KPA Special Issue (RTM)

Issue 1 1
Kent Political Almanac
‘Europe in theWorld’
Special Issue

2 Kent Political Almanac
MANAGING EDITOR
Léo Wilkinson
EDITORIAL BOARD
Noémie Battini
Afroditi-Maria Koulaxi
Eugenie Megally
Maëlle Poulin
Erik Lindner-Olsson
Rebecca Walker
April Yeung
School of Politics and International Relations
Rutherford College
University of Kent
Canterbury
Kent, CT2 7NX
United Kingdom
Blog: http://blogs.kent.ac.uk/kentpoliticalalmanac/
E-mail: kentpoliticalalmanac@gmail.com
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ABOUTTHE GLOBAL EUROPE CENTRE
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ABOUT THE KENT
POLITICAL ALMANAC
The Kent Political Almanac was
created to provide a platform for
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reviewed publication opportuni-
ties for students in Politics and
International Relations. This
journal’s purpose is to showcase
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The initiative came from stu-
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and International Relations,
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IR at the University of Kent.

Issue 1 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The English School of
Thought ………………………….4
Europe in the financial
turmoil………………………….16
Peace-building ‘from below’
in Kosovo………………………26
Power-Sharing, Minority
Rights and Equal Citizenship
in Nigeria and Mali…....…..38
The EU’s International Role:
A Normative Power in Theo-
ry or in Practice?...............50
‘Europe in the World’
Special Issue
WELCOMETOTHIS SPECIAL ISSUE
This Spring issue of the of the Kent Political Almanac is special for two
reasons: it is not only the journal’s first publication, but we also have
been privileged to launch it jointly with the Global Europe Centre, Uni-
versity of Kent. We therefore decided to make this special issue focused
on the theme of “Europe in the World”, in its first printed edition.
The articles in this issue were submitted for publication by students in
response to our call for papers in February 2014. We were delighted to
have submissions from both undergraduate and postgraduate students,
with authors representing different countries of Europe and beyond. Sim-
ilarly, our editorial team was just as international: even though we all
study at the University of Kent, we had editors originally from Sweden,
Greece and France, but also from Hong Kong and Malta.
We would like to thank all of the authors who contributed to this first
issue. All articles were then reviewed by members of staff from the
School of Politics and International Relations, to whom we are very
grateful to. Our special thanks go to the Global Europe Centre,
and particularly to Professor Elena Korosteleva, whose support has been
pivotal to the journal’s launch. We also would like to acknowledge the
support of the European Parliament office in London, for helping us to
publish this first edition.
We hope that you will enjoy reading this very special issue of the Kent
Political Almanac.
Léo Wilkinson
Managing Editor
Spring 2014
Issue 1

Introduction
The international society approach, also referred to as
the English School (ES) or Liberal Realism, is a particular strand
of International Relations theory and is commonly associated
with a group of academics of the British Committee and the In-
ternational Relations Department of the London School of Eco-
nomics during the second half of the 20th century.1
Among its
most prominent figures are the founding fathers Martin Wight
and Charles Manning, as well as Wight’s student Hedley Bull but
also contemporary theorists like Richard Little and Barry Buzan.
The English School introduced the idea of an international socie-
ty, a society of states, that, driven by shared values and inter-
ests, exists despite the condition of anarchy in the international
arena.2
On this basis, the international society approach tries to
harmonize both the theoretical axioms of realism as well as
those of the liberal schools of thought. Despite its appeal as a
via media between the two grand schools of IR, the English
School finds itself on the periphery of International Relations
theory and is not given much attention by scholars outside the
United Kingdom.3
The missing recognition of the international
academic community necessitates a critical engagement with the
theoretical positions of the writers of the English School as well
as their critics.
It is the aim of this paper to discuss whether the interna-
tional society approach is an adequate third way between real-
ism and liberalism. In order to do so it must be asked to what
extent the English School depicts the international society ap-
proach as a via media and whether it is convincing.
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part this paper
presents the core features of the international society approach
and examines how attempts are made to synthesise the main
BY JOHANNA HANS
This paper provides a critical
assessment of the English
School of Thought, also known
as the International Society
Approach.
The English School is common-
ly associated with a group of
British academics and political
practitioners during the second
half of the 20th century. Build-
ing upon the two dominant
mainstream approaches of IR
theory, the English school tries
to harmonize both the theoreti-
cal axioms of realism as well as
those of the liberal schools of
thought. Despite its appeal as a
via media between the two
grand schools of IR, the Eng-
lish School finds itself on the
periphery of International Re-
lations theory and is lacking
the wider recognition of the
international academic com-
munity.
Critically engaging with the
English School, this paper por-
trays how the International
Society Approach synthesizes
the mainstream IR theories
into a single approach and dis-
cusses the potency and concep-
tual weaknesses of such an
approach.
1
Totten, Mark RM (2012): The English School of International Relations Theory: Heir Apparent or
Illegitimate Pretender? Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Wiltshire.
2
Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.pp.75-76
3
Totten, p.1
“In compliance with the liberalist tradition, English School scholars
agree that institutions and norms matter and that the interdependence
between states can create pacifying effects.”
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Issue 1 5
theoretical traditions of IR, realism, liberalism and rationalism,
into one single approach.4
The second part will consider the po-
tency and merits of the English School that are articulated by its
advocates such as Robert Jackson.5
The last part will explore and
evaluate the most dominant criticism, most prominently put for-
ward by Roy Jones.6
This paper will conclude with a rather pessimistic view
about the international society approach. It will be shown that
the School’s greatest strength, the harmonization of all three IR
traditions into one theory, is also its biggest weakness. By incor-
porating pluralistic theoretical stances, the English school looses
its coherence and plausibility which ultimately calls into ques-
tion the school‘s stand as an independent theory of International
Relations.
Due to the limited space available in this paper I will
mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin Wight and Hedley
Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society
approach.
The English School as a Via Media
The English School accommodates the theoretical stances
of more than one world view. In his influential work Internation-
al Theory: The Three Traditions (1991) Martin Wight identified
three strands of international political thought and categorized
them into Machiavellian realism, Grotian rationalism and Kanti-
an revolutionism.7
Wight considers the realist tradition as a theory of con-
flict, war and power politics.8
Ascribing the realist school great
explanatory strength in terms of accounting for power constella-
tions in international politics, Wight adopts many of its core fea-
tures. He agrees with realists that states are the key actors in the
international state system which is characterized by the absence
of a central authority.9
Although Wight and other English schol-
ars accept the realist perception of an anarchical state system,
the implications they attribute to it, are rather different. Instead
of concluding a war of all against all in the Hobbesian sense,
they rather agree with the Lockean idea that despite the lack of a
common authority to enforce the law, human beings are able to
“In the rationalist belief, states have mitigated the belligerent effects of the con-
dition of anarchy by developing societal relations with one another which ena-
ble the development of principles of how to control the use of force.”
4
Due to the limited space available in this paper I will mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin
Wight and Hedley Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society approach.
5
Jackson, Robert (1996): Is there a Classical International Theory? In: Ashley, Richard [et al] [ed.]:
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
6
Jones, Roy E. (1981): The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure. In: Re-
view of International Studies, Vol. 7, No 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
7
Wight, Martin (1991): International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester University Press,
Leicester.
8
Totten, p.5
9
Wight, Martin (1986): Power Politics. Penguin, London. P.105

