1. The Japan Times
Tuesday, March 11, 2014
3/11, Three Years On:
Death toll: 15,884 people from 20 of Japan’s 47 prefectures.
A total of 2,636 people from the three hardest-hit
prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima) remain
officially unaccounted for.
Over 300 people have been officially recognized as having
died from post-disaster related stress or other causes.
About 267,000 people remain evacuated in 1,200 cities,
towns and villages nationwide. About 97,000 from the
above three prefectures continue to live in temporary
housing.
3. Characteristics of Japanese Energy
1. Japan imports 90 percent of
energy needs.
2. Due to geopolitical problems,
limited amount of nearby
Russian oil and LNG comes to
Japan.
3. Much Oil and LNG is imported
from Africa, Middle East,
Southeast Asia, and coal comes
from Australia. Huge
transportation costs and, in the
case of oil, political uncertainties,
add to the price.
4. U.S. is exporting shale gas in
small quantities to Japan, which
will increase in coming years.
But political issues in US
Congress are creating
uncertainty of supply. Alaska
wants Japan to help build an
LNG pipeline.
5. Electricity Prices For Fossil Fuels
(yen/kWh)
0
5
10
15
20
25
Coal Oil LNG Nuclear
2012
2013
5 yen
20 yen
11 yen
13 yen
1 yen
4 yen
16 yen
6. Nuclear Pre 3/11
Before March 11, 2011, there were 54 commercial
nuclear reactors in Japan.
Each reactor generated between 540 megawatts
electricity (MWe) and 1.3 gigawatts (GWe).
1,000 megawatts = 1 gigawatt.
The four Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors that were
damaged had a total capacity of about 2.7 GW.
Officially, there are now 50 reactors but the
other two undamaged reactors at Fukushima
Dai-Ichi (about 1.8 GW) will be scrapped.
Also, four undamaged reactors at Fukushima
Dai-Ni (4.4 GW). Politically impossible to restart.
7. Why Did Japan
Go Nuclear in
the first place?
ABrief(verybrief)History
8. The End of WWII and the Occupation
Japan went to war at least partially to secure oil
and gas reserves for its growing domestic
industries. The dream of being ``self-sufficient’’
in energy production had haunted the country
since the late 1800s, after Japan opened to the
outside world following two and a half centuries
of isolation.
The U.S.-led Occupation of Japan (1945-1952)
made the country a U.S. ally in the Pacific
against communism. It also gave Japan access to
fossil fuel sources from U.S. allies, but the
independent energy dream never died.
9. 1953: A Chance Meeting At
Harvard
Yasuhiro
Nakasone Henry Kissinger
10. Dec. 1953: Atoms For
Peace
Concerned about other nations, allied or
otherwise, pursuing their own nuclear
technology programs, President Dwight
Eisenhower announces in the United Nations
the ``Atoms for Peace’’ program, the practical
result being that the U.S. supplies nuclear
knowhow and technology to friendly nations
like Japan wanting it for ``peaceful purposes.’’
In March 1954, Nakasone manages to get the
first-ever budget for nuclear research passed in
parliament, - the beginning of Japan’s road to
nuclear power.
11. Selling Nuclear
To A Skeptical Nation
SHORIKI MATSUTAROYomiuri Shimbun owner, friend of Nakasone, convictedwar criminal, CIA agent, and
The Godfather of Japanese Pro Baseball and the JapaneseNuclear Power Industry
Zensaku Azuma
``Japan’s CharlesLindbergh’’,extremely popular with the public,promoted eating uranium-laced
food, extolled nuclear power (and cigarettes),died of cancer.
12. The Three Electricity Laws:
Payoffs to the Provinces
By the early 1970s, Japan had built its first commercial
nuclear reactors using American, British, and French
technology and knowhow. But as the dangers of nuclear
power, and concerns about nuclear weapons, grew, and
following the 1973 Middle East oil shock, Japan’s leaders
realized that in order to overcome antinuclear sentiment
and build more plants, local governments where the
power plants were located needed to be financially
compensated.
