A comparative analysis of three social policy regimes and their responsiveness to demographic and political change between 1990 and 2010.

1.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
Stability
in
a
Changing
World:
The
Social
Policy
Regimes
of
Germany,
Sweden
and
South
Africa
The
use
of
typologies
as
theoretical
frameworks
in
comparative
social
policy
research
has
become
widespread.1
Two
such
theoretical
frameworks,
that
of
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen
and
Ian
Gough
and
Geoff
Wood
will
be
used
here
to
describe,
compare
and
contrast
three
social
policy
regimes;
Germany,
Sweden
and
South
Africa.
Differences
and
similarities
between
those
regimes
will
be
located
in
their
responses
to
the
various
pressures
for
change
that
most
if
not
all
social
policy
regimes
have
faced,
to
varying
degrees,
within
the
last
twenty
years.
Frameworks
of
Analysis
Esping-­‐Andersen,
building
on
the
work
of
Richard
Titmuss,2
developed
a
framework
for
the
purpose
of
comparing
welfare
state
regimes.
Critical
of
studies
that
ranked
welfare
states
solely
on
expenditure
levels,
he
sought
to
explore
the
actual
structure
and
content
of
those
regimes.3
He
argued
that
in
order
to
understand
a
particular
country’s
social
policies
we
must
look
to
its
prevailing
social
and
institutional
structures,
themselves
a
result
of
diverse
historical
and
political
processes.4
The
most
crucial
process
he
identified
in
this
regard
was
the
ideological
competition
between
rival
versions
of
the
‘Good
Society,’
which
could
be
measured
by
the
content
of
the
social
rights
granted
by
individual
Western
countries
during
the
twentieth-­‐century.5
Such
rights,
for
1
Helen
Bolderson
and
Deborah
Mabbett,
‘Theories
and
Methods
in
Comparative
Social
Policy,’
in
J.
Clasen
(ed.),
Comparative
Social
Policy:
Concepts,
Theories
and
Methods,
Oxford,
Blackwell,
1999,
pp.
44-­‐47.
2
Titmuss
distinguished
three
models
of
social
policy
regimes
–
the
institutional
redistributive
model,
the
industrial
achievement
model,
and
the
residual
welfare
model.
For
an
in
depth
discussion
of
these
models,
see
Michael
Hill,
Social
Policy
in
the
Modern
World,
Oxford,
Blackwell,
2006,
p.
27.
3
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
The
Three
Worlds
of
Welfare
Capitalism,
Cambridge,
Polity
Press,
1990,
p.
156.
4
ibid,
p.
4.
5
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
‘Towards
the
Good
Society,
Once
Again?’
in
G.
Esping-­‐
Andersen
(ed.),
Why
We
Need
a
New
Welfare
State,
Oxford,
Oxford
University
Press,
2002,
pp.
1-­‐2.
1

2.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
Esping-­‐Andersen,
bring
about
different
degrees
of
‘de-­‐commodification,’
or
a
lessening
of
the
importance
of
the
market
in
the
provision
of
a
citizen’s
welfare,
while
at
the
same
time
perpetuating
class
divisions
through
‘social
stratification’.6
Recognising
that
countries
exhibiting
similar
social,
ideological
and
institutional
development
paths
tend
to
have
comparable
measurements
for
these
indicators,
Esping-­‐Andersen
devised
typologies
under
which
different
welfare
state
regimes
could
be
‘clustered’
and
subsequently
compared.7
Using
this
framework,
Esping-­‐Andersen
identified
three
Weberian
ideal
types.
Firstly,
the
Liberal
welfare
state,
rooted
in
the
rigid
belief
of
the
primacy
of
the
market,
is
predominately
based
around
modest
means-­‐tested
social
assistance,
with
the
state
essentially
providing
a
safety
net.
Secondly,
the
Conservative/Corporatist
welfare
state,
which
initially
granted
social
rights
on
the
basis
of
social
status
in
an
attempt
to
entrench
existing
differentials,
is
characterized
by
state-­‐led
development
of
social
policy
institutions
and
social
insurance
systems
tied
to
work
contribution
levels.
