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Abstract the unity of mind and feelings in the process of cognition.

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The Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus
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«Yanka Kupala State University of ...
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the unity of mind and feelings in the process ofcognition. the nature of intuition and
imagination.
the unity of mind an...
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considered the mind a "black box" and thought that mental processes may be better conceived of as forms
of covert verbal...
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Abstract the unity of mind and feelings in the process of cognition.

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The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgment, language, and memory, as well as non-cognitive aspects such as emotion. Under the scientific physicalist interpretation, the mind is housed at least in part in the brain
The original meaning of Old English gemynd was the faculty of memory, not of thought in general. Hence call to mind, come to mind, keep in mind, to have mind of, etc. The word retains this sense in Scotland.[1] Old English had other words to express "mind", such as hyge "mind, spirit".[2]

The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgment, language, and memory, as well as non-cognitive aspects such as emotion. Under the scientific physicalist interpretation, the mind is housed at least in part in the brain
The original meaning of Old English gemynd was the faculty of memory, not of thought in general. Hence call to mind, come to mind, keep in mind, to have mind of, etc. The word retains this sense in Scotland.[1] Old English had other words to express "mind", such as hyge "mind, spirit".[2]

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Abstract the unity of mind and feelings in the process of cognition.

  1. 1. 1 The Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus Higher educational establishment «Yanka Kupala State University of Grodno» The department of philosophy ABSTRACT the course «Philosophy and methodology of science» The Unity of Mind and Feelings in The Process of Cognition. The Nature of Intuition and Imagination. By ALKOLBEE ALAA RADHI MUHSSIN An MA student of the department (dep. of biochemistry, Grodno,belarus ) Ivanov I.I. Grodno, 2020
  2. 2. 2 the unity of mind and feelings in the process ofcognition. the nature of intuition and imagination. the unity of mind and feelings in the process of cognition The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgment, language, and memory, as well as non-cognitive aspects such as emotion. Under the scientific physicalist interpretation, the mind is housed at least in part in the brain The original meaning of Old English gemynd was the faculty of memory, not of thought in general. Hence call to mind, come to mind, keep in mind, to have mind of, etc. The word retains this sense in Scotland.[1] Old English had other words to express "mind", such as hyge "mind, spirit".[2] The generalization of mind to include all mental faculties, thought, volition, feeling and memory, gradually develops over the 14th and 15th centuries.[3] i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as the central issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body.[4] José Manuel Rodriguez Delgado writes, "In present popular usage, soul and mind are not clearly differentiated and some people, more or less consciously, still feel that the soul, and perhaps the mind, may enter or leave the body as independent entities."[5] Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism is the position that mind and body are in some way separate from each other. It can be traced back to Plato,[6] Aristotle[7][8][9] and the Nyaya, Samkhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy,[10] but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century.[11] Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas Property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.[12] The 20th century philosopher Martin Heidegger suggested that subjective experience and activity (i.e. the "mind") cannot be made sense of in terms of Cartesian "substances" that bear "properties" at all (whether the mind itself is thought of as a distinct, separate kind of substance or not). This is because the nature of subjective, qualitative experience is incoherent in terms of – or semantically incommensurable with the concept of – substances that bear properties. This is a fundamentally ontological argument.[13] The philosopher of cognitive science Daniel Dennett, for example, argues there is no such thing as a narrative center called the "mind", but that instead there is simply a collection of sensory inputs and outputs: different kinds of "software" running in parallel.[14] Psychologist B.F. Skinner argued that the mind is an explanatory fiction that diverts attention from environmental causes of behavior;[15] he
  3. 3. 3 considered the mind a "black box" and thought that mental processes may be better conceived of as forms of covert verbal behavior.[16][17] Philosopher David Chalmers has argued that the third person approach to uncovering mind and consciousness is not effective, such as looking into other's brains or observing human conduct, but that a first person approach is necessary. Such a first person perspective indicates that the mind must be conceptualized as something distinct from the brain. The mind has also been described as manifesting from moment to moment, one thought moment at a time as a fast flowing stream, where sense impressions and mental phenomena are constantly changing.[18][19] Thought refers to ideas or arrangements of ideas that are the result of the process of thinking. Though thinking is an activity considered essential to humanity, there is no general consensus as to how we define or understand it. Because thought underlies many human actions and interactions, understanding its physical and metaphysical origins, processes, and effects has been a longstanding goal of many academic disciplines including linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, artificial intelligence, biology, sociology and cognitive science. Thinking allows humans to make sense of, interpret, represent or model the world they experience, and to make predictions about that world. It is therefore helpful to an organism with needs, objectives, and desires as it makes plans or otherwise attempts to accomplish those goals. Thought (or thinking) can be described as An activity taking place in a: brain – organ that serves as the center of the nervous system in all vertebrate and most invertebrate animals (only a few invertebrates such as sponges, jellyfish, adult sea squirts and starfish do not have a brain). It is the physical structure associated with the mind. mind – abstract entity with the cognitive faculties of consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory. Having a mind is a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms. [20][21] Activities taking place in a mind are called mental processes or cognitive functions. The word thought comes from Old English þoht, or geþoht, from stem of þencan "to conceive of in the mind, consider”. [20] The word "thought" may mean [21], [22] a single product of thinking or a single idea ("My first thought was ‘no.’"), thoughts is the product of mental activity ("Mathematics is a large body of thought."), it acts or system of thinking ("I was frazzled from too much thought."), and the capacity to think, reason, imagine, and so on ("All her thought was applied to her work.") it’s also the consideration of or reflection on an idea ("The thought of death terrifies me.") and a recollection or contemplation ("I thought about my childhood.") beside consideration, attention, care, or regard ("He took no thought of his appearance" and
