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Dealing with security threats
    A more connected world than what you think…..

    Ilias Chantzos
    Director EMEA & APJ Government Relations

Kenya 9 March 2010                                  1
Agenda
• A bit about Symantec and where 
  the information comes from
• The current threat landscape
  – Threats to government and national 
    security/CIIP
  – Threats to consumers
  – Examples
• Anatomy of a security breach
• Operationalising security
Symantec Global Presence
                                                    Global Intelligence Network (GIN)
   ATTACK ACTIVITY                                               MALCODE INTELLIGENCE                                                       VULNERABILITIES                                                        SPAM / PHISHING


   • 240,000 sensors                                             •130M+ clients, servers,                                            • 32,000+ vulnerabilities                                                 • 2.5M decoy accounts
   • 200+ countries                                                    gateways                                                  • 11,000 vendors ‐72k  techs                                               • 8B+ emails analyzed daily


                                                                                                                                 Gotheburg, Sweden
                                                                                                            Aschheim, Germany
                                                                                       Reading, Green Park, GBR          Wiesbaden, Germany
                                 Calgary, Alberta, CA                                                                     Ratingen, Germany
                                                                                            Dublin, Ireland                               Warsaw, Poland
                                             Roseville, MN                                Shannon, Ireland
        Seattle, WA                Bloomfield Hills, MI    Toronto, CA                             Zaltbommel, NLD
     Springfield, OR          Englewood, CO                                                             Brussels, Belgium         Milan, Italy
                                                                         Newton/Waltham, MA
  San Francisco, CA                                                Herndon, VA                                                                                                                                                 Seoul, South Korea
                                           Oak Brook, IL                                        Madrid, Spain                                                                                        Beijing, China
  Mountain View, CA                                              Alexandria, VA                                                                                                                                                                  Tokyo, Japan
                                Orem, UT
         Cupertino, CA                                          Durham, NC
                                         Dallas, TX         Atlanta, Georgia                                                                                                             Chengdu, China                        Shanghai, China
       Santa Monica, CA
                                     Houston, TX             Heathrow, FL                                                              Riyadh, Saudi Arabia     Dubai, UAE
       San Luis Obispo, CA
               Culver City, CA         Austin Texas           Miami, FL                                                                                                                                                        Taipei, Taiwan
                                                                                                                                                                                         Mumbai, India      Hong Kong, China
                 Mexico City, Mexico
                                                                                                                                                                           Pune, India
                                                                                                                                                                                           Chennai, India
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Singapore




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Brisbane, Aus
                                                                                    Sao Paola, Brazil
                                                                                                                                                   Sandton, South Africa                                                                                 Sydney, Aus

                                                                              Buenos Aires, Argentina
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Melbourne, Aus




                                 4 MSS Security                                                         11 Security  Research                                                 29 Global Support 
                               Operations Centers                                                             Centers                                                              Centers
                                                                                          Government – Commercial ‐ Consumer


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    3
How Likely Is It?
   To be struck by lightening?                          To be bitten by a snake?



                                 1 in 2.6M   1 in 42M




     To be in car accident?
                                        ?               To be attacked online?




                                 1 in 300      1 in 5



                                                                                   4
The current threat landscape
    Threats to Government and CIIP



Presentation Identifier Goes Here    5
Malicious code is installed…

• Over 60% of all malicious code detected by Symantec discovered in 2008.
       • Over 90% of threats are threats to confidential information.




                                                                     6
                                                                         6
Information is at risk
 Majority of data breaches in   More than half of breaches
Education (27%), followed by     (57%) due to theft or loss,
  Government (20%) and          followed by insecure policy
     Healthcare (15%)                     (21%)




                                                               7
Threat Activity Trends - Malicious Activity

• In 2008 the United States was the top country for malicious activity
 (raw numbers) with 23% of the overall proportion. China was ranked
                           second with 9%.
• As Internet and broadband grows in certain countries their share of
                     malicious activity also grows.




