Geostrategic significance of South Asian countries.ppt
Gggggg
1. A Balance of Fear: Asymmetric Threats and Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza
Author(s): Margret Johannsen
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Autumn 2011), pp. 45-56
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2011.XLI.1.45 .
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3. 46 Journal of Palestine Studies
Ultra-Short-Range Rockets: Evolution and Rationale
Especially since the dismantlement of the Israeli military infrastructure
and settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005, unguided rockets and mortar
bombs fired into southern Israel from the Strip have become the armed
resistance’s weapon of choice.2 Most of these weapons have a range of up
to twelve kilometers. The Qassam is the best known of the home-grown
rocket varieties. Produced by Hamas, it is named, like the movement’s armed
branch, after Shaykh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the Islamist militant whose kill-
ing by the British in 1935 helped spark the 1936–39 Palestinian revolt against
the Mandate. Such labeling serves to legitimate the possession and employ-
ment of these weapons. Designations of rockets used by Palestinian militant
groups other than Hamas include “Aqsa,” “Arafat,” “Kafah,” “Nasser,” “Quds,”
“Saria,” and “Sumoud,” but the generic name remains “Qassam.” The Qassams,
manufactured locally, are inaccurate and fall mostly into uninhabited areas
without causing harm. A minority of rockets with an extended range, such as
the Iranian-produced Katyusha-type Grad rockets and the Chinese-produced
Weishi-type WS-1E rockets, are imported.
Year of introduction, technical parameters, origin, and
inventory of Palestinian rockets*
Qassam 1 Qassam 2 Qassam 3 Grad WS-1E
Introduced in Gaza 2001 2002 2005 2008 2008
Length ~80 cm ~180 cm ~200 cm 283 cm 294 cm
Diameter ~60 mm ~150 mm ~170 mm 122 mm 122 mm
Weight ~5.5 kg ~32 kg ~90 kg 72 kg 74 kg
Warhead 0.5 kg 5–9 kg 10–20 kg 18 kg 18–22 kg
Maximum range 3 km 8–9.5 km 12 km 18–20 km 34–45 km
Origin Self-made Self-made Self-made Imported Imported
Inventory Hundreds Hundreds Hundreds ≤100 ≤100
The number of casualties resulting from rocket attacks is low. From 2001
to 2008, some eight thousand rockets and mortar bombs were launched at
Israeli territory.3 The town of Sederot, located three kilometers from the
border, has borne the brunt of the attacks, which during that period killed
nineteen civilians and two soldiers.4 During the Gaza war (dubbed Operation
Cast Lead by the Israeli military) of 2008–09, more than nine hundred rockets
landed in Israeli territory, killing three civilians and one soldier. Some reached
as far as forty kilometers beyond the border, landing close to Beersheba on
the northern edge of the Negev desert, the seventh-largest city in Israel with
a population of just under 200,000. During Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli
*All figures given here are rough estimates, based on existing data and the author’s informed
judgment. See also GlobalSecurity.org, HAMAS Rockets, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/para/hamas-qassam.htm.
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 46 28/10/11 9:47 AM
4. Asymmetric Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza 47
Air Force employed F-16 fighter jets and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters as
well as unmanned aerial vehicles, reporting a 95 percent success rate with
zero misses in the opening attack.5
Given Israel’s overwhelming military power, the rockets have virtually no
value as war-fighting weapons. However, they have eroded the sense of secu-
rity of a quarter of a million residents of the western Negev. This effect, more
than the actual number of people killed or injured or the material damage,
constitutes the psychological value of the rockets. The rockets are perceived
as offsetting Israel’s sophisticated arms, despite the fact that these can reach
every corner of the occupied Palestinian territories and
deny Palestinians any sense of security in every sphere Gazans, who know that
of life. This could explain why Gazans, who know that they will inevitably suffer
they will inevitably suffer from Israeli retaliation for the from Israeli retaliation
rockets fired, are nevertheless more in favor of military for the rockets fired, are
operations against Israeli targets than their compatriots nevertheless more in favor
in the West Bank.6 of military operations
At the time of writing, short-range rockets fired against Israeli targets
by Palestinians at Israeli territory have, with one than their compatriots in
exception,7 been launched only from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank.
and most of Israel, including the densely populated
areas, remains out of their range. But if the Palestinian armed groups con-
tinue to improve the range, accuracy, and deadliness of these weapons, larger
portions of Israel’s population could be at risk.