behave reasonably towards one another due to a common set of
interests.10
In this sense, the English School rather approximates the
Kantian liberal vision of the international state system in which
all communities, bound together by the same values and ideolo-
gies, can coexist peacefully without having to fear the use of
force.11
In compliance with the liberalist tradition, English School
scholars agree that institutions and norms matter and that the
interdependence between states can create pacifying effects.12
However, Wight and his followers abstain from the cosmopolitan
idea of a world-state or even a Kantian federation and are highly
sceptical that democratic ideas and institutions ultimately lead
to a perpetual peace, as depicted by liberal peace scholars.13
Alt-
hough the English School holds the view that anarchy and socie-
ty can coexist, they do not disregard the hostilities between
states.
As could be seen, the English School takes into account
the core presumptions of both realism and liberalism and pre-
sents them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
In addition to harmonizing the realist and liberalist tradition,
the English school also draws heavily upon rationalist theory
and incorporates its main assumptions into its own approach.
The rationalist tradition has its origin in the writings of Hugo
Grotius (1583 - 1645) on international law. In the rationalist be-
lief, states have mitigated the belligerent effects of the condition
of anarchy by developing societal relations with one another
which enable the development of principles of how to control
the use of force.14
This way, the rationalist tradition captures the
sociological axioms of realism as well as the normative stance of
liberalism.15
Since rationalism recognises the respective strengths of
realism and liberalism without directly challenging any of their
core propositions, Wight views the rationalist tradition as a mid-
dle way between the two.16
This appeal of rationalism as a via
media between realism and liberalism became the basis for
Wight’s concept of an international society.
The international society approach is the central focus of
the English School. ES scholars believe that there exists an inter-
national society among states that is more civilized and orga-
nized than realists suggest, but less idealistic and utopian than
liberals would hope.17
In his work The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World
10
Wight(1991), p.13
11
Linklater, Andrew (2010): The English School Conception of International Society. Reflections on
Western and non-Western Perspectives. In: Ritsumaiken Annual Review of International Studies,
No. 9, p.2. International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto.
12
Jordan, Richard (2011): A Brief Case the English School. In: The Monitor, Special Edition 16, pp.
23. AIM Media Texas, McAllen.
13
Ibid, p.23
14
Suganami, Hidemi (2011): The English School, History and Theory. In: Ritsumeikan International
Affairs, Vol. 9, p.34 Ritsumeikan University, Tokyo.
15
Totten, p.6
16
Ibid, p.1
17
Burchill, Scott [et al.] (2005): Theories of International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Basing-
stoke. p.85

Issue 1 7
“States have agreed that they should work together to better secure the
survival of the members of their society, to mutually respect sovereignty
and property and to ensure that treaties and agreements are kept.”
Politics, (1995) Hedley Bull defines the international society as
follows:
“Whereas a system of states emerges when two or more states
have sufficient contact between them and exert enough impact
upon one another so that their behaviour necessitates the calcu-
lation of the other, a society of states, on the other hand is ‚a
group of states, conscious of certain common interests and com-
mon values, [that] form a society in the sense that they conceive
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their rela-
tions with one another and share on the working of common
institutions.”18
Since life, truth and property - according to the interna-
tional society approach - are the primary goals of each society,19
states have agreed that they should work together to better se-
cure the survival of the members of their society, to mutually
respect sovereignty and property and to ensure that treaties and
agreements are kept.20
The concept of the international society is a prime exam-
ple of how the three traditions blend into each other. From a
methodological point of view this synthesizing is seen by the
pluralistic ‘levels of analysis’ that English School writers operate
with. Advocates of the international society approach take ac-
count of the structural coercions of the international system at
the systemic level while at the same time recognizing the impact
of agents and processes within the society and analysing the im-
portance of individuals and transnational groups at an individu-
al level.21
This way the English School employs the units of analy-
sis of each IR tradition.22
With regard to its epistemology, meaning the question
how we know what we know, the international society approach
is primarily interpretative.23
That is to say, it understands reality
as it is perceived and experienced and sees everything and eve-
ryone as interconnected.24
However, due to the English School’s close links to real-
ism and liberalism it also adopts a positivist approach towards
18
Bull, Hedley (1995): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. 2nd Edition. Co-
lumbia University Press, New York.p.3
19
Ibid, p.5
20
Linklater, p.13
21
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür (2005): The English School, International Rela-
tions, and Progress. In: International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No.2, p.184 The International Studies
Association, Tucson.
22
Neo-realism concentrates especially on the systemic level and holds the view that the distribution
of capabilities of states within the international system shapes international relations (see Waltz
1979: 90). Liberalism on the other hand emphasizes the superiority of individual human beings thus
focusing on the individual level (see Badie 2011: 1434). Rationalists point to the societal relations
between states and employ therefore meso-level analyses.
23
Totten, p.15
24
Israel, Roger R. (2005) Three Styles of Social Inquiry: Positivist, Interpretative and Critical Re-
search. Metropolitan State University, Minnesota, USA.p,2

science, which is especially apparent in the neo-versions of both
realism and liberalism. Like neo-realist and neo-liberalists, ES
scholars believe that an international society exists independent-
ly from the observer’s perception of it and that theories can be
formulated and reviewed against the backdrop of physical obser-
vations from the political world.25
At the same time the international society approach also
incorporates the ethical, normative dimension of classical liber-
alism by depicting a society of states where common norms and
identity are regarded as two of the primary components.26
Hence
the ES features a multi-facetted epistemological nature.
Also with regard to its ontology, that is the question of
what is there that can be known about, the English School re-
tains a rather pluralistic understanding of international rela-
tions. Although war is seen as an inevitable feature in interna-
tional relations, it is claimed that it would be too one-sided to
suppose that statesmen discard all ethical concerns and are ex-
clusively preoccupied with power and conflict.27
Since states are
constantly embedded into interactions and cooperation to
achieve mutual interests, they have developed a form of interna-
tional social consciousness.28
Hence, the international society
'thickens‘ where cooperation is greatest such as in the realm of
international commerce or the agreements on basic human
rights.29
“The most commonly cited criticism that has been targeted against ES
writers is that of the lack of a common epistemology.”
In the ES vision the order of this society is maintained
through five institutions: diplomacy, international law, balance
of power mechanisms, international institutions and com-
merce.30
The role of justice in the maintenance of the internation-
al society became one of the central and most disputed ques-
tions within the English School. Influenced by E.H. Carr’s ques-
tion “order for whom?“.31
Bull concluded that justice ultimately
contributes to order and hence to the maintenance of the inter-
national society.32
Other ES writers, however, hold the view that
pursuing justice entails the danger of increasing conflict and
violence (e.g. Robert Jackson). This tension between order and
justice formed a starting point of an inner split of the English
25
Whyte, Alexander (2012): Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism: Born of the same ap-
proach? (Online) URL: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/11/neorealism-and-neoliberal-institutionalism-
born-of-the-same-approach/.
26
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.183
27
Ibid, p.183
28
Dunne, Timothy (1995): The Social Construction of International Society. In: European Journal of
International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 379. Sage Publication, New York.
29
Totten, p10
30
Ibid, p.9
31
Carr, E.H. (1939): The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of Interna-
tional Relations. Macmillan, London.
32

Issue 1 9
School into a pluralists and solidarist camp, who differ the most
in their opinion on humanitarian interventions.33
To recapitulate, the international society approach fea-
tures a methodological, epistemological and ontological plurali-
ty. By retaining close ties to the rationalist tradition, Wight and
Bull therefore asserted that the international society approach
stands between the realist and revolutionist thought.34
Andrew
Linklater describes the international society approach as ‘more
to international relations than the realist admits but less than
the cosmopolitan desires’.35
Potency of the International Society Approach
After having pointed out the key features of the English
school, it is now imperative to critically assess the international
society approach. According to Scott Burchill ‘the English School
can claim to have passed the test of a good theory’ by success-
fully avoiding ‘the sterility of realism and the naivety of ideal-
ism‘.36
By incorporating elements of all three traditions of Inter-
national Relations theory, the international society approach
provides certain advantages: As a via media the English School
enables a dialogue between the two opposite theories of realism
and liberalism which would otherwise lack the ability to com-
municate with one another effectively.37
Apart from that, synthe-
sizing the grand traditions into one approach provides for more
explanatory variables, many of which one tradition - realism, lib-
eralism or rationalism - taken by its own, would potentially turn
a blind eye on. The English School thus enables theorists to em-
ploy a perspective from across the IR spectrum.38
Another central strength of the approach is that it is not
exclusively concerned with theories of conflict but rather re-
quires a twofold analysis of both war and peace and has a better
account of change in international relations than other theories.
While change in the realist tradition for instance only evolves
through shifts in the distribution of capabilities39
or the rise and
fall of hegemonic powers,40
Wight and Bull believe that the
course of international relations is primarily determined by the
dynamics of the international society.41
Interaction and coopera-
tion in international relations is according to ES scholars essen-
tially shaped by common interests which are subject to change.
The international society approach thus has greater explanatory
power for dynamic phenomena such as globalisation or regional
developments and provides an ideal framework for explaining
33
Unfortunately, a detailed examination of these two distinctive conceptions of the international
society is beyond the scope and space of this paper. For further discussion see e.g. Wheeler 2000.
34
35
Linklater, p108
36
Burchill, p.108
37
Little, Richard (2000): The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations.
In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 396. Sage Publications, New York.
38
Totten, p.5
39
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theories of International Politics. Addison-Wesley, Boton.p.90
40
Gilpin, Robert (1981): War and Change in International Politics. Cambridge University Press, New
York.
41