                                                                         8
                                                                             8
Governments Are Prime Targets
     Certain contact and account data were taken, including user IDs and
    passwords, email addresses, names, phone numbers, and some basic
                             demographic data.
               Data breach at federal government jobsite USAJobs.gov



        Hackers breached the site, then modified it to redirect users to a
       rogue URL that in turn directed attack code against their systems.
        Government travel site GovTrip.gov users suffer malware attacks



                Administrators … were forced to withdraw the page after it was
                 defaced by more than 170 people over a frenzied few hours.
                          Defra website using Wiki editing techniques defaced



                         Shortly after police confiscated the group's servers, DoS attacks
                          took the official government website and the Swedish national
                               police site offline. The attacks were assumed to be a
                                     reprisal from disgruntled Pirate Bay users.
                           DoS attacks on Swedish policy and official government website




                                                                                       9
Different threat scenarios
• Collect intelligence on the infrastructure
   – To attack the infrastructure
   – To determine the location of valuable 
     information
• Collect intelligence
   – Capture  and extract information
   – Intercept communications and ciphers
• Disable the infrastructure
   – That you have already infiltrated
   – Directly attack it from outside
• Collect OSINT
• Conduct Psyops
• Achieve information dominance by 
  communicating your own message
Causing problems to the navy
Stopping the airforce




                        12
Information leaking
Using COTS to collect intelligence
DDoS on Estonia some stats
                                    • Attack Duration:                •Peak saw traffic
• 128 Unique DDoS                                                    equivalent of 5000
  Attacks:                       17 attacks – Less than 1 minute     clicks per second

   – 115 – ICMP Floods           78 attacks – 1 minute ~ 1 hour     •Attacks stopped at
                                  16 attacks – 1 hour ~ 5 hours           Midnight
   – 4 – TCP SYN Floods
   – 9 – Generic Traffic          8 attacks – 5 hours ~ 9 hours     •Tactics shifted as
                                                                   weaknesses emerged
     Floods                       7 attacks – 10 hours or more
      Source = ArborSert                                            •Swamped web sites
                            80                                        associated with
                                                                   Government Ministries,
                                                                   Banks, Newspapers &
• Daily Attack Rate:        60
                                                                       Broadcasters
   – 03/05/2007 = 21        40
                                                                   •Emergency Services
   – 04/05/2007 = 17        20                                     Number disabled for at
                                                                       least 1 hour
   – 08/05/2007 = 31         0
                                                                      •Access was cut to
   – 09/05/2007 = 58
                                        07


                                        07


                                        07


                                        07


                                        07


                                        07


                                        07


                                        07


                                        07
                                                                   sites outside of Estonia
                                     20


                                     20


                                     20


                                     20


                                     20


                                     20


                                     20


                                     20


                                     20
                                  5/


                                  5/


                                  5/


                                  5/


                                  5/


                                  5/


                                  5/


                                  5/


                                  5/
                               /0


                               /0


                               /0


                               /0


                               /0


                               /0


                               /0


                               /0


                               /0
   – 11/05/2007 = 1                                                 in order to keep local
                            03


                            04


                            05


                            06


                            07


                            08


                            09


                            10


                            11
                                                Attack Intensity       access available
 Source = ArborSert
                                                                                    15
Cyber defense and shooting warfare
• Why blow something up?
  – If you can use it to collect intelligence
  – If you can disable it when you want
  – If you can use it afterwards again


• Russian attack in Georgia
  – Information‐intelligence is power
  – Preceded by cyber attack
  – Psychological effect/operations
  – Information dominance 
  – Propaganda
Taking down the traffic grid
Energy supply and distribution
    1999 SCADA failure in Bellingham
    Washington ¼ mil gal of gasoline




                                       18
Attacking the energy grid
Collecting OSINT
A Real And Present Danger
Suddenly the blue screen of death has a different meaning……..



                                                   FOOD, WATER, ENERGY


                                               SEA, AIR, ROAD & RAIL TRAFFIC


                                                       IT & TELECOMS


                                                     FINANCE    MILITARY




                                                                           21
Current and future trends
• Hacking is for fortune not for fame
• Attackers become more sophisticated and 
  well invested
• Target is confidential information
• Attack techniques increase in 
  sophistication and stealth
  – Single use malware
  – Evasion techniques (web and coding)
• Increased sophistication of botnets
• Virtual worlds and social engineering
• Critical infrastructure protection 
  dependant on Internet Security
Threats to consumer…….