  4. 4. 4 "I did it without thinking.") and judgment, opinion, or belief ("According to his thought, honesty is the best policy.") another opinion is the ideas characteristic of a particular place, class, or time ("Greek thought") and tending to believe in something, especially with less than full confidence ("I think that it will rain, but I am not sure.") Definitions may or may not require that thought take place within a human brain (see anthropomorphism),it take place as part of a living biological system (see Alan Turing and Computing Machinery and Intelligence), and it take place only at a conscious level of awareness (see Unconscious Thought Theory),a way to deliver thought it require language, it is principally or even only conceptual, abstract ("formal"),and involve other concepts such as drawing analogies, interpreting, evaluating, imagining, planning, and remembering. Definitions of thought may also be derived directly or indirectly from theories of thought. feelings are also a type of thoughts the word feelings Originally used in the English language to describe the physical sensation of touch through either experience or perception, the word is also used to describe other experiences, such as "a feeling of warmth"[23] and of sentience in general. In Latin, sentire meant to feel, hear, or smell. In psychology, the word is usually reserved for the conscious subjective experience of emotion.[24] Phenomenology and heterophenomenology are philosophical approaches that provide some basis for knowledge of feelings. Many schools of psychotherapy depend on the therapist achieving some kind of understanding of the client's feelings, for which methodologies exist. Perception of the physical world does not necessarily result in a universal reaction among receivers (see emotions) but varies depending upon one's tendency to handle the situation, how the situation relates to the receiver's past experiences, and any number of other factors. Feelings are also known as a state of consciousness, such as that resulting from emotions, sentiments, or desires. People buy products in hopes that the product will make them feel a certain way: either happy, excited, or beautiful. Or, they find the product useful in some way, even indirectly such as to support a charity or for altruistic economic reasons. Some people buy beauty products in hopes of achieving a state of happiness or a sense of self beauty or as an act or expression of beauty. Past events are used in our lives to form schemas in our minds, and based on those past experiences, we expect our lives to follow a certain script. However, storytelling, commemoration, and reservation of commemoration (the unwillingness to overtly impose remembrances), research and investigation, and many other activities can help settle uneasy feelings without "scripting", without the ambivalence that feeling can only be "handled" by proxy, which is not always true. A social psychologist, Daniel Gilbert, conducted a study on the influence of
  5. 5. 5 feelings on events alongside other researchers. The results showed that when the participants predicted a positive feeling for an event, the higher the chances that they wanted to relive the event. Predicted feelings were either short-lived or did not correlate to what the participant expected.[25] Emotions enable us to react to situations – for example, anger or fear will set your heart racing, and feeling happy will make you smile. One of the key areas of your brain that deals with showing, recognizing and controlling the body's reactions to emotions is known as the limbic system. The neurons in your hippocampus play a role in emotions. In Scherer's components processing model of emotion, [26] five crucial elements of emotion are said to exist. From the component processing perspective, emotion experience is said to require that all of these processes become coordinated and synchronized for a short period of time, driven by appraisal processes. Although the inclusion of cognitive appraisal as one of the elements is slightly controversial, since some theorists make the assumption that emotion and cognition are separate but interacting systems, the component processing model provides a sequence of events that effectively describes the coordination involved during an emotional episode. Cognitive appraisal provides an evaluation of events and objects. , Bodily symptoms the physiological component of emotional experience., Action tendencies a motivational component for the preparation and direction of motor responses. Expression facial and vocal expression almost always accompanies an emotional state to communicate reaction and intention of actions. And Feelings the subjective experience of emotional state once it has occurred. A distinction can be made between emotional episodes and emotional dispositions. Emotional dispositions are also comparable to character traits, where someone may be said to be generally disposed to experience certain emotions. For example, an irritable person is generally disposed to feel irritation more easily or quickly than others do. Finally, some theorists place emotions within a more general category of "affective states" where affective states can also include emotion-related phenomena such as pleasure and pain, motivational states (for example, hunger or curiosity), moods, dispositions and traits. [27] The classification of emotions has mainly been researched from two fundamental viewpoints. The first viewpoint is that emotions are discrete and fundamentally different constructs while the second viewpoint asserts that emotions can be characterized on a dimensional basis in groupings. There’s Two Dimensions of Emotion Through the use of multidimensional scaling, psychologists can map out similar emotional experiences, which allows a visual depiction of the "emotional distance"
  6. 6. 6 between experiences.[24] A further step can be taken by looking at the map's dimensions of the emotional experiences. The emotional experiences are divided into two dimensions known as valence (how negative or positive the experience feels) and arousal (how energized or enervated the experience feels). These two dimensions can be depicted on a 2D coordinate map.[28] This two-dimensional map was theorized to capture one important component of emotion called core affect.[29] Core affect is not the only component to emotion, but gives the emotion its hedonic and felt energy. The idea that core affect is but one component of the emotion led to a theory called “psychological construction.”[30] According to this theory, an emotional episode consists of a set of components, each of which is an ongoing process and none of which is necessary or sufficient for the emotion to be instantiated. The set of components is not fixed, either by human evolutionary history or by social norms and roles. Instead, the emotional episode is assembled at the moment of its occurrence to suit its specific circumstances. One implication is that all cases of, for example, fear are not identical but instead bear a family resemblance to one another. With the two-factor theory now incorporating cognition, several theories began to argue that cognitive activity in the form of judgments, evaluations, or thoughts were entirely necessary for an emotion to occur. One of the main proponents of this view was Richard Lazarus who argued that emotions must have some cognitive intentionality. The cognitive activity involved in the interpretation of an emotional context may be conscious or unconscious and may or may not take the form of conceptual processing. Lazarus' theory is very influential; emotion is a disturbance that occurs in the following order: Cognitive appraisal—The individual assesses the event cognitively, which cues the emotion. Physiological changes—The cognitive reaction starts biological changes such as increased heart rate or pituitary adrenal response. Action—The individual feels the emotion and chooses how to react. For example: Jenny sees a snake, Jenny cognitively assesses the snake in her presence. Cognition allows her to understand it as a danger. Her brain activates adrenaline gland which pumps adrenaline through her blood stream resulting in increased heartbeat. Jenny screams and runs away. Lazarus stressed that the quality and intensity of emotions are controlled through cognitive processes. These processes underline coping strategies that form the emotional reaction by altering the relationship between the person and the environment.
