Securing IoT Applications

Securing
the
Internet
of
Things

Paul
Fremantle

CTO,
WSO2
(paul@wso2.com)

PhD
researcher,
Portsmouth
University

(paul.fremantle@port.ac.uk)

@pzfreo

About
me

•  CTO
and
Co-‐Founder

WSO2

– Open
Source
Middleware

plaLorm

•  Part-‐Mme
PhD
looking
at

security

•  Working
in
Apache
for

14
years

•  Working
with
Cloud,

SOA,
APIs,
MQTT,
IoT

2

Firstly,
does
it
maQer?

“Google

Hacking”

hQp://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/26/smart-‐homes-‐hack/

So
what
is
diﬀerent
about
IoT?

•  The
longevity
of
the
device

–  Updates
are
harder
(or
impossible)

•  The
size
of
the
device

–  CapabiliMes
are
limited
–
especially
around
crypto

•  The
fact
there
is
a
device

–  Usually
no
UI
for
entering
userids
and
passwords

•  The
data

–  O_en
highly
personal

•  The
mindset

–  Appliance
manufacturers
don’t
think
like
security
experts

–  Embedded
systems
are
o_en
developed
by
grabbing
exisMng

chips,
designs,
etc

Physical
Hacks

A
PracMcal
AQack
on
the
MIFARE
Classic:

hQp://www.cs.ru.nl/~ﬂaviog/publicaMons/AQack.MIFARE.pdf

Karsten
Nohl
and
Henryk
Plotz.
MIFARE,
LiQle
Security,
Despite
Obscurity

Or
try
this
at
home?

hQp://freo.me/1g15BiG

hQp://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-‐CL-‐TR-‐630.html

Hardware
recommendaMons

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

Hardware
recommendaMons

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

•  Don’t
rely
on
obscurity

Hardware
RecommendaMon
#2

•  Unlocking
a
single
device
should
risk
only
that

device’s
data

Crypto
on
small
devices

•  PracMcal
ConsideraMons
and
ImplementaMon

Experiences
in
Securing
Smart
Object
Networks

–  hQp://tools.ieL.org/html/dra_-‐aks-‐crypto-‐sensors-‐02

ECC
is
possible

(and
about
fast
enough)

Crypto

Borrowed
from
Chris
Swan:

hQp://www.slideshare.net/cpswan/security-‐protocols-‐in-‐constrained-‐environments/13

Won’t
ARM
just
solve
this
problem?

Cost
maQers

8
bits

$5
retail

$1
or
less
to
embed

32
bits

$25
retail

$??
to
embed

SIMON
and
SPECK

hQps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/07/simon_and_speck.html

Datagram
Transport
Layer
Security

(DTLS)

•  UDP
based
equivalent
to
TLS

•  hQps://tools.ieL.org/html/rfc4347

CoAP

•  Constrained
ApplicaMon
Protocol

– hQp://tools.ieL.org/html/dra_-‐ieL-‐core-‐coap-‐18

– REST-‐like
model
built
on
UDP

– Californium
project
coming
soon
to
Eclipse
IoT

•  No
authenMcaMon
or
authorizaMon

– Relies
on
DLTS
or
data
in
the
body

MQTT

•  Very
lightweight
messaging
protocol

–  Designed
for
8-‐bit
controllers,
SCADA,
etc

–  Low
power,
low
bandwidth

–  Binary
header
of
2
bytes

–  Lots
of
implementaMons

•  MosquiQo,
Paho,
RSMB
and
MoqueQe
from
Eclipse

–  Clients:

•  Arduino,
Perl,
Python,
PHP,
C,
Java,
JS/Node.js,
.Net,
etc

•  Plus
an
even
lighter-‐weight
version
for
Zigbee

–  MQTT-‐SN
(Sensor
Network)

MQTT

•  Relies
on
TLS
for
conﬁdenMality

•  Username/Password
ﬁeld

Passwords

•  Passwords
suck
for
humans

•  They
suck
even
more
for
devices

Why
OAuth2?

•  Widely
implemented

•  PreQy
good

– Of
course
there
is
never
100%
agreement

– Or
certainty
with
security
protocols

•  Not
just
HTTP:

– hQp://tools.ieL.org/html/dra_-‐ieL-‐kiQen-‐sasl-‐
oauth-‐12

– OAuth2
used
with
SSL

Why
FIAM
for
IoT?

•  Can
enable
a
meaningful
consent
mechanism

for
sharing
of
device
data

•  Giving
a
device
a
token
to
use
on
API
calls

beQer
than
giving
it
a
password

– Revokable

– Granular

•  May
be
relevant
for
both

– Device
to
cloud

– Cloud
to
app

Two
aspects
using
OAuth
with
IoT

•  On
the
device

– Tokens
are
good

– LimiMng
the
access
of
the
device

•  On
the
cloud

– Puvng
users
in
control
of
their
data

– Just
good
current
pracMce

•  Demo
with
MQTT

– But
not
just
for
MQTT

– Also
for
the
cloud,
CoAP,
and
other
protocols
too

Demo
components

MosquiQo

(Open
Source
MQTT

Broker)

AcMng
as
“Resource

Server”

MosquiQo_py_auth

mqQ-‐oauth2.py

IdP

WSO2
IdenMty

Server

ESB

IntrospecMon

API

Refresher.py

Arduino

CreateToken.py

1
2
3
4
5
6

Lessons
learnt

•  MQTT
and
MPU
/
I2C
code
is
97%
of
Duemilanove

–  Adding
the
final
logic
to
do
OAuth2
flow
pushed
it
to
99%

–  No
TLS
in
this
demo
is
a
big
issue

•  Different
Oauth2
implementaMons
behave
differently

(e.g.
changing
the
refresh
token
every
Mme
you
refresh)

•  Need
to
be
able
to
update
the
scope
of
token
if
this
will

work
for
long
term
embedded
devices

•  The
refresh
flow
should
not
really
go
via
the
Resource

server

–  Easy
fix

•  MQTT
should
have
a
well
defined
model
for
sending
a

message
to
just
one
client
(securely)

What
I
haven’t
covered
enough
of

Summary

•  Think
about
security
with
your
next
device

•  We
as
a
community
need
to
make
sure
that

the
next
generaMon
of
IoT
devices
are
secure

•  We
need
to
create
exemplars

– Shields

– Libraries

– Server
so_ware

– Standards

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