In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s
government passed three new laws that provided
funding to any locality that agreed to host a nuclear
power plant. Thus was born the ``nuclear power village’’
of national government officials, utilities, and local
governments and businesses that we know today.
13. HowMuch Official FundingDo Local GovernmentsGet?
Model Case:
Construction of a 1.35GW nuclear power plant.
Assumptions
(1) Environmental Impact Study takes three years
(2) Construction takes seven years
(3) Plant Operates for 40 years
Over a 45 year period from beginning of environmental assessment to the 35th year of the
plant’s operation, the local government hosting a plant can receive 121.5 billion yen,
or almost 1.2 billion dollars under the Electricity Laws.
This does not include additional donations from the utility or other official forms
of assistance.
TOTAL AMOUNT A LOCAL TOWN OR VILLAGE RECEIVES FOR HOSTING A NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT: Nobody Really Knows.
14. Ye Olde Nuclear Village
For over four
decades, the nuclear
power village has
kept opposition to
nuclear power at bay.
Three years after
3/11, though, a
powerful struggle
between the
powerful village and
renewable energy
proponents, and the
Japanese public, has
threatened the
village as never
before.
16. The Nuclear Village Under Seige
In the months after 3/11, polls showed
that up to 90 percent of Japanese wanted
out of nuclear power.
Seizing the opportunity, renewable energy
advocates pushed hard to win political and
financial support. For months, the nuclear
village was under attack by the media,
politicians, and the public at large as the
nation asked itself fundamental questions
about why it had embraced nuclear to begin
with, and how it could move out of nuclear
power and into renewables.
17. Renewable Energy advocates pushed hard for a Feed-In
Tariff after 3/11. The (then) ruling Democratic Party of
Japan favored the FIT, especially Prime Minister Naoto
Kan. It was strongly opposed by the Nuclear Power
Village but passed at the end of August, 2011– the day
Kan resigned over his handling of 3/11.
The new tariff went into effect on July 1st, 2012:
The New Tariff means businesses in five
different renewable energy industries can sell
their power at a guaranteed fixed rate over a
fixed period of time.
18. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
SOLAR POWER
Output Range ABOVE 10 KW BELOW 10KW
Basic Tariff
(per kilowatt/hour)
(new rate as of 2014)
42 yen/kwH
(37.5 yen/kWh)
42 yen/kwh
(38 yen/kWh)
PERIOD 20 years 10 years
19. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
WIND POWER
Output Range ABOVE 20 KW BELOW 20KW
Basic Tariff
(per kilowatt/hour)
23.10 yen/kWh 57.75 yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years
20. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
GEOTHERMAL POWER
Output Range ABOVE 15 KW BELOW 15KW
Basic Tariff
(per kilowatt/hour)
27.30 yen/kWh 42 yen/kWh
PERIOD 15 years
21. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
MINI-HYDRO
Output
Range
1mW-30mW 200kW-1mW Under 200kW
Basic Tariff
(per kilowatt
hour)
25.20
yen/kwH
30.45
yen/kWh
35.70
yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years
22. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
BIOMASS
Sector Methane Gas Unused
Wood
Products
General
Wood
Waste-related
Biomass
Recycled
Wood
Products
Type Sewer
Sludge
Gas
Household
Waste
Unused Wood
Products
General
Wood
Solid
General
Waste
Solid
Sludge
“
Basic
Tariff
(per kwH)
40.95 yen 33.60
yen
25.20
yen
17.85 yen 13.65
yen
Period
20 years
23. RENEWABLE
ENERGY
TYPE
Before FIT After July 2012 FIT
(as of Dec. 1st 2013)
Amount
before
July 2012
July 2012-
March 2013
April-
November 2013
SOLAR
(residential)
4.7 GW 969,000 kW 953,000 kW
SOLAR
(Non-residential)
0.9 GW 704,000 kW 3,632,000 kW
WIND 2.6 GW 63,000 kW 9,000 kW
MINI-HYDRO 9.6 GW 2,000 kW 3,000 kW
BIOMASS 2.3 GW 30,000 kW 88,000 kW
GEOTHERMAL 0.5 GW 1,000 kW 0
TOTAL 20.6 GW
1,768,000 kW 4,685,000 kW
6,450 million kW OR 6. 45GW
24. The Current Situation with Renewable Energy
TOTAL RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY AS OF Dec. 1st, 2013
Solar (residential) 6.62GW
Solar (non-residential) 5.23 GW
Wind 2.67 GW
Mini-Hydro 9.60 GW
Biomass 2.41 GW
Geothermal 0.50 GW
TOTAL : About 27 GW
25. The Good News: Photovoltaic (Solar) Systems
According to the Yano
Research Institute, thanks to
the 2012 Feed In Tariff,
Japan will rank first in the
world in terms of installed
Solar PV power generation
by April 1st, 2014.