Lastly,
the
Social
Democratic
welfare
state,
heavily
rooted
in
the
principles
of
egalitarianism
and
universalism,
extended
social
rights
to
all
as
part
of
a
commitment
to
welfare
provision
irrespective
of
a
citizen’s
class
or
position
in
the
market.8
While
no
country
represents
a
pure
example
of
these
states,
countries
can
be
classified
into
regime
clusters
based
upon
the
extent
to
which
they
approach
one
of
these
ideal
types.9
Esping-­‐Andersen’s
framework
has
been
criticized
on
several
grounds,
one
of
which
is
important
to
the
current
study.
Gough
and
Wood,
while
acknowledging
the
usefulness
of
Esping-­‐Andersen’s
framework,
suggested
rightly
that
its
‘Western
centric’
underpinnings
exclude
the
welfare
6
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
‘Three
Worlds
of
Welfare
Capitalism,’
in
F.G.
Castles
and
C.
Pierson
(eds.),
The
Welfare
State:
A
Reader,
Oxford,
Blackwell,
2000,
p.
157.
7
Michael
Hill,
Social
Policy,
p.
27.
8
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
The
Three
Worlds
of
Welfare
Capitalism,
pp.
26-­‐27.
9
Ian
Gough,
‘Welfare
Regimes
in
Development
Contexts:
a
Global
and
Regional
Analysis,’
in
I.
Gough
and
Geoff
Wood
et
al
(eds.),
Insecurity
and
Welfare
Regimes
in
Asia,
Africa
and
Latin
America
:
Social
Policy
in
Development
Contexts,
Cambridge,
Cambridge
University
Press,
2004,
p.
22.
2

3.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
arrangements
of
the
Global
South.
In
order
to
facilitate
analysis
of
such
arrangements
within
Esping-­‐Andersen’s
framework,
they
argue
that
a
wider
conception
of
social
policy,
in
which
it
is
formulated
by
a
variety
of
actors
and
not
just
the
state,
is
required.
Owing
to
quite
dissimilar
historical
and
political
processes
from
those
in
the
West,
regimes
in
the
South
are
characterized
by
a
different
combination
of
state,
family
and
market
welfare
provision,
or
‘welfare
mix.’10
Under
their
extended
framework,
Gough
and
Wood
identified
three
regime
clusters
on
a
global
scale;
the
welfare
state
regime
(including
Esping-­‐
Andersen’s
three
ideal
types
with
some
additions),
informal
security
regimes,
and
insecurity
regimes.11
Three
Social
Policy
Regimes
(i)
Germany
Using
Esping-­‐Andersen’s
framework,
the
German
‘social
state’12
can
be
classified
within
the
Conservative/Corporatist
regime
cluster
due
to
three
key
elements
of
Germany’s
social
policy
regime.
Firstly,
as
discussed,
a
common
element
of
Conservative/Corporatist
regimes
is
that
the
initial
granting
of
social
rights
by
the
state
was
intended
to
entrench
class
and
status
differentials,
and
that
this
conservative
infancy
informs
the
present
day
regime.13
In
Germany,
Chancellor
Otto
von
Bismarck
introduced
a
state-­‐led
social
insurance
scheme
in
the
1880s
in
order
to
negate
the
perceived
threat
to
the
traditional
order
from
socialism
on
the
one
hand,
and
laissez-­‐faire
economics
on
the
other.
Under
it,
those
employed
in
the
workforce
contribute
to
a
social
insurance
fund,
the
10
ibid,
pp.
21-­‐26.
11
For
an
in
depth
discussion
of
the
characteristics
of
these
regimes
see
especially
ibid,
p.
34.
While
we
do
not
have
space
here
to
describe
these
regimes
in
detail,
it
is
sufficient
here
to
note
them;
insecurity
regimes
will
be
explored
in
greater
detail
in
relation
to
the
South
African
social
policy
regime
later
in
this
study.
