This critique argues that while Anderson correctly identifies nations as constructed communities, his definition of a nation is insufficient. Anderson fails to operationally define what distinguishes a nation from other styles of community. Consequently, his criteria could apply to premodern communities like medieval cities, which could also be imagined as both limited and sovereign. To fully define the nation, one must explain how it is a distinct style of community, which Anderson does not do.

1. This essa a gues that A de so s
definition of the nation as a community
that is imagined, limited and sovereign,
while correctly identifying nations as
constructed, is insufficient. In fact,
Anderson fails to give a definition at all, by
not explaining how the nation is distinct
f o othe st les of o u it .
Consequently, his community could be
imagined in premodern times.
A critique of
Benedict
Anderson’s
I agi ed
Communities
Konstantin Sietzy

2. 2
Introduction
Whe Be edi t A de so s Imagined Communities was published in 1983, it arrived right in the middle
of a large, and largely one-sided series of texts purporting modernist origins of nationalism. Neither
was Anderson the first to regard nationalism and nations as constructed, as he himself acknowledges
(Anderson, 2006: xii),1
nor is Imagined Communities still very present in contemporary modernist
writing on the subject, except as an obligatory cursory reference (cf. e.g. chapter one in Hutchinson
and Smith, 1994; Breuilly, 2006: xliv . Ne e theless, A de so s ph ase of the i agi ed o u it
has remained resonant inside and even outside of the academic study of nationalism for over four
decades.
Thus it is more than surprising that upon careful consideration Anderson does not give an
operational definition of the nation at all. Anderson fails to define the nation as a discrete entity by
failing to des i e ho it is disti t f o othe st les of o u it A de so s te . In
o se ue e, i agi g a o u it i A de so s se se is o ea s possi le o l i ode ti es;
this can be illustrated by showing that his criteria apply without alteration to, for example, a medieval
city.
The Nation as an Imagined Community
A de so s lassi defi itio of the atio as a imagined community is analytically convincing and
e pi i all o se a le: the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion" (Anderson, 2006: 6). It is also i i alist. I fa t, i agi ed a e st et hed to de ote
the simple fact that the nation is a constructed idea, not (necessarily) rooted in empirically observable
qualities. Requiring the empirical-historical existence of such primordial qualities (as opposed to a
belief that they exist!) is largely discarded in contemporary literature on the subject. Two processes in
which the modern nation works as an imagined (in the sense of constructed) community relate to
collective forgetting: forgetting the very fact that the common past is invented, and forgetting that
nationalism itself exists, as a precondition for nationalist sentiments diffusing through every aspect of
society and culture.
Why would the nation not be imagined? As far back as Joseph Stalin, observers have pointed
out that a common language is one of the ha a te isti featu es of a atio . “tali , : ;
emphasis in the original). Van den Berghe (1994: 96-97) presents a so io- iologi al pe spe ti e
1
“te e T. E gel poi ts out o e tl that the fundamental insight that nations were founded on imagination
was recognized by Rousseau ea s efo e A de so (Engel, 2005: 537).

3. 3
he he p oposes that eth i a d a e se ti e ts a e to e u de stood as a e te ded a d
attenuated fo of ki sele tio . Yet the empirical validity of such primordial attachments is largely
discounted by present-day scholars. Breuilly (2005: 32-33 lai s that ethnic myths or memories do
not matter. People have plenty of other ways to provide collective identity. Fu the o e, Eller and
Coughlan (1993) demonstrate that primordialists provide only unsatisfactory explanatory models.
The folly of primordial ties is illustrated vividly by the twentieth-century history of the
Ge a i states of Ce t al a d Weste Eu ope. The o e ou t ies o tai i g li guisti all Ge a
populations, Austria, Switzerland, and the Federal Republic, have long developed into distinct
communities that are both limited and sovereign. Despite this, ethno-linguistic ties (in the passive
rather than active sense of the word) remain. Anyone claiming that Swiss-German is a distinct
language rather than a dialect (Blocher, 2013) has never travelled to the alemannisch region of
Southern Germany, comprising the strip of land between Rhine and Lake Constance, where a dialect
almost identical to that on the other side of the Swiss-German border is spoken2
(and on top of this
displays a distinct ignorance of the state-of-the-art of linguistics theory; cf. Glaser, 2013). As for
Austrian, the differences are still more insignificant. Ethnically, that the question of a renewed
Anschluss is not even part of Austrian public discourse is admirably demonstrated by the fact that a
sweeping web search reveals not a single public opinion poll on this topic since at least the 1990s
(converse to the above, Switzerland must not be mentioned here). 3
Given the recency of this development (in the Austrian case, historical consensus is that the
1938 Anschluss referendum, polling 99.73%, required no ex post manipulation by the authorities; cf.
Verein demokratische Bildung, 2003) it becomes clear that a central part of imagining is forgetting the
e fa t that the atio s diffe e t g oups o o past is i e ted, o i Billig s te s: the atio ,
hi h ele ates its a ti uit , fo gets its histo i al e e Billig, : . “e o dl , ut of at least
the same importance, is a natio s a ilit to fo get its i he e t atio alis itself. ‘elegati g
atio alis to the olle ti e su o s ious is a ital step o a atio s path to atu it . Whe eas in
conflicted nations, open nationalism is an important tool of promoting social cohesion for elites,4
in
established societies it is at most separatist, or extreme-right groups, that openly run on an explicitly
nationalist platform. Governmental leaders, on the contrary, master the art of habitually evoking
2
Interestingly, a major distinguishing character of the dialects is the common sporadic influence of French
through pronunciation and gallicisms.
3
The ass e odus of eth i Ge a s f o Cze hoslo akia, Pola d a d Hu ga post-1945 provides no
objection to this argument, but rather illustrates the instrumental nature of identity with regards to
distinguishi g et ee us a d the : prior to 1933 (and perhaps even 1939), these identities provided little
cause for friction.
4
Cf. e.g. Gregorian (1967) on constructive nationalist discourse in the media in early 20th
-century Afghanistan.

