Behind the scenes

BEHIND THE SCENES
Major General Joginder Singh (Retired)
Lancer International -New Delhi-1993
273 Pages-Fifteen Sketch Maps. ISBN-1-897829-20-5

Price-Hardbound-380/- Indian Rupees- (Not including
postage)
Reviewed by A.H Amin
August 2000
When I saw this books short description on LANCER
BOOKS promotional leaflet I immediately ordered one
through Bharat Verma's London UK office.I was very
excited and thought very seriously that this book would be
a really fine magnum bonum type of an effort on the Indian
Army.
At that time I was writing my book Pakistan Army till 1965
and hoped that this book would be a tremendous help.

Following are my personal observations written in late
1999.“Behind the Scenes”, setting aside other factors
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs still is a welcome
addition to the limited number of books available on the
Indo Pak wars.
Major General Joginder Singh possesses the distinction of
being an insider in the higher Indian command and staff
echelons in the period 1958-65 and his analysis carries
the weight of authority of a man who saw how various

operational and higher command decisions were taken
from close quarters.
Major General Joginder Singh the author was
commissioned in the 5th Battalion 14th Punjab Regiment
more popularly known as “ Ali Baba’s (its commanding
officers designation) Forty Thieves” British Indian Army in
1937 after having joined the army through the “Y Cadet
Scheme”.

Joginder saw military action in the British operations
against the Frontier tribes in the late 1930s.
He attended the 1945 Army Staff Course at Quetta,
served in various command and staff appointments
including a stint at the Indian Ministry of Defence,

command of an Infantry Battalion (7 Punjab), Commander
80 Brigade-Nowshera Sector), Deputy Commandant
Infantry School, Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps during
the Sino-Indian War, GOC 5 Infantry Division and Chief of
Staff of the Western Command under three successive
GOC in chiefs.
The last assignment included 1965 War after which
Joginder finally retired in 1967.
The book is divided into five parts and covers the entire
modern post-1947 Indian military history with maximum
space devoted to the 1965 conflict while smaller tracts are
devoted to the 1971 War, Interwar years followed by a
small section dealing with the more recent developments.

The first part dealing with “National Strategy” feels that
strategic insight is sadly lacking in India’s higher decision
making echelons.

He feels that politicians leading India are short-sighted
and self- centred and feels that Indian higher leadership
lacks the qualities necessary to attain India’s position of
natural leadership in Asia.

Joginder discusses in considerable detail his experiences
as 80 Infantry Brigade Commander where he first
advanced the possibility that Akhnur bridge by virtue of
being the sole link to Poonch Valley and the fact that it
was defended by the weak 191 Infantry Brigade defending
Chamb Sector .
This represented a serious imbalance in Indian defensive
posture in South Kashmir and that it was most likely that
Pakistan Army in case of war may capture it with ease
using a force of an armoured brigade infantry division.
Joginder states that a divisional exercise was held based
on this scenario in April-May 1956 but the only outcome
was that “GOC 26 Division was asked to proceed on
pension” (Page-28) while no other changes were made in
operational plans or organisational structure till 1965.
The layman readers may note that shortly before the
September 1965 War the Indian High Command did agree
to upgrade the Chamb Brigade to a Divison in August
1965 but at the time of Grand Slam Chamb was defended
only by an infantry brigade and a squadron of light tanks.
Joginder devotes a small chapter to his experiences as
Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps responsible for Indian
Occupied Kashmir and discusses his recommendations
which included creation of an infantry division to defend
Chamb, construction of a bridge on Chenab at Riasi as an
alternative to Akhnur bridge stationing of an independent

armoured brigade in Jammu area and stationing of an
infantry division size force as 15 Corps Reserve.
None of the recommendations were followed by Joginders
bosses !
The author’s discussion of Sino-Indian War is not much
different from the other much known discussions in
various well circulated books, so it is pointless to burden
the readers with repetition of much discussed issues.
The most valuable albeit controversial part of the book is
the one dealing with the authors experiences as Chief of
Staff of the Western Command before and during 1965
war.
The author had a high opinion of his first GOC Western
Command who died in a helicopter crash in 1963 along
with four general officers and an airforce air vice marshal.
Joginder also had a very high opinion about his
second GOC Manekshaw.
It was during this period as the author discusses that the
Western Command carried out a detailed appreciation
dealing with a future Indo-Pak conflict and recommended
an offensive posture with attack aimed at isolating Lahore
(going for Balloki Headwork’s) and Sialkot (from Jammu-
Samba area) and against the Mangla Dam-Mirpur area
were planned.