12
Due
to
the
term
‘welfare
state’
having
negative
connotations
in
Germany
until
the
1950s
it
is
more
commonly
referred
to
as
the
‘social
state.’
Germans
feel
that
such
a
term
embodies
a
commitment
to
social
justice.
Jochen
Clasen
and
Richard
Freeman,
‘The
German
Social
State:
an
Introduction’,
in
J.
Clasen
and
R.
Freeman
(ed.),
Social
Policy
in
Germany,
New
York,
Harvester
Wheatsheaf,
1994,
p.
10.
13
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
The
Three
Worlds
of
Welfare
Capitalism,
p.
27.
3

4.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
benefits
levels
of
which
are
determined
by
occupational
class.
While
expansion
and
moderate
reform
has
occurred
throughout
Germany’s
distinct
historical
periods
of
the
twentieth-­‐century,
to
which
we
shall
return
later,
the
conservative
institutional
structure
of
its
regime
has
essentially
remained
unchanged
to
the
present
day.14
A
second
key
element
of
the
German
‘social
state,’
as
identified
by
Esping-­‐
Andersen,
is
the
pervasiveness
of
Catholic
social
teachings.
The
Catholic
Church,
as
a
significant
provider
of
social
services,
has
historically
been
and
still
very
influential
in
the
formulation
of
social
policy,
especially
as
relates
to
social
care
and
family
social
reproduction.
Hence,
the
traditional
male
bread
winner/female
caregiver
model
forms
the
basis
of
transfers
and
service
provision.
The
state’s
role
in
provision
is
thus
fairly
limited,
largely
taking
the
form
of
welfare
transfers,
with
services
primarily
provided
either
by
the
family,
or
by
voluntary
organisations
such
as
the
Church.15
Thirdly,
the
corporatist
structure
of
economic,
political
and
social
organisation
in
Germany
forms
a
key
element
of
the
‘social
state’.
Under
German
corporatism,
interaction
between
state
and
society
takes
place
in
part
through
inter-­‐mediatory
bodies
such
as
voluntary
welfare
organisations,
the
Catholic
Church,
and
trade
unions,
on
the
basis
of
negotiation
and
consensus.
These
bodies
are
afforded
privileged
and
institutional
access
to
policy
formulation.
For
example,
the
Red
Cross,
who
acts
as
a
service
provider
in
service
centres
and
hospitals,
is
also
a
political
actor
with
a
seat
on
the
administrative
board
of
Children
and
Youth
Services,
a
nominally
state
body.16
Underlying
German
corporatism
is
the
Christian
democratic
principle
of
‘subsidiarity,’
whereby
the
role
of
the
state
in
the
social
realm
is
subsidiary
to
that
of
firstly
the
family,
and
14
Lutz
Leisering,
‘Germany:
Reform
from
Within,’
in
P.
Alcock
and
G.
Craig
(eds.),
International
Social
Policy:
Welfare
Regimes
in
the
Developed
World,
New
York,
Palgrave,
2001,
p.
161.
15
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
‘Welfare
States
without
Work:
the
Impasse
of
Labour
Shedding
and
Familialism
in
Continental
European
Social
Policy,’
in
G.
Esping-­‐
Andersen
(ed.),
Welfare
States
in
Transition:
National
Adaptations
in
Global
Economies,
London,
SAGE,
1996,
p.
67.
16
Lutz
Leisering,
‘Germany,’
pp.
167-­‐169.
4

5.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
secondly
the
various
voluntary
organisations.
The
German
state
then,
rather
than
being
a
universal
provider,
acts
as
a
guarantor
and
regulator
of
certain
social
rights,
which
are
fulfilled
by
other
bodies.17
(ii)
Sweden
For
Esping-­‐Andersen,
the
Swedish
social
policy
regime
is
the
most
developed
example
of
a
Social
Democratic
welfare
state
in
that
it
successfully
maintains
a
balance
between
individual
independence
and
public
responsibility.18
A
speech
delivered
to
parliament
in
1928
by
the
future
Prime
Minister,
Per
Albin
Hansson,
neatly
outlines
the
understanding
of
social
rights
that
informed
the
development
of
the
Swedish
model,
and
is
worth
quoting
at
length;
The
basis
of
the
home
is
community
and
feeling
of
togetherness.