Presentation Identifier Goes Here   23
Stolen information is sold

  • Credit card information (32%) and bank account credentials (19%)
            continue to be the most frequently advertised items.
 • The price range of credit cards remained consistent in 2008, ranging
                    from $0.06 to $30 per card number.
• Compromised email accounts can provide access to other confidential
                   information and additional resources.




                                                                      24
                                                                           24
Website compromise

  • Attackers locate and compromise a high-traffic site through a vulnerability
                specific to the site or in a Web application it hosts.
• Once the site is compromised, attackers modify pages so malicious content is
                                  served to visitors.




       Site-specific vulnerabilities           Web application vulnerabilities
                                                                                  25
                                                                                       25
Vulnerability Trends
               Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
• Vulnerabilities in Web browser plug-ins are frequently exploited to install
                            malicious software.
• Memory corruption vulnerabilities again made up the majority of the type
    of vulnerabilities in browser plug-in technologies for 2008, with 272
                       vulnerabilities classified as such.




                                                                                26
                                                                                     26
Vulnerability Trends
           Unpatched vulnerabilities by vendor
 • In 2008, there were 112 unpatched vulnerabilities affecting enterprise-class vendors
                               compared to 144 in 2007.
         • Microsoft had the most, with a total of 46 unpatched vulnerabilities.
• Of the 112 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities, 37 were low severity, 71 were medium
                          severity, and 4 were high severity.




                                                                                          27
                                                                                               27
Malicious Code Trends Types

• Trojans made up 68 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
   samples reported in 2008, a minor decrease from 69 percent in 2007.
     • Worms increased slightly from 26% in 2007 to 29% in 2008.
  • The percentage of back doors decreased from 21% to 15% in the
                            current period.




                                                                          28
                                                                               28
Malicious Code Trends
                    Propagation mechanisms
• 66% of potential malicious code infections propagated as shared executable
                    files, up significantly from 44% in 2007.
• Malicious code using P2P file sharing protocols declined from 17% in 2007 to
                                  10% in 2008.




                                                                                 29
                                                                                      29
Spam
                       Country of Origin
 • Over the past year, Symantec observed a 192 percent increase in
   spam detected across the Internet as a whole, from 119.6 billion
              messages in 2007 to 349.6 billion in 2008.
    • In 2008, bot networks were responsible for the distribution of
              approximately 90 percent of all spam email.
• Russia, Turkey, and Brazil experienced significant increases in spam
                           volume this year.




                                                                         30
                                                                              30
Spam
                         Categories

• Internet-related spam was the top category with 24% followed by
                 commercial product spam with 19%
          • Financial spam relatively constant at 16%.




                                                                    31
                                                                         31
An example how to exploit a users

                         Phisher

                                                                Cashier




Spammer                                                        Fraud
                                                              Website
                         Egg Drop                         (+ Trojan horse)
                          Server

           Bot -Herder
                            Phishing Messages
                                                Victims
Anatomy of a security breach



Presentation Identifier Goes Here   33
Anatomy of a breach

                              Disruption of operations




Large-scale                                                              Defacing
DDoS attacks                                                             websites

                     Organized      Well Meaning         Malicious
                      Criminal        Insider             Insider


        Malware outbreaks within       Stealthy ex-filtration or unintended
              protected perimeter            loss of confidential data


                                                                                34
Well‐Meaning Insider

                               Hacker




                                              “Well-Meaning Insider” Breach
                                                           Sources
                                         1. Data on servers & desktops
           Desktop            Firewall
                                         2. Lost/stolen laptops, mobile devices
                                         3. Email, Web mail, removable devices
                     Server
                                         4. Third‐party data loss incidents
Employee
                                         5. Business processes 




                                                                                  35
Targeted Attacks
1                          2                         3                         4




    INCURSION                   DISCOVERY                CAPTURE                   EXFILTRATION
 Attacker breaks in via    Map organization’s          Access data on          Confidential data sent to 
  targeted malware,            systems               unprotected systems       hacker team in the clear, 
improper credentials or                                                         wrapped in encrypted 
     SQL injection             Automatically find      Install root kits to      packets or  in zipped 
                               confidential data     capture network data        files with passwords