progressive alliances of states.42
The persistence of war and conflict in international rela-
tions as well the existence of common rules and values (for ex-
ample why else do we have international law and universally ac-
cepted legal principles like jus cogens?) and functioning com-
mon institutions (e.g. the regular exchange of diplomats) along-
side with international and regional organizations (e.g. the Euro-
pean Union) and alliances (e.g. the War on Terror alliance), all
give merit to the international society approach. By taking into
account macro-, meso- and micro-linkages, the English School
brings together the benefits of diversity for understanding IR as
a whole.43
Conceptual Weaknesses and Lack of Plausibility
As appealing as the synthesizing of the three IR tradi-
tions may sound, as much does it expose the international socie-
ty approach at risk of becoming a ‘catch-all theory“. As Richard
Little pointed out ‚the English School can look like a perfidious
Albion, the balancer, ever willing to shift ground in order to be
on the winning side of the argument‘.44
Having spent too much
energy on trying to reconcile the apparently incompatible theo-
retical stances of the grand IR theories, the English School now
lacks a clear and coherent stand as an academic enterprise of IR
theory.
The most commonly cited criticism that has been target-
ed against ES writers is that of the lack of a common epistemolo-
gy. Wights’s proximity to historical and philosophical analysis in
IR and Bull’s obvious rejection of behavioralism,45
compound
with the retaining to positivism by most contemporary ES theo-
rists,46
give credit to the claim that the English School lacks epis-
temological consistency.
Apart from this, one of the principle ontological criti-
cisms is that the essential question of what constitutes an inter-
national society, is far from being clear. Instead, there exist di-
verse and often incompatible perceptions within the School it-
self. Whereas Wight claimed that there must be at least some
degree of cultural unity for states to form a society,47
Buzan and
Butterflied are rather doubtful whether a common culture is a
necessary precondition for the development of an international
society.48
Also Bull is careful enough to not speak of a common
culture but rather of the existence of common interests which
cause states to adopt norms, values and institutions which in
42
Ibid
43
Totten, p.7
44
Little, p.396
45
46
Totten, p.15
47
Wight, Martin (1977): System of States. Leicester University, Leicester. p.33
48
Buzan, Barry (1993): From International System to International Society. Structural Realism and
Regime Theory Meet the English School. In: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, p.333 MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Issue 1 11
turn lead to the creation of an international society.49
Hence,
with regard to the question of which requirements have to be
fulfilled to form a society, the English School yet lacks a coher-
ent answer.
Another point of contestation centres on the importance
of norms. Since norms play a significant role within the interna-
tional society approach, it is almost surprising that the school
devotes so little attention to how these norms are being formed.
As constructivists have convincingly shown, all norms are social-
ly constructed.50
Since societies differ deeply in their belief of
individual liberties or entitlements, it is hard to imagine a socie-
ty in which all members share the same norms and values. For
example it is questionable whether Hungary and the Netherlands
really do form a European international society, as proposed by
Wight,51
because of their rather diverging emphasis on the basic
right to freedom of speech.52
This point automatically leads to another central ques-
tion, which has yet to be addressed by the English School. Alt-
hough one central theme in the international society approach is
that of membership it is rather unclear what full membership
actually means. Who decides who belongs to the society and who
does not? What are the requirements for becoming a member? In
his critical pamphlet on the English School, Roy Jones almost
sarcastically asked whether Nazi Germany and Great Britain be-
longed to the same international society: Both countries obvious-
ly engaged in the institution of war and even Nazi Germany did
follow some of the rules of international law during its regime.53
Therefore, strictly speaking, Nazi Germany and Great Britain
would have both belonged to an international society according
to the international society approach.54
Since English School
scholars are seemingly unable to agree upon what constitutes an
international society, one cannot hope for being able to deter-
mine who belongs to an international society and who is out.
Conclusion
In the preceding sections, I presented the core features of
the international society approach as a via media, alluded to the
potential merits of such a synthesizing approach and exposed
the central criticism towards the English School. As the critical
assessment has shown, the international society approach’s
greatest strength is also its Achilles heel.
The English School draws its explanatory power from the
49
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, 183
50
Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy and What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power
Politics. In: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 395. The IP Foundation, Cambridge (UK).
51
Ibid, p183
52
While Hungary passed a controversial media law which seriously restricted the freedom of press
in Hungary in 2010, Holland highly values the right to freedom of speech which is portrayed in its
high scores on the freedom of press index (see Reporters without Borders 2013).
53
Jones,p.4
54
Ibid

interplay amongst the three IR traditions within one approach.
This way the English school is able to capture and explain com-
plex processes in international relations from different perspec-
tives. The English School thus avoids the narrowness and reduc-
tionism to international relations which one theory, taken by its
own, inevitably entails.
However, by accommodating multi-theoretical stances,
the English school suffers from an epistemological inconsistency
and lacks a coherent point of view. As long as central presuppo-
sitions like the questions as to what constitutes an international
society, how membership is defined and whether norms (as a
central component of the international society) are endogenous-
ly or exogenously formed, are disputed within the English School
itself, the English School cannot be considered as an adequate
third way between realism and liberalism.
As a consequence, the theoretically inconsistent and of-
ten conflicting conceptions of the international society under-
mine the English School’s stand as an independent discipline of
International Relations theory and explain the lack of attention
by the greater academic research community. Although recognis-
ing the potential of the ES as a middle way between the conflict-
centric realism and idealistic liberalism, the English School has
yet to develop greater ontological and epistemological clarity to
keep its promise as a successful third alternative to understand-
ing International Relations.

Issue 1 13
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Ba-
singstoke.
Bull, Hedley (1995): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World
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Burchill, Scott [et al.] (2005): Theories of International Relations. Pal-
grave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Buzan, Barry (1993): From International System to International Society.
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bridge, Massachusetts.
Carr, E.H. (1939): The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction
to the Study of International Relations. Macmillan, London.
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür (2005): The English
School, International Relations, and Progress. In: International Studies
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ter University Press, Leicester.

The European integration process has never been linear
or steady. It has been fraught with periods of stagnation and
questioning since the foundations of the European Communi-
ties. However, sudden developments and rapid progress have
always followed the stages of inertia, often in a drastically shift-
ing way. Scholars who have looked into this peculiar phenome-
non have noted a correlation between crises of an economic na-
ture and further advancements in the European integration. The
1980s are the prime example. The aftermath of the oil shocks
was followed by the Single European Act (SEA), and the comple-
tion of the single market through the ‘1992 programme’, which
eventually led to the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the
European Union (EU). This may suggest that the difficult context
of the 1980s’ crisis triggered reforms of the European Communi-
ties after having stagnated for nearly a decade.
The past experience of the EU can thus shed light on the
multifaceted crisis that the EU is facing today. Since the global
financial crash of 2008, the EU and its twenty-eight Member
States have been experiencing gloomy days. In 2009, the EU
banks’ losses were estimated at £16,3 trillion, whereas the EU
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amounted to €12,5 tril-
lion.1
These figures highlight the gigantic scope of the 2008 fi-
nancial turmoil. Generated by the US subprime crunch, the crisis
started with the collapse of the financial sector, the
‘decapitalisation’ and the illiquidity of the banking system.2
The
European economy shrank from then on, leading to what the
European Commission labelled the worst recession in European
history since the Great Depression of the 1930s.3
The EU itself
was not hit by the crisis initially. Nonetheless, the Greek sover-
eign debt crisis, which started in the spring of 2010, sent the EU
into a tailspin. Although the crisis first began in the US and con-
cerned only the Member States’ national economies, it formed
BY PAULINE CHETAIL
The global financial turmoil
that started in 2008 has affect-
ed the European Union (EU)’s
economy like never before. The
common currency, the rules to
coordinate European budget-
ary, and the economic policies
have therefore been questioned
and put under deep scrutiny.
Nevertheless, such periods of
doubt were far from a novelty
for the Member States of the
EU. The past global crises have
always proved crucial for re-
shaping European integration.
The aim of this paper is there-
fore twofold. First, to analyse
the Member States’ direct re-
sponse to the crisis in order to
understand the choices that
were made to react to global
financial challenges. Second,
this paper envisages different
scenarios for the future of the
EU, in the light of classic Euro-
pean integration theories.
1
Totten, Mark RM (2012): The English School of International Relations Theory: Heir Apparent or
Illegitimate Pretender? Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Wiltshire.
2
Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.pp.75-76
3
Totten, p.1
“The crisis painfully and remarkably shed light on the interdependence of
the European economies.”
EUROPE IN THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL:
WHAT LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES
FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

