Paper I

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND INSTITUTIONS AS EVOLVING ENTITIES 1
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND INSTITUTIONS AS EVOLVING ENTITIES
Amanda Laura Fanshawe Tapp
Society, Science and Information 3
Dr. F.A.I. Buekens
November 16, 2015

“Institutions are evolving entities, constantly revised and adjusted depending on the
circumstances” (Guala 2014, 8)
In Guala’s paper Institutions, A Philosophical Study, he discusses the
complexities of one of the larger institutions in our society, marriage. More specifically,
he targets the controversy of the current issue of same-sex marriage in relation to the
extension of the term and the consequences this would hold as well as to the role the
philosophy of language plays in this debacle. Today, other than the US, which legalized
gay marriage on Friday June 26th 2015 to all 50 states, there are twenty one other
countries where same-sex marriage is legalized nation-wide (Waxman 2015). In Chapter
14, Meaning, he explores the implications of realism and the consequences from our
current understandings of institutions by laying out the arguments both for and against
same-sex marriage in relation to the power of language.
It is important, Guala continuously stresses in Meaning, to be realistic when
discussing the conditions of social terms in order to prevent important consequences. He
states that because realism and infallibilism are inseparable, thus the extension of
institutional terms, for example “money”, is not determined by what people think it is but
by the rules that “actually follow in their economic interactions” (Guala 1). Another
example is given in Chapter One, Introduction, of Guala’s book, when he outlines the
basic functions of the institution of marriage. Anthropologists have classified marriage as
“regulating activities aimed at procreation, rearing of children and economic cooperation
between spouses” (Guala 5). Marriage should not merely be determined by what people
think it is (folk theories) but the reality of what is actually happening: same-sex couples
wanting to get married. The main arguments for resistance against gay and lesbian
activities is that they should use different names for things, as they see different
terminology as a reflection of the “deep prejudice against homosexuals” and also as a
“form of discrimination against same-sex couples” (Guala 3). He also argues that
conservatives often use the more traditional, religious, transcendental values as
arguments. According to Guala, the question is whether or not there should be an
extension of the term to include same-sex couples and what this would mean to the
institute of marriage itself, its rules and its functions.
“New things deserve to have new names” (Guala 3). Guala did not believe in the
extension of the term “marriage” to include same-sex couples and says that “marriage”
refers to “a contractual relation between individuals of different sex” and thus, there
cannot be an extension to include those between two women or two men (Guala 3). His
solution is that we “ought to use a different term for different institutions, in this case for
contracts among adults of the same sex” (Guala 3). The issue of same-sex marriage is not
a “mere philosophical quibble” but political, legal and furthermore, practical. He believes
that by allowing same-sex couples to engage in the same activities that were
“traditionally reserved for heterosexual couples” there would be a “shift in the meaning
of marriage” (Guala 4). The dichotomy between the conservatives and liberals for the
debate for equality amongst same-sex couples is highlighted by the argument that if
same-sex couples were to be included in the marriage of institution it would change the
meaning of marriage entirely.

