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Authentication Protocols Paul Krzyzanowski [email_address] [email_address] Distributed Systems Except as otherwise noted, the content of this presentation is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License.
Authentication ,[object Object],[object Object]
Authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Reusable passwords ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Reusable passwords ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Reusable passwords ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
One-time password ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Skey authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Skey authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],give this list to Alice
Skey authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Skey authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Two-factor authentication with an authenticator card ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Challenge-Response authentication “ alice” Alice network host look up alice’s key,  K generate random challenge number  C R  ’ = f( K , C ) R  = f( K ,  C ) R  =  R  ’ ? “ alice” C R  ’ “ welcome” an eavesdropper does not see  K
SecurID card Username: paul Password: 1234 032848 PIN passcode from card + Something you know Something you have ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Password: 354982 Passcode changes every 60 seconds
SecurID card ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SecurID ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SKID2/SKID3 authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SKID2/SKID3 authentication Alice chooses a random number (nonce) R A and sends it to Bob R A Bob
SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B  , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Bob chooses a random number (nonce):  R B. He computes  H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) and sends it to Alice with  R B Bob shows that he can encrypt Alice’s nonce
SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B  , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Alice receives  R B  and has  R A . Computes:  H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) compares result to verify that Bob was able to encrypt data with key  K . Authentication is complete as far as Alice is concerned (Bob knows the key).
SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B  , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Now Alice has to convince Bob ( mutual authentication ) H K (R B , “alice”) Bob Alice demonstrates that she can encrypt Bob’s nonce
SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B  , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Bob computes  H K (R B , “alice”)  and compares Alice’s message. If they match, he trusts Alice’s identity Key point :  Each party permutes data generated by the other. Challenge the other party with data that will be different each time. H K (R B , “alice”) Bob
Combined authentication and key exchange
Wide-mouth frog ,[object Object],[object Object],“ alice” , E A (T A ,”bob”, K) Alice Trent session key destination time stamp – prevent replay attacks sender
Wide-mouth frog ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],“ alice” , E A (T A ,”bob”, K) Alice Trent session key destination time stamp – prevent replay attacks sender Trent:
Wide-mouth frog ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],“ alice” , E A (T A ,”bob”, K) Alice Trent session key source time stamp – prevent replay attacks Trent: E B (T T ,”alice”, K) Bob
Wide-mouth frog ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],“ alice” , E A (T A ,”bob”, K) Alice Trent session key source time stamp – prevent replay attacks Bob: E B (T T ,”alice”, K) Bob
Wide-mouth frog ,[object Object],Alice E K (M) Bob
Kerberos ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Kerberos ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Kerberos ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Authenticate, get permission ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],{“Bob’s server”, S} A Alice Authentication Server (AS) {“Alice”, S} B TICKET sealed envelope
Send key ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],{“Alice”, S} B , T S Alice Bob sealed envelope
Authenticate recipient ,[object Object],[object Object],Alice Bob {“Bob’s Server”, T} S
Kerberos key usage ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ticket Granting Service (TGS) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Using Kerberos ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],{“TGS”, S} A {“Alice”, S} TGS
Using Kerberos ,[object Object],[object Object],Alice sends session key, S, to TGS  Alice receives session key for rlogin service & ticket to pass to rlogin service {“rlogin@somehost”, S’} S {“Alice”, S’} R {“Alice”, S} TGS ,T S rlogin TGS session key for  rlogin ticket for rlogin server on somehost
Public key authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Like SKID, demonstrate we can encrypt or decrypt a nonce:
Public key authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Public key authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
X.509 Certificates ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],version serial # algorithm, params issuer validity time distinguished name public key (alg, params, key) signature of CA
X.509 certificates ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Example: Root Certificates in IE As of January 2007 http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Example: Root Certificates in IE As of January 2007 http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Example: Root Certificates in IE As of January 2007 http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Example: Root Certificates in IE As of January 2007 http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Example: Root Certificates in IE As of January 2007 http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Example: Root Certificates in IE As of January 2007 http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125
Transport Layer Security (TLS) aka Secure Socket Layer (SSL) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) client server ,[object Object],hello(version, protocol) hello(version, protocol) certificate (or public key) hello done certificate (or none)
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) client server ,[object Object],client authenticates server server authenticates client encrypt with server’s private key client nonce E(nonce) client decrypts nonce with server’s public key server nonce E(nonce) server decrypts with client’s public key encrypt with client’s private key
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) client server 3.   Establish session key (for symmetric cryptography) encrypt with server’s public key server decrypts with server’s public key pick a session key E(session key) set cipher mode [optional]
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) client server E S (data) 4. Exchange data (symmetric encryption) encrypt and decrypt with session key and symmetric algorithm (e.g. RC4)
The end.

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Authentication (Distributed computing)

  • 1. Authentication Protocols Paul Krzyzanowski [email_address] [email_address] Distributed Systems Except as otherwise noted, the content of this presentation is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License.
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14. Challenge-Response authentication “ alice” Alice network host look up alice’s key, K generate random challenge number C R ’ = f( K , C ) R = f( K , C ) R = R ’ ? “ alice” C R ’ “ welcome” an eavesdropper does not see K
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19. SKID2/SKID3 authentication Alice chooses a random number (nonce) R A and sends it to Bob R A Bob
  • 20. SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Bob chooses a random number (nonce): R B. He computes H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) and sends it to Alice with R B Bob shows that he can encrypt Alice’s nonce
  • 21. SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Alice receives R B and has R A . Computes: H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) compares result to verify that Bob was able to encrypt data with key K . Authentication is complete as far as Alice is concerned (Bob knows the key).
  • 22. SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Now Alice has to convince Bob ( mutual authentication ) H K (R B , “alice”) Bob Alice demonstrates that she can encrypt Bob’s nonce
  • 23. SKID2/SKID3 authentication R A Bob R B , H K (R A , R B ,”bob”) Alice Bob computes H K (R B , “alice”) and compares Alice’s message. If they match, he trusts Alice’s identity Key point : Each party permutes data generated by the other. Challenge the other party with data that will be different each time. H K (R B , “alice”) Bob
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  • 54. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) client server 3. Establish session key (for symmetric cryptography) encrypt with server’s public key server decrypts with server’s public key pick a session key E(session key) set cipher mode [optional]
  • 55. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) client server E S (data) 4. Exchange data (symmetric encryption) encrypt and decrypt with session key and symmetric algorithm (e.g. RC4)