Slideshow presented at the Moscow conference on missile defence, May 2012.

1. International Conference
«Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security
Environment»
VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE
DEFENSE ISSUES
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation – First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation, Army General N.E.MAKAROV
Moscow, 2012

2. 1
Russian Core BMD Guidelines
Equal and
Solid linkage
indivisible Mutual nuclear
between strategic
security as crucial deterrence is key
offensive and
feature of regional to global security
defensive
and global and stability
weapon systems
security

3. 2
FUNDAMENTALS OF ABM TREATY OF 1972
The Treaty had the USSR and the USA committed:
 to limit their Missile Defense systems;
 not to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense system;
 not to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areas;
 not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD
systems;
 not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.

4. 3
US SDI PROGRAM
BOOST-PHASE
BOOST-BASED SURVERLANCE &
SPACE-BASED SURVERLANCE & TRAKING SYSTEM
INTERCEPTOR TRACKING SYSTEM NEUTRAL
PARTICLE
BEAM
RELAY
MIRROR
FRONTING
MIRROR
SPACE-BASED
SPACE-BASED LASER
SURVERLANCE &
TRACKING SYSTEM
GRAUND- GRAUND-BASED
BASED RADAR
HIGH ENDO-
INTERCEPTOR
ATMOSPHERIC
DEFENSE
GRAUND-
BASED INTERCEPTOR
LASER
BATTLE
MANAGTR
The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting
the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .

5. ABMD AGREEMENTS OF 1990-s 4
Joint US-Russian statement on Joint statement of Presidents of Provision on Standing
global protection system the Russian Federation and the Consultative Commission
(Washington, 17th of June 1992) United States of America (New-York, 26th of September 1997)
regarding Agreement on Ballistic
Missile Defense
(Helsinki, 21st of March 1997)
First agreed statement General understanding to the Second agreed statement
regarding Agreement between first agreed statement of 26 regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on September 1997 regarding the USSR and the USA on
limitation of ABMD systems, Agreement between the USSR limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972 and the USA on limitation of dated 26th of May 1972.
(New-York, 26th of September 1997) ABMD systems, dated 26th of (New-York, 26th of September 1997)
May 1972
General understanding to the Agreement on confidence- Memorandum of understanding
second agreed statement building measures regarding regarding Agreement between
dated 26th of September 1997 systems for fighting Ballistic the USSR and the USA on
regarding Agreement between Missiles, which are not strategic limitation of ABMD systems,
the USSR and the USA on ballistic missiles dated 26th of May 1972.
limitation of ABMD systems, (New-York, 25th of September 1997) (New-York, 26th of September 1997
dated 26th of May 1972.

6. 5
PLANS OF THE USA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIRD POSITIONING AREA
Possible trajectories of
Russian ICBMs
Kozelsk
Tatistchevo
TPA defense
zone
Radar ‘s
range in
Czech
Republic

7. 6
DECLARED PHASES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US BMD SYSTEM IN EUROPE (NATO BMD)
Phase I(2011) PhaseII (2011-2015) Phase III (2015-2018) Phase IV (2018-2020)
- deployment of MD -deployment of MD base -deployment of MD base - outfitting deployed MD
ships with with «Standard-3» with «Standard-3» 2А shooters in Europe with
«Standard-3» 1А interceptors 1B in interceptors in Poland. «Standard-3» 2B
interceptors in Aegean, Romania. Outfitting deployed MD interceptors.
Adriatic and shooters with
Mediterranean seas. «Standard-3» 2А
interceptors.
Protection of South Protection of South and Protection of Protection of
European States from South-East European European states from European states from
States from shorter range
shorter range intermediate range ICBMs
missiles
missiles missiles

8. RUSSIAN “SECTORAL” APPROACH 7
BM trajectories do not
cross NATO BMD
area of responsibility
NATO area of
responsibility RUSSIAN AREA OF
(NATO BMD assets only) RESPONSIBILITY
(RUSSIAN BMD assets
only)
Territoies of European
states (NATO members)
covered by Russian BMD,
where deployment of
NATO BMD challenges
Russian Strategic Nuclear
Force capabilities
NATO-RUSSIA JOINT SYSTEM OF COMBAT CONTROL
(information exchange and target distribution)

9. 8
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE
European MD The Russian Federation NATO approach («cooperative
Concurrence
system element proposal («sectoral system»)
of views
approach»)
Joint sector wise area Two independent areas
Defense area No
Responsible for interception NATO responsible for NATO
Responsibility of any BM attacking Europe territory, No
in its «sector» Russia – for Russian territory
Full data sharing on shooter Limited data sharing on missile
performances, missile threats, joint exercises
Information No
threats, target distribution,
results assessment
All BMs within the area of Only the BM attacking the area of
Missile kills responsibility responsibility (including adjacent No
area)
Decision to National level National level
Yes
engage
Not required (possible Possible ( with NATO and Russian
«Buffer» zone outside of Russian BM areas overlapping to embrace No
trajectories) Russian territory)

10. RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS
9
CRITERIA LIST:
technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number of
interceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.),
deployment sites,
capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminal
phases of flight.
joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the
relevant strategic deterrence capabilities
development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities
legally binding agreements defining mutual obligations of the pertinent
parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all
participants

11. 10
RETALIATORY MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDRATION
to increase defense of fixed launching sites,
to ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers,
to increase readiness of deployed BM platforms,
to increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense,
to decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time,
to increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification
by Russian AD and BMD assets,
to employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets,
to ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets (interceptors
launchers, command & control posts, outer-space detection means).
All said measures will be implemented only as retaliatory steps provided a
threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force from the US and NATO
deployed BMD assets appears to be on the rise. Russian response will be
adequate, economically well-balanced and effective.