Attack Operations (AO) are conducted to destroy enemy missiles and supporting infrastructure before launch. This reduces the threat to defensive forces. AO can range throughout enemy territory and are conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. In Practice: Difficult to achieve perfect intelligence and surveillance to locate all missiles and infrastructure; political constraints on preemptive action; risk of escalation; enemy may have mobile/concealed forces

1. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Defense:
Overview and Implications for
Naval Planners
Naval War College
Non-Resident Seminar: Joint Maritime Operations
30-31 Jan 2012
UNCLASSIFIED

2. UNCLASSIFIED
THIS PRESENTATION IS
UNCLASSIFIED
Please Keep the Discussion At That Level
All Material is drawn from public/open sources
Program Information is Drawn From MDA’s Public Website (www.mda.mil)
UNCLASSIFIED

3. UNCLASSIFIED
OVERVIEW
•! Ballistic Missile Basics
•! Essential Lexicon
•! Threat
•! BMD Fundamentals
•! History/Background
•! Doctrine & “Three Pillars”
•! BMD Phases of Intercept
•! BMD Elements
•! BMD Planning and Execution
•! BMDR
•! Homeland Defense and PAA
•! BMD Planning Lexicon
•! BMD Ops in the Joint/Maritime
Environment
Break
•! Discussion
UNCLASSIFIED

4. UNCLASSIFIED
Part I
Ballistic Missile Basics
UNCLASSIFIED

5. UNCLASSIFIED
Essential Ballistic Missile Lexicon
Ballistic Missile Class Max. Range (km) Relevant International Conventions
Short Range Ballistic Missile SRBM <1000
Medium Range Ballistic Missile MRBM 1,000 – 3,000 INF Treaty
MTCR (Bi-lateral; US-RU)
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile IRBM 3,000 – 5,500 (Multi-lateral)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM >5,500
START Treaty
(Bi-lateral; US-RU)
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLBM Varies
UNCLASSIFIED

6. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Composition
SIMPLE DESIGN: COMPLEX DESIGNS:
SCUD variant MaRV
MIRV
PBV
Warhead/RV
Tankage:
Oxidizer &
Propellant
Airframe
Guidance Multiple
Stages with
Separating
Warhead
Motor
UNCLASSIFIED

7. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missiles:
Propellant Types
Propellant = Fuel + Oxidizer which produces Thrust
Solid Propellant Liquid Propellant
•! Basically – combustion chamber tubes •! Combines separately stored liquid chemicals,
packed with a propellant that contains a fuel and an oxidizer, to produce thrust.
both fuel and oxidizer blended together •! May be either cryogenic or hypergolic:
uniformly. For example Shuttle SRBs:
•! Cryogenic Propellant : very cold, liquefied
•! Oxidizer -- ammonium perchlorate gases as fuel and oxidizer; Typical uses:
(69.93%) SLV
•! Fuel – Powdered aluminum (16%) •! Hypergolic Propellant: fuel and oxidizer
ignite on contact with each other. No spark
•! Catalyzer -- Iron oxidizer powder is needed.
(0.07%)
•! SCUD B/Shahab/No Dong: Inhibited
•! Remainder is an epoxy binder that Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA)
also burns (oxidizer) + Unsymmetrical
Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)(fuel)
•! Shape of chamber controls burn via
exposed propellant surface •! Advantages: highest energy per unit of fuel
mass, variable thrust, and a restart capability
•! Advantages: Stable, storable; simple –
•! Disadvantages: Complex storage/plumbing;
enables mobility;
Precise injection metering; High capacity
•! Disadvantages: Low tolerance for error pumps; Limited mobility and long term
in manufacture, cannot shut down & storage; HIGHLY TOXIC (hypergolics)
restart
UNCLASSIFIED

8. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missiles:
Basing Mode - Fixed
Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or mobile
bases
•! Silo: Hardened, underground shelter for security and
protection from elements
•! Not immune to attack, difficult for liquid
propellant missiles for long term storage
•! Elevate to Launch: Semi-buried, better access to
service missile, useful when terrain does not permit
deeply buried facilities
•! More vulnerable to attack
•! Roll-out to Launch: Missiles stored in hard/deeply
buried facility, rolled out to pre-surveyed launch pad
for launch
•! Missiles vulnerable until launch or returned to
facility; gives away intentions (aids opponent
I&W) and may lead to preemptive strike.
UNCLASSIFIED

9. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missiles:
Basing Mode - Mobile
Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or mobile bases
•! Rail: Permits dispersal across broad area; organic support;
deployment of “heavy” missiles
•! Unique identifiers of train set, maintenance shelters a
weak point, costly infrastructure to build/maintain
•! TEL/MEL: Most mobile of land-based modes, self-sufficient
for solid propellant missiles; easier for CCDD
•! Limitations on size/weight of missile and supporting road
infrastructure/terrain
•! SHIP-BASED: Asymmetric threat concept but on the
margins
•! Vessel size/stability vs. sea state directly impacts ability to
successfully elevate, service, launch missile
•! SLBM: Most survivable, assured 2nd strike. Employed by US,
Russia, with China and India in development
•! Very expensive to develop, build and operate
•! ALBM: Allows launch closer to threat territory decreasing
flight and warning times
•! Limited by carrier aircraft size
UNCLASSIFIED

10. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missiles Defined
•! Guided only during boost phase
of flight
•! Once powered flight is complete,
only gravity affects remainder of
trajectory
•! Plus a little drag on reentry
•! “Guided” has historically implied
a relatively gentle means of
controlling the state vector at
thrust termination (Vbo)
•! To a static target
UNCLASSIFIED

11. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missiles Defined:
Reality
In reality, ballistic missiles are not “ballistic” . . . there are many ways to change trajectory during
and after boost
•! Endo-atmospheric maneuvers
•! Maneuvers in the atmosphere using aerodynamic surfaces on the booster or RV
•! Used during boost, after boost or both
•! Exo-atmospheric maneuvers
•! Maneuvers outside the atmosphere using small liquid propellant thrusters or solid
propellant motors
•! Used after boost
•! Generalized energy management system maneuvers
•! Used on boosters that allow all stages to burn to depletion (i.e., solid fuel); missile
pitches and yaws during boost phase to waste energy to control range
•! Can result in a much less “gentle” guidance during boost phase
Complicates Missile Warning And BMD Missions
UNCLASSIFIED

12. UNCLASSIFIED
Endo-Atmospheric
Maneuvers
Booster Mounted
•! Uses aerodynamic surfaces for lift Booster
•! Takes advantage of atmosphere and missile’s velocity to
“fly” further down range
•! Can increase range by 100s of km over “basic” ballistic
missile
RV Mounted (MaRV)
•! Ballistic missile performance and accuracy decrease as MaRV
ranges >500 km if payload remains attached to booster
•! Booster needs to be strengthened for re-entry
•! Easier to separate payload after boost
•! To make a MaRV, add moveable fins to separating
payload
•! Then maneuver in atmosphere during re-entry to: Avoid
defenses; aero range extensions; add terminal guidance
maneuvers
•! All at large ranges
UNCLASSIFIED

13. UNCLASSIFIED
Boost-Phase Maneuvering
Generalized Energy Management Steering (GEMS)
•! Many solid propellant missiles don’t shut down
to control range, instead their motors burn to
depletion
•! Since thrust is constant, boosters pitch/yaw
during powered flight to “waste” energy as
required to make planned range.
•! Examples: Trident I C4 SLBM and THAAD
•! May be as simple as corkscrews or more complex
maneuvers
This is an example of GEMS …and this is not
(THAAD launch) (failed BULAVA SLBM launch)
UNCLASSIFIED

14. UNCLASSIFIED
Exo-Atmospheric
Maneuvers
Post-Boost Vehicles (PBVs)
•! Use a small (typically restartable liquid
propellant) upper stage motor
•! Deploy MIRVs from a single booster
•! Targets may be 100s of kms apart
•! Deploy BMD countermeasures
•! Correct boost phase errors during mid-
course flight
Inflatable decoy
for Minuteman III
UNCLASSIFIED

15. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Threat
•! Ballistic missile threat will continue to
proliferate and grow in capacity and
capability
•! Increasingly seen as both an asymmetric
threat and economical log-range/deep
strike alternative to manned aircraft
•! Threat countries are pursuing WMD
warheads despite international sanctions
and counter-proliferation efforts
•! Future systems will incorporate active and
passive countermeasures and a reduced
logistical footprint
•! Mobility and underground facilities will
protect deployed missiles
•! Growing mobile force using deception and
denial Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
which complicate I&W and counter-
targeting
UNCLASSIFIED