Japan’s market for PV
system in 2012 was worth
1.32 trillion yen, or nearly
13.5 billion dollars – an 80
percent increase over 2011.
Residential PV systems
(rooftop solar panels, etc.)
account for about 80 percent
of total installed PV systems.
Unofficial estimate of how much
power solar energy could
``feasibly’’ generate:
100-150GW
26. The Good News: Offshore Wind Power
A 2 megawatt offshore wind power
facility was built off the coast of
Fukushima prefecture, almost within
site of the crippled nuclear power
plant.
Operation commenced in November
2013. This will be followed by two 7
MW offshore wind turbines, which will
be installed by next March.
Studies show Fukushima and
Japanese coastal areas are ideal for
offshore wind farms. No concerns
about noise complaints, and there is a
wider area of potential establishment
than land-based wind farms, which
means they can be located closer to
the grid.
Japan’s potential offshore
wind power capacity:
1,600GW
27. But It’s Not All Good News
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES TO
REALIZING A RENEWABLE FUTURE
28. CHALLENGE A: The Grid System
Grids to Major Urban
Centers (electricity users)
are locatedfar away from
rural locations best suited
for renewable energy
projects, particularly
large-scalesolar farms
and wind farms.
Japanis divided into 60
Hz grids(for western
Japan) and 50 Hz grids
(for easternand northern
Japan), meaning one
nationwiderenewable
grid is not commercially
feasible.
30. CHALLENGE B:
Regional Utility Monopoly System
10 major utilities largely control the generation,
distribution, and sale of electric power in Japan. They
set prices in general agreement with each other, and
new players to the energy market have to deal with
them if they want to get connected to a piece of the
national grid.
Utilities, at present, have nearly total control over which
electricity generation sources they send down to the grid
to customers, and their motto is always the same, ``Safe,
Stable, and Secure’’ electricity supply, at a fixed price.
32. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
SOLAR POWER
Rapidly improving solar
technologies makes Japan’s highly
conservative electricity industry
cautious about installing solar power
technology now that will be out of
date in one or two years.
Worries about securing a ``safe and
stable’’ electricity supply during
cloudy nights, at night, etc.
Battle between Large Solar Farm
proponents and Small Solar
Products/Residential Area
proponents over direction of industry.
Nuclear lobby’s anti-solar campaign
(``nobody wants solar farms in their
backyard’’, ``it’s still too expensive’’
is working.
33. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
WIND POWER
FIT needs to be based on wind conditions
and location, not a fixed amount of power
generation for all locations.
Noise: Local communities complain about
loud windmills
Birds: Bird strikes and migratory patterns
mean strict environmental regulations on
wind farm development in places like the
area in and around the Kushiro Wetlands.
Remoteness: Best Locations for On-Shore
windmills often located far from urban
centers, necessitating expensive grid
connections.
34. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
GEOTHERAL POWER
1) Vast majority of Japan’s geothermal
resources are in National Park areas:
Strict Environmental regulations.
2) Many ideal geothermal locations on,
or beside,, onsens (hot spring resorts)
whose politically-connected owners
oppose geothermal development for
business reasons.
3) Geothermal requires heavy initial
investment. High cost to maintain and
repair plants.
