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Strong Authentication in Web Application
         “State of the Art 2011”


      Sylvain Maret / Digital Security Expert / OpenID Switzerland

                               @smaret
                           Version 1.0 / 2PM
RSA FAILED ?
Who am I?




   Security Expert
        17 years of experience in ICT Security
        Principal Consultant at MARET Consulting
        Expert at Engineer School of Yverdon & Geneva University
        Swiss French Area delegate at OpenID Switzerland
        Co-founder Geneva Application Security Forum
        OWASP Member
        Author of the blog: la Citadelle Electronique
        http://ch.linkedin.com/in/smaret or @smaret
        http://www.slideshare.net/smaret


   Chosen field
        AppSec & Digital Identity Security
Protection of digital identities: a topical issue…




                                    Strong Auth
«Digital identity is the cornerstone of trust»




         http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authentification_forte
Definition of strong authentication




       Strong Authentication on Wikipedia
Strong Authentication

 A new paradigm?
Which Strong Authentication technology ?
Legacy Token / OTP / PKI / SuisseID ? / Open Source Solution ?
OTP   PKI (HW)   Biometry
    Strong
 authentication
  Encryption

Digital signature

Non repudiation

Strong link with
    the user
Strong Authentication
      with PKI
PKI: Digital Certificate

                           Hardware Token (Crypto PKI)
                              Strong Authentication
Software Certificate
  (PKCS#12;PFX)
SSL/TLS Mutual Authentication : how does it work?

                     Validation
                     Authority


   CRL
     or
OCSP Request

                     Valid
                     Invalid
                     Unknown




                   SSL / TLS Mutual Authentication
                                                     Alice
    Web Server
Demo #1: Software Certificate Auth using an IDP OpenID




          http://www.clavid.com/
Strong Authentication with Biometry (Match on Card technology)




   A reader
       Biometry
       SmartCard




   A card with chip
       Technology MOC
       Crypto Processor
            PC/SC
            PKCS#11
            Digital certificate X509
Strong Authentication


         With


(O)ne (T)ime (P)assword
(O)ne (T)ime (P)assword




   OTP Time Based           Others:
       Like SecurID
                                 OTP via SMS
   OTP Event Based              OTP via email
                                 Biometry and OTP
                                 Bingo Card
   OTP Challenge
                                 Etc.
    Response Based
OTP T-B?
OTP E-B?
OTP C-R-B?


Crypto - 101
Crypto-101 / Time Based OTP




                                     HASH Function

K=Secret Key / Seed


                                                     OTP
 T=UTC Time




          ie = OTP(K,T) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,T))
Crypto-101 / Event Based OTP




                                      HASH Function

K=Secret Key / Seed


                                                      OTP
  C = Counter




          ie = OTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))
Crypto-101 / OTP Challenge Response Based




                                    HASH Function

K=Secret Key / Seed

                                                      OTP
                                                    Challenge
          nonce




                                             ie:
Other[s] OTP technologies…




OTP Via SMS




                             “Flicker code” Generator Software
                                   that converts already
                                    encrypted data into
                                  optical screen animation

     By Elcard
Demo #2: Protect WordPress (OTP Via SMS)
How to Store
my Secret Key ?

   A Token !
OTP Token: Software vs Hardware ?
Software OTP for Smartphone




       http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/iotp/id328973960
Where are[is] the seed ?
Seed generation & distribution ? Still a good model ?


                                                  K1

    Threat
    Agent                                                Editor / Vendor
    (APT)
                                                         Secret Key are[is]
                                                        generated on promise




                 K1                                               K1
TokenCode
New Standards

     &
Open Source
Technologies accessible to everyone 




   Initiative for Open AuTHentication (OATH)
       HOTP
       TOTP
       OCRA
       Etc.


   Mobile OTP
       (Use MD5 …..)
Initiative for Open AuTHentication (OATH)




   HOTP
       Event Based OTP                       Token Identifier
       RFC 4226                               Specification

