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Disclaimer
The Content, Demonstration, Source Code and Programs presented here is "AS IS" without
any warranty or conditions of any kind. Also the views/ideas/knowledge expressed here are
solely of the trainer’s only and nothing to do with the company or the organization in which
the trainer is currently working.

However in no circumstances neither the trainer nor SecurityXploded is responsible for any
damage or loss caused due to use or misuse of the information presented here.




                                        www.SecurityXploded.com
Acknowledgement
 Special thanks to null & Garage4Hackers community for their extended support and
  cooperation.
 Thanks to all the trainers who have devoted their precious time and countless hours to make it
  happen.




                                         www.SecurityXploded.com
Reversing & Malware Analysis Training

This presentation is part of our Reverse Engineering & Malware Analysis Training
program. Currently it is delivered only during our local meet for FREE of cost.




For complete details of this course, visit our Security Training page.



                                        www.SecurityXploded.com
Who am I
Monnappa
    m0nna
    Member of SecurityXploded
    Info Security Investigator @ Cisco
    Reverse Engineering, Malware Analysis, Memory Forensics
    GREM, CEH
    Email: monnappa22@gmail.com




                                 www.SecurityXploded.com
Contents
   Why Memory Forensics?

   Steps in Memory Forensics

   Volatility Quick Overview

   Volatility help and plugins

   Demo




                                    www.SecurityXploded.com
Why Memory Forensics?
   Finding and extracting forensic artefacts

   Helps in malware analysis

   Determining process, network, registry activities

   Reconstructing original state of the system

   Assists with unpacking, rootkit detection and reverse engineering




                                    www.SecurityXploded.com
Steps in Memory Forensics
   Memory acquisition - Dumping the memory of a target machine

         - tools: Win32dd/Win64dd, Memoryze, DumpIt, FastDump

         - In Virtual machine: Suspend the VM and use .vmem file


   Memory analysis - Analyzing the memory dump for forensic artifacts

         - tools: Volatility, Memoryze




                                    www.SecurityXploded.com
Volatility Quick Overview
   Advanced memory Forensics Framework written in python

   Installation details:
           - http://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/FullInstallation

   Use -h or --help option to get list of command-line switches
           - example: python vol.py –h

   Use -f <filename> and --profile to indicate the memory dump you are analyzing
            example: python vol.py -f mem.dmp --profile=WinXPSP3x86


   To know the --profile info use below command:
            example: python vol.py -f mem.dmp imageinfo
                                               www.SecurityXploded.com
Volatility help and plugins
-h or –help option displays help and available plug-in commands in volatility.




                                  www.SecurityXploded.com
http://youtu.be/YcVusDjnBxw
Demo-Scenario

Your security device alerts, show malicious http connection to ip address
208.91.197.54 from a source ip 192.168.1.100 on 8th june 2012 at around
13:30hrs...you are asked to investigate and do memory forensics on that machine
192.168.1.100

- To start with, acquire the memory image “infected.dmp” from 192.168.1.100,
using memory acquistion tools (win32dd)
   command: win32dd.exe /f infected.dmp

- Analyze the memory dump “infected.dmp”


                                www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 1 – Start With what you know
Volatility’s connections module shows connection to the malicious ip by pid 1748




                                 www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 2 – Info about 208.91.197.54
Google search shows 208.91.197.54 associated with malware, probably “spyeye”, we need to confirm
that yet.




                                         www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 3 – Who is Pid 1748?
“psscan” shows pid 1748 belongs to explorer.exe, also two process created during same time reported by security device (i.e june
8th 2012)




                                                     www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 4 – Process handles of explorer.exe
Explorer.exe opens a handle to the B6232F3A9F9.exe, indicating explorer.exe created that process, which might be
malicious…focusing on explorer.exe for now.




                                                    www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 5 – apihooks in explorer.exe
apihooks module show, inline api hooks in explorer.exe and jump to an unknown location




                                                    www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 6 – exploring the hooks
Disassembled hooked function (TranslateMessage), shows a short jump and then a long jump to malware location




                                                  www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 7 – Embedded exe in explorer.exe
Printing the bytes show the presence of embedded executable in explorer.exe




                                                    www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 8 – dumping the embedded exe
vaddump dumps the embedded exe from explorer.exe




                                               www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 9 – virustotal submission
Submission to virustotal, confirms the dumped executable as component of “spyeye”




                                                     www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 10 – Can we get more info?
Strings extracted from the dumped executable, show reference to interesting artifacts (executable and the registry key)




                                                      www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 11 – Printing the registry key
Malware creates registry key to survive the reboot




                                                     www.SecurityXploded.com
Step 12 – Finding the malicious exe on infected machine
Finding malicious sample from infected host and virustotal submission confirms spyeye infection




