LS3: Implementing bus reform - Institutional dimensions
1. Implementing Bus Reform
Institutional Dimensions
Christopher Zegras
Manuel Tironi
Onesimo Flores Dewey
Matías Fernandez
2. Research Objectives
• Understand, from the planning, policy and
sociological perspectives, the political hurdles facing
bus system reform in Latin America
– With potential implications beyond (e.g., Africa)
• Document and analyze how reform proponents
navigate tensions with, and address the concerns,
of:
a) Existing transport operators, and
b) Civil society, more generally.
• “Soft” tech transfer
3. Research questions
1. How and why do reform projects change in response
to pressure from social groups?
2. What institutional devices and negotiation strategies
best cope with conflict and integration?
3. How do similar bus reform projects in different cities
compare?
4. What consequences does the participation (or lack of
thereof) of stakeholders in the design and operation
of the new system have on the effectiveness and
legitimacy of the resulting system?
4. Methods
• Two research units:
– MIT: Focusing on negotiations with transport
operators
– PUC: Focusing on “public engagement”
• Collaborative framework:
– Jointly developed case selection framework and
research method.
– Ongoing dialogue and feedback
• Online meetings, research workshops, public seminar
5. Methods
• Structured, focused comparison of case studies.
• Fieldwork:
– MIT and PUC fieldwork in the two case cities.
• ~140 in-depth semi-structured interviews with key
stakeholders (March-August, 2012)
– Experts
– Politicians involved in design and implementation processes.
– Community leaders.
– Scholars
• Reviewed official documents, technical studies,
financial reports, operating contracts, newspapers,
other written material, websites
6. Case selection
1) Implementation strategies
in transitioning incumbent bus
industry into BRT
• “force-foster continuum”
2) Reform approaches
• Piecemeal: “evolution”
• System-wide: “revolution”
(Big Bang)
7. Foster change
Type A: e.g. Mexico City Type B: e.g. Leon
Incorporate incumbents, no Incorporate incumbents, no
competition competition
Incremental expansion, different “Big Bang”: All (or most) services
conditions agreed at each stage simultaneously transformed
Non-integrated, Feeder, other services Integrated, corridors, feeders, etc. all
continue operations without change subject to new rules
Evolution Revolution
Type C: e.g. Quito Type D: e.g. Santiago
Introduce new actors, maintaining Introduce new actors, maintaining
incumbents operators not priority incumbents operators not priority
Incremental expansion, different “Big Bang” All (or most) services
simultaneously transformed.
conditions agreed at each stage
Integrated, corridors, feeders, etc. all
Non-integrated, Feeder, other services subject to new rules
continue operations without change
Force change
8. The case of Mexico City (2002)
106 organizations
(“rutas”), formed by
owners of individual bus
concessions operating
22,850 minibuses, 2,271
buses and 3,094 vans.
Most linked around a few
informal groups, known as
“cúpulas”.
9. Fostering BRT in Mexico City
“Replacing (incumbent
operators) was never a
possibility for us, because
it represented a social, a
political and a legal
problem. What, are you
going to displace all these
people from night to
morning without offering
them an alternative?”
Claudia Sheimbaum
10. Fostering BRT in Mexico City
“We deal with 2 fundamental
premises: First, negotiate
with pre-existing operators
terms that will get them to
participate in the system.
Second, relocate those that
choose not to participate to a
viable feeder route, and
compensate their income loss
by giving them taxi
medallions”
Officer at SETRAVI
12. The case of Santiago, Chile (2001)
119 organizations
(“asociaciones
gremiales”), formed by
owners of individual bus
concessions operating
8,179 vehicles.
Most linked around a few
Federations, notably the
Asociación Gremial
Metropolitana de
Transporte Público
(AGMPT).
13. Forcing bus reform in Santiago
“We had a tiger roaming
the streets of the city and
we needed to place it in a
cage. This unregulated
tiger was destroying,
killing, causing most of the
accidents… our task was to
put it in the cage of a State
that regulates”
German Correa
14. Strategic adjustments: Forcing-Fostering-Forcing
Forced
Dissolution of Initial BRT plans,
Public costs (and
Ruta 100, political mandate to
operator’s
informal buses continue only with
expectations) rise
Mexico “tolerated” incumbents’ support
Fostered
1995 2002 2010
Forced Route-based tenders, PTUS planning Contract terms
Cartel rigging bids advances, operators tightened, several
and influencing protest, tender terms incumbent-formed
terms softened for companies exit system
Santiago AGMPT
Fostered
1991 2001 2007-8
15. Industry Reform: Main Findings
Mexico City Santiago
Successes Scrapped ~ 900 small, Opened industry to external
underutilized minibuses competition
Substituted with 284 BRT Broke cartel
buses Transformed several quasi-
Transformed numerous informal asociaciones gremiales
quasi-informal rutas into 7 into professional, accountable
professional, accountable firms
firms.
Challenges Sustainability of reform “Partially” Open: space
& • Negotiations increasingly reserved for incumbents (3/5
Observations complex trunks & 9/10 feeders)
• Subsidies increasing Transition phase reduced
Integration elusive operator costs
History can help Prior decade
(90s) prepared some operators for
reform
Subsidies increasing?
16. Public Engagement: Main Findings
Mexico City Santiago
How the project was Progressive discourse: social Modernizing discourse: to be
justified? sustainability. a first-world city.
Which restrictions Sociopolitical restrictions: Economic restrictions:
are recognized? how to satisfy all incumbent excessively low budget,
outside and within the suspicion against subsidies.
government.
Where to intervene? “Donde se pueda”: routes “En la red completa”: routes
determined by political defined by computing
feasibility. programs.
How the ‘citizen’ is As a “militant”: a priori As a “user”: accommodate-
defined? opponent. able, behavior can be
modeled.
Who participates in “Everything is negotiable”: Decision-making limited to
decision-making? everyone with a stake experts (transport engineers)
participates. and high-ranking authorities.
How powerful is the Weak government; strong Extremely strong government;
government? clientelistic networks. technocratic culture.
17. “Extension” Opportunities
• Lessons for other cities in Chile and Mexico
– Negotiation “stance” and public engagement
approach
• Applications in rest of region and beyond (e.g,
Africa, Asia) with similar industry structures
and reform intentions (BRT revolution)
• Propagate lessons through BRT ALC
– Which has co-financed the research
18. Conclusions
Negotiation stance with operators
• Both approaches opened a window for reform
• Bus organization leaders prioritize role as entrepreneurs
over role as trade-union representatives.
• Convergence of “forcing” and “fostering” transitions
– “Forcing" strategies relaxed to minimize political conflict and
investment costs
– “Fostering" strategies tightened to avoid legitimizing rent-
seeking behavior and limit spiraling public subsidy
Public Engagement
• Larger economic philosophy and technocracy influences
approach and perspectives
• How different is ultimate outcome?
19. Tentative “meta” conclusions
• Politics matters
• Force-fostering process is pendelum
– Ongoing calibration process
– Fostering cost (initial political buy-in) eventually
leads to forcing correction
– Forcing cost requires eventual accomodation
• Specific politico-cultural conditions seem to
propel (or hamper) ‘fostering’ or ‘forcing’
strategies
– Technocratic versus clientelistic powers
21. Transantiago Trunk Contracts Tenders (2003)
Bids by
Bids by
new
entrants
incumbent
operators
Black arrow – successful bid
Red arrow – unsuccessful bid