The
good
home
knows
no
privileged
or
disadvantaged
individual,
no
favourites
and
step-­‐
children…Applied
to
the
great
people’s
and
citizens’
home,
this
would
mean
the
breaking
down
of
all
social
and
economic
barriers,
which
now
divide
citizen
into
privileged
and
disadvantaged,
into
rulers
and
dependants,
into
rich
and
poor,
propertied
and
miserable,
plunderers
and
the
plundered.19
Thus,
as
Esping-­‐Andersen
framework
would
suggest,
the
historical
development
of
the
Swedish
social
policy
regime
is
characterized
by
its
underlying
commitment
to
universalism
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
reduction
of
its
citizens’
reliance
on
the
market
through
de-­‐commodification
on
the
other.20
As
a
result,
Sweden’s
social
policy
regime
displays
two
further
hallmarks
of
Social
Democratic
regimes.
Firstly,
basic
security
in
the
form
of
a
flat-­‐rate
pension
as
a
right
of
citizenship
is
combined
with
income
security
in
the
form
of
17
Jochen
Clasen
and
Richard
Freeman,
‘The
German
Social
State,’
p.
11.
18
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
‘Towards
the
Good
Society,’
p.
4.
19
Per
Albin
Hansson
quoted
in
Tapio
Salonen,
‘Sweden:
Between
Model
and
Reality,’.
in
P.
Alcock
and
G.
Craig
(eds.),
International
Social
Policy:
Welfare
Regimes
in
the
Developed
World,
New
York,
Palgrave,
2001,
p.
146.
20
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
The
Three
Worlds
of
Welfare
Capitalism,
p.
27.
5

6.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
an
earnings
related
supplementary
pension
with
a
relatively
high-­‐income
replacement
rate.21
Financed
by
considerable
economic
expansion
from
the
1950s
to
the
1970s,
the
uniting
of
basic
security
with
income
security
sought
to
bring
the
middle-­‐class
within
the
social
policy
regime.22
Secondly,
in
contrast
to
the
German
‘social
state’,
Sweden’s
social
policy
regime
is
service
intensive
in
nature.
The
Swedish
state,
heavily
centralised
in
nature,
is
directly
involved
in
ensuring
the
equal
provision
of
social
services
for
all,
with
its
long-­‐term
goal
being
to
eradicate
the
conditions
that
had
historically
shaped
class-­‐related
inequality
in
Swedish
society.23
At
the
core
of
the
Swedish
social
policy
system
is
the
interaction
between
three
policy
areas
–
social
security,
labour
market
policy
and
the
public
service.
Through
citizenship-­‐based
social
security,
large-­‐scale
state
intervention
by
an
expansive
public
sector,24
and
active
labour
market
policies,
the
Swedish
social
policy
regime
pursues
the
seemingly
contradictory
goals
of
universalist
welfare
reform
alongside
a
guarantee
of
full
employment.25
For
Esping-­‐Andersen,
this
Swedish
model
is
the
most
developed
example
of
a
Social
Democratic
welfare
state
due
to
its
ability
to
do
just
this;
promote
market
productivity
while
maintaining
preventative
social
policies.26
(iii)
South
Africa
South
African
social
policy
development
throughout
the
twentieth-­‐
century,
and
indeed
into
the
twenty-­‐first,
cannot
be
separated
from
the
political
economy
of
Apartheid.
Yet
the
foundations
of
this
system
of
racial
discrimination
had
been
put
in
place
prior
to
the
election
of
the
National
Party
government
in
21
John
D.
Stephens,
‘The
Scandinavian
Welfare
States:
Achievements,
Crisis,
and
Prospects,’
in
G.
