1. Comelec: A Question of Confidence By Joey de Venecia III Senatorial Candidate & Spokesman on Poll Automation PwersangMasang Pilipino Presented at the Kapihansa Manila Hotel, May 3, 2010

2. D Day -- May 10, 2010 One week from today, 50 million Filipino voters will head for their respective precincts to elect the next president, vice president, 12 senators, party-list representatives, and local government officials. This will be the first time that the Commission on Elections will conduct automated (AKA computerized) elections.

3. There are serious issues the Comelec needs to address The Comelec has not succeeded in winning the trust and confidence of the electorate for a number of reasons: The PCOS machines have failed or underperformed in a number of instances; The entire voting system appear to have numerous pitfalls/shortcomings; and It is not clear if cheating – in the form of digital dagdagbawas – can still take place.

5. Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) certification and report – promised to be provided today April 27

6. PCOS Machine Test Results (and the PCOS test procedures that generated these results)– promised to be provided April 27

7. Three (3) test results in particular: mean time between failures (MTBF); average rejection rate of valid ballots; and accuracy rate (given x test ballots, how many were miscounted, if any) If we can have full access to the reports per machine, we can do statistically analysis and have a good idea about the % of failures, ballot rejections, and count accuracy levels to expect on May 10

8. Random Manual Audit (RMA) Procedures – promised to be provided by April 27

9. Design Specifications – still to be discussed during en banc on Tuesday, April 27

10. Test Protocols – to be discussed during en banc on Tuesday, April 27

11. TEC Resolution 2010-002.pdf

12. Tabular Information 03 03 2010.pdf

13. Systest Source Code Review Readiness and Security.pdf

14. System Acceptance Test.pdf

15. Systest Certification Report Summary.pdf

16. RMA Resolution No 8873.pdf

17. PCOS Firmware Extract Hash 03 03 2010.pdf

18. Other Certifications.pdf

19. DOST Discrepancies Reports Analysis.pdf

20. Certification on Final Trusted Build.pdf

21. ANNEX J - TEC Compensating Controls.pdf

22. ANNEX G - Revised Continuity Plan.pdf

23. ANNEX F - TEC Validation and Verification Procedures.pdfHard copy of the documents were received then converted to PDF format for proper distribution. Downloadable through Joey’s website: http://www.joeydevencia.com Remaining documents were promised to be given on Monday, May 3, 2010

25. The report showed the strength and weaknesses of the system.

26. A statement in the SysTest Labs website says a comprehensive test was done to the system

28. Test Results on accuracy, security and quality of the system.

29. The Certification released to the public does not satisfy the requirement of the Law.

31. Smartmatic received the machines from their Chinese manufacturer.

32. What was the basis for accepting these machines?

33. COMELEC received the machines from Smartmatic.

34. What was the basis for accepting these machines?

35. There has to be some form of Test Data for both COMELEC and Smartmatic to accept these machines. None were provided.

37. 75, 471 precinct clusters

39. Two Memory Cards per precinct cluster (one firmware, one data) yields a requirement of 150,942 memory cards.

40. 29,698 spare memory cards available. (39% of the total number of clustered precincts)

41. These cards could either be used for data or firmware.

42. Spare PCOS machines can be used to generate multiple ERs and store the corresponding data file to the spare memory cards.

43. Could be used as the basis when a candidate questions the results.

44. Could be used to switch the data card during transport.

45. These Compact Flash cards are small enough to cover with the palm of your hand.

46. Spare PCOS machines could be used to connect to the servers.

47. There is more than enough spare data cards to attach to the spare machines.

49. The official COMELEC reason is “alignment problems.”

50. Empowering the BEI to control the fate of the Ballots.

51. To date, voters are unaware of how this UV markings should look like.

52. Disabling the voter verification feature which implements the provision of the law allowing the voter to confirm that the machine (PCOS) registered his/her choice.

53. Although it is very clear in RA 9369, the COMELEC decided solely to disable this function

55. The Digital Signature will automatically be embedded by the PCOS machine.

56. This contradicts the original General Instruction document released by the COMELEC. Although a revised GI was released to reflect this change.

57. All Digital Signatures were prepared and generated by Smartmatic/COMELEC.

59. With the absence of time and date logs, records & results can be accessed during and after elections without the public knowing the time and date they were accessed.

61. Remote operations on the database is possible.

64. Converting types during program execution could affect the values during the conversion process (round up, round down, etc).

66. The log file could be overwritten thus clearing the previous log records.

68. Statements like “the implementation of manual processes and procedures will further mitigate any potential issues” are frequently used in the document to downplay the gravity of the findings.

69. Relying on manual processes to address shortcomings of the system contradicts the entire idea of AUTOMATION.

70. Issues creating opportunities for Digital Dagdag – Bawas

71. CCS Security issues allow database manipulation.

72. Adding and removing records in the database.

73. Log issues will make make it almost impossible to recreate events when needed.

74. Significant amount of Backup Memory Cards in tandem with the spare PCOS machines can be used to generate ERs.

75. Lack of Test Data for the 48,000 modems makes the transmission of ERs questionable.

76. Could create the scenario to transfer Data Card to a different machine for transmission due to modem failure.

77. Switching of Data Cards is always possible once it is removed from the PCOS machine.

78. Could create the scenario to send the ERs manually.

80. Alignment issues (as demonstrated and confirmed in the UV marking controversy) could result to significant Ballot rejection.

81. There is no certainty at this point that the alignment issues applies to the names and ovals in the Ballot.

82. Digital Signatures of the BEI are no longer required by the PCOS in order to transmit the ER.

83. Allows any PCOS machine to transmit ERs without any BEI officer present.

84. There are 6,726 spare PCOS machines on standby.

85. There are 29,698 spare memory cards readily available. COMELEC – SMARTMATIC - TIM Voting Transmission Canvassing With the COMELEC having absolute control and access to the entire Voting System, it should truly secure this and ensure honest elections.

86. Notes on Digital Dagdag - Bawas Of the 48,000 voting centers nationwide, only 36,000 have been surveyed for signal, power, etc. Only 48,000 field technicians were recruited to handle 75,471 machines to be used on election day Comelec assigned only 438 trainers to train 260,000 Board of Election Inspectors (1 trainor for every 593 BEIs)

89. Thank You