                                                      www.SecurityXploded.com
Reference

   Complete Reference Guide for Reversing & Malware Analysis Training




                                 www.SecurityXploded.com
Thank You !



www.SecurityXploded.com

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Reversing & Malware Analysis Training Part 8 - Malware Memory Forensics

  • 2. Disclaimer The Content, Demonstration, Source Code and Programs presented here is "AS IS" without any warranty or conditions of any kind. Also the views/ideas/knowledge expressed here are solely of the trainer’s only and nothing to do with the company or the organization in which the trainer is currently working. However in no circumstances neither the trainer nor SecurityXploded is responsible for any damage or loss caused due to use or misuse of the information presented here. www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 3. Acknowledgement  Special thanks to null & Garage4Hackers community for their extended support and cooperation.  Thanks to all the trainers who have devoted their precious time and countless hours to make it happen. www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 4. Reversing & Malware Analysis Training This presentation is part of our Reverse Engineering & Malware Analysis Training program. Currently it is delivered only during our local meet for FREE of cost. For complete details of this course, visit our Security Training page. www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 5. Who am I Monnappa  m0nna  Member of SecurityXploded  Info Security Investigator @ Cisco  Reverse Engineering, Malware Analysis, Memory Forensics  GREM, CEH  Email: monnappa22@gmail.com www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 6. Contents  Why Memory Forensics?  Steps in Memory Forensics  Volatility Quick Overview  Volatility help and plugins  Demo www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 7. Why Memory Forensics?  Finding and extracting forensic artefacts  Helps in malware analysis  Determining process, network, registry activities  Reconstructing original state of the system  Assists with unpacking, rootkit detection and reverse engineering www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 8. Steps in Memory Forensics  Memory acquisition - Dumping the memory of a target machine - tools: Win32dd/Win64dd, Memoryze, DumpIt, FastDump - In Virtual machine: Suspend the VM and use .vmem file  Memory analysis - Analyzing the memory dump for forensic artifacts - tools: Volatility, Memoryze www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 9. Volatility Quick Overview  Advanced memory Forensics Framework written in python  Installation details: - http://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/FullInstallation  Use -h or --help option to get list of command-line switches - example: python vol.py –h  Use -f <filename> and --profile to indicate the memory dump you are analyzing example: python vol.py -f mem.dmp --profile=WinXPSP3x86  To know the --profile info use below command: example: python vol.py -f mem.dmp imageinfo www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 10. Volatility help and plugins -h or –help option displays help and available plug-in commands in volatility. www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 12. Demo-Scenario Your security device alerts, show malicious http connection to ip address 208.91.197.54 from a source ip 192.168.1.100 on 8th june 2012 at around 13:30hrs...you are asked to investigate and do memory forensics on that machine 192.168.1.100 - To start with, acquire the memory image “infected.dmp” from 192.168.1.100, using memory acquistion tools (win32dd) command: win32dd.exe /f infected.dmp - Analyze the memory dump “infected.dmp” www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 13. Step 1 – Start With what you know Volatility’s connections module shows connection to the malicious ip by pid 1748 www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 14. Step 2 – Info about 208.91.197.54 Google search shows 208.91.197.54 associated with malware, probably “spyeye”, we need to confirm that yet. www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 15. Step 3 – Who is Pid 1748? “psscan” shows pid 1748 belongs to explorer.exe, also two process created during same time reported by security device (i.e june 8th 2012) www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 16. Step 4 – Process handles of explorer.exe Explorer.exe opens a handle to the B6232F3A9F9.exe, indicating explorer.exe created that process, which might be malicious…focusing on explorer.exe for now. www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 17. Step 5 – apihooks in explorer.exe apihooks module show, inline api hooks in explorer.exe and jump to an unknown location www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 18. Step 6 – exploring the hooks Disassembled hooked function (TranslateMessage), shows a short jump and then a long jump to malware location www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 19. Step 7 – Embedded exe in explorer.exe Printing the bytes show the presence of embedded executable in explorer.exe www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 20. Step 8 – dumping the embedded exe vaddump dumps the embedded exe from explorer.exe www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 21. Step 9 – virustotal submission Submission to virustotal, confirms the dumped executable as component of “spyeye” www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 22. Step 10 – Can we get more info? Strings extracted from the dumped executable, show reference to interesting artifacts (executable and the registry key) www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 23. Step 11 – Printing the registry key Malware creates registry key to survive the reboot www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 24. Step 12 – Finding the malicious exe on infected machine Finding malicious sample from infected host and virustotal submission confirms spyeye infection www.SecurityXploded.com
  • 25. Reference  Complete Reference Guide for Reversing & Malware Analysis Training www.SecurityXploded.com