  7. 7. 7 George Mandler provided an extensive theoretical and empirical discussion of emotion as influenced by cognition, consciousness, and the autonomic nervous system in two books (Mind and Emotion, 1975, and Mind and Body: Psychology of Emotion and Stress, 1984) There are some theories on emotions arguing that cognitive activity in the form of judgments, evaluations, or thoughts are necessary in order for an emotion to occur. A prominent philosophical exponent is Robert C. Solomon (for example, The Passions, Emotions and the Meaning of Life, 1993). Solomon claims that emotions are judgments. He has put forward a more nuanced view which response to what he has called the ‘standard objection’ to cognitivism, the idea that a judgment that something is fearsome can occur with or without emotion, so judgment cannot be identified with emotion. The theory proposed by Nico Frijda where appraisal leads to action tendencies is another example. It has also been suggested that emotions (affect heuristics, feelings and gut-feeling reactions) are often used as shortcuts to process information and influence behavior.[31] The affect infusion model (AIM) is a theoretical model developed by Joseph Forgas in the early 1990s that attempts to explain how emotion and mood interact with one's ability to process information. A common way in which emotions are conceptualized in sociology is in terms of the multidimensional characteristics including cultural or emotional labels (for example, anger, pride, fear, happiness), physiological changes (for example, increased perspiration, changes in pulse rate), expressive facial and body movements (for example, smiling, frowning, baring teeth), and appraisals of situational cues.[32] One comprehensive theory of emotional arousal in humans has been developed by Jonathan Turner (2007: 2009).[33][34] Two of the key eliciting factors for the arousal of emotions within this theory are expectations states and sanctions. When people enter a situation or encounter with certain expectations for how the encounter should unfold, they will experience different emotions depending on the extent to which expectations for Self, other and situation are met or not met. People can also provide positive or negative sanctions directed at Self or other which also trigger different emotional experiences in individuals. Turner analyzed a wide range of emotion theories across different fields of research including sociology, psychology, evolutionary science, and neuroscience. Based on this analysis, he identified four emotions that all researchers consider being founded on human neurology including assertive-anger, aversion-fear, satisfaction-happiness, and disappointment-sadness. These four categories are called primary emotions and there is some agreement amongst researchers that these primary emotions become combined to produce more elaborate and complex emotional experiences. These more elaborate emotions are called first-order elaborations in Turner's theory and they include sentiments such as pride, triumph, and awe. Emotions can also be experienced at different levels of intensity so that feelings of concern are a low- intensity variation of the primary emotion aversion-fear whereas depression is a higher intensity variant.
  8. 8. 8 Attempts are frequently made to regulate emotion according to the conventions of the society and the situation based on many (sometimes conflicting) demands and expectations which originate from various entities. The emotion of anger is in many cultures discouraged in girls and women, while fear is discouraged in boys and men. Expectations attached to social roles, such as "acting as man" and not as a woman, and the accompanying "feeling rules" contribute to the differences in expression of certain emotions. Some cultures encourage or discourage happiness, sadness, or jealousy, and the free expression of the emotion of disgust is considered socially unacceptable in most cultures. Some social institutions are seen as based on certain emotion, such as love in the case of contemporary institution of marriage. In advertising, such as health campaigns and political messages, emotional appeals are commonly found. Recent examples include no-smoking health campaigns and political campaigns emphasizing the fear of terrorism. Sociological attention to emotion has varied over time. Emilé Durkheim (1915/1965)[35] wrote about the collective effervescence or emotional energy that was experienced by members of totemic rituals in Australian aborigine society. He explained how the heightened state of emotional energy achieved during totemic rituals transported individuals above themselves giving them the sense that they were in the presence of a higher power, a force, that was embedded in the sacred objects that were worshipped. These feelings of exaltation, he argued, ultimately lead people to believe that there were forces that governed sacred objects. In the 1990s, sociologists focused on different aspects of specific emotions and how these emotions were socially relevant. For Cooley (1992),[36] pride and shame were the most important emotions that drive people to take various social actions. During every encounter, he proposed that we monitor ourselves through the "looking glass" that the gestures and reactions of others provide. Depending on these reactions, we either experience pride or shame and this results in particular paths of action. Retzinger (1991)[37] conducted studies of married couples who experienced cycles of rage and shame. Drawing predominantly on Goffman and Cooley's work, Scheff (1990)[38] developed a micro sociological theory of the social bond. The formation or disruption of social bonds is dependent on the emotions that people experience during interactions. Subsequent to these developments, Randall Collins (2004)[39] formulated his interaction ritual theory by drawing on Durkheim's work on totemic rituals that was extended by Goffman (1964/2013; 1967)[40][41] into everyday focused encounters. Based on interaction ritual theory, we experience different levels or intensities of emotional energy during face-to-face interactions. Emotional energy is considered to be a feeling of confidence to take action and a boldness that one experiences when they are charged up from the collective effervescence generated during group gatherings that reach high levels of intensity.