The goal, Guala argues, is to achieve a sort of equilibrium by asking questions
that would satisfy the operative-manifest-normative triangle. The operative concept states
that the concept associated with a term is implicit in our practices, while the manifest
concept implies that it is what is consciously endorsed by most people. The conservatives
opposing same-sex marriage can be seen in the manifest concept, while the liberals
fighting for same-sex marriage use the operative concept. Guala stresses the importance
in studying people’s practices and not just folk-theories. Bringing theory to practice, it is
important to note that same-sex couples are getting married in many countries and are
already doing many things opposite-sex married couples are already doing (that they are
legally allowed to do so). In marriage, the manifest and operative concepts coincide
(Guala 3).
In Chapter 15, Reform, Guala talks more about the extension of the term marriage.
Marriage is used to regulate the relationship between a man and woman, but as he points
out, this does not mean it has to be limited to such relationships. For example, “all swans
are white” might be incorrect if not taking into account the swans in Australia (Guala 1).
In this way, he draws a comparison to the institution of marriage which also holds the
possibility of extension to include homosexual couples if all the different types of
marriage were studied. He does not believe marriage has a single essential function due
to the vast diversity of marriage through societies, but holds that it regulates activities of
some kind to fulfill its function of an institute (Guala 3). He proves the importance of
introducing separate categories and terms for various institutions, in other words, noting
the diversity of institutions, by giving an example of the degree of diversity to which
marriage extends to; Kiddushin, Gandharva Vivaha, and Nikah al-Mut’ah – three forms
of marriage all codified in the Jewish, Hindu and Muslim traditions. He notes the
generalisations applied to different types of marriages, and that the conservatives’
arguments often backed up by sophisticated semantic arguments. To him, “the
controversy highlights an interesting problem” as one “cannot be a realist and a reformist
about institutions” (Guala 11). The realist believes that institutions do not depend on our
intentions while the reformist believes that the rules of the game may be re-designed
without changing the identity of the institution, just as the conservative and liberal
believe so, respectively (Guala 12).
Guala attempts to explain the concept of externalism by using water as his
example. Externalism has a clear distinction between the extension of terms and the ideas
people hold regarding the extension of the term. Many people believe water is merely a
colourless liquid we drink to quench our thirst (baptism). This “stereotype” or
“conception” must be revised when the social practice is inconsistent with the stereotype.
The extension of the term is when the water is then given to scientific experts who
formulate a scientific theory (discovery). These scientists would define water as
something that “refers to all substances constituted by two atoms of hydrogen and one of
oxygen” (Guala 2). However, he points out that this extension may also be fallible. The
“real extension” of the term is determined “by the way the world is”, and so one must
include those entities and only those entities that have those properties (application).
Stereotypes must be altered or abandoned entirely to adapt when the social practice no

longer coincides with the stereotypes, but in reality it is quite common for these folk
theories to survive alongside scientific theories (Guala 2).
This is quite clear in the institution of marriage today. Many people still believe it
holds much traditional or transcendence value and can only be applied to opposite-sex
couples (folk theory), but the term “marriage” should be “determined by the way the
world is”, and should include only those entities that have those properties- according to
the application step. The traditional Christian belief holds that marriage symbolizes the
union of Christ and His church, which today is being used in a widespread manner and
more general argument- that it holds “transcendental values”. However, to look at the
practices people partake in a marriage, those would typically include sexual intimacy, the
couple’s cooperation in dealing with economic and domestic necessities of life, rearing
children and entering into a mutual long-term commitment to sustaining the relationship
(Wedgwood 3). These rules of the institution of marriage together create the social
meaning of marriage, and these rules may also be applied to same-sex couples, with
rearing children done through methods such as adoption or sperm-donations for lesbian
couples.
Guala highlights the arguments of the conservative side by bringing up some of
the arguments of various conservatives and then counter-arguing against them.
Conservatives believe there should not be an extension of the term “marriage” to include
same-sex couples, as it would change the meaning of the institution. Stainton,
philosopher of language at the university of Western Ontario, is as an example of
someone who supports the case against the extension of the term. Guala quotes Stainton:
“…marriage as divorced from the religious interpretation of the practice and the historical
background of the practice is to miss the meaning of marriage altogether” (Guala 4).
Guala opposes this, stating that marriage does not have religious origins: “Stainton claims
that marriage has religious origins, which is at least controversial and most likely untrue”
(Guala 5). Archbishop Kurtz is a conservative who also opposes the stance for same-sex
marriage, and whose arguments are, according to Guala, “factual, metaphysical and
normative arguments, where moral judgments play a big role” (Guala 8). Again Guala
opposes this argument, labeling it a “mistake” to let normative institutions decide the
rules of an institution.
Guala lays out the arguments for same-sex marriage by showing how institution
s can change. The liberals of the issue on same-sex marriage consider the conservative
position unacceptable, as institutions are not static, but rather, evolving entities able to
progress and adapt. He gives examples of how other various institutions have changed
over time, including the change marriage has seen over the epochs. Anti-miscegenation
laws ensured racial segregation until 1967 (Pascoe 3). Nowadays, there are many
interracial marriages. By drawing similarities with other institutions, such as women
sitting in parliament today, he proves that institutions do, in fact, evolve, and are not
static. Although he starts off the chapter by saying that institutions are rules in
equilibrium, it is in a given context, and the context may change. In Chapter six,
Constitution, he states, “institutions are constituted by informal rules” which “provide
flexibility [and] a certain degree of vagueness regarding what a given institution is at any

