. First results In WTA treatment, 76 % of subjects make more annotations than the average number of annotations in PPT scenario. Anyway, there are several subjects in both scenarios that make few annotations. This suggests that WTA incentive system does not provide the same incentives to all subjects.
- 39. The results 2/23/11 www.insemtives.eu 44 3 5 This suggests that WTA scenario spurs subjects to perform at their very best. At the same time, under PPT incentive system subjects seem to be less interested in the final result and tend to coordinate at lower levels of productivity.
- 44. “ Incentivizing the tool”
- 50. A procedural ordering of methods to develop incentive compatible applications
Editor's Notes
- Nash and travelling salesman
- Nash and travelling salesman
- MARKUS
- We start with the laboratory experiment with University students Doing the experiment in experimental laboratory requires us to provide incentives to students to participate. They are not our friends that give us a favor to test the software or students in our course that earn course credit – it is not what we want. We want subjects that are neutral to us and to the task and that will reply only to the incentive structure that we provide. There is a fee that we need to pay to students no matter what just to maintain reputation of the laboratory to be sure that students will keep coming to the experiments organized also by other researchers. You can think of environments where you can run the test and don’t pay the participation fee but offer only the flexible part (Mechanicle Turk?) Don’t look at the €5 but concentrate on the flexible part of the payment
- 36 students – randomly assigned, no previous experience required, no knowledge of the tool We used the Telefonica annotation application to annotate images Notice, however, that for the first testing of our incentive system we do not really need the real tool. We can also do it with some other task that can be percieved as similar in terms of effort.
- T-student = 2.58, p-value = 0.0089 assuming unequal variance F-test for the significance of the difference between the Variances of the two samples F=2.34, p-value = 0,042
- (Leon Festinger, 1954) (Bram Buunk and Thomas Mussweiler 2001, Jerry Suls, Rene Martin, and Ladd Wheeler 2002), (Solomon E. Asch 1956, George A. Akerlof 1980, Stephen R. G. Jones 1984, Douglas Bernheim 1994).
- (Leon Festinger, 1954) (Bram Buunk and Thomas Mussweiler 2001, Jerry Suls, Rene Martin, and Ladd Wheeler 2002), (Solomon E. Asch 1956, George A. Akerlof 1980, Stephen R. G. Jones 1984, Douglas Bernheim 1994).