4) Public fears, aided by pro-nuclear
propagandists, that geothermal drilling
causes earthquakes.
35. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
MINI- HYDRO POWER
Requires rivers and streams with regular flows of water at ideal
speeds.
Strict gradation requirements often means construction work is
needed, creating further environmental damage.
Remote areas of many ideal mini-hydro spots means increased
costs to deliver generated electricity.
36. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
BIOMASS
1) Bureaucratic turf wars in
Japan means a regulatory
nightmare, little cooperation
between ministries
(Environment, Forestry, Trade
and Industry) to promote
different biomass forms.
2) Opposition from both the
pro-nuclear business lobby and
from environmentalists who
warn burning biomass for fuel
will simply increase
greenhouse gas emissions.
3) Lack of government and
major corporate interest in
biomass, compared to solar
and wind.
38. 1) Outdated Structure of Established
Anti-Nuclear Groups.
a) Traditional anti-nuclear
NGO leaders now well
into their 60s, 70s, and 80s,
and have been protesting
for over four decades.
b) They often have limited
understanding of, or
interest in, modern NGO
leadership techniques,
media and public
outreach strategies, or
broad-based public
education of their cause.
39. 2) Provincialism
Because anti-nuclear groups
have traditionally been local
community-based, they can
be extremely provincial and
suspicious of outsiders.
Town A’s anti-nuclear
groups don’t talk or care
much about Town B’s anti-
nuclear groups.
When cooperation occurs, it’s
often at the ``let’s exchange
information’’ level only, not at
the political action level.
40. 3) Group-ism
Seniority, deferring to one’s
elders, and group
consensus cultural traits
mean young people (i.e.
those under 50 years of age)
feel shut out by traditional
anti-nuclear groups.
As a result, such groups
played something of a
secondary role in the mass
public demonstrations
against nuclear power after
March 11, 2011.
41. 4) Divisions Within Anti-Nuke Movement
Factionalism Within Anti-
Nuclear Organizations
Themselves:
For decades, many of the groups
in Japan seeking the abolishment
of nuclear weapons were
actually pro-nuclear power. Even
today, most of the main groups
that organize the yearly protests
against nuclear weapons at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be
reluctant to come out strongly
against nuclear power because
their members work at utilities.
42. Problems With Renewable Energy Groups
Bottom Up Versus Top Down:
Major NGOs and other
organizations promoting
renewable energy are Tokyo-
based, and generally favor a top-
down approach whereby the
central government leads and
local governments follow.
Local governments often favor a
more decentralized, bottom-up
approach (localized small-scale
renewable energy projects with
revised local ordinances to make
them happen)
43. Problems With Renewable Energy Groups
The Big Guys versus the New
Players:
Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sharp,
Sanyo, Toyota, Kyocera. . . these are
just some of the huge Japanese
firms making heavy investments in
renewable energy technologies and
massive projects. Clearly, the new
FIT is tilted in their favor.
Thus, the kind of innovation from
small and medium-sized firms like
we see here in the U.S., as well as
Canada, China, South Korea, India,
and parts of Europe is not as high-
profile. It’s occurring, but (mostly?)
under the media radar.
44. Problems with Renewable Energy
Groups
``Solar? Wind? Geothermal’’?Competition And Factionalism
Within The Renewable Energy
Movement Creates Public
Confusion and Doubt:
Solar, wind, biomass and
geothermal advocates lobby hard
for their chosen energy source. But
policy makers at the local and
national levels want the ``best
energy mix’’ that offers ``safe,
stable, and secure’’ electricity
generation.
WHICH combination of
renewables meets this goal in the
short to medium-term? Depends
on who you talk to.
45. Problems with Renewable Energy Groups
Weakness in
Addressing Specific
Public Concerns
about Higher
Electricity Bills for
Individuals and
Possible Negative
Effects on
Industries Using
Lots of Electricity
46. HOWEVER. . .
FOR ALL OF THE
PROBLEMS WITH
RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE
PROBLEMS WITH A
RETURN TO NUCLEAR ARE
MUCH GREATER
47. AGING REACTORS
13 out of the
remaining 50 reactors
are now over 30 years
old.