Esping-­‐Andersen
(ed.),
Welfare
States
in
Transition:
National
Adaptations
in
Global
Economies,
London,
SAGE,
1996,
p.
34.
22
Tapio
Salonen,
‘Sweden,’
p.
147.
23
John
D.
Stephens,
‘The
Scandinavian
Welfare
States,’
p.
35.
24
No
other
Western
country
has
as
high
a
proportion
of
the
workforce
employed
in
the
public
sector
as
witnessed
in
Sweden.
Tapio
Salonen,
‘Sweden,’
p.
148.
25
Tapio
Salonen,
‘Sweden,’
pp.
143-­‐144.
26
Gøsta
Esping-­‐Andersen,
The
Three
Worlds
of
Welfare
Capitalism,
p.
76.
6

7.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
1948.
Over
the
first
half
of
the
century,
the
majority
of
the
population
(hereafter
non-­‐whites)27
were
stripped
of
all
rights
including
those
to
property,
free
labour
mobility,
and
choice
of
living
arrangements.
In
essence,
non-­‐whites
had
no
social
rights
in
the
Western
conception,
as
they
were
not
thought
of
as
citizens
in
any
real
sense
of
the
word.
Social
benefits,
as
they
were
gradually
implemented,
were
to
be
the
domain
of
whites
only.28
With
the
ascension
of
the
National
Party
this
discrimination
simply
became
more
overt.
Non-­‐whites
were
prevented
from
joining
trade
unions,
from
entering
many
professions,
and
with
the
creation
of
the
Bantustans
(supposedly
traditional
native
areas)
were
expected
to
reside
far
from
social
services
and
employment
opportunities
in
barren
rural
areas
where
they
may
have
never
even
set
foot
before.
Hence,
inequality
for
the
majority
of
South
Africans
was
built
in
into
the
fundamental
structure
of
society.29
Following
the
end
of
the
Apartheid
era
in
1994,
the
imperative
of
the
new
ANC
(African
National
Congress)
government
was
to
rewrite
the
formally
adversarial
social
contract
betwThe
een
state
and
society.
Initially,
under
the
Reconstruction
and
Development
Programme
(RDP),
this
entailed
a
compromise
between
binding
the
state
to
meeting
the
basic
needs
of
all
South
Africans,
and
the
maintenance
of
the
political
settlement.30
Hence,
while
measures
such
as
universal
pension
provision,
ambitious
housing
construction
programmes,
and
the
removal
of
formal
racially
based
restrictions
were
implemented,
the
ANC
stopped
short
of
instituting
large-­‐scale
redistribution
of
land
and
resources.
Under
external
pressure
from
the
International
Monetary
Fund
and
the
World
Bank
to
institute
structural
adjustment
policies,
however,
the
RDP
gave
way
in
27
Non-­‐whites
here
refers
to
the
majority
of
the
population,
which
includes
Africans,
‘Coloureds’
and
Indians,
who
were
also
grouped
under
the
term
‘blacks’
at
the
time.
Francie
Lund,
‘South
Africa:
Transition
Under
Pressure,’
in
P.
Alcock
and
G.
Craig
(eds.),
International
Social
Policy:
Welfare
Regimes
in
the
Developed
World,
New
York,
Palgrave,
2001,
p.
222.
28
ibid,
pp.
221-­‐222.
29
Beth
Goldblatt,
‘Citizenship
and
the
Right
to
Child
Care,’
in
A.
Gouws
(ed.),
(Un)thinking
Citizenship:
Feminist
Debates
in
Contemporary
South
Africa,
Aldershot,
Ashgate
Publishing,
2005,
pp.
11-­‐16.
30
Krista
Johnson,
‘State
and
Civil
Society
in
Contemporary
South
Africa:
Redefining
the
Rules
of
the
Game,’
in
R.
Calland
and
S.
Jacobs
(eds.),
Thabo
Mbeki’s
World:
The
Politics
and
Ideology
of
the
South
African
President,
Scottsville,
University
of
Natal
Press,
2002,
pp.
