SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 6
Download to read offline
Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab
                                      




An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European
                   Allies??




      PUBLISHED BY: EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.


                               December 1, 2010
                    Authored by: C. L. Staten and Associates




                         ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010

                                      0
Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab
                                                        


Terrorist Alliance Between
AQAP and Al-Shabaab
An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies?
                                                                               The troubled Gulf
                                                                               of Aden Area
Al-Shabaab                                                                                




The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (al-Shahbaab)— also
known as al-Shabaab, Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al-
Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement,
Mujahidin Youth Movement, and other names and variations
— was the militant wing of the Somalia Council of Islamic
Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second                   In the waters off the coast
half of 2006.                                                                  of East Africa,
                                                                               CENTCOM‟s Coalition
Although the Somali government and Ethiopian forces routed the                 Task Force 151 (CTF-
group in a two-week war between December 2006 and January                      151), conducts maritime
2007, al-Shabaab has continued its violent insurgency in southern              security operations to
and central Somalia. The group has gained control of many parts of             protect shipping routes in
southern and central Somalia by using „guerrilla warfare and                   the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of
                                                                               Oman, the Arabian Sea,
terrorist tactics‟.
                                                                               Red Sea, and the Indian
                                                                               Ocean.
The Bab al Mandab waterway and Gulf of Aden were termed "of supreme
strategic importance "in Al Qaeda's long term plan. On April 2009 , the        Coalition and U.S. naval
deputy leader of Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Sa'id Ali Jaber Al         forces have had numerous
Khathim Al Shihri (aka Abu Sufian al-Azdi) released a message calling on       engagements with pirates
Somali jihadists to step up their attacks on "crusader" forces at sea in the   in these waters in the past
Gulf of Aden and on land in neighboring Djibouti, which hosts France           few years.
largest military base in Africa. "To our steadfast brethren in Somalia, take
caution and prepare yourselves and Increase your strikes against the           It must also be noted that
crusaders at sea and in Djibouti.” Shihri opened his message by                Africa‟s exports of crude
addressing the Jihadi leaders: Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar,             oil to the United States are
Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri.                                now roughly equal to those
                                                                               of the Middle East, further
                                                                               emphasizing this
                                                                               continent‟s increasing
                                                                               strategic importance.



                                       ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010

                                                        1
Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab
                                                         

Though this story has fallen out of favor with the popular press (MSM –
Main Stream Media), the battle for the Gulf of Aden, and other nearby
(and not so nearby) waters, goes on almost every day. One of the more
recent attacks (11 Dec 2010) involves alleged Somali pirates hijacking a
Liberian-owned bulk cargo ship in the Indian Ocean, about 1,050 nautical
miles east of the Somali coastal village of Eyl. In typical Somali pirate
fashion, the attack was launched from two attack skiffs, supported by a
mother ship, with pirates firing small arms and rocket propelled grenades
(RPG‟s) at the merchant vessel (See photo – right).

At last report, the Panama-flagged MV Renuar was headed for Somalia,
with the 24-man Filipino crew in the custody of the armed pirates. “There are presently no communications with
the ship and the condition of the crew is not known,” according to the EU anti-piracy task-force.

Why is this attack, or other similar attacks…significant? Because these kinds of crimes, and the ransoms that they
most often generate, are believed to be a major funding sources for tribal groups, criminals, insurgents and
radical Islamists in this region. In other words, the pirates (and a larger Islamic insurgency) are, in actuality, being
funded by Western companies/nations, who would rather pay a ransom than try to engage and defeat the pirates.
Consequently, each successful ship hijacking/hostage-taking, (and corresponding ransom payment) funds even
more pirates. And, the ransom money also facilitates the logistics (purchase of more boats, weapons, and
explosives) to allow the pirates to undertake more and even bigger attacks in the future.

