1. Mulvey 1
Dylan Mulvey
Professor Ferraro
World Politics
12 March 2015
The Realist Perspectives of the Crisis in Ukraine
In early 2014, mass protests swept across Ukraine in response to President Viktor Yanukovych's
pro-Russian stance. The protesters, largely in favor of aligning Ukraine with the West, ousted
Yanukovych who was then forced exile in Russia. After an election held several months later, the new
President Petro Poroshenko was sworn into office. Unfortunately for Ukraine, this was not the end of
the turmoil as many parts of its country began to declare secession, including Crimea, which was
annexed by Russia following a shaky referendum, as well as the eastern provinces of Donetsk and
Luhansk. Amidst a civil war, more problems came for Ukraine when Russian President Vladimir Putin
gave his support to the secessionist movements and accepted the accession of Crimea into the Russian
Federation. In regards to international relations, a classical realist would interpret Putin's policy as
being offensive and driven for power, while a structural realist would interpret Putin's policy as being
more defensive in search of security.
For a classical realist, it is the flawed nature of humans and the inherently flawed systems run
by them that form the fundamental cause of war (Class Lecture, 29 January 2015). As such, a classical
realist would view Putin's policy in Ukraine as a result of innate violent tendencies that led the Russian
President to work to assure Russian influence and domination over the country for his country's
“power” and “interests” (Course Syllabus, Korab-Karpowicz). For Russia, the unique geopolitical
position held by Ukraine makes it valuable to Russian interests. In the case of Crimea, which is now

2. Mulvey 2
under de facto Russian control, the peninsula serves as the home base for the Russian navy's Black Sea
Fleet. Additionally, the region has a population of approximately 60% ethnic Russians and strong
historical ties to Russian leading back to the 18th
century (Adam Taylor). By placing Crimea once again
under Russian control, Putin is gaining for himself the image of a strong leader at home and prestige
for the country among certain members of the international community, if at the cost of a bit of infamy.
Putin is also following in accordance with another one of the classical realist principles: the “balance of
power.” The “balance of power” dictates that states prefer to increase their power by diplomatic outlets
first and then, when all else fails, proceed to take military action (Class Syllabus, Morton Kaplan). This
is precisely what Putin is doing in regards to the recent negotiations with himself and the leaders of
Germany, France, and Ukraine (Chris Johnston). From the perspective of a classical realist, Putin
would take advantage of these negotiations to quell the threat of the Western powers throwing their
financial support to Ukraine, all the while maintaining the gains he had already acquired over the past
year. However, if the negotiations did fall through, that would mean the fighting in eastern Ukraine
would continue, to which German Chancellor Angela Merkel commented, “I cannot imagine any
situation in which improved equipment for the Ukrainian army leads to President Putin being so
impressed that he believes he will lose militarily,” which indicates that Putin presumably has the upper
hand and will further advance his interests in the region, likely taking what he can of the pro-Russian
east, either through cession or a satellite (Chris Johnston). The view of the classical realist seems to
promote the notion that Putin's role in the crisis in Ukraine is motivated wholly by his innate human
affinity for violence and lust for power.
Although it heavily draws upon classical realism and is in many respects similar to it, structural
realism modifies the classical view on international relations by putting an emphasis on the anarchic
character of world politics (Class Lecture, 29 January 2015). Because of the anarchic order that
perpetuates throughout international conflict, states are faced with the issues of “insecurity” and fear of

