Political Science 5 – Western Political Thought - Spring 2013 - Power Point Presentation #12 - © 2013 Tabakian, Inc.

1. Western Political Thought
Dr. John Paul Tabakian
Political Science 5
Fall 2012 – Power Point #12

2. COURSE LECTURE: WEEK 12 (1)
Today’s Lecture Covers The Following:
• “The American Persona”
• Rationale of domestic policy
• Rationale of foreign policy
• America’s rise to power
• How citizens view their role
• Domestic Policies
• Foreign Policies
• Major Power, Superpower, Hegemonic Power
• How did America rise to power?

3. COURSE LECTURE: WEEK 12 (2)
• Bureaucracies
• Interest Groups
• Obsolescence of War
• Security Dilemma
• Deterrence
• Bandwagoning
• Counterbalancing
• Models of Decision Making
• Decision Making As Steering
• Group Psychology

4. COURSE LECTURE: WEEK 12 (3)
• Crisis Management
• Military Industrial Complex
• Public Opinion
• Legislatures
• Strategic Defense Initiative
• Missile Defense Agency

5. • Diplomats
– Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or
foreign service, of diplomats in embassies in foreign
capitals
– Political appointees
– Career diplomats
– Tension common between state leaders and foreign
policy bureaucrats
• Interagency tensions
– Bureaucratic rivalry as an influence on foreign policy
challenges the notion of states as unitary actors in the
international system
BUREAUCRACIES

6. OBSOLESCENCE OF WAR
• Realism
• Struggle for power remains constant
• Only variable balance of power
• Bipolar
• Best method for maintaining peace
• Multipolar
• Unipolar
• Deterrence Theory = war is obsolete!

7. SECURITY DILEMMA
• Nation-states pursue national-interests
• Stable international system
• Competitive security system
• States increase their security
• Ego’s gain as alter’s loss
• Cooperative security system
• States equate as collective good
• National interests
• International interests

8. Deterrence has worked because neither
side really knew what the other side was
thinking. A problem with deterrence is that
the more times bluffs are made it may lead
to a time when someone is going to make
the call. At this point there are only three
alternatives:
1. Resort to nuclear war
2. Retreat
3. Resort to conventional war
DETERRENCE

9. SECURITY DILEMMA
• Nation-states pursue individual national-interests
• Leads to a stable international system
• Competitive security system
• States striving to increase their security
• Ego’s gain as alter’s loss
• Cooperative security system
• States equate security of each as to the collective good.
• National interests are seen to bolster international interests

10. BANDWAGONING
•Bandwagoning results in
attraction
•Countries ally themselves
with another nation

11. COUNTERBALANCING
• Counterbalancing results in fear
• Countries join together to
check another nation

12. • Foreign policies are the strategies
governments use to guide their actions in
the international arena
–Spell out the objectives state leaders
have decided to pursue in a given
relationship or situation
–Foreign policy process
• How policies are arrived at and
implemented
MAKING FOREIGN POLICY

13. • Rational model
–Decision makers set goals, evaluate
their relative importance, calculate the
costs and benefits of each possible
course of action, and then choose the
one with the highest benefits and lowest
costs.
–Role of uncertainty
–Accepting of risk versus averse to risk
MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (1)

14. • Organizational process model
– Foreign policy makers generally skip the labor-
intensive process of identifying goals and alternative
actions, relying instead for most decisions on
standardized responses or standard operating
procedures (sop)
• Government bargaining (bureaucratic) model:
– Foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining
process among various government agencies with
somewhat divergent interests in the outcome
MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (2)

15. DECISION MAKING AS STEERING

16. • Study of individual decision making revolves
around the question of rationality
– To what extent are national leaders (or citizens)
able to make rational decisions in the national
interest?
• Difficulties of oversimplification
– Individual decision makers have differing values
and beliefs and have unique personalities.
– Idiosyncrasies
INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (1)