Furthermore, given current circumstances, where is the downside for the pirates? Few attacks are thwarted, as
many ships and crews are taken and eventually ransomed – usually following the payment hundreds of
thousands or million dollars in payments to the pirates. In actuality, the number of hijackings by Somali pirates
has steadily increased in recent years, with the Somalis accounting for 35 of the world‟s 39 ships hijacked in the
                                                       first nine months of 2010.

                                                        Aside from the efforts of Combined Task Force 151, (a
                                                        multinational task force established in January 2009 to
                                                        conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission-based
                                                        mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
                                                        area of responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress
                                                        piracy), little else is being done (internationally, politically,
                                                        diplomatically) to eliminate this immediate threat to shipping
                                                        and/or a larger potential for disruption of a strategic “choke-
                                                        point” at an outlet through the Red Sea and the Suez
                                                        Canal.

                                                        At last count, the increasingly brazen pirates were holding
                                                        26 vessels and 609 hostages off the coast of Somalia,
                                                        according to a European Union anti-piracy force.

                                                        (A representation of the location of the actual
                                                        attacks/attempted attacks appears at left.)




                                        ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010

                                                          2
Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab
                                                         

Current Developments…

The three main factions of jihadists, or Islamists, in Somalia: there is the dominant faction of al Shabaab that is
globalist and jihadist in its aim led by an individual known as Godane Abu Zubayr. The second faction of al
Shabaab is the nationalist wing of al Shabaab, led by a commander known as Muktar Robow, also known as Abu
Mansur. Now this Hizbul Islam faction is led by an old-time warlord and Somali nationalist leader whose name is
Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Now the Godane wing of al Shabaab essentially issued a threat to Aweys‟ group of
Hizbul Islam basically saying “join us or die,” and after a series of clashes over the last couple of weeks, Aweys‟
group basically conceded. Now this significance is less in the number of troops that the Awey‟s faction of Hizbul
Islam brings to al Shabaab, but the significance is rather of the Godane-led dominant faction of al Shabaab,
eliminating internal dissents which ultimately would lead to its defeat if it festered. While these internal tensions
are never going to be fully eliminated, Godane must fight these. He has no choice but to eliminate internal
tensions that are on the radar of his enemies, such as the Somali government and its backers.

The latest (officially unconfirmed) intelligence out of Somalia would seem to indicate that Al-Shahbaab may be
consolidating its hold over new (and larger) parts of the mostly ungoverned nation. According to at least one
recent account, the radical Islamist Somali group “Hisbul Islam” is now joining forces with Al-Shahbaab.
Apparently, this alliance was a “shot-gun wedding,” with Al Shahbaab “forcibly” increasing its control over Hisbul
Islam areas. (e,g.- in grunt „milspeak‟; Al-Shahbaab kicked some Hisbul Islam butt, and is now “appropriating”
their territory. i.e. - Parts of Somalia could well be compared to parts of a U.S. „ghetto‟, with gang combat carried
out in order to assume control of small tracts of land…sometimes as small as one or several blocks).

According to the Wall Street Journal, a U.S. intelligence official said information gleaned from militant
communications shows links between al Shabaab and al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Yemen. U.S. officials
also see evidence of overlap in training and membership and say their working assumption is that al Shabaab has
several hundred core members, similar to the numbers in al Qaeda in Pakistan and in al Qaeda's Yemeni outpost.

Assessment by Foreign Policy Magazine: Somalia

“If Somalia keeps heading south in 2011, the entire country could fall under Islamist insurgent control. Up to
now, the country's U.N.-backed transitional government has withstood attacks from Islamist insurgents only
thanks to protection from an African Union peacekeeping force; it remains weak and divided, a national
government in name alone. Further, the capital city of Mogadishu is under perpetual siege by militants, a reality
that has sent millions fleeing from their homes in this year alone. When the government does make gains on the
insurgents, they are counted in mere city blocks, captured one by one.