   TOTP                                      IETF KeyProv Working Group
       Time Based OTP                             PSKC - Portable Symmetric Key
                                                    Container, RFC 6030
       Draft IETF Version 8
                                                   DSKPP - Dynamic Symmetric
                                                    Key Provisioning Protocol, RFC
                                                    6063
   OCRA
       Challenge/Response OTP                And more !
       Draft IETF Version 13

          http://www.openauthentication.org/specifications
(R)isk

(B)ased

(A)uthentication
RBA (Risk-Based Authentication) = Behavior Model
Use OATH-HOTP & TOTP
http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/
Integration with
web application
Web application: basic authentication model
Web application: Strong Authentication Implementation Blueprint
“Shielding" approach: perimetric authentication using Reverse Proxy / WAF
Module/Agent-based approach (example)
Demo #3: Apache and Mod_OpenID (Using Biometry / OTP)
Demo #3: Challenge / Response OTP with Biometry
API/SDK based approach (example)
Multi OTP PHP Class Demo #4 & Hardening OS
Proof of Concept Code by
           Anne Gosselin, Antonio Fontes, Sylvain Maret !

if (! empty($_REQUEST['pma_username'])) {
        // The user just logged in
        $GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_USER'] = $_REQUEST['pma_username'];

       // we combine both OTP + PIN code for the token verification
       $fooPass = empty($_REQUEST['pma_password']) ? '' : $_REQUEST['pma_password'];
       $fooOtp = empty($_REQUEST['pma_otp']) ? '' : $_REQUEST['pma_otp'];
       $GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW'] = $fooPass.''.$fooOtp;

       // OTP CHECK
       require_once('./libraries/multiotp.class.php');
       $multiotp = new Multiotp();
       $multiotp->SetUser($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_USER']);
       $multiotp->SetEncryptionKey('DefaultCliEncryptionKey');
       $multiotp->SetUsersFolder('./libraries/users/');
       $multiotp->SetLogFolder('./libraries/log/');
       $multiotp->EnableVerboseLog();

       $otpCheckResult = $multiotp->CheckToken($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW']);
       // the PIN code use kept for accessing the database
       $GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW'] = substr($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW'], 0, strlen($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW']

       if($otpCheckResult == 0)
               return true;
       else
               die("auth failed.");
Step1: Add a new method using cookie authentication

                            In config.inc.php
Howto #1
Step2: Add pma_otp field

  In common.inc.php
Step3: Add new input




 File ori: cookie.auth.lib.php




New file: cookieotp.auth.lib.php
File ori: cookie.auth.lib.php
New file: cookieotp.auth.lib.php   Step3: Call multiotp
Demo 4#: PHP[OTP] integration for[in] phpmyadmin
Multi OTP PHP Class by André Liechti (Switzerland)




      Source Code will be publish soon:
      http://www.citadelle-electronique.net/
      http://www.multiotp.net/
SSH Hardening with OTP Multi OTP PHP Class




                               AES 256




                                             PAM
Strong Authentication
Strong Authentication and Application Security




                                     &

   Application Security
Threat Modeling

“detecting web application

threats before coding”
ICAM:

a changing paradigm

on Strong Authentication
Federation of identity approach a change of paradigm:
using IDP for Authentication and Strong Authentication




                                                         Identity Provider
                                                         SAML, OpenID, etc
SECTION 2
OpenID
> What is it?
> How does it work?
> How to integrate?
OpenID - What is it?




>   Internet SingleSignOn              >   Free Choice of Identity Provider
>   Relatively Simple Protocol         >   No License Fee
>   User-Centric Identity Management   >   Independent of Identification Methods
>   Internet Scalable                  >   Non-Profit Organization
OpenID - How does it work?




     User Hans Muster

                                    3

                                   4, 4a                              Identity Provider
                                                                      e.g. clavid.com
  hans.muster.clavid.com       5                6

                           1                         2 Identity URL
  Caption                                              https://hans.muster.clavid.com
  1. User enters OpenID
  2. Discovery
  3. Authentication
  4. Approval
  4a. Change Attributes
  5. Send Attributes
  6. Validation                            Enabled Service
Surprise! You may already
    have an OpenID !
Other Well Known
       &
Simple Providers




      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_OpenID_providers
Get an OpenID with Strong Authentication for free !
Questions ?
Resources on Internet 1/2




   http://motp.sourceforge.net/
   http://www.clavid.ch/otp
   http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/
   http://www.multiotp.net/
   http://www.openauthentication.org/
   http://wiki.openid.net/
   http://www.citadelle-electronique.net/
   http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/
Resources on Internet 2/2




   http://rcdevs.com/products/openotp/
   https://github.com/adulau/paper-token
   http://www.yubico.com/yubikey
   http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/
   http://www.nongnu.org/oath-toolkit/
   http://www.nongnu.org/oath-toolkit/
   http://www.gpaterno.com/publications/2010/dublin_oss
    barcamp_2010_otp_with_oss.pdf
Backup Slides
Kerckhoffs's Principle ?
Une conviction forte !