16. UNCLASSIFIED
Worldwide Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: 1990
UNCLASSIFIED

17. UNCLASSIFIED
Worldwide Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: 2009
UNCLASSIFIED

18. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Threat:
North Korea
•! Nation “of the greatest concern” according to 2010
BMDR
•! Nuclear ambitions + long-range missiles
•! Nuclear tests Oct 2006 and May 2009
•! Three attempted space launches, none successful
•! 1998, 2006, 2009
•! 2006: Simultaneous with 6 x SRBM & MRBM
launches
•! 2009: Closest to success; demonstrated potential
ICBM capabilities in 3-stage variant to reach
CONUS
•! Mobile IRBM under development and may be
operational
•! Extensive hardened/deeply buried supporting
infrastructure and garrisons complicate I&W
•! “Serial proliferator” of nuclear and ballistic missile
technology and whole systems Toksa SCUD No Dong Musudan Musudan Taepo
B/C ER Dong 2
120- 300- 1300 km 3000 – 4000 km (est) 15000 km
140 km 500 km (3-stage)
UNCLASSIFIED

19. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Threat: Iran
•! Active indigenous program 2nd only to China in
size/scope; nuclear program strongly condemned in
2011 IAEA report
•! Majority of inventory – liquid propellant SRBMs
•! Mobile force supported by growing hardened/
deeply buried infrastructure
•! Aggressive solid propellant effort
•! Fateh-110 SRBM and Ashura MRBM
•! Two ASBM development programs
•! Recently demonstrated as part of naval exercise
•! Safir SLV – 2 successful on-orbit deliveries in three
attempts
•! Knowledge and technology developed would aid
IR/ICBM program
•! “Serial proliferator” – to other state and non-state
actors
SCUD Shahab-3 Ashura/ Safir
Fateh-110 Shahab-3 BM-25
A/B/C ER Sejil (SLV)
300-
200 km 1300 km 2000 km 2500 km 2000 km
600 km
UNCLASSIFIED

20. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Threat:
China
•!Largest, most active and diverse ballistic
missile program in the world
•!Ballistic missile force developed and deployed
for range of missions from nuclear deterrence
to conventional precision strike
•!Key part of A2/AD capabilities ICW large Taiwan Strait SAM & SRBM
ASCM/LACM force Coverage. This map depicts
notional coverage based on the
•!2010 BMDR notes an imbalance of forces range of land and sea based missile
systems, including advanced SAMs
across Taiwan Straits primarily because of that China would likely employ in
numbers of SRBM/MRBM deployed a Taiwan conflict.
•! Est. 1,000 – 1200
•!ASBM in development or early deployment
specifically to counter US CVBGs
•!Non-signatory to MTCR but verbal pledge to
some provisions
UNCLASSIFIED

21. UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Threat:
Other Notables
•! India: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons
•! Active, indigenous program to build/deploy a range of ballistic
missiles
•! Ranges cover all of Pakistan and eventually all of China
•! Pakistan: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons
•! Not nearly as extensive as India – requires significant outside
help
•! Focused primarily on India
•! Israel: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons (undeclared)
•! SRBM to IRBM (Jericho II/III)
•! Focused on Iran but able to range other regional threats
•! Syria: Ballistic missiles & WMD program
•! Primarily SRBM from Russia, North Korea and/or Iran
•! Reports of sharing weapons and training with Hezbollah
•! Russia: Treaty limited (INF) to weapons of 500km or less;
party to MTCR which limits transfer of technology,
materials, systems and knowledge
•! Broad hints and statements since 2002 over possibly breaking
with INF Treaty
•! Extensive use of SRBMs in Georgian conflict (2008)
UNCLASSIFIED

22. UNCLASSIFIED
Part II
BMD Fundamentals
UNCLASSIFIED

23. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD Timeline
UNCLASSIFIED

24. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD Doctrine
UNDER RE-WRITE
Guiding Pub: “Countering Air and Missile Threats” (JP 3-01, 5 Feb 2007)
BMD included under Counterair Mission:
!! “The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable joint force components, to counter the air and
missile threat by attaining and maintaining air superiority” (Chp 1)
!! Counterair mission consists of Offensive Counterair (OCA) and Defensive Counterair (DCA) missions.
!! Offensive Counterair: “The goal of OCA operations is to prevent the launch of enemy aircraft and missiles by destroying them and
their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary”
!! As applied to BMD – Attack Operations to include “attacks on missile sites,…,command and control (and) infrastructure”
!! Defensive Counterair: “(A)ll defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting
to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace” Includes active and passive measures
!! As applied to BMD:
!! Active Defense: “…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats against
friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic warfare (EW),
sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.”
!! Passive Defense: “…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile
threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception,
dispersion, and the use of protective construction.”
Sometimes Referred To As “The Three Pillars of Missile Defense
UNCLASSIFIED

25. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD: Attack Operations
“…to prevent the launch of enemy . . . missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure
prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary”
In Theory: Preferred method of countering missile threats by reducing level of threat defensive forces face; AO range throughout
enemy territory, are conducted at initiative of friendly forces, and normally are a high priority.
In Practice: Not very successful where ballistic missile forces are concerned:
•! Operation CROSSBOW (Dec 43 – Jun 44): Allied bombing campaign against V-1 and V-2
•! >25,000 sorties with > 36,000 tons of bombs dropped against production and support facilities including fixed launch pads
•! Net result – V-1 strikes continued and V-2 strikes began against London summer ’44
•! Operation DESERT STORM (1992): Dedicated A-10 & SOF assigned to seek/destroy SCUD MEL/TEL
•! 1/3 of the 2,000 daily sorties dedicated to SCUD hunting
•! Net result – SOF team captured, 0 MEL/TEL struck, launches continued against Israel and single largest US casualty event
of DS was via SCUD strike
Major challenges to AO: ROE and real-time, actionable intelligence.
Peenemunde V-2 test site
UNCLASSIFIED

26. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD: Passive Defense
“…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile missile threats against friendly
forces and assets.”
•!Passive BMD improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of detection and
targeting of friendly assets and thereby minimizing the potential effects of adversary
reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack.
•!Passive measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception,
dispersion, and the use of protective construction.
•!Treaties and export control regimes may also be considered a form of passive defense
UNCLASSIFIED

27. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD: Active Defense
“…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile missile threats against friendly forces and
assets.”
•! Active BMD includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic warfare
sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.
•! Missile defense is defined as “defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles, or to
nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.”
•! Integration of systems enables defense in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that increase the
probability for success.
•! AMD assets normally provide overlapping coverage, however, not all anti-air DCA assets have organic
capability against BM; likewise, not all anti-BM DCA have anti-air and CM defense capabilities.
•! Offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations use many of the same sensors, weapons, and
command and control systems.
UNCLASSIFIED

28. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD: Intercept Phases
Apogee
Vbo Mid-Course
Phase
Boost Phase
Terminal
Phase
Launch to
V
(180-320 s bo
ec)
Launch to
Apogee
(< 1,000 se
c)
Launch to Im
pact
(times for ICBM flight ( >10,000 km from launch site)
(~2,000 sec)
UNCLASSIFIED

29. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD By Flight Phase: Boost
•!In theory – most vulnerable part of flight
•!Missile thrusting to gain acceleration
•!Highly visible exhaust plume aids detection/
Note: As of Dec 2011,
tracking ALTB to be mothballed
•!3-5 minutes travel in Earth’s Atmosphere
•! Damage to aerodynamic surfaces or
airframe breach may induce fatal
aerodynamic loads
•! Challenges
•!Compressed launch notification to intercept
timeline/sensor challenges
•!BMOA may be geographically too far to
successfully complete endo-atmospheric
intercept
•!Countermeasures (hardening, counter-
intercept platform defenses, GSM, TTP)
All Active Boost Phase Intercept Programs are Proof of Concept Only
UNCLASSIFIED

30. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD By Flight Phase:
Ascent
ASCENT PHASE: begins right after the missile’s powered
flight and ends just prior to apogee. Benefits include:
•! Earlier intercept in the battle space
•! Optimizes a “shoot-look-shoot” tactic to defeat threat
before countermeasure deployment
•! Enables debris mitigation
•! Reduces number of interceptors required to defeat a raid
of threat missiles
•! Reduces loading on remainder of BMDS architecture by
not eliminating need to track and kill a threat reentry
vehicle and associated objects,
•! Reduces costs of maintaining significant number of
expensive interceptors to destroy advanced
countermeasures in a later phase of a threat missile’s
flight
•! Places a premium on early launch detection and tracking,
emphasis on launch/engage on remote and need for longer-
range interceptors
•! Mostly PPT and paper CONOPS – if funded, capability
won’t be fielded until late this decade/early 2020’s
•! Significant technical, engineering, C2 and fiscal challenges
Boost Phase + Ascent Phase = “Early Intercept”
UNCLASSIFIED

31. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD By Flight Phase:
Midcourse
•! Offers longest decision space over course of flight –
up to 20 to 30 min for ICBMs
•! Missile coasting to apogee
•! Exoatmospheric intercept
•! Debris mitigation for WMD
•! Challenges
•! Detection/tracking:
•! Non-thrusting cold body presents IR detection/
tracking challenges;
•! Radar affected by horizon and position relative
to flight path
•! Discrimination: warhead(s) obscured by debris
cloud and/or deployed PENAIDS
•! PBV maneuvering, MiRV
•! Salvage fusing effects
•! Nuclear weapons effects from an offensive
warhead fuzed to detonate when attacked
Majority Of Current BMD Effort Focused In This Area
UNCLASSIFIED

32. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD By Flight Phase:
Terminal
•!Missile re-enters atmosphere
•!Atmosphere acts as a screen to strip away debris
cloud/PENAIDS
•!Challenges:
•!RV free-falling at extremely high speeds
(+22,500 KPH for ICBM RVs)
•!High-g maneuvering by MaRVs
•!Limited engagement space owing to
speeds, fuzing and warhead altitude
detonation or dispersion of submunitions
•!Lower tier engagements must deal with debris
mitigation from upper tier intercepts
Most Demanding Environment On BMD Systems And
Supporting C2 And C4I Infrastructures
UNCLASSIFIED

33. UNCLASSIFIED
BMDS: System of Sensors
and Shooters
The Ballistic Missile Defense
System is an integrated, “layered”
architecture that provides multiple
opportunities to destroy missiles and
their warheads before they can reach
their targets.
The system’s architecture includes:
•! Networked sensors and ground-
and sea-based radars for target
detection and tracking;
•! Ground- and sea-based
interceptor missiles for destroying
a ballistic missile using either the
force of a direct collision, called
“hit-to-kill” technology, or an
explosive blast fragmentation
warhead;
•! A Command, Control, Battle
Management, and
Communications Network
providing the warfighter with the
needed links between the sensors
and interceptor missiles. The BMDS Is Designed To Counter Ballistic Missiles Of All Ranges
UNCLASSIFIED

34. UNCLASSIFIED
Ground-Based:
Midcourse Defense
•! GMD: “Engage and destroy limited intermediate- and long-range
ballistic missile threats in the midcourse battle space to protect the
United States”
•! Elements:
•! Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI): Three-stage, solid fuel
booster with an EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle)
•! Ground Systems: Includes redundant fire control nodes,
interceptor launch facilities, and a complex
communications network for planning, directing and
controlling GMD element
•! Current Configuration:
•! GBIs: emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg
Air Force Base, California. A total of 30 interceptors were
deployed at the end of 2010.
•! Fire control, battle management, planning, tasking and
threat analysis take place via a dual-node, human-in-control
interface located in Fort Greely, Alaska (49th MD Battalion)
and Colorado Springs, Colorado (100th MDBE)
•! GND C2 via GMD communications network, a secure
data and voice communications system using both
SATCOM and fiber optic cabling for long-haul
communications.
Cue & track
UNCLASSIFIED

35. UNCLASSIFIED
Ground-Based: Terminal
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): a globally
transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and
destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during
their final, or terminal, phase of flight.
•! Land-based, capable of shooting down a ballistic missile inside
and just outside the atmosphere w/hit-to-kill technology.
•! Procurement: First two Batteries fielded at Fort Bliss, TX.
Total hardware for Battery #1 & #2 include:
•! 6 Launchers, 2 Fire Control & Communications components,
2 AN/TPY-2 Radars, and 48 Interceptors. Delivery of first
production interceptors began in March 2011. Batteries 3 and
4 on contract March 2011 with delivery and fielding to start
in 2013.
•! Dec 2011: Agreement to sell battery to UAE
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): Operational and
fielded by the U.S. Army.
•! Procurement: The Army is responsible for production and
further development of the PAC-3 and the Medium Extended
Air Defense System; the Missile Defense Agency remains
responsible for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and PAC-3
interoperability and integration efforts.
UNCLASSIFIED

36. UNCLASSIFIED
Sea-Based BMD:
Aegis BMD
•! Aegis BMD: Describes the entire program of sea-based BMD
but primarily focused on the mid-course intercept of SRBMs,
MRBMs some IRBMs and in latter versions, a limited
capability against certain ICBMs
•! Modifications and upgrades to the Aegis Weapons System
(sensors, hardware and software – currently ver. 3.6.1) and
the SM-3 BLK 1A interceptor.
•! 24 Deployed/forward-based CG/DDGs currently
configured (includes one developmental ship, USS LAKE
ERIE)
•! Missions:
•! Aegis LRS&T: Forward deployed Long Range
Surveillance & Tracking support to GMD for Homeland
Defense
•! Aegis BMD: Exo-atmospheric, mid-course intercept and
endo-atmospheric, terminal intercept
•! First Aegis BMD Patrol (EUCOM AOR): 2011 FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
•! Aegis Ashore: Shore-based program to support PAA
derived from the Aegis BMD ship-based program, using BMD-cap.
23 28 32 36 38 41 42 43 43 43
Ships
the SM-3 BLK IIA and a land-based only version for long-
range intercept of ICBMs. SM-3
111 129 155 201
263 341 428 500
513 515
Inventory +TBD +TBD +TBD +TBD
UNCLASSIFIED

