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Cooperation under Interval Uncertainty
1. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative Game Theory. Operations Research
Games. Applications to Interval Games
Lecture 3: Cooperation under Interval Uncertainty
Sırma Zeynep Alparslan G¨k
o
S¨leyman Demirel University
u
Faculty of Arts and Sciences
Department of Mathematics
Isparta, Turkey
email:zeynepalparslan@yahoo.com
August 13-16, 2011
2. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Outline
Introduction
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
Cooperative games under interval uncertainty
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Some economic examples
References
3. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
Introduction
This lecture is based on the paper
Cooperation under interval uncertainty
by Alparslan G¨k, Miquel and Tijs
o
which was published in
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research.
4. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
Introduction
Classical cooperative game theory deals with coalitions who
coordinate their actions and pool their winnings.
One of the problems is how to divide the rewards or costs among
the members of the formed coalition.
Generally, the situations are considered from a deterministic point
of view.
However, in most economical situations rewards or costs are not
known precisely, but it is possible to estimate intervals to which
they belong.
5. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Introduction
define a cooperative interval game
introduce the notion of the core set of a cooperative interval
game and various notions of balancedness
focus on two-person cooperative interval games and extend to
these games well-known results for classical two-person
cooperative games
define and analyze specific solution concepts on the class of
two-person interval games, e.g., mini-core set, the ψ α -values
6. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
A cooperative n-person game in coalitional form is an ordered
pair < N, v >, where N = {1, 2, ..., n} (the set of players) and
v : 2N → R is a map, assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N a
real number, such that v (∅) = 0.
v is the characteristic function of the game.
v (S) is the worth (or value) of coalition S.
7. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
A payoff vector x ∈ Rn is called an imputation for the game
< N, v > (the set is denoted by I (v )) if
x is individually rational: xi ≥ v ({i}) for all i ∈ N
n
x is efficient (Pareto optimal): i=1 xi = v (N)
The core (Gillies (1959)) of a game < N, v > is the set
C (v ) = x ∈ I (v )| xi ≥ v (S) for all S ∈ 2N {∅} .
i∈S
The idea of the core is by giving every coalition S at least their
worth v (S) so that no coalition has an incentive to split off.
For a two-person game I (v ) = C (v ).
8. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
An n-person game < N, v > is called a balanced game if for each
balanced map λ : 2N {∅} → R+ we have
λ(S)v (S) ≤ v (N).
S
Theorem (Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)):
Let < N, v > be an n-person game. Then the following two
assertions are equivalent:
(i) C (v ) = ∅,
(ii) < N, v > is a balanced game.
9. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
π(N): the set of all permutations σ : N → N
The marginal vector mσ (v ) ∈ Rn has as i-th coordinate (i ∈ N)
miσ (v ) = v (P σ (i) ∪ {i}) − v (P σ (i))
P σ (i) = r ∈ N|σ −1 (r ) < σ −1 (i)
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) Φ(v ) of a game is the average
of the marginal vectors of the game:
1
Φ(v ) = mσ (v )
n!
σ∈π(N)
10. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
For a two-person game < N, v >:
m(12) (v ) = (v ({1}), v ({1, 2}) − v ({1}))
m(21) (v ) = (v ({1, 2}) − v ({1}), v ({2}))
v ({1, 2}) − v ({1}) − v ({2})
Φi (v ) = v ({i}) + (i = {1, 2})
2
Shapley value is the standard solution, in the middle of the core.
Marginal vectors are the extreme points of the core whose average
gives the Shapley value.
11. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
A game < N, v > is superadditive if v (S ∪ T ) ≥ v (S) + v (T )
for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ∩ T = ∅.
A two-person cooperative game < N, v > is superadditive if
and only if v ({1}) + v ({2}) ≤ v ({1, 2}) holds.
A two-person cooperative game < N, v > is superadditive if
and only if the game is balanced.
For further details on Cooperative game theory see Tijs (2003) and
Branzei Dimitrov and Tijs (2008).
12. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Cooperative games under interval uncertainty
A cooperative n-person interval game in coalitional form is an
ordered pair < N, w >:
N := {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players
w : 2N → I (R) is the characteristic function which assigns to
each coalition S ∈ 2N a closed interval w (S) ∈ I (R)
I (R) is the set of all closed intervals in R such that
w (∅) = [0, 0]
The worth interval w (S) is denoted by [w (S), w (S)].
Here, w (S) is the lower bound and w (S) is the upper bound.
If all the worth intervals are degenerate intervals, i.e.,
w (S) = w (S), then the interval game < N, w > corresponds to
the classical cooperative game < N, v >, where v (S) = w (S).
13. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Let < N, w > be an interval game; then v is called a selection of
w if v (S) ∈ w (S) for each S ∈ 2N .
The set of selections of w is denoted by Sel(w ).
The imputation set of an interval game < N, w > is defined by
I (w ) := ∪ {I (v )|v ∈ Sel(w )}.