  9. 9. 9 There is a growing body of research applying the sociology of emotion to understanding the learning experiences of students during classroom interactions with teachers and other students (for example, Milne & Otieno, 2007;[42] Olitsky, 2007;[43] Tobin, et al., 2013;[44] Zembylas, 2002[45]).These studies show that learning subjects like science can be understood in terms of classroom interaction rituals that generate emotional energy and collective states of emotional arousal like emotional climate. Apart from interaction ritual traditions of the sociology of emotion, other approaches have been classed into one of 6 other categories (Turner, 2009) including: evolutionary/biological theories, symbolic interactionist theories, dramaturgical theories, ritual theories, power and status theories, stratification theories, and exchange theories. This list provides a general overview of different traditions in the sociology of emotion that sometimes conceptualize emotion in different ways and at other times in complementary ways. Many of these different approaches were synthesized by Turner (2007) in his sociological theory of human emotions in an attempt to produce one comprehensive sociological account that draws on developments from many of the above traditions. Emotions and the Topography of the Mind How do emotions fit into different conceptions of the mind? One model, advocated by Descartes as well as by many contemporary psychologists, posits a few basic emotions out of which all others are compounded. An alternative model views every emotion as consisting in, or at least including, some irreducibly specific component not compounded of anything simpler. Again, emotions might form an indefinitely broad continuum comprising a small number of finite dimensions (e.g. level of arousal, intensity, pleasure or aversion, self- or other-directedness, etc.). In much the way that color arises from the visual system's comparison of retinal cones, whose limited sensitivity ranges correspond roughly to primary hues, we might then hope to find relatively simple biological explanations for the rich variety of emotions. Rigid boundaries between them would be arbitrary. Alternative models, based in physiology or evolutionary psychology, have posited modular subsystems or agents the function of which is to coordinate the fulfilment of basic needs, such as mating, affiliation, defense and the avoidance of predators. [46],[47]. To date cognitive science does not seem to have provided any crucial tests to decide between competing models of the mind. An eclectic approach therefore seems warranted. What does seem well established in the light of cross-cultural research is that a small number of emotions have inter- translatable names and universally recognizable expressions. According to Ekman and Friesen (1989) these are happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust (the last two of which, however, some researchers consider too simple to be called emotions) [46]. Other emotions are not so easily recognizable
  10. 10. 10 cross-culturally, and some expressions are almost as local as dialects. But then this is an issue on which cognitive science alone should not, perhaps, be accorded the last word: what to a neurologist might be classed as two tokens of the same emotion type might seem to have little in common under the magnifying lens of a Marcel Proust. Other models propose mutually conflicting ways of locating emotion within the general economy of the mind. Some treat emotion as one of many separate faculties. For Plato in the Republic, there seem to have been three basic components of the human mind: the reasoning, the desiring, and the emotive parts. For Aristotle, the emotions are not represented as constituting a separate agency or module, but they had even greater importance, particularly in the moral life, our capacity for which Aristotle regarded as largely a result of learning to feel the right emotions in the right circumstances. Hume's notorious dictum that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions also placed the emotions at the very center of character and agency. For Spinoza, emotions are not lodged in a separate body in conflict with the soul, since soul and body are aspects of a single reality; but emotions, as affections of the soul, make the difference between the best and the worst lives, as they either increase the soul's power to act or diminish that power. In other models, emotions as a category are apt to be sucked into either of two other faculties of the mind. They have then treated as mere composites or offshoots of those other faculties: a peculiar kind of belief, or a vague kind of desire or will. The Stoics made emotions into judgments about the value of things incidental to an agent's virtue, to which we should, therefore, remain perfectly indifferent. Hobbes assimilated “passions” to specific appetites or aversions. Kant too saw emotions as essentially conative phenomena but grouped them with inclinations enticing the will to act on motives other than that of duty. The revival of philosophical interest in emotions from the middle of the twentieth century can be traced to an article by Erroll Bedford (1957), and a book by Anthony Kenny (1963) which argued against the assumption that emotions are feelings, impervious to either will or reason. Bedford stressed both intentionality and the importance of contextual factors on the nature, arousal, and expression of emotions. Kenny, reviving some medieval theories of intentionality, urged that emotions should be viewed as intentional states. He defined a notion of a formal object of an intentional state as that characteristic that must belong to something if it is to be possible for the state to relate to it. This implies an excessively strong logical link between the state and its object's actual possession of the characteristic in question. Nevertheless, it points to an important condition on the appropriateness of emotion to a given object. These papers gave impetus to what became the cognitivist mainstream in the philosophy of emotion, some fairly wide variations going from C.D. Broad (1971 [1954]‘s “affect-laden judgments” to the “strong desires” theory advocated by Joel Marks (1982). Among other philosophers responsible for the revival of interest in emotions, Irving Thalberg (1977) took as given the cognitive dimension of emotion and explored some of the subtleties of the different relations of emotions to their objects. The Wittgensteinian flavor of Bedford's second point, about the contextual dependency of emotions, was elaborated into a “social constructionist” view both by some psychologists and some
  11. 11. 11 philosophers [48]. On this view, favored later by some feminist philosophers such as Naomi Scheman (1983) and Sue Campbell (1998), emotions are not primarily viewed as individual characteristics of the persons to whom they are attributed but emerge out of the dynamics of social interaction. The influence of Wittgenstein, stemming from his remarks on “seeing-as” ([49]), was also felt in Robert Roberts’ (2003) view of emotions as “concern-based construal’s”. [50] Twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy and psychology tended to incorporate emotions into other, better understood mental categories. Under the influence of a “tough-minded” ideology committed to behaviorism, it seemed easier to look for adequate theories of action or will, as well as theories of belief or knowledge, than to construct adequate theories of emotion. Economic models of rational decision and agency inspired by Bayesian theory are essentially assimilative models, viewing emotion either as a species of belief or as a species of desire. That enviably resilient Bayesian model has been cracked, in the eyes of many philosophers, by such refractory phenomena as akrasia or “weakness of will.” In cases of akrasia, traditional descriptive rationality seems to be violated, insofar as the “strongest” desire does not win, even when paired with the appropriate belief [51]. Emotion is ready to pick up the slack. Recent work, often drawing support from the burgeoning study of the emotional brain, has recognized that while emotions typically involve both cognitive and conative states, they are distinct from both, if only in being significantly more complex. It is one thing, however, to recognize the need for a theory of mind that finds a place for the unique role of emotions, and quite another to construct one. Emotions vary so much in a number of dimensions—transparency, intensity, behavioral expression, object-directedness, and susceptibility to rational assessment—as to cast doubt on the assumption that they have anything in common. However, while this variation may have led philosophers to steer clear of emotions in the past, many philosophers are now rising to the challenge. The explanatory inadequacy of theories that shortchange emotion is becoming increasingly apparent, and, as Peter Goldie (2000) observes, it is no longer the case that emotion is treated as a poor relation in the philosophy of mind.