It was during this period that the Western Command’s
proposals for opening a second front across the
international border Joginder states that the Army Chief
Chaudhry accepted the idea of opening a second front in
case of war across the international border.
Joginder, however, noted that by 1964 Nehru incapable of
taking any decisions due to bad health and indifferent
mental state while defence held a very low priority with
Nehru’s successor Shaastri.
Thus the 1964 memorandum prepared by the Western
Command was simply filed away.
Joginder felt that General Chaudhri was not assertive in
presenting the Indian political leadership with the true
defence requirements.The controversial part of the book
begins once Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh enters
the scene as the third boss of the author as GOC Western
Command in November 1964.
It appears that there was a personality clash between
Joginder and Harbaksh while Harbaksh’s book “War
Despatches” published before Joginder’s book indicates
that Harbaksh did not have a very high opinion about
Joginder.
Joginder states that Harbaksh wanted to base India’s main
defence on River Bias while abandoning the entire territory
from the international border till Beas. While it is
impossible to confirm or deny this assertion it seems

highly improbable that Harbaksh could hold such an
opinion whether one takes Harbaksh as an Indian or a
Sikh.
Joginder states that at a conference held in May 1965 the
GOC of 1st Indian Armoured Division advanced the thesis
that the most likely axis of Pakistani main attack was Patti-
Harike -Beas Bridge. It was this conference that the Indian
Chief as per the author agreed to deploy an armoured
brigade in Khem Karan area to meet the Pakistani
armoured threat emanating from Kasur area.
Harbaksh Singh as per the author thought otherwise
giving a higher priority to a Pakistani frontal threat in the
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Harbaksh Singh on the other hand
states in his book that he had appreciated before the war
that a Pakistani armour threat from Kasur towards the
Beas bridge was most likely.
There is no way in which Joginder’s assertions can be
proved or disproved.Joginder’s approach towards
Harbaksh Singh while discussing almost all aspects of the
1965 war is hostile to the point of being irrational.
Thus he defends Major General Nirinjan Prasad who was
sacked for exhibiting timidity and cowardice by Harbaksh
Singh. Joginder thinks that Niranjan was sacked not
because he was irresolute but because he was a difficult
subordinate. Again it is not possible to agree or disagree
with Joginder about this assertion. However, Niranjan’s

sacking was even justified by very neutral and
dispassionate Indian military historians like Major Praval.
There is one fact which stands out in 15 Division’s conduct
on 6th, 7th and 8th September, i.e its conduct keeping in
view its numerical superiority in infantry and the degree of
surprise that it had achieved on 6th of September was not
commensurate with the overwhelming advantages that it
enjoyed.
As a matter of fact many Pakistani defenders of Lahore
who were interviewed by this scribe were surprised at the
lack of initiative exhibited by the 15 Division in its
operations on the 6th of September 1965.
No one can deny the fact that two infantry brigades of this
division bolted away in face of Pakistani counterattacks
and that this led to a serious operational crisis on the 8/9
September once the 96 Brigade was brought forward to
check the conditions of near rout. I am not implying that
the Indians were non- Martial as many Pakistanis
earnestly believe since it is a fact that a Pakistani unit from
the Punjab Regiment opposite Barki also bolted away.
What I am merely trying to point out is the fact that there
was something seriously wrong with 15 Indian Division at
divisional as well as brigade level.

However, Joginder denies it and sees Niranjan as an
angel of a man since Harbaksh sacked him.Niranjan was
also called Dhoti Parshad in Indian Army.Joginder asserts
that he gave a suggestion that the BRB should be crossed
at Barki , after the main Indian attacks against Lahore had
failed on 6-9th September , but does not explain how it
could have been successfully done, keeping in view the
net performance of all Indian brigades of 7 and 15 Division
tasked to contact the BRB, was pathetic by all definitions.

He asserts that he also suggested that the 26 Indian
Division should bypass Sialkot and capture Sambrial west
of Sialkot but does not explain how an infantry division
would do so when an armoured division supported by two

infantry divisions had failed to capture even Chawinda
which was hardly 11 miles from the border.
The author asserts that Harbaksh Singh took no interest in
the main Indian attack i.e the 1 Corps operations opposite
Chawinda but does not explain why it was so. Was it due
to some inter arm rivalry or because Harbaksh was not
interested that India should win the war?