The largest and most alarming insurgent group is al Shabab, which professes to desire the creation of a strict,
conservative Muslim state and portions of whose leadership pledged allegiance to al Qaeda in early 2010. The
group already controls most of southern and central Somalia and is currently trying to capture Mogadishu.
Meanwhile, Somalia's neighbors fear that al Shabab will begin to export terrorism, as it did for the first time last
summer in a series of bombings in Uganda during the World Cup.

That said, Somaliland in the country's northwest is an island of stability and democracy, and Puntland in the
northeast is relatively peaceful, if troubled by Islamists and pirate gangs.

The best hope for Somalia is for its forces to exploit the divisions among the insurgency to recapture territory,
particularly in Mogadishu. International support, already forthcoming, will help. But so would a lot of luck.”




                                        ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010

                                                          3
Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab
                                                             



Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)



                                                           Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
                                                           emerged in January 2009 following an announcement that
                                                           unified Yemeni and Saudi operatives under a common
                                                           banner and signaled the group‟s intention to serve as a hub
                                                           for regional operations targeting government and Western
                                                           interests both in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The leadership of
                                                           this new organization was composed of the group‟s amir,
                                                           Nasir al-Wahishi, and commander Qasim al-Rimi, both
                                                           veteran Yemeni extremist leaders, as well as two Saudis,
                                                           one of whom surrendered to Saudi authorities in February.

AQAP‟s predecessor, al-Qa„ida in Yemen (AQY), largely re-emerged after the escape of 23 al-Qaeda members
from a Political Security prison in the Yemeni capital, Sana‟a, in February 2006.

In early 2008 dramatically increased its operational tempo, carrying out small-arms attacks on foreign tourists and
a series of mortar attacks against the US Embassy in Sana‟a, Yemeni military complexes, the Italian Embassy,
and the Presidential Compound.

On February 8, 2010, deputy leader Said Ali al-Shihri called for a regional holy war and blockade of the Red Sea
to prevent shipments to Israel. In an audiotape he called upon Somalia's al-Shahbaab militant group for
assistance in the blockade.



Since then, AQAP‟s activity level and public profile have both risen in a significant way. Particularly, the
involvement of Anwar al-Awlaki seems to have taken AQAP to a new level of international recognition...as
well as energizing the operational activity/capability of the group. According to U.S. counter-terrorism
officials, Awlaki is the one of the main forces behind AQAP's decision to transform itself from a regional
threat into al-Qaeda's most active affiliate outside Pakistan and Afghanistan (AF-PAK).

In recent times, Awlaki‟s alleged involvement in an attempted bombing of an airliner in-bound to Detroit, MI
(the Underwear Bomber) in 2009…and his participation in a 2010 cargo plane/printer cartridge bomb plot
have given him and AQAP far greater visibility on the world stage (and probably more significantly… moved
him to the top of America‟s most wanted lists).


Current References
Read more: “Dispatch: Al Shabaab's Increasing Power” | STRATFOR

JULY 17, 2010 – “Somali Militant Group Built Training Camps, al Qaeda Links,” WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703722804575369112124063190.html

Source: Foreign Policy; “Next Year's Wars,” The 16 brewing conflicts to watch for in 2011. (Pictoral)
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/28/next_years_wars?page=full

                                           ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010

                                                              4
Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab
                                                            



Previous ERRI/EmergencyNet News References:

“Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab (An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies?)”
http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Terrorist_ Alliance_ Between_ aqap_ and_Al-Shabaab2010.pdf

“Evidence of increasing alliance between Islamic militants in Somalia, Yemen and Al-Qaeda,” By C. L. Staten, Senior National
Security Analyst, ERRI, June 2010
http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/al-shahbaab_Somalia_Al-Qaeda_Yemen.pdf

“AQAP and Al-Shabaab Alliance; An Emerging Terrorist Threat, (Includes Preliminary Report; Yemen Airliner Bomb Plot)”
Saturday, 30 Oct 2010
http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Yemen_AQAP_bomb_alliance.pdf

ENN, “Somalia Piracy Brief,” Nov., 2008 (Flash Slideshow)