[52] Cognitivist Theories Most contemporary philosophical theories of emotion resemble psychological appraisal theories, characterizing emotions primarily in terms of their associated cognitions. But there are several different ways of understanding the cognitions involved. While appraisal theorists generally allow that the cognitive processes underlying emotion can be either conscious or unconscious, and can involve either propositional or non-propositional content, cognitivism typically claims that emotions involve propositional attitudes. Many emotions are specified in terms of propositions: one can't be angry with someone unless one believes that person guilty of some offense; one can't be envious unless one believes that someone else has something good in her possession. Some proponents of cognitivism universalize this feature and maintain that any emotion must involve some sort of attitude directed at a proposition. The most parsimonious type of cognitivist theory follows the Stoics in identifying emotions with
  12. 12. 12 judgments. [53][54][55]. My anger at someone simply is the judgment that I have been wronged by that person. Other cognitivist theories introduce further elements into their analyses. Emotions have been described as sets of beliefs and desires [56], affect-laden judgments ([57]), and as complexes of beliefs, desires, and feelings ([58]). Cognitivist theories have faced criticism along with a number of fronts. Various confusions in the very concept of “cognition” have been alleged to blur most conceptions that invoke that term ([59];[60]). Others has objected that the view of emotions as propositional attitudes has the effect of excluding animals and infants lacking language.[61] Others have argued that if emotions always involve the standard propositional attitudes, namely belief, and desire, then an account of the rationality of emotions will collapse into an account of what it is for those standard propositional attitudes to be rational: but emotional rationality is not reducible to the rationality of beliefs or desires ([62]; [63];[52];. Another criticism, stressed by Wollheim (1999) draws upon a difference between transient mental states and mental dispositions. Emotions, like beliefs and desires, can exist either as occurrent events (jealousy of a rival at a party) or as persisting modifications of the mind (a tendency to feel jealousy). However, dispositional beliefs have a straightforward connection with their occurrent manifestations: if I have a standing belief that the world is round, for example, then I will assent to this proposition on particular occasions. The sincere avowal of desires also counts as evidence for underlying dispositions, though the connection is not as tight. Dispositional emotions, on the other hand, do not have tailor-made forms of expression but can be manifested in a whole diverse range of behavior. In some cases, what might be held to be dispositional emotions are not necessarily dispositions to undergo a specific occurring emotion of the same name. Love, for example, while it can be manifested in amorous feelings, is sometimes expressed in any of a practically unlimited variety of occurring emotions — including longing, grief, jealousy, rage, and other less than pleasant occurring feelings. A frequent objection made to cognitivist theories is the “fear of flying” objection: propositional attitudes are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of emotion, since I may be well aware that flying is the safest means of transport and yet suffer a fear of flying. I may feel a twinge of suspicion towards my butler, and yet believe him to be utterly trustworthy; conversely, I may judge that he is up to no good, and yet feel nothing in the way of emotion. These examples suggest an analogy with perceptual illusions, which a correct belief sometimes quite fails to dispel. Such “recalcitrant emotions” seem to offer pretty conclusive evidence against the assimilation of at least some emotions either to judgment or to belief [64]. A cognitivist might reply that this objection merely establishes that the propositional content of emotion (like the propositional content of perception) differs from the propositional content of belief, not that emotions have no propositional content at all. It remains that even if perceptions necessarily have
  13. 13. 13 propositional content, they cannot be assimilated to belief: so it seems to be with emotion. Furthermore, it is not obvious that the content of perceptions or emotions is exhausted by their propositional content ([66]). Similarly, several theorists insist that experiences of emotion have content beyond any propositional content. ([52];[65]; A crucial mandate of cognitivist theories is to avert the charge that emotions are merely “subjective.” But propositional attitudes are not the only cognitive states. A more basic feature of cognition is that is has a “mind-to-world direction of fit.” The expression is meant to sum up the contrast between cognition and the conative orientation, in which success is defined in terms of the opposite, world-to-mind, direction of fit ([67]). We will or desire what does not yet exist, and deem ourselves successful if the world is brought into line with the mind's plan. A view ascribing to emotions a true mind-to-world direction of fit, inspired by the model of perception, would involve a criterion of success that depended on correctness with respect to some objective property. To take this approach is to give a particular answer to a question posed long ago in Plato's Euthyphro (the question, as originally put forward, concerning the nature of piety, but it extends to values in general): Do we love X—mutatis mutandis for the other emotions—because X is lovable, or do we declare X to be lovable merely because we love it? The first alternative is the objectivist one, encouraged by the analogy of perception. It requires that we define clearly the relevant sense of ‘objectivity’. Specifically, it promises a valid analogy between some of the ways in which we can speak of perception as aspiring to objectivity and ways in which we can say the same of emotion. Emotions are sometimes said to be subjective in this sense: that they merely reflect something that belongs exclusively and contingently to the mind of the subject of experience, and therefore do not co-vary with any property that could be independently identified. This charge presupposes a sense of “objective” that contrasts with “projective,” in something like the psychoanalytic sense. In terms of the analogy of perception, to say that emotions are universally subjective in this sense would be to claim that they resemble hallucinations more than veridical perceptions. The perceptual system is capable of the sort of functioning-in-a-vacuum that leads to perceptual mistakes. Similarly, emotions may mislead us into “hasty” or “emotional” judgments [68]. On the other hand, the lack of perceptual capacities can be a crippling handicap in one's attempt to negotiate the world: similarly, a lack of adequate emotional responses can hinder our attempts to view the world correctly and act correctly in it ([69],). This explains why we are so often tempted to take seriously ascription of reasonableness or unreasonableness, fittingness or inappropriateness, for common emotions. Unfortunately, it is unclear how the alleged objective properties identified by emotions might be identified independently. Closely related to the question of the cognitive aspect of emotions is the question of their passivity. Passivity has an ambiguous relation to subjectivity. In one vein, impressed by the bad reputation