Authentification forte
SECTION 1
SAML
>What is it?
>How does it work?
Using SAML for Authentication and Strong Authentication




                                                             (Assertion
                                                          Consumer Service)
SAML – What is it?


SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language):
> Defined by the Oasis Group
> Well and Academically Designed Specification
> Uses XML Syntax
> Used for Authentication & Authorization

> SAML Assertions
   >   Statements: Authentication, Attribute, Authorization

> SAML Protocols
   >   Queries: Authentication, Artifact, Name Identifier Mapping, etc.

> SAML Bindings
   >   SOAP, Reverse-SOAP, HTTP-Get, HTTP-Post, HTTP-Artifact

> SAML Profiles
   >   Web Browser SingleSignOn Profile, Identity Provider Discovery Profile, Assertion Query
       / Request Profile, Attribute Profile
SAML – How does it work?




    User Hans Muster

                                 3
                                 2
                                 4                              Identity Provider
                                                                e.g. clavid.ch

                             4
                         2
                     1
                 6




                                     Enabled Service

                                             e.g. Google Apps
                                             for Business
Example with HTTP POST Binding

                                       Access Resource
          Browser                                              Web App SAML Ready

                                        1
                                                             AuthN

                                                         2
                            <AuthnRequest>
                      3
  + PIN                       Redirect 302



                                                              ACS
                          POST
                       <Response> 7

                                                         Ressource
                                  Ressource    8

                       <Response>
                      in HTML Form       6

                                                         Single Sign On
                                                            Service

                    <AuthnRequest>      4


                          Credential
                          Challenge     5a


                     User Login                                      IDP MC
                                       5b
A major event in the world of strong authentication




     12 October 2005: the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
      Council (FFIEC) issues a directive

          « Single Factor Authentication » is not enough for the web financial
           applications
          Before end 2006 it is compulsory to implement a strong
           authentication system
          http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr101205.htm

     And the PCI DSS norm
          Compulsory strong authentication for distant accesses

     And now European regulations
          Payment Services (2007/64/CE) for banks

     Social Networks, Open Source
Out of Band Authentication
Phone Factor
SAML
SAML AuthnRequst Transfer via Browser


Redirect-Binding




POST-Binding
A SAML AuthnRequest (no magic, just XML)



<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol“
     ID="glcmfhikbbhohichialilnnpjakbeljekmkhppkb“
     Version="2.0”
     IssueInstant="2008-10-14T00:57:14Z”
     ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST”
     ProviderName="google.com”
     ForceAuthn="false”
     IsPassive="false”
     AssertionConsumerServiceURL="https://www.google.com/a/unopass.net/acs">

  <saml:Issuer xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
      google.com
  </saml:Issuer>

  <samlp:NameIDPolicy AllowCreate="true"
     Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified" />

</samlp:AuthnRequest>
SAML Assertion Transfer via Browser




POST-Binding
A SAML Assertion Response (no magic, just XML)
<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
     ID="s247893b2ec90665dfd5d9bd4a092f5e3a7194fef4"
     InResponseTo="hkcmljnccpheoobdofbjcngjbadmgcfhaapdbnni"
     Version="2.0"
     IssueInstant="2008-10-15T17:24:46Z"
     Destination="https://www.google.com/a/unopass.net/acs">

  <saml:Issuer>
      http://idp.unopass.net:80/opensso
  </saml:Issuer>

  <samlp:Status>
     <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
  </samlp:Status>

  <saml:Assertion
    ID="s295c56ccd7872209ae336b934d1eed5be52a8e6ec"
    IssueInstant="2008-10-15T17:24:46Z"
    Version="2.0">
    <saml:Issuer>http://idp.unopass.net:80/opensso</saml:Issuer>
    <Signature>
      … A DIGITAL SIGNATURE …
    </Signature>


    ...
A SAML Assertion Response (no magic, just XML)



   ...

   <saml:Subject>
      <saml:NameID
         NameQualifier="http://idp.unopass.net:80/opensso">
         sylvain.maret
      </saml:NameID>
      <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:...:bearer">
         <saml:SubjectConfirmationData
           InResponseTo="hkcmljnccpheoobdofbjcngjbadmgcfhaapdbnni"
           NotOnOrAfter="2008-10-15T17:34:46Z"
           Recipient="https://www.google.com/a/unopass.net/acs"/>
      </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
   </saml:Subject>

   ...
A SAML Assertion Response (no magic, just XML)



    ...