                                                                                                            36
Malicious Insiders
                                                 Home
                                                Computer




                        IM                          Firewall
                                                                Malicious Insider: Four Types
     Unhappy                 Webmail
     Employee                                                  1. White collar criminals
                                        Email
                                                               2. Terminated employees
Mobile                                                         3. Career builders
Device
                                                               4. Industrial spies

                             Unhappy
         CD/DVD
                             Employee
                  USB




                                                                                                37
Operationalising security……



Presentation Identifier Goes Here   38
Establishing In‐depth Defense
   Future government                                    Interconnected networks
                               Traditional ‘Bastion’
                                                             require in-depth,
 capabilities are built on   security models do not
                                                        proactive & agile defense
interconnected systems       effectively support such
                                                         at the periphery and the
and effective information      agile, interconnected
                                                        endpoint of infrastructure
         sharing                      networks
                                                              and information




                                                                               39
Collecting intelligence – Real time 
         situation awareness
what enables the wise sovereign and 
 the  good  general  to  strike  and 
 conquer,  and  achieve  things 
 beyond the reach of ordinary men, 
 is foreknowledge 



    SUN TZU – on the Art of
            War




                                         40
Conficker/Downadup – Cumlative




           Source – Conficker Working Group and Shadowserver
How to Stop Security Breaches


    Protect
                         Automate review     Identify threats in
  information
                          of entitlements        real time
  proactively




Integrate security         Prevent data          Stop targeted
    operations              exfiltration            attacks




                                                                   42
Thank you!
    Ilias_chantzos@symantec.com




    Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in 
    the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.

    This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied, 
    are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice.


Presentation Identifier Goes Here                                                                                                                                                            43

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Dealing with security threats and the current threat landscape