  14. 14. 14 of the “passions” as taking over our consciousness against our will, philosophers have been tempted to take the passivity of emotions as evidence of their subjectivity. In another vein, however, it has been noted that the passivity of emotions is sometimes precisely analogous to the passivity of perception. How the world is, is not in our power? So it is only to be expected that our emotions if they actually represent something genuinely and objectively in the world, should not be in our power either: we can no more arbitrarily choose to experience an emotion than we can adopt a belief at will. If the view that emotions are a kind of perception can be sustained, then the connection between emotion and cognition will have been secured. But there is yet another way of establishing this connection, compatible with the perceptual model. This is to draw attention to the role of emotions as providing the framework for cognitions of the more conventional kind. Researchers propose this sort of account, according to which emotions are not so many perceptions as they are ways of seeing—species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies [63]. Emotions make certain features of situations or arguments more prominent, giving them weight in our experience that they would have lacked in the absence of emotion. Consider how Iago proceeds to make Othello jealous. He directs Othello's attention, suggests questions to ask, and insinuates that there are inferences to be drawn without specifying them himself. Once Othello's attention turns to his wife's friendship with Cassio and the lost handkerchief, inferences which on the same evidence would not even have been thought of before are now experienced as compelling: “Farewell, the tranquil mind….”This account does not identify emotions with judgments or desires, but it does in a why cognitivist theorists have been tempted to make this identification. Emotions set the agenda for beliefs and desires: one might say that they ask the questions that judgment answers with beliefs and evaluate the prospects that may or may not arouse desire. As every committee chairperson knows, questions have much to do with the determination of answers: the rest can be left up to the facts. In this way, emotions could be said to be judgments, in the sense that they are what we see the world “in terms of.” But they need not consist of articulated propositions. Much the same reasons motivate their assimilation to desire. As long as we presuppose some basic or preexisting desires, the directive power of “motivation” belongs to what controls attention, salience, and inference strategies preferred. Some philosophers suggest that the directive power in which emotions exert over perception is partly a function of their essentially dramatic or narrative structure [70]). A particularly subtle examination of the role of narrative in constituting our emotions over the long term is to be found in ([71]). It seems conceptually incoherent to suppose that one could have an emotion—say, intense jealousy or a consuming rage—for only a fraction of a second ([65] One explanation of this feature of emotions is that a story plays itself out during the course of each emotional episode, and stories take
  15. 15. 15 place over stretches of time. Studies has suggested that the stories characteristic of different emotions are learned by association with “paradigm scenarios.” These are drawn first from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to which we are exposed. Later still, they are supplemented and refined by literature and other art forms capable of expanding the range of one's imagination of ways to live. [63] Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects of the specific emotion-type (where objects can be of the various sorts mentioned above), and second, a set of characteristic or “normal” responses to the situation, where normality is determined by a complex and controversial mix of biological and cultural factors. Once our emotional repertoire is established, we interpret various situations we are faced with through the lens of different paradigm scenarios. When a particular scenario suggests itself as an interpretation, it arranges or rearranges our perceptual, cognitive, and inferential dispositions. A problem with this idea is that each emotion is appropriate to its paradigm scenario by definition since it is the paradigm scenario which in effect calibrates the emotional repertoire. It is not clear whether this places unreasonable limitations on the range of possible criticism to which emotions give rise. What is certain is that when a paradigm scenario is evoked by a novel situation, the resulting emotion may or may not be appropriate to the situation that triggers it. In that sense at least, then, emotions can be assessed for rationality.
  16. 16. 16 Conclusion 1.Conclusion of mind and feelings in the process of cognition: The study of the mind in the early 2000s has been invigorated through the study of disorders of the mind. Appreciating the ways in which mind can break down can add to our understanding of what it is that we are studying. The mind is at once most intimately familiar to each of us and at the same time most mysterious and elusive to our understanding. While the human mind retains its pre-eminence, it is a real question whether it represents something continuous or discontinuous with what we find in other animals, and in machines. While materialism is the dominant culture, we must not forget the observations of Descartes and others that make it difficult to understand just how a mere body can produce the various activities we associate with the mind. The history of mind in the history of our attempt to explain how our experiences, perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and the like can be fully understood in relation to the world of flesh and blood. In other hand Feelings its a state of consciousness resulting from emotions, sentiments or desires. And Emotions usually considered being a feeling about or a reaction to certain important events or thoughts. It can be pleasant or unpleasant. No aspect of our mental life is more important to the quality and meaning of our existence than emotions. They are what make life worth living, or sometimes ending. So it is not surprising that most of the great classical philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume—had recognizable theories of emotion, conceived as responses to certain sorts of events of concern to a subject, triggering bodily changes and typically motivating characteristic behavior. What is surprising is that in much of the twentieth-century philosophers of mind and psychologists tended to neglect them— perhaps because the sheer variety of phenomena covered by the word “emotion” and its closest neighbors tends to discourage tidy theory. In recent years, however, emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science. In view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation from the approaches of other disciplines, particularly psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, and even economics. While it is quite impossible to do justice to those approaches here, some sidelong glances in their direction will aim to suggest their philosophical importance I begin by outlining some of the ways that philosophers have conceived of the place of emotions in the topography of the mind, particularly in their relation to bodily states, to motivation, and to beliefs and desires, as well as some of the ways in which they have envisaged the relation between different emotions. Most emotions have an intentional structure: we shall need to say something about what that means.
  17. 17. 17 Psychology and more recently evolutionary biology have offered a number of theories of emotions, stressing their function in the conduct of life. Philosophers have been especially partial to cognitivist theories, emphasizing analogies either with propositional judgments or with perception. But different theories implicitly posit different ontologies of emotion, and there has been some dispute about what emotions really are, and indeed whether they are any kind of thing at all. Emotions also raise normative questions: about the extent to which they can be said to be rational, or can contribute to rationality. In that regard the question of our knowledge of our own emotions is especially problematic, as it seems they are both the object of our most immediate awareness and the most powerful source of our capacity for self- deception. This results in a particularly ambivalent relation between emotions and morality.