37. UNCLASSIFIED
Sea-Based BMD:
Ship Mods
NFIC-CA has critical role in IAMD (cruise- and TBM) mission
The caveat: These plans all depend on outcome of major program cuts
and revisions DoD-wide
UNCLASSIFIED

38. UNCLASSIFIED
Sea-Based BMD: SBT
Sea-based Terminal: Provides a sea-
based, endo-atmospheric intercept
capability for a limited threat set.
•!Initially comprised of 72 modified SM-2
Blk IV deployed on BMD configured
ships with the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 system.
•!Blast frag warhead, not HTK
•!Increasingly capable versions of SBT will
be fielded beginning with Increment I
SBT (IOC 2014) which uses the SM-6
with BMD 5.0 and Increment II SBT
(IOC 2018) which will debut with BMD
5.1 SBT: Sea-Based Terminal Kill vs. SRBMs
UNCLASSIFIED

39. UNCLASSIFIED
Part III
BMD Planning and
Execution
UNCLASSIFIED

40. UNCLASSIFIED
Navy BMD Pedigree
National guidance and policy:
22 July 1999: 16 Dec 2002: March 2006: June 2008: 17 Sept 2009: “Field
National Missile NSPD-23 - NSS – “Field NDS – “Missile more of most capable
Defense Act of 1999 National Policy BMD to protect defenses can theater MD systems
(Public Law 106-38) on Ballistic US from rogue defend against to protect our forces
Missile Defense states” attack should and those of allies.”
deterrence fail”
DIRECTS
DOD/JCS guidance:
Guide/Influence
MDA January 15 March 2007 – 15 Dec 2008 –
CHARTER 2002 – Missile Defense NAVY BOD
MDA Executive Board Membership
Charter (MDEB) Memo 2010
Established 2012
Navy guidance: Guide/Influence
October 2007: A Sept 2009: CNO Guidance Naval Fleet
Cooperative 2010 – “Issue NOC that links Navy Operating TACPRO
Strategy for 21st CS21 to operations and force Strategic Concept
Century structure with guidance from Guidance
Seapower QDR 10 and BMDR 10” PR-11
(NOC) TACMEMOs
Classified
•! Limit Regional Conflict •! Deterrence
“…preventing wars CS-21 •! Deter major Power War CS-21 •! Sea Control
is as important as Strategic
•! Win our nation’s Wars
Core •! Power Projection
•! Homeland defense •! Forward Presence
winning wars.” Imperatives •! Cooperative Relationships Capabilities •! HA/DR
•! Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions •! Maritime Security
UNCLASSIFIED

41. UNCLASSIFIED
The Ballistic Missile Defense
Review (BMDR)
The BMDR - Congressionally mandated and guided by
Presidential directive, released in Feb 2010 for the
purpose of conducting a comprehensive review of US BMD
policies, strategies, plans and programs.
Established Policy Priorities:
1.!U.S. will continue to defend the homeland against the
threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
2.! U.S. will defend against regional missile threats to US
forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling
them to defend themselves.
3.!Before new capabilities are deployed, they must
undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic
conditions.
4.!The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally
sustainable over the long term.
5.! US BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt
as threats change.
6.!US will seek to lead expanded international efforts for
missile defense.
“This review. . . will result in an enhanced defense of the United
States and its forces, allies, and partners from the danger of
ballistic missiles wherever and whenever they threaten us.”
UNCLASSIFIED

42. UNCLASSIFIED
Defense of the Homeland
“The United States will…”
•! Maintain readiness…develop capabilities at Fort
Greely, AK (FGA) and Vandenberg AFB, CA
(VAFB)
•! Complete the 2nd field of 14 silos at FGA as a hedge
•! Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for
missiles launched at the US from Iran or
elsewhere in Middle East
•! Invest in further development of the SM-3 for
future land-based use as ICBM threat matures
•! Increase investments in sensors and early-
intercept kill systems to defeat countermeasures
•! Pursue new enhancements…and other hedging
strategies including continued development of a
two-staged ground-based interceptor
UNCLASSIFIED