3. Mulvey 3
“unequal gains” (Class Syllabus, Korab-Karpowicz). As such, the structural realist would interpret the
policies of Putin as being preemptive and in the interest of his state's security. For example, in reference
to the crisis in Ukraine, Putin asserts his support of the pro-Russian rebels because losing Ukraine to
the West would be a disaster for Russia amidst a post-Soviet era in which the European Union and
NATO continue to admit members nearer and nearer to Russia's borders, many of whom had been allies
of or even a part of the Soviet Union. Faced with a clear challenge to its security, Russian, under the
leadership of Putin, had to prevent the loss of its naval base in Crimea, first and foremost, and then
issue support to the pro-Russian rebels in the hopes that they would break away and form a new
government friendly to Russia that could serve as a buffer. Putin's opposition of the EU and NATO
further reflects the realist notion of a “balance of power”, in which one of the rules declares that states
will work against alliances that grow too powerful (Class Syllabus, Morton Kaplan). The structural
realist clearly views Russia as being on the defensive as it fears Western influence over Ukraine will
threaten its security. As for the recent meeting amongst Putin and the representatives from Europe and
Ukraine, a structural realist would presume the meeting would take a turn for the worst and, highly
likely, war. This pessimistic view of the diplomatic venture stems from the structural realist belief that,
because of the anarchic nature international relations, powers live in a constant state of paranoia and
“afraid that the possible gains resulting from cooperation may favor other states more than itself, and
thus lead it to dependence on others” (Class Syllabus, Korab-Karpowicz). The Russian Federation is
left in something of a prisoner's dilemma in which cooperation between the two belligerents, although
preferable to the alternative of a war, is impossible because of the fear that the other side will not
follow through on their side of the deal. In reference to the recent negotiations, this would mean that
Putin would be cautious and reluctant to make a deal because, if he let his guard down and had the pro-
Russian side disarm and demobilize, the other side could at a later date fall through on their agreement
and impose their demands, leaving Putin in a difficult position as Russia and the rebels would be less

4. Mulvey 4
prepared for conflict. Structural realism views Putin's challenge to Ukraine's political integrity as being
purely for the well-being of his nation's security and defense.
Overall, the structural view of realism seems to be the most compelling explanation of Vladimir
Putin's role in the recent turmoil in Ukraine. Despite the fact that Putin's policies may come across as
being incessant power grabs, it is imperative to recognize the geopolitical situation Russia is currently
facing. With its sphere of influence slowly being absorbed into the West over the past few decades,
Putin is working to assure the security of his state by maintaining a border area between Russia and the
West, as well as preserving the well-being of his navy in the Black Sea. Any difficulties perceived by
the West regarding the negotiations must be carefully viewed because it is paramount for Russia to
reach an agreement in which they are able to sustain their security. The anarchic system puts Putin in a
unprivileged position in which his state must endure against an ever-growing coalition of unfriendly
states which it has conflicting interests with. Although it is undeniable that Putin is looking for his
state's interests, it is necessary to look at this event through a structural realist's lens because this
challenge of Ukraine's autonomy is not an opportunistic attempt to increase power, but rather a
calculated effort to preserve the status quo and guarantee the security of the Russian state.

5. Mulvey 5
Works Cited
Ferraro, Vincent. “Classical Realism.” University of Massachusetts Amherst. 29 January 2015. Lecture.
Johnston, Christopher. "Ukraine Crisis Will Not Be Solved by Military Means, Says Angela Merkel."
theguardian.com. The Guardian, 07 Feb. 2015. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.
Kaplan, Morton A. System and Process in International Politics. (New York, 1957).
Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. "Political Realism in International Relations". The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Taylor, Adam. "To Understand Crimea, Take a Look Back at Its Complicated History."
washingtonpost.com. The Washington Post, 27 Feb. 2015. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.

6. Mulvey 5
Works Cited
Ferraro, Vincent. “Classical Realism.” University of Massachusetts Amherst. 29 January 2015. Lecture.
Johnston, Christopher. "Ukraine Crisis Will Not Be Solved by Military Means, Says Angela Merkel."
theguardian.com. The Guardian, 07 Feb. 2015. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.
Kaplan, Morton A. System and Process in International Politics. (New York, 1957).
Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. "Political Realism in International Relations". The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Taylor, Adam. "To Understand Crimea, Take a Look Back at Its Complicated History."
washingtonpost.com. The Washington Post, 27 Feb. 2015. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.