  18. 18. 18 The Nature of Intuition and Imagination Intuition is the ability to acquire knowledge without recourse to conscious reasoning.[72] Different writers give the word "intuition" a great variety of different meanings, ranging from direct access to unconscious knowledge, unconscious cognition, inner sensing, inner insight to unconscious pattern- recognition and the ability to understand something instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning.[73][74] The word intuition comes from the Latin verb intueri translated as "consider" or from the late middle English word intuit, "to contemplate".[72] Both Eastern and Western philosophers have studied the concept in great detail. Eastern philosophy In the East, intuition is mostly intertwined with religion and spirituality, and various meanings exist from different religious texts.[75] In Hinduism, various attempts have been made to interpret the Vedic and other esoteric texts. For Sri Aurobindo intuition comes under the realms of knowledge by identity; he describes the psychological plane in humans (often referred to as mana in sanskrit) having two arbitrary natures, the first being imprinting of psychological experiences which is constructed through sensory information (mind seeking to become aware of external world). The second nature being the action when it seeks to be aware of itself, resulting in humans being aware of their existence or aware of being angry & aware of other emotions. He terms this second nature as knowledge by identity.[76] He finds that at present as the result of evolution the mind has accustomed itself to depend upon certain physiological functioning and their reactions as its normal means of entering into relations with the outer material world. As a result, when we seek to know about the external world the dominant habit is through arriving at truths about things via what our senses convey to us. However, knowledge by identity, which we currently only give the awareness of human beings' existence, can be extended further to the outside of ourselves resulting in intuitive knowledge.[77] He finds this intuitive knowledge was common to older humans (Vedic) and later was taken over by reason which currently organizes our perception, thoughts, and actions resulting from Vedic to metaphysical philosophy and later to experimental science. He finds that this process, which seems to be decent, is actually a circle of progress, as a lower faculty is being pushed to take up as much from a higher way of working.[78] He finds when self-awareness in the mind is applied to one's self and the outer (other) -self, it results in a luminous self-manifesting identity; the reason also converts itself into the form of the self-luminous intuitional knowledge.[79][80][81] Osho believed consciousness of human beings to be in increasing order from basic animal instincts to intelligence and intuition, and humans being constantly living in that conscious state often moving between these states depending on their affinity. He also suggests living in the state of intuition is one of the ultimate aims of humanity.[82]
  19. 19. 19 Advaita vedanta (a school of thought) takes intuition to be an experience through which one can come in contact with an experience Brahman.[83] Buddhism finds intuition to be a faculty in the mind of immediate knowledge and puts the term intuition beyond the mental process of conscious thinking, as the conscious thought cannot necessarily access subconscious information, or render such information into a communicable form.[84] In Zen Buddhism various techniques have been developed to help develop one's intuitive capability, such as koans – the resolving of which leads to states of minor enlightenment (satori). In parts of Zen Buddhism intuition is deemed a mental state between the Universal mind and one's individual, discriminating mind.[85][86] In Islam there are various scholars with varied interpretations of intuition (often termed as hadas (Arabic: ‫,)حدس‬ hitting correctly on a mark), sometimes relating the ability to have intuitive knowledge to prophethood. Siháb al Din-al Suhrawadi, in his book Philosophy Of Illumination (ishraq), finds that intuition is knowledge acquired through illumination, is mystical in nature, and also suggests mystical contemplation (mushahada) bring about correct judgment.[87] Ibn Sīnā finds the ability to have intuition as a "prophetic capacity" and describes it as knowledge obtained without intentionally acquiring it. He finds that regular knowledge is based on imitation while intuitive knowledge as based on intellectual certitude.[88] Western philosophy In the West, intuition does not appear as a separate field of study, and early mentions and definitions can be traced back to Plato. In his book Republic, he tries to define intuition as a fundamental capacity of human reason to comprehend the true nature of reality.[89] In his works Meno and Phaedo, he describes intuition as a pre-existing knowledge residing in the "soul of eternity", and a phenomenon by which one becomes conscious of pre-existing knowledge. He provides an example of mathematical truths and posits that they are not arrived at by reason. He argues that these truths are accessed using a knowledge already present in a dormant form and accessible to our intuitive capacity. This concept by Plato is also sometimes referred to as anamnesis. The study was later continued by his followers.[90] In his book Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes refers to an “intuition” sting knowledge gained through rational reasoning or discovering truth through contemplation. This definition is commonly referred to as rational intuition.[91] Later philosophers, such as Hume, have more ambiguous interpretations of intuition. Hume claims intuition is a recognition of relationships (relation of time, place, and causation) while he states that "the resemblance" (recognition of relations) "will strike the eye" (which would not require further examination) but goes on to state, "or rather in mind"—attributing intuition to the power of the mind, contradicting the theory of empiricism.[92][93] Immanuel Kant’s notion of “intuition” differs considerably from the Cartesian notion and consists of the basic sensory information provided by the cognitive faculty of sensibility (equivalent to what might loosely be called perception). Kant held that our mind casts all of our external intuitions in the form of space, and all of our internal intuitions (memory,
  20. 20. 20 thought) in the form of time.[94] Intuitionism is a position advanced by Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer in the philosophy of mathematics derived from Kant's claim that all mathematical knowledge is knowledge of the pure forms of the intuition—that is, the intuition that is not empirical. Intuitionistic logic was devised by Arend Heyting to accommodate this position (and has been adopted by other forms of constructivism in general). It is characterized by rejecting the law of excluded middle: as a consequence, it does not, in general, accept rules such as double negation elimination and the use of reductio ad absurdum to prove the existence of something. Intuitions are customarily appealed to independently of any particular theory of how intuitions provide evidence for claims, and there are divergent accounts of what sort of mental state intuitions are, ranging from mere spontaneous judgment to a special presentation of necessary truth.[95] In recent years a number of philosophers, especially George Bealer have tried to defend appeals to intuition against Quinean doubts about conceptual analysis.[96] A different challenge to appeals to intuition has recently come from experimental philosophers, who argue that appeals to intuition must be informed by the methods of social science. The metaphilosophically assumption that philosophy ought to depend on intuitions has recently been challenged by experimental philosophers (e.g., Stephen Stich).