point in time” (Guala 8). The example given here of an informal rule is that of women of
many different societies sacrifice their careers for rearing children. But because this is
changing in many countries, it is “becoming unclear what is the exact composition of the
bundle of rules that constitute marriage”. This, in turn, leads to “different groups
interpreting the concept [of marriage] in different ways” (Guala 8). Here the “different
groups” may refer to same-sex couples. Guala states that real institutions also introduce
new rights and obligations, and once again he uses the institute of marriage as an example
for this.
Guala believes that the institution of marriage itself should be extended to include
same-sex couples, but the term should be altered or else the traditional meaning of
marriage would be lost. A counter-argument to this is that although there are seemingly
broad definitions of family that refer to the mutual contract between a man and woman
including caring for elderly family members, rearing children, and meeting the emotional
needs of family members, this is not always the case, as marriage does not always include
children, nuclear households, romantic love or consensual sexual relations (Hills 3). It is
important not to generalize or romanticize the idea behind marriage in an attempt to
exclude same-sex marriage from the same rights and thus excluding them from full-class
citizenship. Religious based theories nowadays hold that marriages are God-ordained and
had always existed, a dangerous assumption which is disproven by looking at cross-
cultural studies which offers numerous examples, including polygamous marriages that
practiced sexual freedom and were ruled by women in a matriarchal marriage, where men
were marginal (Hills 4).
Chapter 14 also highlights some of the frameworks around the phenomena of
same-sex marriage and it’s relationship to the philosophy of language. He lays out some
arguments as to why it is not a verbal dispute nor is it a contract between two persons
independent of their gender or not. To challenge Stainton’s arguments, Guala argues that
same-sex marriage has happened for centuries, going so far as the Early Christian era or
the Roman emperors (e.g. Nero). However, he was careful to note these cases as
anomalous, highlighting the dangers of drawing hasty conclusions from anomalous cases.
How information is represented and the intentionality behind it can alter the rules of an
institution and in turn may affect the function of the institution itself. The language of
thought is powerful, and may be used to misrepresent certain entities (Alan). According
to the Developed Function View, humans are not wired by evolution but rather hold the
capacity for capabilities. Thus, we are augmented by learning, including the capability to
learn to adapt to same-sex couples wanting to get married.
On the other hand, Searle argued that humans have an “innate capacity for
linguistic symbolism” (Searle 285). “Marriage” is only marriage due to collective
acceptance, not transcendence value. According to Searle, the theory of promises states
that “X counts as Y in terms of context C”, but today we see context C changing
drastically. Vincent Cooper, on The Commentator, highlighted some of his arguments
opposing same-sex marriage, while largely focusing on the philosophy of language. He
argues that in this culture war currently seeking equality, marriage “is society’s formal
recognition of the reproductive act”. He supports this using language of thought, such as