In the two years following the 2008–09 Gaza war, there was a significant
reduction in the extent and severity of rocket attacks carried out by Palestinian
militant organizations in the Gaza Strip. Thus, by 31 December 2010, only
261 rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory, killing one civilian.8 After
the devastations of the war, Hamas apparently shunned the risk of another
major military confrontation, seeking instead to consolidate its rule in Gaza.
Weapons smuggling, however, continued unabated, indicating that the prevail-
ing calm could turn out to be no more than a hiatus that could end any time,
all the more so in that it was not clear if Hamas would be able or willing to
fully exercise the monopoly of force it claims as the Gaza Strip’s de facto gov-
ernment. The military escalation in August 2011 following a guerilla operation
conducted by militants from the Gaza Strip, who had taken advantage of the
undefended borders in the Sinai to create havoc in the southern Negev, was
evidence that the mutual but unilateral ceasefires declared by Israel and Hamas
on 18 January 2009 had been wasted, in the sense that they had not been used
as an opportunity to negotiate the terms of a more sustainable arrangement.
Israeli Measures against the Rocket Threat
Fortification, Early Warning, and Missile Defense
Israeli defensive measures against rocket attacks include fortifying public
buildings and private homes in towns in proximity to the Gaza Strip, early
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 47 28/10/11 9:47 AM
5. 48 Journal of Palestine Studies
warning systems, and antimissile defense countermeasures. The “Color Red”
system provides warning to civilians of rocket launches. Because of the short
distances, the time to seek shelter is very short: fifteen seconds for launches
from a distance of up to ten kilometers, one minute for launches from a
distance of forty kilometers.9 Systems designed to destroy rockets in flight
are under development. In 2007, the Israeli government selected the missile
defense system “Iron Dome,” designed to detect incoming rockets of a range
of four to seventy kilometers and fire missiles to destroy them in midair. In
March 2011, Iron Dome was declared operational and Defense Minister Ehud
Barak authorized its deployment. Two batteries were deployed to protect
Beersheba and Ashqelon. On 7 April 2011, the Iron Dome system in the area
of Ashqelon successfully intercepted a Grad rocket fired at the city.10 During
the military clashes sparked by the cross-border attacks in southern Israel
on 18 August 2011, almost 160 rocket launches were reported, of which an
unknown number were intercepted; about 120 fell in Israeli territory.11
It is doubtful whether these systems will eliminate the threat to Israel
posed by the Qassam rockets and comparable weapons. In particular, due
to time constraints, Iron Dome may not be effective against ultra-short-range
rockets and therefore unable to protect Sederot and other locations near the
border.12 In addition to the technological challenges, Iron Dome also faces
potential financial constraints. Because of the gross disparity in the manufac-
turing costs of an interceptor compared to a Qassam rocket, the launching of
large numbers of Qassams could end up costing more than Israel is willing to
pay.13 Following Iron Dome’s deployment, Palestinian militant groups have
accordingly tried to adapt their rocket-launch tactics to the changed situation,
first, by aiming more frequently at areas beyond the Iron Dome protection
area, and, second, by firing multiple rocket volleys almost simultaneously to
overwhelm the defense system by sheer numbers. Amid the military flare-up
in August 2011, one rocket indeed penetrated the defense system and killed
one person in Beersheba.14
Boycott and Blockade
A year after the first fatal rocket attack in 2004, Israel withdrew from the
Gaza Strip, removing all settlements and military infrastructure while main-
taining control over the Gaza borders. Together with the construction of the
separation wall and the checkpoint system in the West Bank, the evacuation
of the Strip was part of Israel’s unilateral strategy of disengaging from the
Palestinians. According to then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who had pre-
sented his “Disengagement Plan” in December 2003, its purpose was “to grant
[Israeli citizens] maximum security and minimize friction between Israelis
and Palestinians.”15 The withdrawal was completed in autumn 2005. About
six months later, however, after Hamas won the January 2006 Palestinian
legislative elections and in March formed the new Palestinian Authority (PA)
government, Israel imposed a crippling blockade on the Gaza Strip; the fact
that it simultaneously intensified settlement expansion in the West Bank,
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 48 28/10/11 9:47 AM
6. Asymmetric Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza 49
including East Jerusalem, gave credence to the allegations that the real pur-
pose of evacuating Gaza was to fend off criticism of the ongoing colonization
of Palestinian territory in violation of the road map.