Issue 1 17
“The EU Member States sought conjectural and contra-cyclic measures
through the intergovernmental method, and tried to co-ordinate their
national responses.”
into a far-reaching crisis for the EU common market and its com-
mon currency. It painfully and remarkably shed light on the in-
terdependence of the European economies, the imperfections of
the economic governance in the EU, and the flaws of the Europe-
an Monetary Union (EMU). Thus, the numerous breaches of the
Stability and Growth Pact, the inconsiderate debts contracted by
the Member States, as well as the lack of convergence of the na-
tional economies were in the commentators’ sights. For instance,
Paul Krugman, famous for having always claimed the inherent
contradictions of the single currency, wrote in 2011 that:
“the architects of the euro, caught up in their project’s sweep and
romance, chose to ignore the mundane difficulties a shared cur-
rency would predictably encounter — to ignore warnings, which
were issued right from the beginning, that Europe lacked the in-
stitutions needed to make a common currency workable”.4
It is therefore legitimate to wonder how the crisis might
change the EU, as it rattled the very foundations of the European
integration. Commentators argue that the EU may not survive
the crisis. This pessimistic scenario does not necessarily apply
to the EU, for it has gone ‘too far to fail’. And as we will see, the
EU response to the crisis did not make the integration back-
pedal. However, as the crisis catalysed the issues and contradic-
tions of EU integration, there is an urgent need for reform that
requires further discussion. There has been indeed a series of
‘mitigated meetings’ including Nice, the Laeken Conference, and
the failed Constitution Treaty) followed by the difficult ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. . As Jürgen Habermas pointed
out, “the experts seem to be in agreement on the diagnosis of
the deeper reasons for the crisis: the European Union lacks the
competences to bring about the necessary harmonisation of na-
tional economies whose levels of competitiveness are drifting
drastically apart.”5
We will thus see to what extent the crisis spurred a re-
thinking of the EU, its institutions and its governance. First, we
will briefly assess how the global financial crisis has changed the
EU’s economic governance so far. Only then will we be able to
draw out the meaning of possible changes for Europe’s future,
through the prism of the main European integration theories.
4
Due to the limited space available in this paper I will mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin
Wight and Hedley Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society approach.
5
Jackson, Robert (1996): Is there a Classical International Theory? In: Ashley, Richard [et al] [ed.]:
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lessons from the financial crisis: conjectural and
structural reforms
This first section of this study does not seek to analyse
the consequences of the crisis for European integration as this
will be carefully examined in a second phase. It only aims at ob-
serving the changes that have occurred so far, as well as the way
they were instigated, in order to understand the framework in
which the EU and its Member States are able to handle the
storm.
First of all, it is necessary to study the procedures that
were put in place in the direct aftermath of the financial crisis,
before heading towards the structural measures negotiated be-
tween the EU institutions and the Member States to overcome
the sovereign debt crisis.
Against all odds, there was a surprising co-operation be-
tween the European Member States to counter the expansion of
the crisis, which just burst out in 2008, as they jointly sought
solutions at the European level rather than withdrawing into
themselves. The detractors of the EU, as well as the media, con-
demned the EU for being slow to react to the crisis, but it is nec-
essary to rehabilitate the reality of the situation. Indeed, the Un-
ion lacked apparatus to deal with the immense shock experi-
enced by the European economies. It was therefore predictable
that the EU would not be able to take action quickly. Nonethe-
less, even without any provisions, the Member States indeed re-
grouped within the Eurogroup as off the Autumn 2008.
They first sought conjectural and contra-cyclic measures
through the intergovernmental method, and tried to co-ordinate
their national responses. As Hodson and Quaglia pointed out,
“this spirit of co-operation carried over (…). The heads of state
and government agreed on a ‘line to take’ on international finan-
cial issues (…) and EU members of the G20 (…) joined by repre-
sentatives of the Council Presidency and the ECB worked closely
together to co-ordinate their positions”.6
The first real change
coming out of the Member States’ co-ordination was the Europe-
an Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) implemented in June 2010,
so as to ensure the Member States in difficulties’ financial stabil-
ity, as well as reassuring financial markets. Financed by the
members of the Eurozone, the EFSF would be able to raise funds
on the financial markets and provide affordable loans to the in-
debted Member States.
6
Dermot Hodson, and Lucia Quaglia, “European Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis: Intro-
duction”, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 n°5 (2009): 942-943.

Issue 1 19
“The crisis spurred the reinforcement of an integrated and coherent eco-
nomic policy at the European level.”
In the second half of 2010, structural responses started
to come from the EU. This delay was largely due to the institu-
tional sluggishness, which is inherent to the EU’s decision-
making process, based on negotiation and compromise. The lim-
its of the EFSF were quickly pointed out, and the need for fur-
ther and deeper reforms of the EMU identified by the European
Council. Therefore, a task force was created under the presiden-
cy of Herman van Rompuy. The purpose of this task force was to
reflect on the economic governance of the EU. It presented its
first reform proposals at the end of 2010.7
These proposals came down to three fundamental chang-
es for the economic governance of the EU. First, the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) was amended with the estab-
lishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a consoli-
dated and institutionalised version of the EFSF. Second, a set of
regulations and directives called ‘Six-pack’ deepened and
strengthened the Stability and Growth Pact. Besides, the most
7
Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance
économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 186-187, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI:
10.3917/eufor.358.0173.
8
Paul Craig, “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragma-
tism”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47 (2012): 232-233.
emblematic reform was the signature of a new treaty, the Treaty
on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). The core pro-
posal made in December 2011 was intensively negotiated in the
European Council, and after no less than six revisions, which
considerably weakened its original provisions, the TSCG was
signed in March 2012.8
The idea behind the TSCG was to “foster

budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the
co-ordination of their [the Member States] economic policies and
to improve the governance of the euro area”.9
We can summarise
the core provisions of the TSCG with two main evolutions for the
EU and its Member States: a balanced-budget rule and an en-
hanced correction mechanism against the Member States in
breach of the obligations underlying the TSCG.10
It is necessary to mention one last main ‘change’ pro-
voked by the financial turmoil of 2008 and the widespread sov-
“The genuine drivers behind the anti-crisis measures, and, later on, be-
hind the EU structural reform, were the Member States.”
ereign debt crisis. The perception of the role of the European
Central Bank (ECB), until then confined to the maintenance of
price stability, was reconsidered and enhanced. As Jean-Claude
Trichet put it, the ECB “has confirmed its capacity to take bold
action to foster financing conditions and enhance its credit sup-
port to the euro area economy, while remaining fully aligned
with its primary mandate of safeguarding medium-term price
stability”.11
Looking towards the future through European inte-
gration theories: perspectives for the EU
Now that the changes spurred by the financial crisis have
been outlined, it is time to assess the potential implications
these could have for the future of Europe. However, by adopting
9
Ibid., 233.
10
Ibid., 235.
11
Jean-Claude Trichet, “State of the Union: The Financial Crisis and the ECB’s Response between
2007 and 2009”, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.48 Annual Review (2010): 7.