                                          ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010

                                                            5

More Related Content

More from Emergency Response & Research Institute (8)

Latin American Insurgency 2010b
Latin American Insurgency 2010bLatin American Insurgency 2010b
Latin American Insurgency 2010b
 
Continued Devolution Al Qaeda
Continued Devolution Al QaedaContinued Devolution Al Qaeda
Continued Devolution Al Qaeda
 
Emerging China
Emerging ChinaEmerging China
Emerging China
 
Coming To America2004
Coming To America2004Coming To America2004
Coming To America2004
 
World Wide Terrorism 2005
World Wide Terrorism 2005World Wide Terrorism 2005
World Wide Terrorism 2005
 
Suicide Bomb Tactic Review
Suicide Bomb Tactic ReviewSuicide Bomb Tactic Review
Suicide Bomb Tactic Review
 
Somalia Piracy Brief2008
Somalia Piracy Brief2008Somalia Piracy Brief2008
Somalia Piracy Brief2008
 
Chemical Terrorism2005
Chemical Terrorism2005Chemical Terrorism2005
Chemical Terrorism2005
 

Terrorist Alliance Between Aqap And Al Shabaab2010

  • 1. Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab  An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies?? PUBLISHED BY: EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC. December 1, 2010 Authored by: C. L. Staten and Associates ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010 0
  • 2. Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab  Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies? The troubled Gulf of Aden Area Al-Shabaab  The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (al-Shahbaab)— also known as al-Shabaab, Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al- Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement, and other names and variations — was the militant wing of the Somalia Council of Islamic Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second In the waters off the coast half of 2006. of East Africa, CENTCOM‟s Coalition Although the Somali government and Ethiopian forces routed the Task Force 151 (CTF- group in a two-week war between December 2006 and January 151), conducts maritime 2007, al-Shabaab has continued its violent insurgency in southern security operations to and central Somalia. The group has gained control of many parts of protect shipping routes in southern and central Somalia by using „guerrilla warfare and the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, terrorist tactics‟. Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The Bab al Mandab waterway and Gulf of Aden were termed "of supreme strategic importance "in Al Qaeda's long term plan. On April 2009 , the Coalition and U.S. naval deputy leader of Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Sa'id Ali Jaber Al forces have had numerous Khathim Al Shihri (aka Abu Sufian al-Azdi) released a message calling on engagements with pirates Somali jihadists to step up their attacks on "crusader" forces at sea in the in these waters in the past Gulf of Aden and on land in neighboring Djibouti, which hosts France few years. largest military base in Africa. "To our steadfast brethren in Somalia, take caution and prepare yourselves and Increase your strikes against the It must also be noted that crusaders at sea and in Djibouti.” Shihri opened his message by Africa‟s exports of crude addressing the Jihadi leaders: Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar, oil to the United States are Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri. now roughly equal to those of the Middle East, further emphasizing this continent‟s increasing strategic importance. ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010 1
  • 3. Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab  Though this story has fallen out of favor with the popular press (MSM – Main Stream Media), the battle for the Gulf of Aden, and other nearby (and not so nearby) waters, goes on almost every day. One of the more recent attacks (11 Dec 2010) involves alleged Somali pirates hijacking a Liberian-owned bulk cargo ship in the Indian Ocean, about 1,050 nautical miles east of the Somali coastal village of Eyl. In typical Somali pirate fashion, the attack was launched from two attack skiffs, supported by a mother ship, with pirates firing small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPG‟s) at the merchant vessel (See photo – right). At last report, the Panama-flagged MV Renuar was headed for Somalia, with the 24-man Filipino crew in the custody of the armed pirates. “There are presently no communications with the ship and the condition of the crew is not known,” according to the EU anti-piracy task-force. Why is this attack, or other similar attacks…significant? Because these kinds of crimes, and the ransoms that they most often generate, are believed to be a major funding sources for