Four are at least 40 years
old.
The life-span of Japan’s
nuclear reactors is
officially considered 40
years.
At the end of the 40 year
cycle, the operator can
apply for a 20 year
extension and then
another one, if needed,
theoretically extending
the life of a plant to 60
years.
49. AGING REACTORS
Power Company Reactor
# of Years in
Operation
(by Dec. 2014)
Kansai Electric
Mihama No. 1 43
Mihama No. 2 41
Takahama No. 1 39
Takahama No. 2 38
Mihama No.3 37
Oi No. 1 35
Oi No. 2 34
Kyushu Electric Genkai No. 1 38
Genkai No. 2 33
Shikoku Electric Ikata No. 1 36
Ikata No. 2 33
Chugoku Electric Shimane No. 1 40
Nihon GenshiryokHatsuden Tsuruga No. 1 44
50. PROBLEM NUMBER TWO:
SPENT FUEL POOLS
ALMOST FULL:
``Building a nuclear power plant is like
building a house without a toilet.’’
Once nuclear fuel is burned, the resulting
spent fuel waste is removed from the reactor
and stored in cooling pools.
But. ..
51. NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER
RESTART UNTIL SPENT FUEL
POOLS ARE FULL
NAME OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
AND REACTORS
LESS THAN SIX YEARS
REMAINING UNTIL
FULL
(33 of 50 reactors)
Tomari No. 1, 2 (Hokkaido);
Onogawa No. 1, 2 (Miyagi)
Fukushima Daichi 1 No. 5, 6; Fukushima Daini, No. 1-4
Kashiwazaki-Karuiwa No. 1-7 (Tepco)
Hamaoka No. 3,4 (Chubu),
Mihama No. 1, 2; Oi 1, 2; Takahama 1, 2 (Kepco)
Shimane No. 1,
Ikata No. 1,2 (Shikoku)
Genkai No. 1-4 (Kyushu)
BETWEEN SIX AND
TWELVE YEARS
REMAINING UNTIL FULL
(14 of 50 reactors)
Higashidori (Aomori)
Onogawa No. 3 (Miyagi)
Tsuruga No. 1,2 (Fukui)
Hamaoka No. 5 (Shizuoka)
Shiga No. 1,2 (Ishikawa)
Mihama No. 3 (Fukui)
Oi No. 3, 4 (Fukui)
Takahama No. 3, 4 (Fukui)
Shimane No. 2 (Shimane)
Sendai No. 2 (Kagoshima)
MORE THAN 12 YEARS
(3 reactors)
Tomari No. 3 (Hokkaido)
Ikata No. 3 (Ehime)
Sendai No. 1 (Kagoshima)
52. SO, NOW WHAT?
Currently, 14,200 tons of spent nuclear fuel sits in storage at Japan’s
nuclear power plants.
Spent fuel pools are now 70 percent full, on average
What Are The Options Each Plant Has For
Dealing With Spent Fuel?
OPTION 1:
Ship it to the (as-
yet-to-start)
Rokkasho
Reprocessing
Plant
in Aomori
Prefecture
OPTION 2:
Move it from plant to
specially designed
mid-term (50 years) storage
containers and then bury it
or reprocess at Rokkasho
OPTION 3:
Reprocess the
spent fuel
overseas
53. OPTION 1: Ship it to Rokkasho
PROBLEMS
The Rokkasho reprocessing plant :
1) HAS YET TO START, having suffered numerous
technical problems, delaying the projected start-up
numerous times.
2) Is opposed by not only traditional antinuclear activists
but also international nonproliferation experts.
3) Is not expected to go into operation anytime soon.
4) Is already storing 2,945 tons of previously
shipped spent fuel –98 percent of its
storage capacity
54. OPTION 2: Mid-term Storage
PROBLEMS
1) COSTS: Transporting spent fuel by truck or ship from current
location to new facility and costs of storage: Who pays? The utilities
and/or the government, but, ultimately, the consumer in the form of
higher electric bills for ``cheap’’ nuclear power?