222-­‐226.
7

8.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
1996
to
budgetary
restrictions
and
the
neo-­‐liberal
market
orientated
Growth,
Employment
and
Redistribution
plan
(GEAR).31
The
emphasis
had
shifted
from
the
rewriting
of
the
social
contract,
to
the
building
of
new
social
partnerships
with
state’s
role
in
socio-­‐economic
transformation
gradually
transferred
to
domestic
and
foreign
private
enterprises
and
voluntary
organisations.32
South
Africa
displays
all
the
hallmarks
of
Gough
and
Wood’s
insecurity
regimes.
The
legacy
of
colonialism
has
left
South
Africa
without
a
developed
economy,
and
a
society
with
inbuilt
and
pervasive
inequalities.
The
lack
of
social
development,
high
unemployment,33
and
a
burgeoning
informal
sector,
has
left
the
household
as
the
main
provider
of
social
care
and
risk
mitigation,
while
poverty
and
poor
health
outcomes
(notably
the
HIV/AIDS
epidemic)
are
rising.34
The
ability
of
the
state
to
arrest
the
influence
of
historical
forces
in
contemporary
South
Africa
is
severely
limited.
Changing
Environments
Using
the
theoretical
frameworks
discussed
above,
the
social
policy
regimes
of
Germany,
Sweden
and
South
Africa
can
be
compared
and
contrasted
on
several
grounds.
Difference
can
clearly
be
located
in
ideological
underpinnings,
institutional
structure
and
historical
development,
as
well
specific
social
policies,
welfare
outcomes
and
degrees
of
de-­‐commodification
and
31
Elizabeth
Francis,
‘Poverty:
Causes,
Responses
and
Consequences
in
Rural
South
Africa,’
in
B.
Harriss-­‐White
and
J.
Heyer
(eds.),
The
Comparative
Political
Economy
of
Development:
Africa
and
South
Asia,
New
York,
Routledge,
2010,
pp.
91-­‐92.
32
Krista
Johnson,
‘State
and
Civil
Society,’
p.
227.
33
Using
a
‘broad
definition,’
Berstein
claims
that
South
Africa’s
unemployment
rate
is
approaching
40
percent.
Henry
Berstein,
‘Globalisation,
Neoliberalism,
Labour,
with
Reference
to
South
Africa’
in
A.
Saad-­‐Filho
and
G.L.
Yalman
(eds.),
Economic
Transitions
to
Neoliberalism
in
Middle-­‐income
Countries:
Policy
dilemmas,
Economic
Crises,
Forms
of
Resistance,
New
York,
Routledge,
2010,
p.
183.
34
Jeremy
Seekings,
‘Welfare
Regimes
and
Redistribution
in
the
South’
in
D.
Donno,
I.
Shapiro
and
P.A.
Swenson
(eds.),
Divide
and
Deal:
The
Politics
of
Distribution
in
Democracies,
New
York,
New
York
University
Press,
2008,
pp.
24-­‐
27.
8

9.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
stratification.35
On
the
other
hand,
similarities
are
manifest
in
each
country’s
basic
desire
to
provide
some
level
of
security
for
their
citizens
through
the
medium
of
redistribution.36
Due
to
space
constraints,
however,
and
given
that
both
frameworks
emphasize
the
importance
of
historical
processes,
it
would
seem
reasonable
to
locate
difference
in
each
regime’s
responsiveness
to
the
pressures
for
change
felt
by
social
policy
regimes
worldwide
since
the
late
twentieth-­‐century.
The
structure
of
the
German
‘social
state’
has
come
under
significant
pressure
in
recent
decades
and
since
the
mid
1990s
in
particular.
Economic
pressures
linked
to
globalisation,
including
higher
unemployment
associated
with
trade
liberalisation
and
increasing
immigration,
along
with
an
ageing
population,
sluggish
growth,
and
the
propping
up
of
the
East
after
reunification,
have
led
many
to
talk
of
crisis
and
a
dismantling
of
the
regime
in
its
current
form.