Issue 1 21
such a prospective position, one has to be aware of the prism
through which European integration is regarded, as such an
analysis is inevitably subjective. Hence, the most satisfactory
way to prospect the aftermath of the EU reforms seems to fall
within the different theories on the European integration. That is
why we will assess the meaning of the changes first through the
neo-functionalist lenses, then through the liberal intergovern-
mental ones, and finally from a broader governance standpoint.
The signature of the TSCG and the set of ancillary
measures represent a major step towards more integration in
the EU. Hence, we can argue that the crisis spurred the reinforce-
ment of an integrated and coherent economic policy at the Euro-
pean level, and that there is every reason to believe further re-
forms will keep going on this track. This echoes the neo-
functional approach of the European integration, first envisaged
by Jean Monnet and theorised by Ernst Haas through the so-
called ‘spill-over’ effect of sectorial integration.12
Just like gears,
the economic integration spurred the monetary integration in
the 1990s. With the current crisis and the orientation taken by
the reforms to overcome the crisis, the EU is heading towards
fiscal and budgetary federalism, more integrated and convergent
economic policies and eventually a greater role to play in super-
vising the Member States. So as to claim that the EU and its insti-
tutions will hold greater responsibilities and that the national
budgetary policies will homogenise, we can rely on three major
orientations of the anti-crisis measures.
First, the national economic policies will most likely head
towards more convergence and co-ordination. The crisis indeed
provoked a raise of awareness of the interdependency of Mem-
ber States’ economies, and spurred financial solidarity between
the members of the Eurozone. As debated as it was, the creation
of the ESM has been accepted like a necessity by all twenty-seven
Member States. It is also likely to increase the bailed out Member
States’ liability.
Moreover, with the reinforced provisions of the TFEU and
the TSCG, the Member States will be constrained to co-operate
with each other and with the EU institutions. The correction
mechanism clause of the TSCG, and the fact it will be enforced
through the European Court of Justice, is very likely to be much
more dissuasive than the previous Stability and Growth Pact. It
will increase the EU’s power to oversee Member States’ policies,
and thus increase Member States’ liability before the EU – some-
thing that was hardly imaginable before the crisis.
12
économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 189, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/
eufor.358.0173.

Lastly, it seems likely that the importance of the typically
supranational European institutions will drastically increase.
Taking the example of the European Parliament, often depicted
as powerless in the EU decision-making compared to the Europe-
an Council or the Council of the EU, we can argue that it was
granted with more attention than before. First, it played a cen-
tral role in creating three supervising financial agencies in
2010.13
Second, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, urged the
MEPs to back the euro by addressing the Parliament for the first
time in 2012, thus acknowledging its potential decisive role for
the future of the EU.14
In sum, whether it is illustrated by the renewed interest
of Member States for key-institutions of the EU, by the increase
of liability of Member States before the EU, or by new provisions
enhancing the EU’s competence, everything leads to think that
the Union will be more integrated and prominent than ever be-
fore in the years to come.
However, these prospects can be put into perspective if
we have a close look at the competing approach of the European
integration, namely liberal intergovernmentalism. Andrew Mora-
vcsik built on earlier realist conceptions of the international rela-
tions that were applied to the European integration process. He
places the Member States and their interests at the centre of his
analysis, and claims that any progress in the integration process
will come at the mercy of the Member State’s preferences. More-
over, he argues that despite the influence of the Community
method developed in the EU decision-making, the intergovern-
mental method prevailed. Indeed, to some extent, if we consider
how the reforms have been achieved, one must recognise the
active role of Member States in the decision-making process. As
Moravcsik stated, “today, European states retain far more con-
trol than Brussels”.15
First, as Lépine acknowledges and as it was shown in the
first section, the genuine drivers behind the anti-crisis measures,
and, later on, behind the EU structural reform, were the Member
States. Typically, the intergovernmental institutions of the EU,
such as the Eurogroup or the European Council, became the priv-
ileged EU apparatus for decision-making during the crisis and
even after it was about reforming the EU.16
Second, the intergovernmental premise has been verified
that the strongest Member States’ preferences have been deci-
sive in shaping the future of Europe. As a matter of fact, the
commentators have been underlining the crucial role of Germa-
13
eufor.358.0173.
14
“Debate with Angela Merkel”, BBC News, November 7th, 2012, accessed January 13th, 2013,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/newsid_9766000/9766850.stm.
15
Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common Currency”, Foreign Affairs
Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 68
16
eufor.358.0173.

Issue 1 23
ny in influencing decision-making during the crisis. As Moravc-
sik points out, “Germany benefits greatly from the current sys-
tem”,17
and its preferences and interests have been prominent in
the establishment of budgetary discipline rules and the reject of
certain measures enhancing the role of the ECB or mutualising
the European debt, which shaped the reform of the EU.
To a certain extent, the measures intending to reform the
EU economic governance did not transfer sufficient power to the
EU institutions. Taking the example of the ESM, one has to admit
it has an intergovernmental character: it operates outside of the
European budget and the decision-making procedure is unanimi-
ty. Furthermore, the financial help is guaranteed by the Member
States individually and not jointly, and the ESM management will
not be subject to any form of control by EU institutions.18
In light of the examples provided, it is necessary to con-
sider the scenario forecasted by those who believe that the Mem-
ber States are ‘obstinate’ and that they will be the central players
in the future European integration. As Renaud Dehousse stated
recently, this “raises the ques-
tion whether the current
strengthening of intergovern-
mentalism is a temporary sit-
uation or a structural
change”.19
However, a third
scenario can be envisaged for
the future of the EU in the
light of the recent changes in
the economic governance of
the Eurozone – that is, the
development of new forms of
governance in the Union.
First, one can predict
the incremental institutionali-
sation of a multi-speed Eu-
rope. Indeed, the signature of the TSCG and the treaty of Lisbon
amendment to integrate the ESM in the Union’s provisions are
prime examples of this evolution for the EU. As the United King-
dom and the Czech Republic refused to be part of the TSCG pro-
visions as they were being drawn out, the Union found a way to
accommodate all Member States preferences by allowing the UK
and the Czech Republic not to be part of the TSCG. As straight-
forward as it may seem, this development has consequences for
the EU, which is starting to legally build a two-speed Europe. As
Jean-Claude Piris sums it up, a two-speed Europe “would consist
17
Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common Currency”, Foreign Affairs
Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 64.
18
Eulalia Rubio, “Quel budget Européen pour l’Après-Crise”, Regards croisés sur l’économie n°11
(2012): 145, accessed January 13, 2012, DOI: 10.3917/rce.011.0139.
19
Andrea Jancsó, “The dominance of intergovernmentalism in the economic crisis management of
EU: Professor Renaud Dehousse's presentation at the Central European University”, South-East
Europe International Relations Quarterly Vol.1 n°3 (2012): 1.

in permitting some Member States, those that are willing and
able, to cooperate at a faster pace than the other Member
States”.20
Moreover, the TSCG, as it was signed, represents an over-
haul of European integration as we know it. As it is distinct from
Lisbon and did not use the enhanced cooperation provisions pre-
scribed by the consolidated version of the Treaty,21
we can fore-
cast a genuine rethinking on the legitimacy of change in the EU.
As Paul Craig justly mentions, “even though it has not been pos-
sible to attain unanimity, and even though the rules on en-
hanced co-operation have not been used, it is legitimate to attain
the desired ends by a different route and EU institutions can be
integral to such a project”.22
It is also justified to imagine that, in
the light of the latest changes of the EU economic governance
with the TSCG, a recasting of the EU institutions is around the
corner. Indeed, the conferral of additional supervision, imple-
mentation and steering functions for the EU institutions might
provoke a rethinking on the compatibility of those with the cur-
rent powers and functions of the EU.
Conclusion
In the light of the changes brought about to the EU in
relation to the crisis, one could assert that European integration
is experiencing a major turning point. Whether we believe the
crisis urged more integration on a supranational level, brought
the Member States back at the negotiations table, or provoked a
rethinking of the EU’s current balance of powers and functions,
no sufficient time has passed to tell with certainty to which ex-
tent the crisis will change the EU. Given that the EU is still grap-
pling with the crisis, and the reforms that have been put in place
may not have yielded necessary results, predicating the future
proves hard and ungratifying in these circumstances.
Overall, we cannot emphasise enough the overriding les-
son of the crisis, which demonstrates the EU and its Member
States’ political will to proceed with integration.23
Whatever
shape the future Europe will eventually take, the crisis exhibited
the capacity of the EU to ensure its co-ordination.
20
Jean-Claude Piris, “Fourth option: legally binding a two-speed Europe”, In The Future of Europe:
Towards a Two-Speed EU? (New-York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 121.
21
Paul Craig, “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragma-
tism”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47 (2012): 238.
22
Ibid., 238.
23
eufor.358.0173.