the word marriage, or matrimony, which comes from mater or matris, meaning “mother”,
and the word “husband” itself comes from an old German root-word meaning “to make
fertile.” Excluding same-sex couples from marriage just because it is thought that
marriage is between man and woman means to demean same-sex couples to second-class
citizenship, an act of oppression against gays and lesbians. “Marriage” like “citizen” may
be extended to new cases without thereby changing its meaning, thus “defining marriage
must depend on, rather than precede, ethical and political inquiry” (Stanford
Encyclopedia 2009).
Philosopher Cheshire Calhoun from Arizona State argues against the idealized
version of marriage and for the empirical reality of actual marriages, stating that marriage
does not have “transcendent” value and should not be exclusive to opposite sex couples.
She against the conservatives’ main argument that use language, specifically ones
relating to religious or transcendence values. She emphasizes that although conservatives
may argue that marriage is recognized throughout ancient times as a bond between man
and woman, there is an enormous variation in socio-historical forms of marriage,
including monogamous, polygamous, temporary/permanent marriages; chosen/arranged,
same-sex/different-sex, open/closed marriages; Catholic, Muslim marriages and so on
(Dailynous). She brings to light the fact that most of these same-sex couples do not want
the transcendent meaning from marriage or the spirituality, but rather the “basic state-
granted entitlements”, such as being listed on a partner’s death certificate, being able to
jointly adapt, set up residence together, etc (Dailynous). This goes against the argument
based on religious values or traditional values through philosophy of language.
Searle argued that institutions act on a behaviour rule or definite action: If in
context C, then do action A (Buekens). Those opposing same-sex marriage are neglecting
the possibility that “action A” may change, or evolve. The context must not be forgotten,
as it so often is in terms of the same-sex marriage debate. After all, institutions “give rise
to specific occurrences in restricted contexts” (Walliser 22). Each institution serves as a
solution to a coordination problem, according to the unified theory, and in Walliser’s
Game Theory and Emergence of Institutions, he goes further to outline the possibilities of
these “coordination problems” changing. For example, he says that “marriage satisfies
different rules within different religions” just as it is “not independent of other social
institutions like resource allocation or nationality” and so it cannot be independent of
change (Walliser 20).

References
Alan, Thomas. “Information & Society: Information, Representation and Intentionality”
(Presentation at Dante Building on Tilburg University Campus, Tilburg, Netherlands,
November 3, 2015).
BBC News, “US Supreme Court Rules Gay Marriage Is Legal Nationwide”, June 27, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33290341
Buekens, Filip. “Information & Society: Construction of Social Reality- Comments on
Searle’s Theory of Institutional Facts” (Presentation at Dante Building on Tilburg University
Campus, Tilburg, Netherlands, October 6, 2015).
Cooper, Vincent. “Why Same-Sex Marriage Would Undermine The Institution” The
Commentator, December 18, 2012.
http://www.thecommentator.com/article/2291/why_same_sex_marriage_would_undermine_t
he_institution
Daily Nous, “Philosophers on the Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Ruling”, June 29, 2015.
Guala, Francesco. Institutions: A Philosophical Study. Preliminary draft, Spring 2014.
Hill, S. “Contemporary Family Perspectives: Families: A social class perspective- The
Evolution of families and marriages”, 2012
Pascoe, Peggy. “Why The ugly Rhetoric Against Gay Marriage Is Familiar To This Historian
of Miscegenation” History News Network,April 19, 2004.
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/4708
Searle, John. “An Illuminating Exchange: The Construction of Social Reality – Barry Smith
and John Searle” American Journal of Economics and Sociology,Vol 62 Issue 1, p. 285-309.
Feburary 27, 2003.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Marriage and Domestic Partnership”, July 11, 2009.
Waxman, Olivia. “Here Are Other Countries Where Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal” Time,
June 26, 2015.
http://time.com/3937766/us-supreme-court-countries-same-sex-gay-marriage-legal/
Walliser, Bernard. Game Theory and Emergence of Institutions. Unpublished manuscript.
January 2006.
Wedgwood, Ralph. “The Meaning of Same-Sex Marriage”, May 24, 2012.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/marriage-meaning-and-equality/

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