The core set of an interval game < N, w > is defined by
C (w ) := ∪ {C (v )|v ∈ Sel(w )}.
An interval game < N, w > is strongly balanced if for each
balanced map λ it holds that
λ(S)w (S) ≤ w (N).
S
14. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Proposition: Let < N, w > be an interval game. Then, the
following three statements are equivalent:
(i) For each v ∈ Sel(w ) the game < N, v > is balanced.
(ii) For each v ∈ Sel(w ), C (v ) = ∅.
(iii) The interval game < N, w > is strongly balanced.
Proof: (i) ⇔ (ii) follows from Bondareva and Shapley theorem.
(i) ⇔ (iii) follows using the inequalities:
w (N) ≤ v (N) ≤ w (N)
λ(S)w (S) ≤ λ(S)v (S) ≤ λ(S)w (S)
15. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Balancedness and related topics
Let < N, w > be a two-person interval game:
the pre-imputation set
I ∗ (w ) := x ∈ R2 |x1 + x2 ∈ w (1, 2)
the imputation set
I (w ) := x ∈ R2 |x1 ≥ w (1), x2 ≥ w (2), x1 + x2 ∈ w (1, 2)
the mini-core set
MC (w ) := x ∈ R2 |x1 ≥ w (1), x2 ≥ w (2), x1 + x2 ∈ w (1, 2)
the core set
C (w ) := x ∈ R2 |x1 ≥ w (1), x2 ≥ w (2), x1 + x2 ∈ w (1, 2)
18. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Balancedness and related topics
s1 ∈ w (1) = [w (1), w (1)], s2 ∈ w (2) = [w (2), w (2)]
t ∈ w (1, 2) = [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)]
w s1 ,s2 ,t : the selection of w corresponding to s1 , s2 and t
C (w ) = ∪ C (w s1 ,s2 ,t )|(s1 , s2 , t) ∈ w (1) × w (2) × w (1, 2)
MC (w ) = ∪ C (w s1 ,s2 ,t )|s1 ∈ [w (1), w (1)], s2 ∈ [w (2), w (2)]
MC (w ) ⊂ ∪ C (w s1 ,s2 ,t )|s1 ∈ w (1), s2 ∈ w (2), t ∈ w (1, 2)
The mini-core set is interesting because for each s1 , s2 and t all
points in MC (w ) with x1 + x2 = t are also in C (w s1 ,s2 ,t ).
19. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Superadditivity
Let A and B be two intervals. We say that A is left to B, denoted
by A B, if for each a ∈ A and for each b ∈ B, a ≤ b.
A two-person interval game < N, w > is called superadditive, if
w (1) + w (2) w (1, 2)
20. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
If < N, w > is a superadditive game, then for each s1 , s2 and t we
have s1 + s2 ≤ t. So, each selection w s1 ,s2 ,t of w is balanced.
If w (1) + w (2) ≤ w (1, 2) is satisfied, then each selection w s1 ,s2 ,t of
w is superadditive.
A two-person interval game < N, w > is superadditive if and only
if < N, w > is strongly balanced.
21. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
ψ α -values and their axiomatization
α = (α1 , α2 ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]: the optimism vector
α
s1 1 (w ) := α1 w (1) + (1 − α1 )w (1)
α
s2 2 (w ) := α2 w (2) + (1 − α2 )w (2)
22. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
α α
If α = (1, 1), then s1 1 (w ) = w (1), s2 2 (w ) = w (2) which are
the optimistic (upper) points.
α α
If α = (0, 0), then s1 1 (w ) = w (1), s2 2 (w ) = w (2) which are
the pessimistic (lower) points.
If α = ( 1 , 1 ), then s1 1 (w ) = w (1)+w (1) , s2 2 (w ) = w (2)+w (2)
2 2
α
2
α
2
which are the middle points of the intervals w (1) and w (2),
respectively.
23. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
A map F : IG {1,2} → K(R2 ) assigning to each interval game w
a unique curve
F (w ) : [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)] → R2
for t ∈ [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)], i ∈ {1, 2}, in K(R2 ) is called a solution.
IG {1,2} : the family of all interval games with player set {1, 2}
24. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
F has the following properties:
(i) efficiency (EFF), if for all w ∈ IG {1,2} and
t ∈ [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)]; i∈N F (w )(t)i = t.
(ii) α-symmetry (α-SYM), if for all w ∈ IG {1,2} and
α α
t ∈ [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)] with s1 1 (w ) = s2 2 (w );
F (w )(t)1 = F (w )(t)2 .