1) SAFTEY CONCERNS: What happens if towns and villages or
fisherman’s unions oppose shipments, forcing transportation routes
to be altered? Will they demand financial compensation from
government or utilities for allowing waste to pass through? How does
that affect the ultimate cost of ``cheap’’ nuclear power?
1) THE BIGGEST PROBLEM: Local governments
around Japan have ignored pleas from Tokyo to
host facilities, which would mean nuclear waste
in their backyard for at least a half century.
55. OPTION 3: Reprocess it Overseas
This has been done. Reprocessing Japanese fuel,
which is then returned to Japan and reused, has
taken place in England and France.
PROBLEMS:
1) Huge Expense, Drives Up Cost/kWh.
2) International Proliferation Risks
3) Refusal of Many Countries to Allow Nuclear-laden
Ships to Pass Through Their Waters.
4) Risk of an Accident, Sinking or Damaging Ships
Transporting Nuclear Cargo.
56. ``So, just extend the plants’
life past 40 years.’’
Questions about Safety
Would a plant that is 40
years old pass the stricter
safety standards that went
into effect in 2013?
Would the operating
utility be required to beef
up safety measures before
government permission for
extension past 40 years is
granted?
Would local governments
hosting the plant need to
implement any additional
safety measures?
Questions about Money
Though not a legal requirement,
would local authorities grant
permission for plant’s life to be
extended past 40 years?
How much money would they
demand (in the form of, for example,
``stronger safety measures’’) from
either Tokyo or the operating utility
before granting permission?
How long would these negotiations
over money take, and, ultimately,
would they cost the taxpayers
money in the form of higher utility
bills?
Would a nuclear reactor more than
40 years old generate electricity at
an economically competitive price?
57. By The Way. . .
National Energy
Policy requires
planning for the
mid and long-
term –decades,
not years.
Obviously, the
most basic
question is,
how big will your
domestic
electricity market
be by, say, 2030
or 2040?
58. Future Electricity Demand: Supplying
Power to a Smaller, Older Japan
Japan’s Population faces a steep decline
between now and 2040
2010
population
2015
population
2020
population
2025
population
2030
population
2035
population
2040
population
128.057
million
126.597
million
124.100
million
120.659
million
116.618
million
112.124
million
107.276
million
The Working Age Population (15-64) was 81 million in 2010
By 2040, it will be 57 million – a decline of 30 percent
59. Who is Going to Need
Electricity?
In Tokyo, the overall
population is expected to
decline by just seven
percent by 2040,
compared to 2010.
However, over one-third
of Tokyoites (34%) will be
over 65 years old (20% in
2010) ;and 17% (9% in
2010) will be over 75
years old by 2040.
In Osaka, the overall
population will decline by 16%
by 2040 compared to 2010.
36% of Osakans will be over 65
years old in 2040 (22% in 2010).
20% will be over 75 years old
(10% in 2010).
Nationwide, 36% of the
population, on average, will be
over 65 years old by 2040.
Over one-fifth,
21% ,of Japan will be
over 75 years old in
2040.
60. And What If. . .?
20%of the world’searthquakes5.0 and above on the Richter
Scaleoccur in Japan.
Accordingthe Japanese government,the numberaftershocks
(notearthquakes)thatmeasured5.0andaboveon the different
scaleJapanusesbetweenMarch11, 2013andMarch10, 2014
was ``only’’56. That’sdownfrom653betweenMarch11, 2011
andMarch10, 2012
Doyoureallywantbuildmorenuclearreactorsgiventhis
seismicreality?
61. So, To Sum
Up. . . In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country that has
16% less people than it had in 2010 (128 million down to 107 million).
In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country where,
overall, more than one-third of the population (36%) has reached
retirement age and, presumably, will be consuming less electricity in
the workplace than at present.
In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will include the needs of
the one-fifth of the country (21%) who are 75 years and above.
In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will provide power to
consumer products and businesses that are likely to be far more
energy-efficient than is the case today, as technological innovation
continues.