     <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2008-10-15T17:14:46Z"
                NotOnOrAfter="2008-10-15T17:34:46Z">
        <saml:AudienceRestriction>
           <saml:Audience>google.com</saml:Audience>
        </saml:AudienceRestriction>
     </saml:Conditions>
     <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2008-10-15T17:24:46Z“
                SessionIndex="s2bb816b5a8852dcc29f3301784c1640f245a9ec01">
        <saml:AuthnContext>
           <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
             urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport
           </saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
        </saml:AuthnContext>
     </saml:AuthnStatement>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>

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Strong Authentication in Web Application #SCS III

  • 1. Strong Authentication in Web Application “State of the Art 2011” Sylvain Maret / Digital Security Expert / OpenID Switzerland @smaret Version 1.0 / 2PM
  • 2.
  • 4. Who am I?  Security Expert  17 years of experience in ICT Security  Principal Consultant at MARET Consulting  Expert at Engineer School of Yverdon & Geneva University  Swiss French Area delegate at OpenID Switzerland  Co-founder Geneva Application Security Forum  OWASP Member  Author of the blog: la Citadelle Electronique  http://ch.linkedin.com/in/smaret or @smaret  http://www.slideshare.net/smaret  Chosen field  AppSec & Digital Identity Security
  • 5. Protection of digital identities: a topical issue… Strong Auth
  • 6. «Digital identity is the cornerstone of trust» http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authentification_forte
  • 7. Definition of strong authentication Strong Authentication on Wikipedia
  • 8. Strong Authentication A new paradigm?
  • 9. Which Strong Authentication technology ? Legacy Token / OTP / PKI / SuisseID ? / Open Source Solution ?
  • 10.
  • 11. OTP PKI (HW) Biometry Strong authentication Encryption Digital signature Non repudiation Strong link with the user
  • 13. PKI: Digital Certificate Hardware Token (Crypto PKI) Strong Authentication Software Certificate (PKCS#12;PFX)
  • 14. SSL/TLS Mutual Authentication : how does it work? Validation Authority CRL or OCSP Request Valid Invalid Unknown SSL / TLS Mutual Authentication Alice Web Server
  • 15. Demo #1: Software Certificate Auth using an IDP OpenID http://www.clavid.com/
  • 16. Strong Authentication with Biometry (Match on Card technology)  A reader  Biometry  SmartCard  A card with chip  Technology MOC  Crypto Processor  PC/SC  PKCS#11  Digital certificate X509
  • 17. Strong Authentication With (O)ne (T)ime (P)assword
  • 18. (O)ne (T)ime (P)assword  OTP Time Based  Others:  Like SecurID  OTP via SMS  OTP Event Based  OTP via email  Biometry and OTP  Bingo Card  OTP Challenge  Etc. Response Based
  • 19. OTP T-B? OTP E-B? OTP C-R-B? Crypto - 101
  • 20. Crypto-101 / Time Based OTP HASH Function K=Secret Key / Seed OTP T=UTC Time ie = OTP(K,T) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,T))
  • 21. Crypto-101 / Event Based OTP HASH Function K=Secret Key / Seed OTP C = Counter ie = OTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))
  • 22. Crypto-101 / OTP Challenge Response Based HASH Function K=Secret Key / Seed OTP Challenge nonce ie:
  • 23. Other[s] OTP technologies… OTP Via SMS “Flicker code” Generator Software that converts already encrypted data into optical screen animation By Elcard
  • 24. Demo #2: Protect WordPress (OTP Via SMS)
  • 25. How to Store my Secret Key ? A Token !
  • 26. OTP Token: Software vs Hardware ?
  • 27. Software OTP for Smartphone http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/iotp/id328973960
  • 28.
  • 30.
  • 31. Seed generation & distribution ? Still a good model ? K1 Threat Agent Editor / Vendor (APT) Secret Key are[is] generated on promise K1 K1
  • 33. New Standards & Open Source
  • 34. Technologies accessible to everyone   Initiative for Open AuTHentication (OATH)  HOTP  TOTP  OCRA  Etc.  Mobile OTP  (Use MD5 …..)
  • 35. Initiative for Open AuTHentication (OATH)  HOTP  Event Based OTP  Token Identifier  RFC 4226 Specification  TOTP  IETF KeyProv Working Group  Time Based OTP  PSKC - Portable Symmetric Key Container, RFC 6030  Draft IETF Version 8  DSKPP - Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol, RFC 6063  OCRA  Challenge/Response OTP  And more !  Draft IETF Version 13 http://www.openauthentication.org/specifications