Issue 1 25
BIBLOGRAPHY
Begg, Iain. “Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in
the EU: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis”. Journal of Common Mar-
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Craig, Paul. “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Princi-
ple, Politics and Pragmatism”. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47
(2012): 231-247.
“Debate with Angela Merkel”. BBC News, November 7th
, 2012. Accessed
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, 2013. http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/
newsid_9766000/9766850.stm
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lated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
Hodson, Dermot, and Quaglia, Lucia. “European Perspectives on the
Global Financial Crisis: Introduction”. Journal of Common Market Stud-
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Hosli, Madeleine O., van Demen, Adrian M. A., Widgrén, Mika, ed. Institu-
tional Challenges in the European Union. London: Routledge, 2002.
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nomic crisis management of European Union: Professor Renaud
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Studies Vol.48 Annual Review (2010): 7-19.

PEACE-BUILDING ‘FROM BELOW’ IN
KOSOVO: HOW A COMMUNITY-BASED
APPROACH CAN ENHANCE THE UNMIK
EXECUTIVE PEACE-BUILDING MODEL
Introduction
This paper explores societal reconciliation as a bottom-
up alternative to the United Nations Interim Administrative Mis-
sion in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) offsets in dealing with the protracted
culture of conflict in Kosovar civil society. The theoretical frame-
work used in this analysis will rely essentially on John-Paul
Lederach’s transformation orientated approach to societal recon-
ciliation which places particular emphasis on the unique role of
NGOs as ‘middle range actors’ in promoting local ownership of
the peace process.1
This particular aspect of peace-building is
firstly discussed through a critical analysis of the relationship
between international non-governmental organizations (INGOs)
and local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) under the
UNMIK. Successful examples of initiatives at inter-communal rec-
onciliation from both INGOs and LNGOs working in this domain
in Kosovo will then be explored, by looking at current efforts
made towards creating cross-ethnic networks and opportunities
for direct contact from both sides. As Lederach argues, it is only
via direct contact that sustained relationships can be formed
and misperceptions corrected, addressing the issue of inter-
communal mistrust.
Conceptualising societal reconciliation: peace-
building from below
Kosovo provides an ideal example of a deeply divided
society that can be analysed both on the horizontal and the ver-
tical level. On the vertical level, the literature reveals a general
BY DELPHINE GIRMA
This paper argues that a com-
munity-based or ‘bottom-up’
approach to peacebuilding of-
fers a more legitimate and ef-
fective alternative to the stale-
mate in Kosovo, characterized
by a protracted underlying
culture of mistrust and hatred
between the Kosovo-Serb and
the Kosovo-Albanian commu-
nities.
A bottom-up approach comes
to offset the shortcomings of
the United Nations Interim
Administrative Mission in Ko-
sovo’s (UNMIK) technocratic
top-down peace model. The
theoretical framework used in
this analysis will rely essential-
ly on John-Paul Lederach’s
transformation orientated ap-
proach to societal reconcilia-
tion, a fundamental aspect of
peace-building which has been
hitherto overlooked by the UN-
MIK. While institutional con-
solidation, as part of the broad-
er peace process, is by all
means necessary in Kosovo, it
is here argued that democrati-
zation of Kosovo by way of in-
stitutional consolidation alone
fails to address the culture of
mistrust still persistent in the
country.
Both the necessity of and the
obstacles to local initiatives of
building inter-communal trust
as the foundation to sustaina-
ble peace are explored in this
argument.
1
John-Paul Lederach, Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997)
“As priority was given to top-down institutionalization under the UNMIK,
within a specific model of peace based on democratic institutions and a market
-driven economy, the underlying issue of social cohesion was overlooked. ”

Issue 1 27
“Temporal dilemmas deal with the underlying issue of peace-building,
asking this vital question: should peace be a pre-condition for democra-
cy, or democracy a pre-condition for peace? ”
consensus that the democratization process failed and that
there is no solid democratic culture.2
A key factor of division in
Kosovo is the sustained politicization of civil society. There are
two civil societies, with the majority of Kosovo Serbs relying on
parallel Serbian institutions, pursuing a policy of non-
cooperation with the new Kosovar institutions implemented un-
der the UNMIK. The political scene continues to reflect the un-
derlying ethnic divide of both communities, with Kosovo Serbs
largely refusing to participate in Kosovar elections, and remains
split between mono-ethnic parties.3
In addition to territorial and
political divide, Kosovo is fragmented socially and psychologi-
cally. The UNMIK liberal peace model, widely equated with exten-
sive state-building, effectively attempted to create a new Koso-
var state without any strong basis of civic trust or democratic
culture of peace.4
A fundamental reason behind the failed de-
mocratization of Kosovo is the absence of an inclusive notion of
Kosovar citizenship. As priority was given to top-down institu-
tionalization under the UNMIK, within a specific model of peace
based on democratic institutions and a market-driven economy,
the underlying issue of social cohesion was overlooked.5
There is
very little cross-community interaction in Kosovo as the pro-
tracted culture of conflict and mistrust persist, reinforced by
segregated education and healthcare systems and very few
mixed communities.6
John-Paul Lederach’s transformation orientated approach
towards conflict resolution defines peace-building as ‘a compre-
hensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and ap-
proaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable,
peaceful relations and outcomes'.7
Lederach’s understanding of
reconciliation within peace-building can be extended by the soci-
etal argument put forward by theorist David Beetham that de-
mocracy relies upon a democratic culture of tolerance and
peace.8
In Beetham’s broader definition of democracy, institu-
tions are derived from the creation of social norms and values.
This theoretical approach to peace-building, with regards to Ko-
sovo, falls under a larger central debate, best identified by Anna
2
Osin Tansey, Regime-Building:Democratization and International Administration: Democratization
and International Administration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Roberto Belloni, "Civil
society in war-to-democracy transitions" in From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding, ed.
Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 182-210 ; Ro-
land Paris, “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice ’”, Review of international stud-
ies, 28 (2002)
3
Tansey, Regime-Building, 147-48.
4
Franks, Jason, and Oliver P. Richmond, "Coopting liberal peace-building untying the Gordian knot
in Kosovo." Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 82.
5
Ibid, 92.
6
Shpend Kursani and Ilir Deda , “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation in the North-
ern Part of Kosovo”, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Policy
Paper Series (2012/03): 10.
7
Lederach, Building peace, 14.
8
Beetham, Democracy and human rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999)