In its election campaign, Hamas had not campaigned for the destruction
of Israel. Instead, taking account of the people’s priorities, it had presented
a program of good governance. Hamas could not live up to its promises,
however. In the wake of the diplomatic boycott and economic sanctions
orchestrated by Israel and the West, the political contest between Hamas and
Fatah escalated to fierce interfactional fighting in summer 2007, resulting in
the Ramallah-decreed dissolution of the Hamas-led PA government and the
political division between the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and the Fatah
(PA)-controlled West Bank under PA president Mahmud Abbas.
Responding to the split, Israel tightened the blockade of Gaza while the
West Bank became the sole beneficiary of American and European financial
and institution-building support. However, the U.S.-designed “West Bank
First” strategy, as this approach was dubbed, did not yield the desired politi-
cal results. As expected, the economic strangulation of the Gaza Strip cre-
ated unprecedented poverty levels,16 but contrary to Israeli, Western, and PA
expectations the population did not turn against Hamas. Moreover, the strat-
egy to isolate and undermine Hamas while strengthening the (West Bank)
PA led to Hamas countertactics aimed at eroding the PA’s political standing
and credibility, already undermined by its sole reliance on negotiations with
Israel even as settlements continued to expand.
Rockets, claimed as legitimate weapons of resistance against the continu-
ing occupation of Palestinian territory and the collective punishment of the
Gazan population, formed a significant part of Hamas’s countermoves. If any
Israeli government had ever seriously considered ending the occupation, the
firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip could only strengthen the resolve not
to redeploy in (let alone to withdraw from) the West Bank. Casting doubt on
the PA’s ability to deal with belligerent factions, Israel refused to reduce its
presence in the West Bank. As a result, the PA, unable to demonstrate that
negotiations were better suited to deliver on the Palestinians’ national aspira-
tions and that armed resistance was obsolete, was further undermined.
Military Operations
From the 2005 Gaza disengagement onward, Israel, with the declared
intention of putting an end to the firing of rockets, repeatedly launched mili-
tary operations against the Gaza Strip that ranged from short-term incursions
of small forces to full-fledged war operations involving air, naval, and ground
forces. The most devastating of these was Operation Cast Lead in 2008–09,
the official goal of which, according to the Israeli military, was to deliver a
lethal blow to Hamas; targeting both Hamas’s paramilitary infrastructure and
its political leadership would increase the deterrent strength of Israel’s mili-
tary and thereby improve security in southern Israel in the long term.17 About
1,400 Palestinians were killed in the densely populated territory during the
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 49 28/10/11 9:47 AM
7. 50 Journal of Palestine Studies
war, including large numbers of noncombatants.18 The report issued by the
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict headed by Justice
Richard Goldstone found both Israel and Hamas accountable for war crimes,
although Israel was more harshly criticized for using excessive force and
employing tactics that resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians and
caused massive damage to the civil infrastructure in the Gaza Strip.19 The
extent to which Operation Cast Lead either failed or succeeded in achieving
its objectives is a matter of interpretation or emphasis. On the one hand, it
failed to seriously impair Hamas’s military infrastructure and stop the influx
of weapons to resupply Hamas.20 On the other hand, in the months following
the war, Hamas suspended its use of rockets and shifted its focus to winning
support at home in order to consolidate its rule. As a result of its efforts to
exercise control over other Palestinian militant groups, the number of rockets
attacks decreased considerably.21
Engaging Hamas: An Alternative Approach
to Demilitarizing the Conflict
There is no empirical evidence that would allow generalizations about
the relative value of coercive versus noncoercive deescalation strategies.22
In the Gaza case, however, the punitive approach that has so far dominated
Israeli policy has apparently failed to prevent the resumption or escalation of
rocket fire. For this reason, a serious effort to seek alternatives is worthwhile.