43. UNCLASSIFIED
Phased Adaptive Approach
“A key objective (for regional defense) is to leverage recent
successes in regional missile defense to further expand that
capability at low risk.”
•! Near-term capabilities
•! Increase procurement of proven systems (SM-3,
THAAD, An/TPY-2)
•! Improve already developed technology
•! “Aegis Ashore” – 2015 epoch: land-based Aegis
BMD weapons system including land-based SM-3
variant
•! SM-3 BLK IB, BLK IIA, BLK IIB/NGAM
•! Develop/deploy enhanced C2BMC
•! Long-term Capabilities
•! Develop SM-3 BLK IIA/IIB with higher Vbo and
divert, providing greater regional coverage
•! BLK IIB will have some early-intercept
capability against long-range missiles
•! “Engage on remote” – enables interceptor “Ballistic missile defenses help support U.S. security commitments
engageability at greater ranges using off-board to allies and partners. They provide reassurance that the United
sensors States will stand by those commitments despite the growth in the
•! Develop persistent overhead sensors to detect/ track military potential of regional adversaries.”
large raid sizes over entire trajectories from space
UNCLASSIFIED

44. UNCLASSIFIED
PAA Implemented: Europe
Sep 2009 decision followed SECDEF/JCS recommendation to
revise Sept 2007 deployment plan
•! Phase 1 (2011): Existing missile defense systems deployed
to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles.
•! Protection of portions of southern Europe with sea-based
BMD supported by new TPY-2 site in Turkey
•! Phase 2 (2015): Fielding enhanced capabilities -- SM-3
Block IB and additional sensors.
•! Phase 2 will include land-based SM-3s in southern 2009 CONCEPT
Europe expanding coverage to additional NATO allies.
•! Phase 3 (2018): Coverage against medium- and
intermediate-range threats improved with 2nd land-based
SM-3 site, located in northern Europe, and deployment of
SM-3 BLK IIA
•! Extends coverage to all NATO allies in Europe.
•! Phase 4 (2020): adds capability against a potential ICBM
launched from the Middle East against the United States.
•! Deploys SM-3 BLK IIB/NGAM will be available.
UNCLASSIFIED

45. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD:
International Participation
“The U.S. is committed to working intensively with allies and
partners…”
Per the BMDR, international cooperation is
focused on:
•!Development and deployment of joint and/or
complementary capabilities
•!Technological and industrial cooperation
Current Initiatives:
•! Europe: implement PAA in a NATO context
•! East Asia and Middle East: strengthen
cooperative relationships in bilateral
frameworks
•! Arrow development program w/Israel
•! THAAD sale to UAE
•! Renew cooperation with Russia
•! Conduct a substantive and sustained
dialogue with China
UNCLASSIFIED

46. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD Planning Lexicon
•! Defended Area (DA): Defended area is the portion of the territory protected against long-range missile
attacks;
•! Critical Asset List (CAL): A list compiled by the JFC w/input from components of assets requiring theater
level protection
•! Organized by phase of operations and prioritized
•! Defended Asset List (DAL): a list of those assets on the CAL that receive theater level asset protection.
•! Each defended asset on the DAL should be prioritized as requiring active air defense or appropriate passive
measures if that is all that is available.
•! Launch Area Denied (LAD): Refers to the collection of threat countries from which the DA is protected;
•! Probability of Engagement Success (Pes): The probability that all attacking warheads are destroyed, derived
from the probabilities associated with missile defense functions like detection, discrimination, and hit-to-kill;
•! Raid size breakpoint: The maximum number of warheads the system can realistically defeat in a single
engagement. This metric is highly dependent on interceptor inventory.
UNCLASSIFIED

47. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD Planning Lexicon
Point Defense
(PAC 3)
DEFENDED AREA Area Defense
(Aegis BMD/THAAD)
Critical Asset List
Launch Area Denied
UNCLASSIFIED

48. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD & Joint Doctrine for
C2 Architecture
•!The JFACC / Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is the supported
commander for Counter-Air operations to include BMD – The
JFMCC has a supporting role (JP 3-01)
•!In mature theaters, the JFC will normally designate the JFACC as
the AADC and Airspace Control Authority (JP 3-01)
•!Decentralized execution remains a basic C2 tenet of joint operations.
The level of control used will depend on the nature of the operation
or task, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated
comfort level of the CDR. (JP 1)
•!BMD engagement timelines may dictate that engagement authority be
held by the ship’s CO for optimal employment of BMD-capable ships
•!Strategic considerations may drive engagement authority to be held
at the highest level in some situations (JP 1)
UNCLASSIFIED