K. Jarstad as the temporal and horizontal dilemmas of war-to-
democracy transition.9
Temporal dilemmas deal with the under-
lying issue of peace-building, asking this vital question: should
peace be a pre-condition for democracy, or democracy a pre-
condition for peace? Democratic institutions in Kosovo were
introduced not merely before any agreement on the country’s
legal status was reached, but, more importantly,
without any societal reconciliation. The horizon-
tal dilemma concerns the actors of the peace
process and which groups of society it should
include. In view of the bottom-up approach to
peace-building, the reconciliation process should
be essentially driven by local actors.10
The UN
advocates national ownership and capacity
building as necessary to the creation of sustaina-
ble peace with short-term, limited external assis-
tance (Agenda for Peace 1992). Timothy Donais
asserts that the UN defends a liberal vision of
local ownership. In such vision local actors im-
plement a global, predefined model of peace-
building, as opposed to a communitarian under-
standing of local ownership in which the peace-
building process must be defined and carried
out by these same local actors.11
Likewise, Sever-
ine Autesserre points out that the concept of
‘local ownership’ is now a ‘buzzword’ in interna-
tional organizations, referring to ownership by
the central government rather than such actors.
It is asserted here that the local ownership with-
in civil society was undermined under the UN-
MIK in terms of the unequal relationship be-
tween INGOs and LGOs.
Civil society under the UNMIK: A criti-
cal analysis
The end of the 1999 NATO military intervention in Kosovo and
the establishment of UNMIK saw the proliferation of LNGOs as
sub-divisions of larger INGOs. It is in fact the ‘largest contingent
of INGOs in the shortest time ever seen in a post-war setting’.12
In an insightful consideration of the international and local lim-
its of peace-building in Kosovo, Ana Devic speaks of an ‘unequal’
and ‘instrumental’ partnership initiated from the very beginning
of the UNMIK, not only between LNGOs and international actors
9
Jarstad and Sisk, From war to democracy, 23-5.
10
Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding Processes”, Peace & Change, 34 (2009): 6.
11
Severine Autesserre, The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of
international peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 43.
12
By the end of 1999, just six months after the ending of armed conflict, there were 285 INGOs
registered with the UN in Kosovo, compared with around a dozen two years previously and possibly
50 or so immediately prior to the NATO bombings of 1999 (Scott-Flynn 2000 cited in Bill Sterland,
“Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies: The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo”, International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), Praxis Paper 9, (2006):
25.

Issue 1 29
but also between LNGOs and the local political elite (i.e. the Pro-
visional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)). She reproves
this imposition of a pre-defined peace model, led with disregard
of local dynamics of interethnic cooperation prior to the military
intervention, and criticizes the ethnic ‘un- mixing’ and out-
migration trends following the intervention, and the striking ne-
glect in the area of refugee return.13
Part of the UNMIK policy of
decentralization was to encourage lobbying from LNGOs against
the PISG, but this remains rare and little pressure is put on polit-
ical elites on issues of multi-ethnic cooperation, minority returns
and reintegration.14
Indeed, INGOs have reinforced legacies of
the post-war Kosovo political culture which influenced the func-
tioning of LNGOs characterized by mistrust of governmental and
state structures, lack of inter-ethnic cooperation and fear of con-
troversial advocacy, while failing to exploit its positive network
of human resources.15
Concerning this uneven relationship between INGOs and
LNGOs, a temporal dilemma of the peace-building process espe-
cially relevant to Kosovo, characterizing the pre-defined peace
model condemned by Devic, is the institutional pressure put by
international organizations to achieve short-term results. Such a
trend is coupled with the lack of underlying structural projects
and comprehensive understanding of how to ensure peace sus-
tainability.16
Missions in postwar Kosovo are often limited to ra-
ther superficial, single events, including training workshops, lec-
tures and seminars.17
The local NGO Me Dorë Në Zemër (MDNZ)
insisted on the lack of sustainable projects which it attributed to
both the critical economic situation and continued political in-
stability. The challenge faced by LNGOs to achieve concrete
short-term results with limited resources constraints them to
accept this model of peace, leaving little space for alterative vi-
sions of peace and multi-ethnic cooperation for fear of political
controversy or absence of funding. As a result, the majority of
LNGOs focus on the same areas and employ the same methods.
Priority is placed, for instance, on working with the Kosovar
Youth through conversation workshops one of the mains areas
of work of MDNZ. In fact, only 5% of NGOs registered in Kosovo
put forward ethnic reconciliation as their defining goal.18
Civil
society has progressively been dominated by the agendas of IN-
OGs, reflecting the lack of local cooperation and ownership.19
Additionally, there is a danger of financial dependency where
LNGOs become more accountable to INGOs than to the real re-
cipients of aid in local communities.20
International donors, alt-
hough crucial, can thus limit local ownership.
13
Ana Devic, “Transnationalization of civil society in Kosovo: International and local limits of peace
and multiculturalism”, Ethnopolitics, 5 (2006): 261.
14
Ibid, 34.
15
Monica Llamazares and Laina Reynolds Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, (University of
Bradford :Department of Peace Studies; 2003), 25.
16
Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions", 184.
17
Shpend Kursani and Ilir Deda , “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26.
18
Ibid, 25.
19
Anne Holohan, Networks of democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005): 160.
20

Similarly, Milja Kurki critically examines the European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) aiming at
promoting democracy ‘from below’ through the strengthening of
civil society. Kurki analyses EIDHR’s work in light of the Fou-
cauldian theoretical concept of neoliberal governmentality, de-
scribing the subtle exercise of control over the functioning of
society disguised behind the normative ideal of freedom.21
Alt-
hough the EU democratic promotion is depoliticized, as to avoid
normative and ideological debate over what kind of democracy
should be promoted, it nonetheless promotes the model of a
particular understanding of freedom and prosperity, based on
the functioning of the liberal free market. The ultimate form of
control manifests itself when the functioning of civil society is
shaped by the rules of the liberal market, and when such rules
are extended into all areas of society as a model of living.22
The EIDHR’s emphasis on local ownership is thus paradoxical, as
the idea of responsibility and independence is already condi-
tioned by the EU’s governmental rationality. NGOs are expected
to function as homo economicus and to follow the laws of com-
petitions of the market to compete with other civil society actors
for funding, in order to implement their ‘self-designed’ pro-
jects.23
Yet, as we have seen in the unequal relationships between
INGOs and LNGOs, local initiatives are conditioned by the neces-
sity of funding and therefore tend to prioritize short-term pro-
jects rather than longer-term structural changes. As Kurki high-
“The need to ‘de-ethnicise’ politics in Kosovo starts with the focus on al-
ternative identities by giving people a new purpose and a new role with-
in their community, where shared interests can be created.”
lights, ‘capacity to democratize becomes, even if rather uninten-
tionally, equated with capacity to obtain and manage funding’.24
This offers a reflection of the systematic issues of external peace
-building in terms of the imposition of a particular vision of
peace, which persists under the European Union Rule of Law
Mission in Kosovo (EUR-Lex).
Another systematic issue of peace-building is the rushed
aspect of the ‘transition phase’ when INGOs withdraw from a
post-war society.25
In Kosovo, the superficial handover of INGOs
to LNGOs and lack of training were especially salient in the
‘emergency phase’ of the UNMIK, where international and local
structures focused on providing post-war relief and social ser-
vices. While INGOs relied on LNGOs from a practical point of
21
Milja Kurki, "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for De-
mocracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies." International Politi-
cal Sociology 5 (2011): 325.
22
Ibid, 353.
23
Ibid, 359.
24
Kurki, "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion”, 361.
25

Issue 1 31
“One of the interviewed NGO activists stated that ‘it was very important
to have in the report a written statement that there have been 25 Albani-
ans and 25 Serbs and that they have done something together; no matter
what, in order to receive adequate funding.”
view, not enough emphasis was put on the transferring of exper-
tise and management skills.26
Consequently, there is still a lack
of competent local staff within many local branches of INGOs as
top management positions were essentially monopolized by in-
ternational staff.27
In the second phase, priorities shifted to in-
troducing municipal governing structures, civil society services,
and large-scale infrastructure projects.28
This phase embodies
the Western technocratic models of democratization via institu-
tion-building according to the liberal internationalist paradigm,
overlooking social mechanisms for reconciliation.29
Indeed, the
majority of external peace-building interventions “follow a do-
nor-driven, bureaucratic-institutional logic that conjures into
existence a social field on which policies can be imposed by ex-
perts defined not by their local knowledge but by their grasp of
institutional imperatives and pseudo-scientific models of society
and social change.”30
The consolidation phase was thus under-
mined because there was arguably nothing to consolidate in
terms of civic reconciliation. Success was measured by concrete
achievements, such as rehabilitated infrastructures or return of
refugees, but rarely expanded to the sustainability of these
achievements.
Civil society nowadays is greatly weakened in Kosovo,
which is paradoxical considering the vast deployment of INGOs
following the end of the conflict. It is weak for a large part be-
26
Llamazares and Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, 13.
27
Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 18.
28
29
Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition?”, 8.
30
Keith Krause and Oliver Jutersonke, “Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environ-
ments,” Security Dialogue, (2005): 459 cited in Donais, Empowerment or Imposition?”, 9.