  • 38. Use OATH-HOTP & TOTP http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/
  • 39.
  • 41. Web application: basic authentication model
  • 42. Web application: Strong Authentication Implementation Blueprint
  • 43. “Shielding" approach: perimetric authentication using Reverse Proxy / WAF
  • 45. Demo #3: Apache and Mod_OpenID (Using Biometry / OTP)
  • 46. Demo #3: Challenge / Response OTP with Biometry
  • 48. Multi OTP PHP Class Demo #4 & Hardening OS
  • 49. Proof of Concept Code by Anne Gosselin, Antonio Fontes, Sylvain Maret ! if (! empty($_REQUEST['pma_username'])) { // The user just logged in $GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_USER'] = $_REQUEST['pma_username']; // we combine both OTP + PIN code for the token verification $fooPass = empty($_REQUEST['pma_password']) ? '' : $_REQUEST['pma_password']; $fooOtp = empty($_REQUEST['pma_otp']) ? '' : $_REQUEST['pma_otp']; $GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW'] = $fooPass.''.$fooOtp; // OTP CHECK require_once('./libraries/multiotp.class.php'); $multiotp = new Multiotp(); $multiotp->SetUser($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_USER']); $multiotp->SetEncryptionKey('DefaultCliEncryptionKey'); $multiotp->SetUsersFolder('./libraries/users/'); $multiotp->SetLogFolder('./libraries/log/'); $multiotp->EnableVerboseLog(); $otpCheckResult = $multiotp->CheckToken($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW']); // the PIN code use kept for accessing the database $GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW'] = substr($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW'], 0, strlen($GLOBALS['PHP_AUTH_PW'] if($otpCheckResult == 0) return true; else die("auth failed.");
  • 50. Step1: Add a new method using cookie authentication In config.inc.php Howto #1
  • 51. Step2: Add pma_otp field In common.inc.php
  • 52. Step3: Add new input File ori: cookie.auth.lib.php New file: cookieotp.auth.lib.php
  • 54. New file: cookieotp.auth.lib.php Step3: Call multiotp
  • 55. Demo 4#: PHP[OTP] integration for[in] phpmyadmin
  • 56. Multi OTP PHP Class by André Liechti (Switzerland) Source Code will be publish soon: http://www.citadelle-electronique.net/ http://www.multiotp.net/
  • 57.
  • 58. SSH Hardening with OTP Multi OTP PHP Class AES 256 PAM
  • 59. Strong Authentication Strong Authentication and Application Security & Application Security
  • 60. Threat Modeling “detecting web application threats before coding”
  • 61. ICAM: a changing paradigm on Strong Authentication
  • 62. Federation of identity approach a change of paradigm: using IDP for Authentication and Strong Authentication Identity Provider SAML, OpenID, etc
  • 63. SECTION 2 OpenID > What is it? > How does it work? > How to integrate?
  • 64. OpenID - What is it? > Internet SingleSignOn > Free Choice of Identity Provider > Relatively Simple Protocol > No License Fee > User-Centric Identity Management > Independent of Identification Methods > Internet Scalable > Non-Profit Organization
  • 65. OpenID - How does it work? User Hans Muster 3 4, 4a Identity Provider e.g. clavid.com hans.muster.clavid.com 5 6 1 2 Identity URL Caption https://hans.muster.clavid.com 1. User enters OpenID 2. Discovery 3. Authentication 4. Approval 4a. Change Attributes 5. Send Attributes 6. Validation Enabled Service
  • 66. Surprise! You may already have an OpenID !
  • 67. Other Well Known & Simple Providers http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_OpenID_providers
  • 68. Get an OpenID with Strong Authentication for free !
  • 70. Resources on Internet 1/2  http://motp.sourceforge.net/  http://www.clavid.ch/otp  http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/  http://www.multiotp.net/  http://www.openauthentication.org/  http://wiki.openid.net/  http://www.citadelle-electronique.net/  http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/
  • 71. Resources on Internet 2/2  http://rcdevs.com/products/openotp/  https://github.com/adulau/paper-token  http://www.yubico.com/yubikey  http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/  http://www.nongnu.org/oath-toolkit/  http://www.nongnu.org/oath-toolkit/  http://www.gpaterno.com/publications/2010/dublin_oss barcamp_2010_otp_with_oss.pdf