Instead of viewing Hamas largely through the lens of the “war on terror”
proclaimed in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, an attempt should
be made toward an inclusive strategy that engages Hamas and encourages
its transformation from an insurgent opposition movement to a responsible
political actor. Whether such a strategy will work is a matter of controversy.23
One school of thought deems it unlikely that Hamas, on account of religious
dogmas, will undergo such transformation.24 Another school of thought
emphasizes the political flexibility that Hamas has demonstrated at various
junctures as proof of its potential for transformation.25
Assuming that, despite its steady decline in public support in the years
following the split, Hamas and its ideology of resistance will not simply disap-
pear but will persist as a potent force in the Palestinian body politic,26 a strat-
egy of engaging the organization is worth considering. Providing incentives to
Hamas to become less militant and more politically accountable would raise
the political costs of possessing and employing rockets and could induce it to
seek face-saving ways of forsaking this option. Palestinian national reconcilia-
tion that would include acceptance of future election outcomes irrespective
of who carries the vote is essential to such transformation; in fact, a step in
this direction was taken in May 2011, when Fatah and Hamas signed a rec-
onciliation agreement one of whose provisions was formation of a national
unity government that would lay the ground for presidential and legislative
elections along the lines above, but the agreement appears to have broken
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 50 28/10/11 9:47 AM
8. Asymmetric Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza 51
down.† At the international and regional level, endorsement by Hamas of the
two-state solution in line with the Arab League’s Peace Initiative of 2002,27
reaffirmed in 2007, would facilitate a change of mind on the part of external
actors and might even affect Israel.
Step by Step toward Accountability
Disarmament: In principle, disarmament can either precede or follow
the termination of a conflict; in practice, however, the latter is preferable
because it stabilizes postconflict environments and helps start the next
stages of recovery and development. In principle, disarmament can be either
negotiated or enforced; in most cases, however, it is achieved through a mix
of coercion and incentives. Disarmament can be carried out in various ways:
by destroying the weapons, by putting them under the control of a legitimate
authority, or by integrating the paramilitaries into the regular security ser-
vices. Basically, disarmament is a politically driven process.
In the Palestinian context, disarming the militias should be part of a com-
prehensive approach that would include their demobilization and integration
into PA security forces.28 Without doubt, this would go a long way to trans-
forming Hamas and, for that matter, other Palestinian factions maintaining
armed wings. However, this cannot occur without genuine political will, the
cooperation of all parties involved, and an appropri-
ate political climate, which in the Palestinian-Israeli Conditions likely to foster
case can be excluded for the foreseeable future. Aside disarmament on the
from the Fatah-Hamas dimension of any comprehen- wider Palestinian-Israeli
sive approach, conditions likely to foster disarma- front cannot be created in
ment on the wider Palestinian-Israeli front cannot technical ways, but must
be created in technical ways, but must be generated be generated through
through addressing the root causes of the conflict. addressing the root
Only then would it be possible for the Palestinian causes of the conflict.
militant groups to swallow the fact that their disar-
mament (or integration into the PA forces) would be a totally one-sided affair
insofar as it would most certainly not be reciprocated by any restraints on
Israel’s military power.