tribal groups, criminals, insurgents and radical Islamists in this region. In other words, the pirates (and a larger Islamic insurgency) are, in actuality, being funded by Western companies/nations, who would rather pay a ransom than try to engage and defeat the pirates. Consequently, each successful ship hijacking/hostage-taking, (and corresponding ransom payment) funds even more pirates. And, the ransom money also facilitates the logistics (purchase of more boats, weapons, and explosives) to allow the pirates to undertake more and even bigger attacks in the future. Furthermore, given current circumstances, where is the downside for the pirates? Few attacks are thwarted, as many ships and crews are taken and eventually ransomed – usually following the payment hundreds of thousands or million dollars in payments to the pirates. In actuality, the number of hijackings by Somali pirates has steadily increased in recent years, with the Somalis accounting for 35 of the world‟s 39 ships hijacked in the first nine months of 2010. Aside from the efforts of Combined Task Force 151, (a multinational task force established in January 2009 to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission-based mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area of responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy), little else is being done (internationally, politically, diplomatically) to eliminate this immediate threat to shipping and/or a larger potential for disruption of a strategic “choke- point” at an outlet through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. At last count, the increasingly brazen pirates were holding 26 vessels and 609 hostages off the coast of Somalia, according to a European Union anti-piracy force. (A representation of the location of the actual attacks/attempted attacks appears at left.) ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010 2
  • 4. Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab  Current Developments… The three main factions of jihadists, or Islamists, in Somalia: there is the dominant faction of al Shabaab that is globalist and jihadist in its aim led by an individual known as Godane Abu Zubayr. The second faction of al Shabaab is the nationalist wing of al Shabaab, led by a commander known as Muktar Robow, also known as Abu Mansur. Now this Hizbul Islam faction is led by an old-time warlord and Somali nationalist leader whose name is Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Now the Godane wing of al Shabaab essentially issued a threat to Aweys‟ group of Hizbul Islam basically saying “join us or die,” and after a series of clashes over the last couple of weeks, Aweys‟ group basically conceded. Now this significance is less in the number of troops that the Awey‟s faction of Hizbul Islam brings to al Shabaab, but the significance is rather of the Godane-led dominant faction of al Shabaab, eliminating internal dissents which ultimately would lead to its defeat if it festered. While these internal tensions are never going to be fully eliminated, Godane must fight these. He has no choice but to eliminate internal tensions that are on the radar of his enemies, such as the Somali government and its backers. The latest (officially unconfirmed) intelligence out of Somalia would seem to indicate that Al-Shahbaab may be consolidating its hold over new (and larger) parts of the mostly ungoverned nation. According to at least one recent account, the radical Islamist Somali group “Hisbul Islam” is now joining forces with Al-Shahbaab. Apparently, this alliance was a “shot-gun wedding,” with Al Shahbaab “forcibly” increasing its control over Hisbul Islam areas. (e,g.- in grunt „milspeak‟; Al-Shahbaab kicked some Hisbul Islam butt, and is now “appropriating” their territory. i.e. - Parts of Somalia could well be compared to parts of a U.S. „ghetto‟, with gang combat carried out in order to assume control of small tracts of land…sometimes as small as one or several blocks). According to the Wall Street Journal, a U.S. intelligence official said information gleaned from militant communications shows links between al Shabaab and al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Yemen. U.S. officials also see evidence of overlap in training and membership and say their working assumption is that al Shabaab has several hundred core members, similar to the numbers in al Qaeda in Pakistan and in al Qaeda's Yemeni outpost. Assessment by Foreign Policy Magazine: Somalia “If Somalia keeps heading south in 2011, the entire country could fall under Islamist insurgent control. Up to now, the country's U.N.