3. Birkland, Thomas: Introduction to the
Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and
Models of Public Policy Making. 2nd ed.
2005. ME Sharpe. New York. Chapter 3-4.
pp. 52-107
Ostrom, Elinor: Institutional Rational
Choice: An Assessment of the
Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework in Sabatier, Paul A. (ed.)
Theories of the Policy Process. Westview
Press. Boulder. 1999. pp. 35-72
4. ACTORS
OFFICIAL UNOFFICIAL
INTEREST
LEGISLATURE JUDICIARY CITIZENS
GROUPS
POLITICAL
EXECUTIVE THINK TANKS
PARTIES
MEDIA
6. Difference President Congress
Veto One-man 2/3 majority in
decision both Houses
Organization Unitary Multiplicity
Publicity Intensive Diffused
Information Exhaustive Limited and
delayed
7. Deliver indivisible and nonexclusive public
goods
Congress grants discretion for administrative
expertise of bureaucracy
Major issue of accountability vis-à-vis
discretion
Discretion is not absolute
Competition between bureaus and levels of
the same department provide checks and
balances
Legislative oversight for accountability
8. Power of judicial review in Marbury vs.
Madison case
Final word in the application of laws?
Wilson – distinction between law and
politics
Easton – political and administrative
action structured by constitutional order
Dahl – courts political institution
Progressive or regressive role?
9. Low electoral participation
40% disenfranchised
population (Schattschneider)
Periodic mobilization only
for specific interests
Then how is public interest
defined and who defines it?
10. Privatization of power (Schattschneider)?
Madison’s federal support designed to contain such
groupism
Communication aids proliferation of groups
Schattschneider categorizes them into special interest
groups and pressure groups (Birkland-institutional
interest group)
Concluded that special interest groups (Birkland-
economic or private interest group) were very small
Instruments used are lobbying, litigation, mass
mobilization
Influence? Pharma majors & tobacco
11. Provide cues for voting – Democrats
conservative or Republicans liberal
(Statehouse Democracy)?
Connecting link between ideological
preferences of electorate and Congress
Help create public policy
Controversial democratic
accountability – disproportionate power
over policy in senior members?
12. Brookings Institution (center-
left), RAND & Cato (libertarian)
Institute
Ideologically placed but at
times disguised, eg NCPA
Provide important social and
political inputs
13. Print media – muckrakers, Watergate, NYT,
Washington Post
Electronic media – CNN, VoA, NPR, C-SPAN
Agenda-setting role: expand scope of conflict
(Schattschneider)
Debate between journalistic norms and
profitability
Reporting bias, eg. Gulf War as confrontation
between George Bush and Saddam Hossein rather
than as war
Remains major catalyst of public opinion
14. Regulated interest
Subcommittees provide Agencies negotiate
policy for distribution of with regulated interest
benefits
Interests provide
Interest support Congress political support to
with political support and Congress and public
contributions
Be
Be
ne
ne
fiit
ft
s
sp
m
pr
om
roov
Subcommittees provide fiscal & political
viid
-C
diin
ub
support to agency
ngga
.S
ag
Agency works for distribution of benefits
ge
ng
ennc
Co
with subcommittees
cyy
Birkland (2005): op. cit p. 98
15. Mutually reinforcing nature
Policy monopolies (Baumgartner & Jones)
Benefit distributing agency negotiates with
interests
In return regulated interests support
subcommittees
In turn subcommittees support the
agencies
Eg. Dept., of Interior, Public Works,
16. Policies distributive – costs dispersed and benefits
concentrated
In reality the scope of conflict is much wider
Conflict also complex with entering and exiting
actors – venue shopping by interests (Baumgartner &
Jones)
Devolution of powers and public scrutiny add to
complexity
Wider definition – subgovernments – Ripley and
Franklin
Issue network – Heclo
Does not explain ebbs and tides in policy making?
17. Socialization of power (Schattschneider)
Focusing events, eg. Exxon-Valdez,
March on Washington (1963)
Mass mobilization, eg. Civil rights –
liberal vs. conservative
Local initiative, eg. California and MADD
Public campaign using communication
and media
19. Varied definition of term ‘institution’ – “shared
concepts used by humans in repetitive situations
organized by rules, norms and strategies”. (Crawford &
Ostrom 1995)
Requirement of inputs from diverse disciplines
Need for a coherent institutional framework to
compare models and theories in diverse settings
Decisions made at multiple levels by various
individuals with reference to combinations of sets of
rules
Ostrom – institutions refer to “rules, norms and
strategies adopted by individuals operating within or
across organizations” (p. 37)
20. Ostrom (1999): op. cit p. 42
Physical/Material
Considerations
Action Arena
Attributes of Action Patterns of
Community Situations Interactions
Actors Evaluative
Criteria
Rules in Use
Outcomes
21. Action Arena = Action Situation + Actors =
“social space where individuals interact……” (p.
42)
7 Variables of Action Situation: Participants,
positions to be filled, outcomes, action-outcome
linkages, control that participants exercise,
information & costs and benefits assigned to
outcomes
Variables of Actors: Resources, valuation, use
of information and knowledge contingencies,
selection of particular courses of action
Do actors influence arenas or vice –versa?
22.
23. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, FISCAL
EQUIVALENCE, REDISTRIBUTIONAL
EVALUATION CRITERIA
EQUITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, GENERAL
MORALITY, ADAPTABILITY
+ INFORMATION INFORMATION
PROCESSING
Homo economicus COLLECTIVE
CHOICE
Fallible learner
RULE
CONFIGURATION
- INFORMATION
OUTCOME
PHYSICAL
WORLD
24. Free rider and excludability: Leads to
underinvestment in capital and maintenance, eg.
irrigation projects – compliance depends upon
legitimacy of public choice mechanism used to
make provision decisions, eg. Public vote
Subtractability of flow: Eg. Irrigation project –
needs effective allocation mechanisms to obviate
conflict among users – allocation rules determine
sustainability
Cultural attributes of a community: Ability to
cooperate between communities reduces chances
of conflict , eg. involvement of tribes in forest areas
for ecological preservation
25. How is public interest defined and by whom?
Do interest groups fill the void caused by general
elector disinterest?
Does intensity of conflict between institutions
determine feasibility and sustainability of public
projects?
How do trades-off between institutions determine
the outcome of public policy?
Do rule configurations regulate conflict between
competing institutions? Or are rule configurations
decided by the competitors?