4. 4
atio alisti s pathies, dail ep odu tio of the atio -state, i su h a a that this reminding
is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding (Billig, 1995: 6).To Billig,
the metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent
passion; it is the flag hanging un oti ed o the pu li uildi g (Billig, 1995: 8).
The Nation as a Distinct Style of Community
Thus, i a se se, A de so s fa to of the o u it ei g i agi ed is a e essa ut, as i di ated
above, not a sufficient condition for it to present a nation. He is emphatic in pointing out that
" o u ities a e to e disti guished … the st le i hi h the a e i agi ed A de so , : .
Yet he does not actually explain how the nation is diffe e t i st le from other communities.
Anderson posits the nation against the dynastic realm as ell as the religious community ;
but this is a historical argument, displaying the origins of nations, rather than an analytical one. One
can imagine a variety of forms of governance unit other than the nation-state that satisf A de so s
conditions of being a community imagined as both limited and sovereign (and indeed in the sense that
Anderson employs these terms; this criticism is not merely semantic!). One of these possible
alternatives is the medieval European city.5
Premodern Imagined Communities – The Medieval City
European (and perhaps non-European) cities of the Middle Ages can be shown, at minimum in the
abstract (but compatible with a pletho a of histo i al e a ples , to efit A de so s fou ite ia fo
constituting a nation.
They were:
a. imagined, because "in fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face
contact (and perhaps even those) are imagined," according to his own definition (Anderson,
2006: 6);
b. limited, because a medieval town, by definition, imagined itself as "coterminous with
mankind" (again, Anderson's definition of "limited") less than a nation;
c. sovereign, because it may equally "dream of being free"; in fact, multiple were (the Swiss
city states of Geneva or Basle, for example, or the German Hansestädte); and even if under
5
The choice of this particular time-period is arbitrary; any premodern example could work. Indeed, the
academic avoidance of the question of nationality among Ancient Greek city states is instructive. Gellner
(2006: 14) is the only one to make even a cursory reference to Greek city states, only to dismiss them in a
single sentence.

5. 5
a federal system, it may be highly contentious to assign the status of the (most) relevant
"governance unit" to the federal government (cf. Hechter, 2000: 10);
d. a community, because the existence of "deep, horizontal comradeship" is dubious at the
least for modern nations themselves; under Anderson's qualification that it may exist
"regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each," (Anderson,
2006: 7) it is possible just as much in a township; and similarly because Anderson joins in
the standard academic conception6
of how this community is realised, namely, that
" illio s of people … illi gl … die fo su h li ited i agi i gs" – which of course may also
be equally true for the medieval town (again, refer to the examples of the Swiss towns - e.g.
the Second Kappeler War of 1531, costing the lives of hundreds of citizens in defence of
their cities; cf. Meyer, 1977).
Thus, i agi i g i A de so s se se is lea l possi le i p e ode ti es.
At the same time, without falling into the trap of equating the "nation" with "nation-state", it
can be safely claimed that the medieval city or village did ot o stitute a atio i a o e tio al,
modern usage.7
Anderson himself would presumably instinctively deny this usage when asked; in fact,
he uses the two as distinct entities in multiple instances throughout the text (e.g. Anderson, 2006: 42).
Conclusion
A de so s concept of the nation as imagined proves to be a necessary but insufficient component of
its profitable definitions. Nations are imagined because they construct a common identity bonding
together a number of individuals far larger than the practical benefits of grouping together warrant
(except, perhaps, in wartime). Primordial attachments are not a relevant criterion as empirical
examples show. Furthermore, a crucial component of such imagining is an implicit agreement to
fo get, oth the e o st u ted ess of a atio s olle ti e histo itself, a d the a tifi ialit of its
o sta t flaggi g .
Yet nations form only one of a multiplicity of possi le i agi ed o u ities , e e if o e
e ai s lose to all of A de so s o defi itio al ite ia. As su h, it is e possi le to o st u t
such an imagined community in premodern times, and historical examples supporting this view
abound, for e a ple a o gst Eu ope s edie al ities.
6
Cf. e.g. Billig (1995: 1).
7
Gellner (1964: 152): "What are the political units for most of human history? Small tribal or village units; city
states; feudal segments loosely associated with each other or higher authority; dynastic empires; the loose
moral communities of a shared religion. How often do these political units coincide with those of 'nations', i.e.
linguistic and cultural boundaries? Seldom."

6. 6
Ultimately, Anderson makes a valuable contribution through enriching the academic
vocabulary by a catchy phrase (in a non-i o i a ; this e e fa t has helped to popula ise A de so s
book and thus open up the academic study of nationalism one further bit beyond the ivory tower),
and through a certain extent through his novel ideas on print capitalism (Anderson, 2006: chapter 2).
Yet the disproportion between, when Anderson is cited in contemporary debates, the focus on these
two ideas and the almost complete ignorance of the remaining pages of Imagined Communities, gives
testimony to the extent to which his ideas have been assimilated into the mainstream of modernist
writing on the subject.

7. 7
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