Certainly
a
system
based
upon
work
contributions
is
particularly
vulnerable
to
economic
shocks.37
Yet
the
fundamental
institutional
structure
of
the
German
‘social
state’
has
remained
fundamentally
unchanged.
It
should
not
be
forgotten
that
this
structure
has
survived
distinct
historical
periods
including
National
Socialism
and
the
separation
and
subsequent
reunification
of
East
and
West,
each
marked
by
sometimes-­‐conflicting
ideas
regarding
the
relationship
between
state
and
society.38
Indeed,
if
anything,
the
‘social
state’
has
expanded
and
become
more
egalitarian,
the
closing
of
the
gap
between
white
and
blue-­‐collar
occupational
insurance
funds
being
but
one
example.39
This
is
due
in
part
to
a
rigid
political
system,
with
multiple
actors,
drawn
from
both
state
and
non-­‐state
bodies,
having
significant
influence
on
social
policy,
making
consensus
building
for
fundamental
35
Michael
Hill,
Social
Policy,
p.
27.
36
Patricia
Kennett,
‘Introduction:
The
Changing
Context
of
Comparative
Social
Policy,’
in
P.
Kennett
(ed.),
A
Hanbook
of
Comparative
Social
Policy,
Northampton,
Edward
Elgar,
2004,
p.
4.
37
Lutz
Leisering,
‘Germany,’
p.
176.
38
ibid,
pp.
162-­‐164.
39
ibid,
pp.
172-­‐173.
9

10.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
structural
change
politically
difficult.40
This
inflexibility
has
meant
that
what
change
has
occurred
to
Germany’s
highly
legitimated
system,
has
necessarily
taken
place
within
historically
established
structures.41
Sweden’s
social
policy
regime
has
also
experienced
crisis,
and
pressures
upon
its
structure,
resulting
from
economic
stagnation
in
the
late
twentieth-­‐
century.
Owing
to
globalizing
forces
and
an
opening
up
of
the
economy
during
the
1980s,
Sweden
was
left
vulnerable
to
external
shocks,
and
during
the
recession
of
the
early
1990s
the
country
experienced
negative
growth
rates
and
soaring
unemployment.42
Combined
with
an
ageing
population,
falling
birth
rates
and
changes
in
family
structures,
this
proved
disastrous
for
a
social
policy
regime
dependent
upon
a
high
ratio
of
working
to
non-­‐working
citizens,
much
as
it
had
in
Germany.43
Forced
into
cutbacks
in
social
transfers
and
services,
as
well
as
reductions
in
public
sector
employment,
this
seemed
to
point
to
drastic
changes
to
the
Swedish
social
policy
regime.44
Despite
a
sharp
decline
in
the
welfare
state
in
Sweden
during
the
1990s,
however,
the
fundamental
character
of
the
Swedish
social
policy
regime
has
remained
intact.
Certainly
the
unemployment
shock
led
to
a
rollback
of
benefits
and
a
move
towards
the
introduction
of
social
insurance
and
means-­‐tested
residual
pensions.45
Yet
cuts
to
most
universal
services
and
benefits
were
generally
reversed
within
a
short
timeframe.46
Thus,
notwithstanding
a
40
Jochen
Clasen
and
Richard
Freeman,
‘The
German
Social
State,’
p.
12.
41
Lutz
Leisering,
‘Germany,’
p.
178.
42
Sweden
experience
negative
growth
rates
between
1991
and
1993.
Virpi
Timonen,
Restructuring
the
Welfare
State:
Globalization
and
Social
Policy
Reform
in
Finland
and
Sweden,
Northampton,
Edward
Elgar,
2003,
p.
5.
Negative
growth
lead
to
heavy
private
sector
cuts
during
these
years,
with
unemployment
rising
from
1.5
percent
to
10
percent.
Cuts
would
be
extended
to
the
public
sector
in
the
years
following
the
recession.