However, removal of the rocket threat need not await the conclusion of
a formal agreement to end the conflict. By the same token, an agreed-upon
long-term settlement cannot be accomplished under fire. So instead of get-
ting stuck in a chicken-and-egg dilemma, incremental steps to reduce the
violence in Israeli-Palestinian relations so as to allow meaningful negotiations
are the more promising approach.
Long-term truce: Whereas disarmament implies the physical elimination
of weapons, a truce is solely a pledge not to use the weapons at one’s dis-
posal, provided the other side reciprocates. As demonstrated in the years
†See Doc. B4 in JPS 160, and Doc. A3 in the current issue. –Ed. Note.
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 51 28/10/11 9:47 AM
9. 52 Journal of Palestine Studies
following the abortive Israeli-PLO Camp David negotiations in 2000, uni-
laterally declared ceasefires are usually short lived, due to failure to recip-
rocate, the absence of monitoring, and/or a lack of agreed procedures on
how to deal with disputes over alleged ceasefire breaches. Accordingly, a
negotiated long-term truce needs to install mechanisms that address the vul-
nerabilities of a ceasefire, namely provocative acts committed by so-called
spoilers. In this regard, it is worth noting that Hamas leaders since 2004 have
expressed readiness to accept in principle a long-term truce (hudna) under
certain conditions within the context of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.29
Importantly, because a truce would ban the use of all military means within
the overall asymmetric military equation (be they rockets, combat aircraft,
suicide bombings, or unmanned aerial vehicles), a long-term truce can be
achieved without transforming the conflict to such an extent that disarma-
ment becomes possible.
A long-term truce could encourage Hamas and other Palestinian fac-
tions that still maintain military wings to reduce and finally relinquish their
emphasis on a military course of action. This possibility rests on the assump-
tion that Hamas further develops a pragmatic interest in exercising restraint
based on a cost-benefit calculus influenced by sanctions and incentives from
the outside as well as domestic considerations.30 Indeed, acting on such prag-
matic considerations in the past, Hamas was able to bring its campaign of
suicide attacks inside Israeli territory to a halt.31 Irrespective of the fate of the
May 2011 reconciliation agreement, past Hamas-Fatah unity talks give reason
to assume that in such future talks—which seem almost inevitable—Hamas
would again respond positively to acceptance by Fatah of the principle of
power sharing as well as the results of future elections. (In this regard, it
is important to emphasize that Israel and the Western powers must also be
willing to accept these principles in keeping with the democratic process.)
Addressing other grievances, such as the blockade on the Gaza Strip or the
shutting down of its charities in the West Bank, could also influence Hamas’s
calculations of the costs and benefits of ceasefire arrangements as opposed to
armed operations. It goes without saying that as long as the political division
of the Palestinian territories persists and Hamas is denied the opportunity
to integrate as a legitimate actor into the Palestinian political system, it will
preserve its character as a hybrid organization that aims to garner popular
support through exercising its monopoly on the use of force as well as con-
ducting resistance operations.
Integration into national-security structures: Given the continuing
Israeli attacks on Hamas (which Israel holds responsible for provocations
by dissident factions) and the low level of trust in its relations with Fatah,
Hamas will remain armed during negotiations even with Fatah. As long as
Hamas is threatened with obliteration, it will not abandon the weapons it
sees as an equalizer. Therefore, within the framework of a long-term truce,
gradual demilitarization may be the more promising option. One way of
implementing it would be to integrate the military structures of Hamas into
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 52 28/10/11 9:47 AM
10. Asymmetric Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza 53
a national-security framework (an option almost certainly discussed in past
discussions between the two parties), which in turn would require a new
attempt at security-sector reform in the Palestinian territories. Due to the
Palestinian divide and in line with Western blacklisting of Hamas as a terror
organization, the reform measures undertaken under the guidance of American
and European experts have been limited to the West Bank and moreover have
been employed in ways that allow Hamas to portray the measures as primarily
serving Israeli security interests. A reform that responds to the necessities of
Palestinian unity must shed its politicized features and be based on Hamas-
Fatah institutional coordination and cooperation. Integrated into a larger
national-security structure, Hamas may eventually be able to relinquish sole
control of its rocket arsenal and participate in negotiations on the elimination
of these “nationalized” weapons in the framework of a peace treaty.