-backed transitional government has withstood attacks from Islamist insurgents only thanks to protection from an African Union peacekeeping force; it remains weak and divided, a national government in name alone. Further, the capital city of Mogadishu is under perpetual siege by militants, a reality that has sent millions fleeing from their homes in this year alone. When the government does make gains on the insurgents, they are counted in mere city blocks, captured one by one. The largest and most alarming insurgent group is al Shabab, which professes to desire the creation of a strict, conservative Muslim state and portions of whose leadership pledged allegiance to al Qaeda in early 2010. The group already controls most of southern and central Somalia and is currently trying to capture Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Somalia's neighbors fear that al Shabab will begin to export terrorism, as it did for the first time last summer in a series of bombings in Uganda during the World Cup. That said, Somaliland in the country's northwest is an island of stability and democracy, and Puntland in the northeast is relatively peaceful, if troubled by Islamists and pirate gangs. The best hope for Somalia is for its forces to exploit the divisions among the insurgency to recapture territory, particularly in Mogadishu. International support, already forthcoming, will help. But so would a lot of luck.” ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010 3
  • 5. Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab  Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emerged in January 2009 following an announcement that unified Yemeni and Saudi operatives under a common banner and signaled the group‟s intention to serve as a hub for regional operations targeting government and Western interests both in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The leadership of this new organization was composed of the group‟s amir, Nasir al-Wahishi, and commander Qasim al-Rimi, both veteran Yemeni extremist leaders, as well as two Saudis, one of whom surrendered to Saudi authorities in February. AQAP‟s predecessor, al-Qa„ida in Yemen (AQY), largely re-emerged after the escape of 23 al-Qaeda members from a Political Security prison in the Yemeni capital, Sana‟a, in February 2006. In early 2008 dramatically increased its operational tempo, carrying out small-arms attacks on foreign tourists and a series of mortar attacks against the US Embassy in Sana‟a, Yemeni military complexes, the Italian Embassy, and the Presidential Compound. On February 8, 2010, deputy leader Said Ali al-Shihri called for a regional holy war and blockade of the Red Sea to prevent shipments to Israel. In an audiotape he called upon Somalia's al-Shahbaab militant group for assistance in the blockade. Since then, AQAP‟s activity level and public profile have both risen in a significant way. Particularly, the involvement of Anwar al-Awlaki seems to have taken AQAP to a new level of international recognition...as well as energizing the operational activity/capability of the group. According to U.S. counter-terrorism officials, Awlaki is the one of the main forces behind AQAP's decision to transform itself from a regional threat into al-Qaeda's most active affiliate outside Pakistan and Afghanistan (AF-PAK). In recent times, Awlaki‟s alleged involvement in an attempted bombing of an airliner in-bound to Detroit, MI (the Underwear Bomber) in 2009…and his participation in a 2010 cargo plane/printer cartridge bomb plot have given him and AQAP far greater visibility on the world stage (and probably more significantly… moved him to the top of America‟s most wanted lists). Current References Read more: “Dispatch: Al Shabaab's Increasing Power” | STRATFOR JULY 17, 2010 – “Somali Militant Group Built Training Camps, al Qaeda Links,” WSJ.com http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703722804575369112124063190.html Source: Foreign Policy; “Next Year's Wars,” The 16 brewing conflicts to watch for in 2011. (Pictoral) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/28/next_years_wars?page=full ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010 4
  • 6. Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab  Previous ERRI/EmergencyNet News References: “Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab (An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies?)” http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Terrorist_ Alliance_ Between_ aqap_ and_Al-Shabaab2010.pdf “Evidence of increasing alliance between Islamic militants in Somalia, Yemen and Al-Qaeda,” By C. L. Staten, Senior National Security Analyst, ERRI, June 2010 http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/al-shahbaab_Somalia_Al-Qaeda_Yemen.pdf “AQAP and Al-Shabaab Alliance; An Emerging Terrorist Threat, (Includes Preliminary Report; Yemen Airliner Bomb Plot)” Saturday, 30 Oct 2010 http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Yemen_AQAP_bomb_alliance.pdf ENN, “Somalia Piracy Brief,” Nov., 2008 (Flash Slideshow) ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010 5