62. ``Nuclear power will continue to play an important role in
Japan’s future energy mix’’.
A Reality Check…
In 2040, 45 of the current 50 commercial nuclear
power plants will be at least 40 years old
(By 2020, 12 will have already reached 40 years of
operation)
Assuming their life is extended to 60 years
(involving unknown additional costs), 17 of the 50
reactors would be at least 50 years old in 2040.
12 reactors would be over 60 years old by 2040 and
would be undergoing decommissioning – including
8 of 14 reactors in Fukui Pref. which supply power
to the Kansai region.
63. what all this means is. . .
By 2020, long-term decisions will have to be made on the first 12
reactors that have reached, or surpassed, 40 years of operation.
Continuing their operations means:
1) Getting local permission to operate for another 20 years. This will
involve increased use of national tax money for local pet construction
projects in return for permission.
2) Ensuring that the reactors pass the new safety standards, including,
perhaps new standards to operate past 40 years. This will be a time-
consuming process, filled with political and bureaucratic struggles.
3) Making whatever safety and engineering adjustments are needed to
get approval for another 20 years. Who pays for such measures? How
long will they take to implement?
4) Operating an aging plant, more likely to be in needed of increased
monitoring and repairs. Will such plants continue to operate at a
capacity that keeps the cost per kilowatt hour competitive with LNG
or even some renewables?
64. Oh, and don’t forget about those
nearly full spent fuel pools.
Even if you extend the life of a 40 year old
reactor, you still have the problem of what to
do with the spent fuel it generates over the
extra 20 years.
Remember, at present, 33 of the nation’s 50
reactors will see their spent fuel pools filled to
the brim within about six years if operations
are restarted tomorrow. Another 14 will be
full a dozen years after being restarted.
65. And just who is going to be
operating those nuclear plants?
Japan has three undergraduate and nine master’s
degree courses with either ``nuclear’’ or ``atomic’’ in
their names. Most are under-enrolled.
Majority of nuclear plant workers entered workforce
in the 1970s, now facing retirement.
Japan Atomic Industrial Forum reported that 80
percent fewer students participated in annual
recruitment events in Tokyo and Osaka in 2012,
compared to 2010.
The lack of interest in nuclear power among the
younger generations comes as aging plants must be
continued or decommissioned after 40 years,
requiring a new generation of skilled workers.
66. BUT HERE IS THE
REAL PROBLEM:
Japan says it is doing all it can to save energy
and electricity and is far more efficient than
most nations in using electricity.
Is it?
67. Not Legally Required to Cut Usage
1) Despite all of the nuclear power
village warnings about possible
electricity shortages, there are no
legal, mandatory electricity savings
measures in place.
What Japan has are ``voluntary’’
reductions on electricity use that
carry no legal weight.
68. ``Don’t Worry, Be Happy’’
4) City residents have made very few major
changes to their lifestyle since 3/11. Many
cities have not curbed the use of neon
lighting. Nor have they made serious efforts
to do things like hold outdoor sporting events
at night during the summertime or enact
countless other ``common sense’’ measures to
save electricity.
69. A Small Example:
Vending Machines
Few curbs on things like electricity-
guzzling vending machines.
Japan has over 5 million vending machines
–in country with a population of 127
million.
The U.S, with a population of 317 million,
has about 4.6 million vending machines.
70. Limits on What Households Can Do
Traditional
Japanese Homes:
Beautiful, but Not
Designed with
Efficient Use of
Electricity In Mind.
Modern Homes:
Often lack
insulation, central
heating, double-
glazed windows,
71. In Conclusion
To continue with nuclear power will be far more
expensive than the Nuclear Power Village claims,
carries all sorts of safety risks, and runs the risk of
investing in a technology that, like the steam
engine, has had its day.
To switch to renewables will take time and huge
amounts of money, angers the politically powerful
Nuclear Power Village, and involves technologies
that are still being developed.
Japanese are addicted to a hyper-urban, hyper-
convenient lifestyle that uses lots of electricity.
Getting them to change their habits is the toughest
challenge, but demographics may do it anyway.