Conclusion
Engaging Hamas is not a technical issue. It needs to take into account the
dynamics of the armed struggle that, in the absence of a long-term solution,
can be revived easily under the proper circumstances. It needs to involve
the rank and file; addressing only the top echelons and disregarding popu-
lar perceptions and sentiments would be a recipe for failure. With regard
to this, four observations deserve special attention. First, the notion that
Israel’s military superiority will ensure its survival against all odds does not
go undisputed; the Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon and the Gaza
Strip have been adduced as evidence that Israel can be defeated militarily.
Second, the perception that the rockets create a balance of fear can satisfy
an emotional need among the population of the occupied territories show-
ing that the enemy suffers, too.32 Third, in an atmosphere of disillusionment
with regard to stalled or fruitless negotiations, military operations can be
useful in the competition with other Palestinian factions for popular consent
as they bolster the image of an organization willing to stand up against great
odds. Fourth, the credibility of rivals that have opted for negotiations with
the enemy can be easily undermined by military tit-for-tat tactics. Engaging
Hamas is suggested here with the expectation that such approach would be
instrumental in stemming the tides of violence that are periodically afflicting
the troubled region, thereby facilitating negotiations to resolve the seemingly
intractable conflict.
Endnotes
1. For an in-depth analysis of the roots and Ways Forward (London: Routledge,
and rationales of suicide bombing in the 2005), pp. 87–102.
context of the Israeli-Palestinian con- 2. The first such incident occurred
flict, see Hisham H. Ahmed, “Palestinian on 16 April 2001, when a rocket fired
Resistance and ‘Suicide Bombing’: Causes from the Gaza Strip landed harmlessly
and Consequences,” in Tore Bjørgo, ed., in a field on Israeli territory. On 28 June
Root Causes of Terrorism: Myth, Reality 2004, two rockets landed near a school
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 53 28/10/11 9:47 AM
11. 54 Journal of Palestine Studies
and shopping center in Sederot, killing a 8. The Meir Amit Intelligence and
man and a three-year-old child. Terrorism Information Center, Terrorism
3. Israel Ministry of Foreign from the Gaza Strip since Operation
Affairs, Suicide and Other Cast Lead: Data, Type and Trends
Bombing Attacks in Israel since (Ramat Hasharon: IICC, 17 March 2011),
the Declaration of Principles (Sept http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_
1993), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e169.
Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/ pdf.
Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Suicide 9. GlobalSecurity.org, HAMAS
+and+Other+Bombing+Attacks+in+Isra Rockets, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
el+Since. military/world/para/hamas-qassam.htm.
4. B’Tselem, Rocket and Mortar Fire 10. Anshel Pfeffer and Yanir Yagna,
into Israel (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2010), “Iron Dome Successfully Intercepts Gaza
http://www.btselem.org/israeli_civil- Rocket for First Time,” Ha’Aretz, 7 April
ians/qassam_missiles. See also the 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/
Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission diplomacy-defense/iron-dome-success-
on the Gaza Conflict (the “Goldstone fully-intercepts-gaza-rocket-for-first-time-
Report”), 25 September 2009, UN 1.354696.
General Assembly Document A/64/490, 11. The Meir Amit Intelligence
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/7 and Terrorism Information Center,
762C5EF0B1DEA24852576650053D1AA0, News of Terrorism and the Israeli-
paras. 1594–1691, excerpted in Journal Palestinian Conflict (August 17–22,
of Palestine Studies 29, no. 2 (Winter 2011) (Ramat Hasharon: IICC, 22 August
2010), pp. 89–94. 2011), http://www.terrorism-info.org.