  • 74. Une conviction forte ! Authentification forte
  • 75. SECTION 1 SAML >What is it? >How does it work?
  • 76. Using SAML for Authentication and Strong Authentication (Assertion Consumer Service)
  • 77. SAML – What is it? SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language): > Defined by the Oasis Group > Well and Academically Designed Specification > Uses XML Syntax > Used for Authentication & Authorization > SAML Assertions > Statements: Authentication, Attribute, Authorization > SAML Protocols > Queries: Authentication, Artifact, Name Identifier Mapping, etc. > SAML Bindings > SOAP, Reverse-SOAP, HTTP-Get, HTTP-Post, HTTP-Artifact > SAML Profiles > Web Browser SingleSignOn Profile, Identity Provider Discovery Profile, Assertion Query / Request Profile, Attribute Profile
  • 78. SAML – How does it work? User Hans Muster 3 2 4 Identity Provider e.g. clavid.ch 4 2 1 6 Enabled Service e.g. Google Apps for Business
  • 79. Example with HTTP POST Binding Access Resource Browser Web App SAML Ready 1 AuthN 2 <AuthnRequest> 3 + PIN Redirect 302 ACS POST <Response> 7 Ressource Ressource 8 <Response> in HTML Form 6 Single Sign On Service <AuthnRequest> 4 Credential Challenge 5a User Login IDP MC 5b
  • 80. A major event in the world of strong authentication  12 October 2005: the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issues a directive  « Single Factor Authentication » is not enough for the web financial applications  Before end 2006 it is compulsory to implement a strong authentication system  http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr101205.htm  And the PCI DSS norm  Compulsory strong authentication for distant accesses  And now European regulations  Payment Services (2007/64/CE) for banks  Social Networks, Open Source
  • 81. Out of Band Authentication
  • 83. SAML
  • 84. SAML AuthnRequst Transfer via Browser Redirect-Binding POST-Binding
  • 85. A SAML AuthnRequest (no magic, just XML) <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol“ ID="glcmfhikbbhohichialilnnpjakbeljekmkhppkb“ Version="2.0” IssueInstant="2008-10-14T00:57:14Z” ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST” ProviderName="google.com” ForceAuthn="false” IsPassive="false” AssertionConsumerServiceURL="https://www.google.com/a/unopass.net/acs"> <saml:Issuer xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> google.com </saml:Issuer> <samlp:NameIDPolicy AllowCreate="true" Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified" /> </samlp:AuthnRequest>
  • 86. SAML Assertion Transfer via Browser POST-Binding
  • 87. A SAML Assertion Response (no magic, just XML) <samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" ID="s247893b2ec90665dfd5d9bd4a092f5e3a7194fef4" InResponseTo="hkcmljnccpheoobdofbjcngjbadmgcfhaapdbnni" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2008-10-15T17:24:46Z" Destination="https://www.google.com/a/unopass.net/acs"> <saml:Issuer> http://idp.unopass.net:80/opensso </saml:Issuer> <samlp:Status> <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/> </samlp:Status> <saml:Assertion ID="s295c56ccd7872209ae336b934d1eed5be52a8e6ec" IssueInstant="2008-10-15T17:24:46Z" Version="2.0"> <saml:Issuer>http://idp.unopass.net:80/opensso</saml:Issuer> <Signature> … A DIGITAL SIGNATURE … </Signature> ...
  • 88. A SAML Assertion Response (no magic, just XML) ... <saml:Subject> <saml:NameID NameQualifier="http://idp.unopass.net:80/opensso"> sylvain.maret </saml:NameID> <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:...:bearer"> <saml:SubjectConfirmationData InResponseTo="hkcmljnccpheoobdofbjcngjbadmgcfhaapdbnni" NotOnOrAfter="2008-10-15T17:34:46Z" Recipient="https://www.google.com/a/unopass.net/acs"/> </saml:SubjectConfirmation> </saml:Subject> ...
  • 89. A SAML Assertion Response (no magic, just XML) ... <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2008-10-15T17:14:46Z" NotOnOrAfter="2008-10-15T17:34:46Z"> <saml:AudienceRestriction> <saml:Audience>google.com</saml:Audience> </saml:AudienceRestriction> </saml:Conditions> <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2008-10-15T17:24:46Z“ SessionIndex="s2bb816b5a8852dcc29f3301784c1640f245a9ec01"> <saml:AuthnContext> <saml:AuthnContextClassRef> urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport </saml:AuthnContextClassRef> </saml:AuthnContext> </saml:AuthnStatement> </saml:Assertion> </samlp:Response>