  • 1. Dealing with security threats A more connected world than what you think….. Ilias Chantzos Director EMEA & APJ Government Relations Kenya 9 March 2010 1
  • 2. Agenda • A bit about Symantec and where  the information comes from • The current threat landscape – Threats to government and national  security/CIIP – Threats to consumers – Examples • Anatomy of a security breach • Operationalising security
  • 3. Symantec Global Presence Global Intelligence Network (GIN) ATTACK ACTIVITY MALCODE INTELLIGENCE VULNERABILITIES SPAM / PHISHING • 240,000 sensors •130M+ clients, servers,    • 32,000+ vulnerabilities • 2.5M decoy accounts • 200+ countries gateways • 11,000 vendors ‐72k  techs • 8B+ emails analyzed daily Gotheburg, Sweden Aschheim, Germany Reading, Green Park, GBR Wiesbaden, Germany Calgary, Alberta, CA Ratingen, Germany Dublin, Ireland Warsaw, Poland Roseville, MN Shannon, Ireland Seattle, WA Bloomfield Hills, MI Toronto, CA Zaltbommel, NLD Springfield, OR Englewood, CO Brussels, Belgium Milan, Italy Newton/Waltham, MA San Francisco, CA Herndon, VA Seoul, South Korea Oak Brook, IL Madrid, Spain Beijing, China Mountain View, CA Alexandria, VA Tokyo, Japan Orem, UT Cupertino, CA Durham, NC Dallas, TX Atlanta, Georgia Chengdu, China Shanghai, China Santa Monica, CA Houston, TX Heathrow, FL Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Dubai, UAE San Luis Obispo, CA Culver City, CA Austin Texas Miami, FL Taipei, Taiwan Mumbai, India Hong Kong, China Mexico City, Mexico Pune, India Chennai, India Singapore Brisbane, Aus Sao Paola, Brazil Sandton, South Africa Sydney, Aus Buenos Aires, Argentina Melbourne, Aus 4 MSS Security  11 Security  Research  29 Global Support  Operations Centers Centers Centers Government – Commercial ‐ Consumer 3
  • 4. How Likely Is It? To be struck by lightening? To be bitten by a snake? 1 in 2.6M 1 in 42M To be in car accident? ? To be attacked online? 1 in 300 1 in 5 4
  • 5. The current threat landscape Threats to Government and CIIP Presentation Identifier Goes Here 5
  • 6. Malicious code is installed… • Over 60% of all malicious code detected by Symantec discovered in 2008. • Over 90% of threats are threats to confidential information. 6 6
  • 7. Information is at risk Majority of data breaches in More than half of breaches Education (27%), followed by (57%) due to theft or loss, Government (20%) and followed by insecure policy Healthcare (15%) (21%) 7
  • 8. Threat Activity Trends - Malicious Activity • In 2008 the United States was the top country for malicious activity (raw numbers) with 23% of the overall proportion. China was ranked second with 9%. • As Internet and broadband grows in certain countries their share of malicious activity also grows. 8 8
  • 9. Governments Are Prime Targets Certain contact and account data were taken, including user IDs and passwords, email addresses, names, phone numbers, and some basic demographic data. Data breach at federal government jobsite USAJobs.gov Hackers breached the site, then modified it to redirect users to a rogue URL that in turn directed attack code against their systems. Government travel site GovTrip.gov users suffer malware attacks Administrators … were forced to withdraw the page after it was defaced by more than 170 people over a frenzied few hours. Defra website using Wiki editing techniques defaced Shortly after police confiscated the group's servers, DoS attacks took the official government website and the Swedish national police site offline. The attacks were assumed to be a reprisal from disgruntled Pirate Bay users. DoS attacks on Swedish policy and official government website 9
  • 10. Different threat scenarios • Collect intelligence on the infrastructure – To attack the infrastructure – To determine the location of valuable  information • Collect intelligence – Capture  and extract information – Intercept communications and ciphers • Disable the infrastructure – That you have already infiltrated – Directly attack it from outside • Collect OSINT • Conduct Psyops • Achieve information dominance by  communicating your own message
  • 15. DDoS on Estonia some stats • Attack Duration: •Peak saw traffic • 128 Unique DDoS  equivalent of 5000 Attacks: 17 attacks – Less than 1 minute clicks per second – 115 – ICMP Floods 78 attacks – 1 minute ~ 1 hour •Attacks stopped at 16 attacks – 1 hour ~ 5 hours Midnight – 4 – TCP SYN Floods – 9 – Generic Traffic  8 attacks – 5 hours ~ 9 hours •Tactics shifted as weaknesses emerged Floods 7 attacks – 10 hours or more Source = ArborSert •Swamped web sites 80 associated with Government Ministries, Banks, Newspapers & • Daily Attack Rate: 60 Broadcasters – 03/05/2007 = 21 40 •Emergency Services – 04/05/2007 = 17 20 Number disabled for at least 1 hour – 08/05/2007 = 31 0 •Access was cut to – 09/05/2007 = 58 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 sites outside of Estonia 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 – 11/05/2007 = 1 in order to keep local 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 Attack Intensity access available Source = ArborSert 15
  • 16. Cyber defense and shooting warfare • Why blow something up? – If you can use it to collect intelligence – If you can disable it when you want – If you can use it afterwards again • Russian attack in Georgia – Information‐intelligence is power – Preceded by cyber attack – Psychological effect/operations – Information dominance  – Propaganda
  • 18. Energy supply and distribution 1999 SCADA failure in Bellingham Washington ¼ mil gal of gasoline 18
  • 21. A Real And Present Danger Suddenly the blue screen of death has a different meaning…….. FOOD, WATER, ENERGY SEA, AIR, ROAD & RAIL TRAFFIC IT & TELECOMS FINANCE MILITARY 21