Tapio
Salonen,
‘Sweden,’
p.
148.
43
Virpi
Timonen,
Restructuring
the
Welfare
State,
pp.
5-­‐6.
44
Tapio
Salonen,
‘Sweden,’
p.
149.
45
ibid,
pp.
154-­‐155
46
Virpi
Timonen,
Restructuring
the
Welfare
State,
p.
15.
10

11.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
restructuring
of
the
state’s
social
policy
regime,
and
a
partial
reduction
in
its
de-­‐
commodifying
nature,
the
essential
universalist
character
remains.47
In
South
Africa,
efforts
to
alleviate
the
legacy
of
Apartheid
have
proved
largely
unsuccessful;
inequality
remains
part
of
the
fundamental
structure
of
South
African
society
and
is
in
fact
deepening.
Those
in
former
Bantustan
areas
and
the
urban
poor
still
have
grossly
inadequate
access
to
the
universal
services
that
have
been
implemented
by
the
ANC
government,
while
the
non-­‐poor
has
disproportionate
access.48
Thus,
while
South
Africa’s
social
policy
regime
is
now
far
more
extensive
in
nature,
and
nominally
universal,
the
realities
of
South
African
social
development
have
proved
difficult
to
overcome
in
a
relatively
short
period
of
time.49
It
is
apparent
that
the
expectation
that
fundamental
changes
in
the
relationship
between
state
and
society
would
rapidly
improve
social
policy
outcomes
proved
misguided.
This
was
due
on
the
one
hand
to
an
underestimation
of
the
time
it
takes
to
formulate
good
policy,
and
of
the
pervasiveness
of
structures
of
inequality
on
the
other.50
Though
the
historical
and
political
processes
in
play
in
South
Africa
are
no
doubt
vastly
different
to
those
in
Sweden
and
Germany,
much
as
in
those
countries,
the
power
of
these
processes
to
block
fundamental
change
is
considerable.
Thus
we
arrive
at
an
interesting
result.
The
quite
divergent
social
policy
regimes
of
Germany,
Sweden
and
South
Africa,
all
exhibit
a
similar
resistance
to
change
in
the
face
of
crisis.
Whether
due
to
political
inflexibility
in
the
case
of
Germany,
ideological
commitment
in
the
case
of
Sweden,
or
pervasive
social
structures
in
the
case
of
South
Africa,
the
historical
and
political
processes
identified
as
crucial
indicators
of
difference
by
the
frameworks
used
in
this
study
seem
to
perpetuate
the
characteristics
and
structures
that
they
themselves
47
ibid,
p.
186.
48
Anthony
Butler,
Contemporary
South
Africa,
Hampshire,
Palgrave
Macmillan,
2004,
pp.
66-­‐67.
49
Francie
Lund,
‘South
Africa,’
p.
230.
50
ibid,
pp.
236-­‐237
11

12.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
generate.
Hence,
the
usefulness
of
Esping-­‐Andersen’s
framework,
albeit
extended
to
account
for
the
Global
South,
in
characterising
and
comparing
social
policy
regimes
would
seem
to
hold
in
the
face
of
rapidly
changing
environments.
Conclusions
Using
Esping-­‐Andersen’s
theoretical
framework,
in
conjunction
with
that
of
Gough
and
Wood,
the
social
policy
regimes
of
Germany,
Sweden
and
South
Africa
have
been
classified
within
divergent
sets
of
regime
clusters.
Within
those
same
frameworks
I
have
identified
pressures
for
change
that
each
has
had
to
address
within
the
last
twenty
years.
The
responses
to
those
pressures,
while
diverse,
all
indicate
an
entrenchment
of
the
characteristics
and
structures
examined
during
this
study.
Such
a
result
is
consistent
with
the
extended
theoretical
framework
used
due
to
the
explanatory
power
afforded
historical
processes
by
that
framework
in
the
development
of
social
policy
regimes.
12

13.
Sebastian
Hancock
(134922)
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