The author’s conclusion that there was no worthwhile
higher direction in 1965 war as far as the Indian Army is
concerned stands out as one of the most credible
conclusions of the book.
His assertion that the 1965 War was a show of some “20
Lieutenant Colonel and their units and about seven
regiments of the armoured corps....” is valid for both the
armies conduct in 1965.Joginder flatly denies that General
Chaudhri ever asked Harbaksh Singh to withdraw to the
Beas River.

General Kaul whose book was published many years
before Harbaksh Singh’s “War Despatches” had also
made a similar accusation (i.e that such a withdrawal was
suggested by Chaudhri).

I came across a similar assertion in another book by an
Indian Colonel H.C Karr’s book. It appears that Chaudhri
did discuss something with Harbaksh about re-adjusting
his position but since there is nothing on record, therefore,
only a Prophet or a Jinn may ever know about what
exactly happened.
The possibility that Joginder dismisses this incident since
Harbaksh Singh had written that it occurred cannot be
denied since “opposition for opposition’s sake” is one of
the cardinal attributes of the Sub Continental psyche.
The author agrees that the main failure at Chawinda
occurred in the handling of 1st Indian Armoured Brigade
on the 8th September 1965 but has spent far more energy
in painting Harbaksh Singh as the main reason for the
Indian failure all over the book. In this regard it appears
that the book had the support of the Indian military
establishment who were outraged by Harbaksh very frank
and forthright remarks about the mishandling of Indian
Army at various levels in the 1965 War.

In this regard the book stands out as more of a “Rejoinder”
to Harbaksh’s “War Despatches” than a study carried out
in a detached manner with the aim of correctly analysing
the 1965 War.

The author gives no explanation why the Indians wasted
two complete days doing nothing following their failure at
Gadgor on the 8th of September.
This was the most critical phase of war for the Pakistanis
when they were off balance and it was possible for the
Indian armour to regain its freedom of manoeuvre by
outflanking the Pakistani force opposite them.
The situation after 10/11 September when the Pakistani
1st Armoured Division started reinforcing the 6th
Armoured Division was totally transformed. The major
Indian failure occurred on 8th 9th and 10th September and
was entirely because of indecisiveness and lack of
resolution in pressing forward on behalf of the Indian 1
Corps/1 Armoured Division/1st Armoured Brigade
Commander.

The author has also discussed 1971 War in brief but here
his criticism is very mild about the higher direction in the
war. Indian Western Command Chief Candeth has
acknowledged in his book that had the Pakistanis attacked
in late October 1971 all Indian plans to attack East
Pakistan would have been blown into winds.
This proves that the plans to invade East Pakistan were
not as sound as they appeared and that the Indian plan
was only carried out successfully since Yahya was
irresolute enough not to launch a counteroffensive in the
Western Front as had been planned before 1971 War.
Joginder does not explain how establishment of the
Bangladesh strategically helped India in the long run since
Bangladesh is militarily stronger than the old East

Pakistan and is not an Indian satellite as Indians had
envisaged. Even Indian thinkers are divided about the
strategic success of the 1971 War!
Was it fought to add another feather to the Durga Devis
cap or to liberate the Bengalis ! Indira’s conduct after the
1971 War does not paint a very bright picture about her
motivation to start the 1971 War.
Even if the aim was to help the Bengalis it failed since
major killings by the Pakistan Army whatever their
quantum took place in April-June 1971 and by November
1971 the situation was far different from that of June 1971.
Genocide was committed but the Indians came not with a
missionary’s motive to help the oppressed but for other
reasons.
Wars are not fought for missionary purposes alone and
1971’s only enduring legacies are “a more aggressive and
militarily viable Pakistan eager to vindicate its honour” and
the creation of a smaller ethnic state which proves that
after a decade or two all provinces of present day Indo
Pak are tomorrow’s full time members of the UNO!
In this regard the 1971 war as far as India was concerned
was a strategic failure and only a symbolic success! It
would have been a success only if India had the resolution
to overrun West Pakistan or to at least recapture Pakistan
held Kashmir.Joginder has not discussed anywhere the
relative failure of the Indian command system especially
with reference to the Western Command.