17. • Beyond individual idiosyncrasies, individual
decision making diverges from the rational model
in at least three systematic ways:
• Decision makers suffer from misperceptions
and selective perceptions when they compile
information on the likely consequences of their
choices
• The rationality of individual cost-benefit
calculations is undermined by emotions that
decision makers feel while thinking about the
consequences of their actions (affective bias)
INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (2)

18. • Cognitive biases are systematic distortions of
rational calculations based not on emotional
feelings, but simply on the limitations of the
human brain in making choices
• Cognitive dissonance
• Justification of effort
• Wishful thinking
• Mirror image
• Projection
• Historical analogies
INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (3)

19. • Two specific modifications of the rational model of
decision making have been proposed to accommodate
psychological realities
– Bounded rationality:
• Takes into account the costs of seeking and
processing information.
– Optimizing
– Satisfying
– Prospect theory:
• Decision makes go through two phases: editing
phase and the evaluation phase.
• Holds that evaluations take place by comparison
with a reference point, which is often the status
quo but might be some past or expected situation
INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (4)

20. • Group dynamics can be a promoter of state interests but
they can also introduce new sources of irrationality into
the decision-making process
• Groupthink
– Refers to the tendency for groups to reach decisions
without accurately assessing their consequences,
because individual members tend to go along with
ideas they think the others support
– Groups tend to be overly optimistic about the chances
of success and are thus more willing to take risks
• Iran-Contra scandal
GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

21. • Crises are foreign policy situations in
which outcomes are very important
and time frames are compressed
–Time constraints
–Groupthink
–Psychological stress
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

22. • Huge interlocking network of governmental agencies,
industrial corporations, and research institutes, working
together to supply a nation’s military forces
• Response to the growing importance of technology
• Encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has
an interest in military spending
– Corporations, military officers, universities, and scientific
institutes that receive military research contracts
– Revolving door
– PACS from the military industry
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1)

23. The phrase, “Military Industrial
Complex” was first used by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower
during his farewell address to the
nation on January 17, 1961. He
warns against the increasing
influence of corporate influence in
all areas of government.
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2)

24. • Range of views on foreign policy issues
held by the citizens of a state
• Has a greater influence on foreign policy in
democracies than in authoritarian
governments
–Legitimacy
–Propaganda
–Journalists as gatekeepers
PUBLIC OPINION (1)

25. • In democracies, public opinion generally
has less effect on foreign policy than on
domestic policy
–Attentive public
–Foreign policy elite
–Rally ’round the flag syndrome
–Diversionary foreign policy
PUBLIC OPINION (2)

26. • Conduit through which interest groups and public opinion
can wield influence
– Presidential systems; separate elections
• Legislatures play a direct role in foreign policy
• Different rules apply to military force
– Rally ’round the flag
– May challenge the president if they have power
of the “purse”
LEGISLATURES (1)

27. – Parliamentary systems; political parties are
dominant
• Often parliamentary executives do not need
to submit treaties or policies for formal
approval by the legislature
• Call elections; new executive
• Legislatures play a key role in designing
and implementing foreign policy
LEGISLATURES (2)

28. AIRBORNE LASER LABORATORY
The Airborne Laser Lab was a gas-dynamic
laser mounted in a modified version of a KC-
135 used for flight testing. Similar to the
commercial Boeing 707, the slightly smaller
KC-135 was designed to military specifications
and operated at hight gross weights. The
NKC-135A (S/N 55-3123) is one of 14 KC-
135As permanently converted for special
testing. It was extensively modified by the Air
Force weapons Labratory at Kirtland AFB,
New Mexico, and used in an 11-year
experiment to prove a high-energy laser could
be operated in an aircraft and employed
against airborne targets. During the
experiment, the Airborne Laser Lab destroyed
five AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and a
Navy BQM-34A target drone.
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (1)

29. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (2)

30. MDA’s mision is to develop and field an
integrated, layered, ballistic missile
defense system to defend the United
States, its deployed forces, allies, and
friends against all ranges of enemy
ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
The fundamental objective of the Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) program is to
develop the capability to defend forces
and territories of the United States, its
allies and friends against all classes and
ranges of ballistic missile threats.

31. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has developed a
research, development and test program focusing on missile
defense as a single layered defense system. The structure
involves three basic phases of ballistic missile trajectories:
boost, midcourse and terminal. Boost phase is the portion of
flight immediately after launch, when the missile is to gain
acceleration under power to lift its payload into the air
(airspace). This lasts 3-5 minutes.

32. Midcourse phase is the longest part of
the missile flight. It is where the missile
payload has separated from the
booster rocket and is coasting
unpowered toward a target. This phase
can be as long as 20 minutes. The final
phase is called terminal. This is when
the missile's warhead re-enters the
earth's atmosphere and falls towards
its target, propelled only by its
momentum and the force of gravity.
However, its speed can be thousands
of miles per hour. This phase lasts
approximately 30 seconds.

34. BOOST PHASE DEFENSE
The boost phase is the part of a missile flight path
from launch until it stops accelerating under its own
power. Typically the boost phase ends at altitudes of
300 miles or less, and within the first 3 to 5 minutes
of flight. During this phase, the rocket is climbing
against the Earth's gravity. Intercepting a missile in
its boost phase is the ideal solution. We can defend a
large area of the globe and prevent midcourse decoys
from being deployed by destroying the missile early
in its flight. Of the boost phase defenses, the
Airborne Laser (ABL) is the most mature.

35. The two types of boost defense elements are:
1. Directed energy systems using high power lasers
such as the Airborne Laser
2. Kinetic energy interceptors
Boost phase elements will be integrated into an
overall Ballistic Missile Defense operational concept.
Sensors developed in this segment will have multi-
mission capabilities intended to provide critical
tracking data for threat ballistic missiles in all
phases of flight.

36. AIRBORNE LASER
1. Designed to detect, track, target, and
kill threatening missiles, no matter if
they are short, medium, or long-
range
2. Uses an amalgamation of
technologies including a Boeing 747-
400 freighter and Chemical, Oxygen
Iodine Laser (COIL)
3. Laser destroys the missile by heating
its metal skin until it cracks
4. Infrared sensors were first tested on
the F-14 "Tomcat" fighter aircraft
shortly before the first Gulf War

37. Overview
The Airborne Laser program brings together a combination
of technologies: a 747 aircraft, an advanced detection and
tracking system, adaptive optics, and a revolutionary high-
energy laser, all of which are being integrated into a single
weapon system for the first time

38. Operational Sequence
1. The Airborne Laser uses six strategically placed infrared
sensors to detect the exhaust plume of a boosting
missile
2. Once a target is detected, a kilowatt-class laser, the
Track Illuminator, tracks the missile and determines a
precise aim point
3. The Beacon Illuminator, a second kilowatt-class laser,
then measures disturbances in the atmosphere, which
are corrected by the adaptive optics system to
accurately point and focus the high energy laser
4. Using a very large telescope located in the nose turret,
the beam control/fire control system focuses the
megawatt class laser beam onto a pressurized area of
the boosting missile

39. Development
1. Testing was completed on the High Energy Chemical Oxygen
Iodine Laser on December 6, 2005. The laser was fired
continuously for more than 10 seconds at a power level
sufficient to destroy a hostile ballistic missile.
2. The Low Power System Integration-active flight test series
was successfully completed on Aug. 23, 2007 at Edwards Air
Force Base, Calif. During the test, ABL used all three of the
aircraft's laser systems to detect, track, and then engaged a
target mounted on a test aircraft with a low-power laser that
is serving as a surrogate for the high-power laser.
3. ABL has begun integration of the High Energy Laser system
on the aircraft. Upon completion, the aircraft will undergo
additional ground and flight tests prior to the lethal
demonstration against a boosting missile in 2009.

40. KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS
1. The program's primary objective over the next
few years is developing an interceptor capable
of destroying incoming missiles
2. The longer-term objective is to develop an
interceptor that can kill ballistic missiles in the
midcourse phase of flight
3. The first generation of these interceptors,
called the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
element
4. System was tested fully in 2011

41. Kinetic Energy Interceptors
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors program’s mission is to provide
the Ballistic Missile Defense System a strategically deployable,
tactically mobile land and sea-based capability to defeat medium
to long-range ballistic missiles during the boost, ascent, and
midcourse phases of flight. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors
weapon system has the potential capacity to be deployed as an
element of the Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System in
three configurations: land-mobile, sea-mobile, and land-fixed.
These multiple deployment configurations increase engagement
opportunities, enhance the Ballistic Missile Defense System’s
layered defensive capability, and decrease life-cycle operation
costs by leveraging common sub-components across the three
deployed configurations.

42. Overview
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon
system is comprised of three major
components: a missile launcher; a fire
control and communications unit; and a
high acceleration interceptor that delivers
payloads capable of destroying adversary
ballistic missiles and their lethal payloads
using kinetic energy.

43. Details
1. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors destroy ballistic
missiles in the boost, ascent, or midcourse phases
of flight
2. During boost or ascent phase intercepts, the
interceptor’s payload acquires, homes, and
kinetically destroys a hot burning threat ballistic
missile prior to deployment of its lethal payload,
decoys, and countermeasures
3. For midcourse phase intercepts, the interceptor’s
payload acquires, discriminates the missile’s
deployed lethal payload from accompanying
decoys, countermeasures and exhausted boost
motors, and then destroys the lethal payload

44. 4. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon system’s
mobility enables rapid deployment near an adversary’s
launch sites and subsequent early battle-space
engagements of the adversary’s ballistic missile in the
boost, ascent, and early midcourse phases of flight.
5. Mobility provides the operational flexibility to respond to
changing adversary conditions (countries,
countermeasures, and tactics) and mitigates an
adversary’s capability to exploit our fixed-site ballistic
missile defense weapon systems.
6. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors fire control component
interfaces with the Ballistic Missile Defense System
command and control element, Ballistic Missile Defense
System sensors and other overhead sensors to obtain
threat tracking data.

45. MIDCOURSE PHASE DEFENSE
The midcourse phase of a ballistic missile trajectory
allows the longest window of opportunity to intercept an
incoming missile up to 20 minutes. This is the point
where the missile has stopped thrusting so it follows a
more predictable glide path. The midcourse interceptor
and a variety of radars and other sensors have a longer
time to track and engage the target compared to boost
and terminal interceptors. Also, more than one
interceptor could be launched to ensure a successful hit.
A downside to the longer intercept window is the
attacker has an opportunity to deploy countermeasures
against a defensive system.

46. Primary Elements Of Midcourse Defense Segment
1. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
2. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)
Ground Based Midcourse (GMD)
1. Defends against long-range ballistic missile attacks
2. During a GMD intercept, a booster missile flies
toward a target's predicted location and releases a
"kill vehicle" on a path with the incoming target.
3. The kill vehicle uses data from ground-based radars
and its own on-board sensors to collide with the
target, thus destroying both the target and the kill
vehicle using only the force of the impact

47. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
The mission of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System is to defend the nation, our deployed
personnel, and our friends and allies against a
limited long-range ballistic missile attack.
Overview
1. Uses an array of sensors, radars, and ground-based
interceptors that are capable of shooting down long-
range ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase
2. Directly hits the incoming missile by ramming the
warhead with a closing speed of approximately 15,000
miles per hour to destroy it. This is called “hit-to-kill”
technology and has been proven to work

48. Details
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense is
composed of three main components:
sensors, ground-based interceptors,
and fire control and communications
1. Sensors: Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense uses a variety of sensors
and radars to obtain information on
missile launches and to track,
discriminate, and target an incoming
warhead. This information is
provided to the Ground-Based
Interceptor before launch and during
flight to help it find the incoming
ballistic missile and close with it.