[97] One of the main problems adduced by experimental philosophers is that intuitions differ, for instance, from one culture to another, and so it seems problematic to cite them as evidence for a philosophical claim.[98] Timothy Williamson has responded to such objections against philosophical methodology by arguing that intuition plays no special role in philosophy practice, and that skepticism about intuition cannot be meaningfully separated from a general skepticism about judgment. In this view, there are no qualitative differences between the methods of philosophy and common sense, the sciences, or mathematics. [99] Others like Ernest Sosa seek to support intuition by arguing that the objections against intuition merely highlight a verbal disagreement. [100] Imagination is the ability to produce and simulate novel objects, peoples, and ideas in the mind without any immediate input of the senses. It is also described as the forming of experiences in one's mind, which can be re-creations of past experiences such as vivid memories with imagined changes, or they can be completely invented and possibly fantastic scenes.[101] Imagination helps make knowledge applicable in solving problems and is fundamental to integrating experience and the learning process.[102][103][104][105] Basic training for imagination is listening to storytelling (narrative),[102][106] in which the exactness of the chosen words is the fundamental factor to "evoke worlds".[107] Imagination is a cognitive process used in mental functioning and sometimes used in conjunction with psychological imagery. It is considered as such because it involves thinking about possibilities. [108] The cognate term of mental imagery may be used in psychology for denoting the process of reviving in the
  21. 21. 21 mind recollections of objects formerly given in sense perception. Since this use of the term conflicts with that of ordinary language, some psychologists have preferred to describe this process as "imaging" or "imagery" or to speak of it as "reproductive" as opposed to "productive" or "constructive" imagination. Constructive imagination is further divided into active imagination driven by the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and spontaneous PFC-independent imagination such as REM-sleep dreaming, daydreaming, hallucinations, and spontaneous insight. The active types of imagination include the integration of modifiers and mental rotation. Imagined images, both novel and recalled, are seen with the "mind's eye". Imagination, however, is not considered to be exclusively a cognitive activity because it is also linked to the body and place, particularly that it also involves setting up relationships with materials and people, precluding the sense that imagination is locked away in the head. [109] Imagination can also be expressed through stories such as fairy tales or fantasies. Children often use such narratives and pretend to play in order to exercise their imaginations. When children develop fantasy they play at two levels: first, they use role-playing to act out what they have developed with their imagination, and at the second level they play again with their make-believe situation by acting as if what they have developed is an actual reality. [110]
  22. 22. 22 2.Conclusion of Imagination and intuition Imagination and intuition are both avenues by which we express ourselves. And while both can use thought and feeling processes, generally imagination plays with our thoughts, while intuition is felt from deep within and comes through as your first impression, without any editing. It can be almost like a magnetic pull or it can be like a nagging, nattering feeling that just will not let up or go away or it can be just a definite knowing. Intuition is an inner awareness that goes beyond the realm of logical thought. It works at your soul level which connects you to higher sources or to higher realms of being. It will speak to you through your inner psychic senses, the major ones being clairvoyance (clear seeing), clairaudience (clear hearing), clairsentience (clear feeling/sensing), and claircognizance (clear knowing). Two other senses which are not referred to as often are clairalience, also call clairaroma (clear smelling) and clairambience, also called clairgustus (clear tasting). Whatever is sensed through these inner senses does not come from a physical source and when developing your psychic senses, you must also develop complete trust and surrender your ego. Yes, I know this is easier said than done. When your intuition is sufficiently developed, you may experience a sudden flow of thoughts or feelings when you least likely expect it, generally when you are in a relaxed state. You may also receive inspirations by intentionally asking for guidance from the universal source and answers may appear as very sudden, quiet subtle thoughts, ideas, or impressions, but unless you have an awareness, you may miss these altogether. Expressions of intuition may be shown through many forms such as painting, dancing, poetry, singing writing, or inventing. The trick here is not to doubt the information that you receive or allow your logic to interfere, but rather just embrace what is received and work with it without becoming overly skeptical. In other words, stay in the moment and go with the flow without arguing or wondering why. How many of you have often said, "I do not know why or how I know this, but I just know it is true" or maybe you have said, "I do not know why, but it just feels right." Imagination can also happen suddenly, or occur as a direct result of deliberately building one thought or idea upon another until you produce a story or a broader picture, but usually, it does not ring as truth deep within, at your soul level. Instead, you consciously know that you are fantasizing or some may call it daydreaming and that it is not to be taken seriously, because you were just having a fun moment. Your intuition will always feel like a truth no matter what, because you will feel and know this, deep within, without wanting or requiring actual proof. Intuition does not cast judgment, it never causes harm to you and it never gives you reasons why it shares certain information - it is just as it is and this is what you must learn to accept unconditionally.
  23. 23. 23 It is also true that your imagination will give you pleasure, relaxation, plus it will comfort you, especially when you are thinking pleasant, peaceful thoughts, but with intuition, you will get an "ah-hah" moment or a revelation. You may suddenly discover a hidden talent that you were unaware of or make a break- through in a scientific project or invention or fix machinery that you had no prior knowledge about. Your intuition will always encourage you to grow and it will take you to higher levels of consciousness where you begin to see everything with more insight and clarity. As well, you will think with greater and deeper understanding. At this stage, you will arrive at a state where you experience complete satisfaction, deep fulfillment, peace, joy and be elated with happiness that cannot be attained through the material world. Imagination does not produce this higher, developed state of being and you are usually still floundering about wondering what your next step or direction should be. Well, can you imagine all the rampant thoughts running through your head fuelled by this dilemma? Hah, what an imagination you have! And yes, your imagination can work against you where it conjures up all sorts of improbable or negative possibilities or situations. Something your intuition would never do, because your intuition always knows what is true and what will benefit you for your highest good. An important concept to keep in mind is that without imagination, there is no intuition. They are sort of like conjoined twins, but intuition will take you far beyond your imagination or beyond your wildest dreams by blessing you with inspirations so profound that you will have no doubt that you tapped into a greater universal source of knowledge and wisdom.
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