(iii) covariance with respect to translations (COV), if for all
w ∈ IG {1,2} , t ∈ [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)] and a = (a1 , a2 ) ∈ R2
F (w + ˆ)(a1 + a2 + t) = F (w )(t) + a.
a
25. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
ψ α -values and their axiomatization
ˆ ∈ IG {1,2} is defined by
a
ˆ({1}) = [a1 , a1 ], ˆ({2}) = [a2 , a2 ]
a a
ˆ({1, 2}) = [a1 + a2 , a1 + a2 ]
a
w + ˆ ∈ IG {1,2} is defined by
a
(w + ˆ)(s) = w (s) + ˆ(s)
a a
for
s ∈ {{1} , {2} , {1, 2}}
26. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
For each w ∈ IG {1,2} and t ∈ [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)]
we define the map
ψ α : IG {1,2} → K(R2 )
such that
α α
ψ α (w )(t) := (s1 1 (w ) + β, s2 2 (w ) + β),
where
1 α α
β = (t − s1 1 (w ) − s2 2 (w )).
2
27. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Proposition: The ψ α -value satisfies the properties EFF, α-SYM
and COV.
Proof:
(i) EFF property is satisfied since
α α
ψ α (w )(t)1 + ψ α (w )(t)2 = s1 1 (w ) + s2 2 (w ) + 2β = t.
α α
(ii) α-SYM property is satisfied since s1 1 (w ) = s2 2 (w ) implies
α α
ψ α (w )(t)1 = s1 1 (w ) + β = s2 2 (w ) + β = ψ α (w )(t)2 .
28. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
(iii) COV property is satisfied since
α ˆ α ˆ
ψ α (w + ˆ)(a1 + a2 + t) = (s1 1 (w + ˆ) + β, s2 2 (w + ˆ) + β)
a a a
Then,
α α
ψ α (w +ˆ)(a1 +a2 +t) = (s1 1 +β, s2 2 +β)+(a1 , a2 ) = ψ α (w )(t)+a.
a
Note that
ˆ 1 t α α
β = β = (ˆ − s1 1 (w + ˆ) − s2 2 (w + ˆ)),
a a
2
where ˆ = a1 + a2 + t.
t
29. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Theorem: The ψ α -value is the unique solution satisfying EFF,
α-SYM and COV properties.
Proof: Suppose F satisfies the properties above. Show F = ψ α .
α α
Let a = (s1 1 (w ), s2 2 (w )). Then, s α (w − ˆ) = (0, 0).
a
By α-SYM and EFF, for each ˜ = t − a1 − a2
t
F (w − ˆ)(˜) = ( 1 ˜, 2 ˜) = ψ α (w − ˆ)(˜).
a t 2t
1
t a t
By COV of F and ψ α ,
F (w )(t) = F (w − ˆ)(˜) + a = ψ α (w − ˆ)(˜) + a = ψ α (w )(t).
a t a t
From Proposition it follows ψ α satisfies EFF, α-SYM and COV.
30. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty
Marginal curves and the Shapley-like solution
The marginal curves for a two-person game < N, w > are defined
by
mσ,α (w ) : [w (1, 2), w (1, 2)] → R2 ,
where
α α
m(1,2),α (w )(t) = (s1 1 (w ), t − s1 1 (w )),
α α
m(2,1),α (w )(t) = (t − s2 2 (w ), s2 2 (w )).
The Shapley-like solution ψ α is equal to
1
ψ α (w ) = (m(1,2),α (w ) + m(2,1),α (w )).
2
31. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Some economic examples
Example 2
A bankruptcy situation with two claimants with demands d1 = 70
and d2 = 90 on (uncertain) estate E = [100, 120].
w (∅) = [0, 0], w (1) = [(E − d2 )+ , (E − d2 )+ ] = [10, 30]
w (2) = [(E − d1 )+ , (E − d1 )+ ] = [30, 50], w (1, 2) = [100, 120].
w (1) + w (2) = 30 + 50 ≤ w (1, 2) = 100
(a strongly balanced game)
32. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
Some economic examples
1
ψ (0,0) (w )(t) = (10 + β, 30 + β) with β = (t − 40) and t ∈ [100, 120]
2
t 100 106 110 114 120
β 30 33 35 37 40
ψ (0,0) (w )(t) (40, 60) (43, 63) (45, 65) (47, 67) (50, 70)
36. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
References
References
[1] Alparslan G¨k S.Z., Miquel S. and Tijs S., “Cooperation under
o
interval uncertainty”, Mathematical Methods of Operations
Research, Vol. 69 (2009) 99-109.
[2] Bondareva O.N., “Certain applications of the methods of linear
programming to the theory of cooperative games”, Problemly
Kibernetiki 10 (1963) 119-139 (in Russian).
[3] Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S., “Models in Cooperative
Game Theory”, Springer-Verlag Berlin (2008).
[4] Gillies D.B., “Some Theorems on n-person Games”, Ph.D.
Thesis, Princeton University Press (1953).
37. 6th Summer School AACIMP - Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI) - National Technical University of Ukraine, 8-20 August 2011
References
[5] Shapley L.S., “A value for n-person games”, Annals of
Mathematics Studies 28 (1953) 307-317.
[6] Shapley L.S., “On balanced sets and cores”, Naval Research
Logistics Quarterly 14 (1967) 453-460.
[7] Tijs S., “Introduction to Game Theory”, SIAM, Hindustan
Book Agency, India (2003).