49. 2. Ground-Based Interceptor: A Ground-Based Interceptor is
made up of a three-stage, solid fuel booster and an
exoatmospheric kill vehicle. When launched, the booster
missile carries the kill vehicle toward the target’s predicted
location in space. Once released from the booster, the 152
pound kill vehicle uses data received in-flight from ground-
based radars and its own on-board sensors to close with and
destroy the target using only the force of the impact.
3. Fire Control and Communications: This is the central
nervous system of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
element. It connects all of the hardware, software and
communications systems necessary for planning, tasking and
controlling Ground-Based Midcourse Defense.

50. Development
1. Interceptor missiles are emplaced at Fort Greely,
Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. More
are planned to be emplaced in 2006
2. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense fire control
centers are in Colorado and Alaska
3. Several existing early warning radars located around
the world, including one on Shemya Island in the
Alaskan Aleutian chain, have been upgraded to
support flight tests and to provide tracking
information in the event of a hostile missile attack
4. Nearing completion is a powerful, mobile Sea-based
X-Band radar that is scheduled to be fully integrated
into the Ballistic Missile Defense System in 2006

51. AEGIS
The sea-based system is intended to
intercept short to medium range
hostile missiles in the ascent and
descent phase of midcourse flight.
Engaging missiles in the ascent phase
reduces the overall BMD System's
susceptibility to countermeasures.
Builds upon technologies in the
existing Aegis Weapons System now
aboard U.S. Navy ships and uses the
Standard Missile 3.

52. JAPANESE AEGIS DESTROYER

53. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the sea-based
element of the Missile Defense Agency’s
Ballistic Missile Defense System that has been
tactically certified, deployed and contributes to
the ongoing BMD System under development.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense leverages and
builds upon capabilities inherent in the Aegis
Weapon System, Standard Missile, and Navy
Ballistic Missile Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
systems. Aegis is at sea, on patrol, certified,
and on alert, performing a strategic role in
Homeland Defense.

54. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Long Range Surveillance
and Track:
1. Aegis Destroyers, on Ballistic Missile Defense patrol, detect
and track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and report
track data to the missile defense system. This capability
shares tracking data to cue other missile defense sensors
and provides fire control data to Ground-based Midcourse
Defense interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. To date, sixteen
Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers have been upgraded with
the Long Range Surveillance and Track capability.
2. At-sea tracking events and flight tests have verified the
capability to track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and
demonstrated the connectivity and reliability of long-haul
transmission of track data across nine time zones.

55. Engagement Capability
1. Aegis Cruisers and Long Range Surveillance and Track
Destroyers are equipped with the capability to intercept
short and medium range, unitary and separating
ballistic missile threats with the Standard Missile 3.
2. Flight tests are conducted using operational warships,
operated by fleet Sailors and Officers. Each test
progressively increases the operational realism and
complexity of targets and scenarios. To date, there have
been nine successful intercepts out of eleven attempts.
The next flight mission is scheduled for summer, 2008.
3. The engagement capability will be resident in three
Aegis Cruisers and 15 Destroyers by 2009. Additionally,
the capability is present on several Japanese ships and
other nations are interested.

56. Testing
To date, including a dual engagement in November, 2007
and the first test by an allied Navy in December, 2007,
the Aegis BMD has had 12 intercepts in 14 attempts,
including two intercepts by two interceptors during one
test. Multiple tests are planned for each year.
Future Capabilities
1. Increased precision track data via radar signal
processing upgrades, improving both Long Range
Surveillance and Track and engagement capabilities
2. Defense against intermediate and intercontinental
ballistic missiles
3. Increased international participation in sea-based
ballistic missile defense capabilities

57. TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSE
A missile enters the terminal phase when the warhead
falls back into the atmosphere. This phase generally
lasts from 30 seconds to one minute. The primary
elements in the Terminal Defense Segment are:
1. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
2. PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
3. Arrow, a joint effort between the U.S. and Israel
4. Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a
co-developmental program with Germany and Italy

58. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System
(THAAD)
1. THAAD will destroy a ballistic missile as it
transitions from the midcourse to terminal
phase of its trajectory
2. A land-based element that has the capability
to shoot down a short or medium range
ballistic missile in its final stages of flight
3. Consists of four principal components: truck-
mounted launchers; interceptors; radars; and
command, control and battle management
(C2BM)
4. All system components fit inside a C-130
aircraft for transport around the world