A dispassionate glance at the conduct of 1965 and 1971
wars proves that the Indian command system is too
unwieldy and keeping in view the frontage, location of
formations and their number it is very difficult for any man
whether it is Harbaksh or Manekshaw to effectively
command anything like the Western Command as it is and
as it was in 1965 and 1971 wars.
Joginder’s hero Manekshaw had nothing to do with actual
operational command of any corps division or command in
any of the three Indo Pak wars. The Indian failure at
Chamb in 1971 which was criticised by Joginder definitely
had a connection with the confusion in the Indian GHQ as
the narratives of Candeth and Gurcharan Singh prove.
Joginder does not explain why Chamb, which was
adequately defended in 1971, lost to Pakistan in 1971. It
was a command failure and had a deeper connection with
the divisional commanders personality and handling of
armour than with anything at brigade or unit level where
the Indian 191 Brigade was brilliantly led and managed to
hold three infantry brigades supported by three tank
regiments for more than two days.
An interesting revelation of the book is the fact that Ayub
Khan commanded the Chamar Regiment and was under
fire in WW Two and seen as not fit to command a battalion
of his parent regiment Punjab Regiment.

How should we analyse the Indian Army’s failure in 1965
or how should I put it as a Pakistani? Joginder sees the
hand of Harbaksh Singh in all Indian failures in 1965! This,
however, is too simplistic an approach. There were deeper
reasons for the Indian (as well as the Pakistani) failure to
function as dynamic entities beyond unit level in 1965.
The Indian Army of 1965 was like the Austrian Army of
1809. It consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders
but was severely handicapped since rapid expansion
since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, despite being
impressive on paper had not made the Indian military
machine really effective because of poor training at
divisional and brigade level.
It was numerically strong but organisationally ineffective
having dashing young leaders but tactically and
operationally inept brigade divisional and corps
commanders from the older pre- 1947 commissioned
generation whom were initially supposed not to go beyond
company level, had the transfer of power not taken place
in 1947.
The strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1
Corps which was shortly created before the 1965 war was
a newly raised formation whose corps commander and
armoured divisional commanders were about to retire in
1965 when war broke out.

The Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the
case with Pakistan Army, consisted of men who had
experience of infantry biased operations in WW Two and
did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare.
It was this lack of understanding that led to the failures in
achieving a decisive armour breakthrough in both sides.
It was a failure of command as well as staff system where
even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for
armoured warfare and worked on yards and furlongs
rather than miles. Their orientation was position oriented
rather than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield
was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North
African experience where the Japanese and Germans
frequently appeared in their rear had made them extra
sensitive about their flanks.
These were men who thought in terms of security
rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox
dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial
orders oriented British Indian Army was the cardinal
script of their life.
It was this British system in which every senior
commander was more interested in doing the job of those
one step junior to him that led to the lack of dash and
initiative at brigade and battalion level.
They were trained that way and there behaviour as far as
the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken
in this context.

How could one man, an army commander responsible
for three corps is made responsible for failures that
occurred at battalion brigade and divisional
level!Once I heard about Joginder’s book in 1998, I
had very high expectations and was convinced that a
man who has been the Chief of Staff of the Western
Command will be the best judge of 1965 War.
In this regard the book was a big disappointment since
instead of analysing Indian military history it is more of a
proof that Joginder Singh was a very fine staff officer and
that Harbaksh Singh was a horrible man! Joginder’s book
is a welcome addition to the limited number of first
hand/direct participant accounts on 1965 War.
The fact that the writer has made some controversial
assertions and has made an effort to write a rejoinder to
Harbaksh Singh’s more famous “War Despatches”,
however, does not diminish the historical value of the
book, at least for the Pakistani readers of military history. I
still maintain that the book thus retains the status of “must
be read and indispensable books” on the list of all keen
students of Indo Pak military history.
However, his anti-Harbaksh bias should be taken with a
pinch of salt. In addition his discussion of what could have
been done must be viewed in relation to the relatively
pathetic performance of both the armies in all three wars.

The under employment of Pakistan and Indian Armies in
all three wars have a deep connection with the
conservative British colonial legacy.
Harbaksh and various other actors were a product of that
system and were relatively better or perceived to be better
than their contemporaries and thus elevated to the higher
command ranks. It was the outmoded system that proved
to be a failure in all three wars. Individuals were just the tip
of the iceberg.

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