  • 22. Current and future trends • Hacking is for fortune not for fame • Attackers become more sophisticated and  well invested • Target is confidential information • Attack techniques increase in  sophistication and stealth – Single use malware – Evasion techniques (web and coding) • Increased sophistication of botnets • Virtual worlds and social engineering • Critical infrastructure protection  dependant on Internet Security
  • 24. Stolen information is sold • Credit card information (32%) and bank account credentials (19%) continue to be the most frequently advertised items. • The price range of credit cards remained consistent in 2008, ranging from $0.06 to $30 per card number. • Compromised email accounts can provide access to other confidential information and additional resources. 24 24
  • 25. Website compromise • Attackers locate and compromise a high-traffic site through a vulnerability specific to the site or in a Web application it hosts. • Once the site is compromised, attackers modify pages so malicious content is served to visitors. Site-specific vulnerabilities Web application vulnerabilities 25 25
  • 26. Vulnerability Trends Browser plug-in vulnerabilities • Vulnerabilities in Web browser plug-ins are frequently exploited to install malicious software. • Memory corruption vulnerabilities again made up the majority of the type of vulnerabilities in browser plug-in technologies for 2008, with 272 vulnerabilities classified as such. 26 26
  • 27. Vulnerability Trends Unpatched vulnerabilities by vendor • In 2008, there were 112 unpatched vulnerabilities affecting enterprise-class vendors compared to 144 in 2007. • Microsoft had the most, with a total of 46 unpatched vulnerabilities. • Of the 112 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities, 37 were low severity, 71 were medium severity, and 4 were high severity. 27 27
  • 28. Malicious Code Trends Types • Trojans made up 68 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples reported in 2008, a minor decrease from 69 percent in 2007. • Worms increased slightly from 26% in 2007 to 29% in 2008. • The percentage of back doors decreased from 21% to 15% in the current period. 28 28
  • 29. Malicious Code Trends Propagation mechanisms • 66% of potential malicious code infections propagated as shared executable files, up significantly from 44% in 2007. • Malicious code using P2P file sharing protocols declined from 17% in 2007 to 10% in 2008. 29 29
  • 30. Spam Country of Origin • Over the past year, Symantec observed a 192 percent increase in spam detected across the Internet as a whole, from 119.6 billion messages in 2007 to 349.6 billion in 2008. • In 2008, bot networks were responsible for the distribution of approximately 90 percent of all spam email. • Russia, Turkey, and Brazil experienced significant increases in spam volume this year. 30 30
  • 31. Spam Categories • Internet-related spam was the top category with 24% followed by commercial product spam with 19% • Financial spam relatively constant at 16%. 31 31
  • 32. An example how to exploit a users Phisher Cashier Spammer Fraud Website Egg Drop (+ Trojan horse) Server Bot -Herder Phishing Messages Victims
  • 34. Anatomy of a breach Disruption of operations Large-scale Defacing DDoS attacks websites Organized Well Meaning Malicious Criminal Insider Insider Malware outbreaks within Stealthy ex-filtration or unintended protected perimeter loss of confidential data 34
  • 35. Well‐Meaning Insider Hacker “Well-Meaning Insider” Breach Sources 1. Data on servers & desktops Desktop Firewall 2. Lost/stolen laptops, mobile devices 3. Email, Web mail, removable devices Server 4. Third‐party data loss incidents Employee 5. Business processes  35
  • 36. Targeted Attacks 1 2 3 4 INCURSION DISCOVERY CAPTURE EXFILTRATION Attacker breaks in via  Map organization’s  Access data on  Confidential data sent to  targeted malware,  systems unprotected systems hacker team in the clear,  improper credentials or  wrapped in encrypted  SQL injection Automatically find  Install root kits to  packets or  in zipped  confidential data capture network data files with passwords 36
  • 37. Malicious Insiders Home Computer IM Firewall Malicious Insider: Four Types Unhappy Webmail Employee 1. White collar criminals Email 2. Terminated employees Mobile 3. Career builders Device 4. Industrial spies Unhappy CD/DVD Employee USB 37
  • 39. Establishing In‐depth Defense Future government Interconnected networks Traditional ‘Bastion’ require in-depth, capabilities are built on security models do not proactive & agile defense interconnected systems effectively support such at the periphery and the and effective information agile, interconnected endpoint of infrastructure sharing networks and information 39
  • 40. Collecting intelligence – Real time  situation awareness what enables the wise sovereign and  the  good  general  to  strike  and  conquer,  and  achieve  things  beyond the reach of ordinary men,  is foreknowledge  SUN TZU – on the Art of War 40
  • 41. Conficker/Downadup – Cumlative Source – Conficker Working Group and Shadowserver
  • 42. How to Stop Security Breaches Protect Automate review Identify threats in information of entitlements real time proactively Integrate security Prevent data Stop targeted operations exfiltration attacks 42
  • 43. Thank you! Ilias_chantzos@symantec.com Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in  the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied,  are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Presentation Identifier Goes Here 43