49. UNCLASSIFIED
Navy C2 Architecture
Planning Factors
•! JFMCC is the persistent maritime IAMD planning and execution command echelon
•! IAMD ships are multi-mission platforms that are most effectively controlled by a Maritime Commander
•! A Maritime Commander will retain OPCON / TACON of multi-mission ships
•! Provides most effective asset management for AADC
•! Maximizes warfighting capacity and capability across all component commanders
•! Optimizes logistics support
•! Ensures asset protection and safety of navigation
•! When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC
for optimum employment of multi-mission ships
Multi-mission Ships Are Most Effectively Controlled By Maritime Commander
UNCLASSIFIED

50. UNCLASSIFIED
Integrated Air & Missile
Defense C2
JFC / JTF Supporting
OPCON / TACON
Lines of Coordination
Engagement Authority
JFACC
JFMCC JFLCC
AADC TAAMDCOORD
DAADC
CRC
CTF IAMD RADC RADC RADC AAMDC
ADAFCO
Maritime Airborne Land-based
Sensors and Sensors and Sensors and
Shooters Shooters Shooters
•! JFMCC is a supporting commander to JFACC/AADC for IAMD
•! Navy retains OPCON and TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships
•! When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC for
optimum employment of multi-mission ships
UNCLASSIFIED

51. UNCLASSIFIED
IAMD C2 Vision:
The Reality
UNCLASSIFIED

52. UNCLASSIFIED
TF Integrated Air & Missile
Defense
•!JFMCC conducts operations at the Operational level from the Maritime
Operations Center (MOC)
•!Commander, Task Force Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TF IAMD)
is the JFMCC’s tactical execution agent for the air and missile defense mission
•!CTF IAMD may serve as the RADC for the maritime BMD fight
•!In most cases, CTF IAMD would reside at the MOC where the supporting
integrated planning and C2 resides
CTF IAMD is JFMCC’s Tactical Execution Agent for IAMD
UNCLASSIFIED

53. UNCLASSIFIED
What This Means For The
Joint Community
•!Joint Force Commanders have a consistent
path to maritime IAMD capability in every
theater
•!Optimized maritime contribution to theater-
level plans and operations
•!Supports JP 3-01 for IAMD C2
Theater IAMD C2 Elements
•!Identifies maritime node to support JFACC / Joint Force
Commander ACC MCC LCC
AADC development and execution of the Area USFF 263rd
NORTHCOM 1st AF
Air Defense Plan AAMDC
•!CTF IAMD plans for maritime IAMD SOUTHCOM 12th AF C4F N/A
•!CTF IAMD, when designated as RADC plan, EUCOM 3rd AF C6F
357th
AMDD
coordinate, and execute engagements 32nd
CENTCOM 9th AF C5F
AAMDC
94th
PACOM 13th AF C7F
AAMDC
94th
USFK 7th AF C7F
AAMDC
The Path to Maritime IAMD Capability is Through the JFMCC
UNCLASSIFIED

54. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD Challenges
Countermeasures
•!PENAIDS: Chaff, decoys
•!Terminal maneuvers
•!Multiple warheads/HGV
•!Salvage fuzing
Debris
•!Upper stages, separation debris,
“chuffing,” other intercepts
Adversary TTP
•!Attack BMD system
•!Trajectory shaping/depressed trajectories
•!Raids
•!Mass launches/Timed arrival
Positional
•!Location of sensors/shooters relative to
BMOA
Geo-political
•!Host-nation concerns/issues
UNCLASSIFIED

55. UNCLASSIFIED
BREAK
UNCLASSIFIED

56. UNCLASSIFIED
Discussion
UNCLASSIFIED

57. UNCLASSIFIED
Backups
UNCLASSIFIED

58. UNCLASSIFIED
BMD: Tracking and Cueing
Vz
Area Of Uncertainty (AOU)
Full Covariance: Space track report transmitted by a BMD
platform: Aegis Track Covariance
Position: X-Y-Z Cartesian
coordinate system w/origin @
Earth center
Vy
Velocity: Along X, Y & Z axes.
Predicts future BM position.
Vx
Full covariance provides a more reliable AOU around the
current and future positions of the space track, enabling
construction of a search pattern that efficiently utilizes
sensor resources by limiting the search only to the most
probable area of the sky
(Earth center)
UNCLASSIFIED