59. Arrow
1. Developed jointly by the U.S. and Israel.
Provides capability to defend against short
and medium-range ballistic missiles
2. Became operational in October 2000
3. Arrow Deployability Program (ADP)
supports Israel's acquisition of a third
Arrow battery and Arrows' interoperability
with U.S. systems
4. Arrow System Improvement Program
(ASIP) includes both technical cooperation
to improve the performance of the AWS
and a cooperative test and evaluation
program to validate the improved
performance

60. ARROW

61. PATRIOT PAC-3 Program
1. The most mature elements of the
BMDS
2. Transferred to the U. S. Army in 2003.
3. MDA still responsible for PAC-3's
integration into BMDS
4. Builds on the previous PATRIOT air
and missile defense infrastructure
5. PAC-3 missiles were deployed to
Southwest Asia as part of Operation
Iraqi Freedom in 2003

62. Medium Extended Air Defense System
1. A cooperative effort between the United
States, Germany, and Italy to develop an
air and missile defense system that is
mobile and transportable
2. Capable of countering ballistic missiles and
air-breathing threats such as aircraft,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise
missiles, utilizing a radar with a 360 degree
capability
3. Uses the combat-proven Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) as a platform

63. 4. MEADS' role in ballistic missile defense is to
bridge the gap between man-portable systems
like the Stinger missile and the higher levels of
the (BMDS), such as the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) system
5. Offers the opportunity for U. S. forces to work in
conjunction with our allies and contributes to the
interoperability of U. S. and allied forces ballistic
missile defense systems
6. Future development will be an Army-led effort
because of its close association with PAC-3

64. Sensors
An effective layered defense incorporates a wide-range
of sensors to detect and track threat missiles through all
phases of their trajectory. Satellites and a family of land-
and sea-based radars provide worldwide sensor
coverage.
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
The restructured Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) will be a constellation of interoperable
Research and Development (R&D) satellites and
supporting ground infrastructure for the detection,
tracking and discrimination of ballistic missiles. Data
from STSS will be used to allow BMDS interceptors to
engage incoming missiles earlier in flight. Plans are for
STSS to be incorporated into the missile defense Test
Bed beginning in 2006-2007.

65. Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites
Existing Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites, now orbiting the earth in a
geosynchronous orbit, provide global coverage
for early warning, tracking and identification.
Besides warning of a ballistic missile launch,
satellite sensors can develop an early estimate of
where the hostile missile is headed. Integration
of DSP into the initial missile defense capability
provides first, accurate warning and early
tracking of a ballistic missile launch.

66. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
constellation will provide early warning of
ballistic missile attacks and accurate state
vector information to effectively cue other
Ballistic Missile Defense System elements to
support, intercept and negate the threat.
Currently under development by the U.S.
Air Force, SBIRS will provide early warning
messages, accurate launch point estimates
to support theater attack operations, radar
cue for enhanced active defense for both
theater operations and Ground Missile
Defense operations.

67. Early Warning Radars (EWR)
MDA is upgrading the hardware and
software of existing ground-based radars
located in California, Alaska and
overseas for incorporation into initial
defense capabilities. These upgrades
will allow the radar to more accurately
determine where an incoming ballistic
missile is headed.

68. THAAD Radar
The TPS-X radar produced for the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) missile system will be
upgraded to be used in the Test Bed
to validate algorithms and support
forward based capability for near
and long-term missile defense
capabilities.

69. Forward Deployable Radars (FDR)
Forward Deployable Radars would provide
additional layers of sensor capability and more
effective tracking of hostile missiles. Forward
basing of ground based radars places the
radar where it can obtain data from early parts
of an ICBM’s trajectory and provides for early
and accurate target-tracing and signature
data, permitting earlier launch of defense
interceptors and a greater battle space within
which they can operate. Derived from the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
X-band radar, it is air-transportable, adding
the ability to quickly move the radar to where it
is most needed.