5. Barbara Opall-Rome, “In Gaza, Both il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/
Sides Reveal New Gear,” Defense News, 5 html/ipc_e219.htm.
January 2009, http://www.defensenews. 12. Reuven Pedatzur and Ha’Aretz
com/story.php?i=3885990. Correspondent, “Iron Dome System
6. According to the April 2011 Found to Be Helpless against Qassams,”
poll of the Jerusalem Media and Ha’Aretz, 22 February 2008, http://
Communications Centre, 61.1 percent www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/956859.
of Gazans polled (total 448 polled) html. See also Ben Hartman, “Iron Dome
support the continuation of military Doesn’t Answer Threats,” Jerusalem
operations against Israeli targets (either Post, 9 May 2010, http://www.jpost.com/
in Israel only, the occupied territories Israel/Article.aspx?id=175042.
only, or both together) compared to 36.7 13. Alon Ben-David, “Iron Dome
percent of West Bank residents polled Advances to Meet Qassam Threat,”
(total 750 polled). Poll No. 73, April Jane’s Information Group (Bracknell:
2011, Governance and Reconciliation IHS Global Limited, 2008), http://www.
(Ramallah: JMCC, 17 April 2011), http:// janes.com/news/defence/systems/jdw/
www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps. jdw080318_2_n.shtml.
aspx?id=827. 14. Anshel Pfeffer, “Israeli Defense
7. In 2006, Islamic Jihad and Fatah’s Sources: Gaza Terror Groups Changing
al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade reportedly fired Tactics to Avoid Iron Dome System,”
a Qassam rocket at Israel from the West Ha’Aretz, 22 August 2011, http://
Bank town of Jenin. The attack marked www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/
the first (and at the time of writing the israeli-defense-sources-gaza-terror-
only) time a Qassam was fired at an groups-changing-tactics-to-avoid-iron-
Israeli target from the West Bank. It came dome-system-1.379914.
close to hitting a Jewish community. 15. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
See Ronny Shaked, “Qassam Fired from “Address by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
West Bank,” Ynet, 1 January 2006, http:// at the Fourth Herzliya Conference,” 18
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340, December 2003 http://www.mfa.gov.il/
L-3193067,00.html. See also “A-Zahar MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+
Calls for Rockets to be Fired from the leaders/2003/Address+by+PM+Ariel+
West Bank,” The Jerusalem Post, 20 June Sharon+at+the+Fourth+Herzliya.htm.
2010, http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/ 16. See UNRWA, Labour Market
Article.aspx?id=178963. Briefing: Gaza Strip (Jerusalem:
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 54 28/10/11 9:47 AM
12. Asymmetric Tit-for-Tat Strategies in Gaza 55
UNRWA, April 2011), http://www.unrwa. include Hamas in a peace settlement, see
org/userfiles/201106083557.pdf. Jeroen Gunning, “Peace with Hamas?
17. Sergio Catignani “Variation on The Transforming Potential of Political
a Theme: Israel’s Operation Cast Lead Participation,” International Affairs 80,
and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum,” no. 2, pp. 233–34.
Royal United Services Institute Journal 24. Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics,
154, no. 4 (2009), p. 68. Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of
18. The Israeli human rights organi- Jihad (New Haven: Yale University Press,
zation B’Tselem reported 1,387 killed, 2006).
of whom 759 were noncombatants: 25. Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in
“Operation Cast Lead, 27 Dec. ’08 to 18 Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence
Jan. ’09,” http://www.btselem.org/gaza_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
strip/castlead_operation. The Palestinian 2009).
Centre for Human Rights, on the other 26. See Alon Ben-Meir, “Above
hand, reported 1,417 killed, includ- the Fray: The Untenable Status Quo,”
ing 1,167 noncombatants: “Targeted Jerusalem Post, 15 July 2011, http://
Civilians: A PCHR Report on the Israeli www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/
Military Offensive against the Gaza Strip, Article.aspx?id=229414 .
27 December 2008–18 January 2009” 27. The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002.
(Gaza City: PCHR, 28 October 2009), p. Official translation of the full text of a
10. The Goldstone Report does not give Saudi-inspired peace plan adopted by
casualty figures, although it does remark the Arab summit in Beirut, 2002, http://
that “the statistics from non-governmen- www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/
tal sources are generally consistent” peace02.htm.
(para. 361). 28. See United Nations Disarmament,
19. United Nations Human Rights Demobilization and Reintegration
Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Resource Centre, What Is DDR? October
Other Occupied Arab Territories, Report 2009, http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.
of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission php.
on the Gaza Conflict, 25 September (New 29. See Beverly Milton-Edwards and
York: United Nations, 2009), http:// Alastair Crooke, “Waving, Not Drowning:
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcoun- Strategic Dimensions of Ceasefires and
cil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf. Islamic Movements,” Security Dialogue 35,
20. Catignani, “Variation on a Theme,” no. 3 (2004), p. 295–310. Hamas has also
p. 72. demonstrated the ability to honor agreed-
21. From January 2010 until July 2011, upon ceasefires, most recently in the
Israeli territory was hit by 236 rockets. months leading up to Operation Cast Lead,
See Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism when Egypt brokered a 6-month cease-
Information Center, News of Terrorism. fire, signed by the two parties on 17 June
This amounts to a monthly average of 2008. The ceasefire was observed until 4
twelve hits, while during the five months November 2008 when it was broken by
preceding the ceasefire of June 2008, a Israel. Efforts to restore it failed, and hostil-
monthly average of 197 rockets hit Israeli ities were launched on 27 December 2008.
territory. See Intelligence and Terrorism See JPS 151, Special Gaza Focus under
Information Center, Israel Intelligence “Lead-Up to Operation Cast Lead.”
Heritage and Commemoration Center, 30. For conceptualizing Hamas as a
Summary of Rocket Fire and Mortar “limited spoiler” that is not principally
Shelling in 2008 (Ramot Hasharon: IICC, oriented toward violence but responsive
2009), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/ to its political environments, see Jeroen
malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ Gunning, “Hamas: Socialization and
ipc_e007.pdf. the Logic of Compromise,” in Marianne
22. Louis Kriesberg, International Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John
Conflict Resolution: The U.S.-USSR and Tirman, eds., Terror, Insurgency, and
Middle East Cases (New Haven: Yale the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts
University Press, 1992), pp. 83–84. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
23. For an overview of the debate on Press, 2007), pp. 123–54.
whether Hamas is an immutable enemy 31. Hamas’s last suicide attack inside
of peace or whether it is feasible to Israeli territory was in February 2008,
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 55 28/10/11 9:47 AM
13. 56 Journal of Palestine Studies
though two additional suicide attacks were MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/
carried out in March and April, respec- Hamas+war+against+Israel/Missile+fire+
tively in East Jersualem and at one of the from+Gaza+on+Israeli+civilian+targets+
crossing points between Gaza and Israel. Aug+2007.htm.
For a statement on ending suicide bomb- 32. Greg Myre “Rockets Create
ings by Hamas Gaza leader Mahmud al- a ‘Balance of Fear’ with Israel,
Zahar, see “Statement in Interview: Rocket Gaza Residents Say,” New York
Barrage of Sederot Is Hamas Strategy,” Times, 8 July 2006, http://www.
in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nytimes.com/2006/07/09/world/
The Hamas Terror War against Israel middleeast/09rockets.html?_r=1&
(Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Foreign pagewanted=print&oref=slogin.
Affairs, 2008), http://www.mfa.gov.il/
Militants from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine take part
in a military training session in the southern Gaza Strip town of Khan Yunis,
19 May 2011. (Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images)
JPS4101_04_Johansson.indd 56 28/10/11 9:47 AM