cause of this unequal and artificial relationship with INGOs,
which made it unsustainable once international structures under
the UNMIK began to withdraw. While approximately 3, 000 NGOs
are registered in Kosovo, only 500 of them are realistically oper-
ative. They remain predominantly small, single-donor and single-
project organisations, with an average staff size of around five.31
The vast number of INGOs under the UNMIK and
their established implementing partners are une-
venly spread, clustered in large urban areas, and
create competition for local stakeholders. This is
the case not only between LNGOs, but mostly be-
tween INGOs and LNGOs. With the end of the UN-
MIK, a majority of LNGOs find themselves com-
pletely dependent on increasingly scarce short-
term funding. Youth and women’s groups com-
prise between 40% and 50% of all NGOs.32
A prag-
matic approach to peace-building, dealing with
everyday issues shared by both communities could
be a way to render the peace process less exoge-
nous, while directly involving the local population.
The following section analyses successful exam-
ples of this community-based, bottom-up ap-
proach of inter-communal reconciliation.
Promoting social capital: beyond the ‘ethnic’ catego-
risation
The developing of social capital within communities re-
quires the identification of mutual interests outside ethnicity
and politics. The case of Kosovo is the perfect example of how
ethnic categorization can lead to such a political and social im-
passe. The ‘ethnic explanation’ is broken down if we understand
it as a result of the basic human need for psychological security,
stemming from the political and security realities of Kosovo.33
The identification with one ethnic group can be seen as a reac-
tion rather than a generalized determinant of individual behav-
iour. In light of this reasoning, it becomes clear that there will be
no sustainable peace in Kosovo, or in any other deeply divided
societies, as long other ethnic groups are perceived as a threat.
The need to ‘de-ethnicise’ politics in Kosovo starts with the fo-
cus on alternative identities by giving people a new purpose and
a new role within their community, where shared interests can
be created.34
Arguably, UNMIK’s multi-ethnicity policy further
externalized the peace process. This is essentially because UN-
31
Sterland, “Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies”, 32.
32
Ibid, 26
33
Aidan, Hehir, “Autonomous province building: identification theory and the failure of
UNMIK” , International peacekeeping, 13 (2006): 205-6 ; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Addressing
ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building: Lessons from recent cases." Security Dia-
logue 36 (2005): 299.
34
Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building”, 306.

Issue 1 33
MIK aimed to build a ‘multi-ethnic Kosovo’ rather than facilitate
the creation of a shared Kosovar identity. Although we lack the
space to delve deeply into UNMIK’s policies, we must consider
their influence in shaping how the Kosovo conflict came to be
perceived by both the international community and the people
of Kosovo. The notion of ‘multi-ethnicity’ in Kosovo has not
been integrated within society, nor did it encourage the emer-
gence of ‘a civic culture of ethnic tolerance and the rule of law’.35
Rather, UNMIK’s multi-ethnicity policy arguably institutionalized
ethnicity within the post-war Kosovo political system and fur-
ther reinforced divisions, to the extent that ethnic identity be-
came the defining social characteristic and the underling factor
in the appropriation of power in politics. In the current Kosovar
electoral system, for instance, any party must pre-register as an
ethnically Serb or other minority party in order to benefit from
overrepresentation.36
Furthermore, in a report analysing grassroots approaches
to inter-ethnic reconciliation in northern Kosovo, it was under-
lined that too much pressure was put on LNGOs for ethnic coop-
eration by means of imposing ethnic quotas. One of the inter-
viewed NGO activists stated that ‘it was very important to have
in the report a written statement that there have been 25 Albani-
ans and 25 Serbs and that they have done something together;
no matter what, in order to receive adequate funding.37
The crea-
tion of shared identities is a lengthy process which must take
place at the grassroots level in order to be internalized. It is not
realistic, therefore, to hold UNMIK entirely responsible for the
lack of Kosovar citizenship. The mission can be criticized, how-
ever, for perpetuating what could be called an ‘ethnicity filter’
over the conflict, entrenching ethnicity as the main determinant
of identity and indirectly undermining the civil reconciliation in
both the short and the longer term. The need to ‘de-ethicise’ pol-
itics should apply to civil society.38
Assimilating ethnic identity
with quotas in civil society can in fact further ingrain existing
tensions.
Successful initiatives of societal reconciliation in
Kosovo
The identification of common interests will enable Koso-
var citizens from both communities to realize that individual
interests are not homogenous within each of the communities
and may contradict with one another, while some interests can
be shared across ethnic division.39
The poor economic situation
35
Jens Narten, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Dynamics of External–Local
Interaction in Kosovo under United Nations Administration.", Journal of Intervention and Statebuild-
ing 2 (2008): 273.
37
37
Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26.
38
39
Ibid, 306.

and high level of unemployment in Kosovo, which is the overall
concern for both sides, can be used as the basis for finding com-
mon interest and developing “bridging social capital” between
both communities.40
In line with Robert Putnam’s assertion that
bridging social capital can engender human and financial capital,
economic projects create direct contact and opportunities for
building relationships during and after work.41
However, they
tend to remain in the private sphere and have not yet had a sig-
nificant impact on society or politics. Ashutosh Varshney has
demonstrated the importance of every day forms of engagement
and building cross-communal networks.42
Varshney’s work, cen-
tred on India, shows that some cities are more likely to experi-
ence ethnic riots than others. In Kosovo, there was interestingly
an increase of ethnic violence in areas where the return process
was overlooked.43
Business is traditionally an arena of inter-
ethnic cooperation in Kosovo but suffered from conflict, years of
distrust and violence, and displacement of population.44
‘Building Peace by Business’ is a central theme to the work of the
INGO Mercy Corps, which benefits from a long experience in Ko-
40
Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26
41
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon and
Schuster, 2000): 23.
42
Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic conflict and civil society" World Politics 53 (2001).
43
44
“Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition: An International NGO’s Experience” Mercy Corps Discus-
sion Paper, 2007, 8.

Issue 1 35
sovo, being implemented there since 1993 (prior to the war).
Mercy Corps has successfully encouraged inter-ethnic coopera-
tion through business in the dairy industry. The creation of inter
-ethnic business relations, combined with assistance towards
helping Kosovars develop individual businesses or micro enter-
prises45
from a range of NGOs following a similar approach to
that of Mercy Corps has considerably improved the reintegration
of returnees, enhancing relational stability on a more personal
level.46
This combined approach reflects a creative and yet prac-
tical way of addressing this salient issue in Kosovo, engaging
local communities directly in the process. Another interesting
example is the local NGO Community Building Mitrovica (CBM),
which describes itself as an ‘interethnic grassroots organization
that identifies, encourages and facilitates joint actions of citi-
zens in the Mitrovica region in order to promote cooperation, co-
existence and democratic values’.47
CBM, in an inclusive grass-
roots approach in line with Lederach’s psychological under-
standing of reconciliation, initiated a trust-building process be-
tween returning refugees and the local communities, via a series
of meetings, counselling events and encouraged dialogues. This
fruitful mediation process was in fact taken as an example by
UNMIK officials, who asked CBM to present their work to them.
NGOs have a key role in encouraging direct contact, eliminating
the psychological barriers of mistrust and progressively help
citizens from conflicting sides to identify common interests to
the mixed-community as a whole. An effective way of achieving
this is the creation of networks which will reinforce trust and
provide space for sustained relationships.
Conclusion
This paper has criticized the inherent paradox of the UN-
MIK: a model based on the diffusion of liberal democratic
norms, but which prioritizes short-term institution building in a
technocratic manner and which, in the end, remains superficial
and lacks legitimacy among the local population. In line with
Beetham’s assertion that democratic norms cannot be trans-
planted, nor peace can be imposed from above, it is argued that
sustainable peace can only be created locally through socializa-
tion. The implementation of a democratic culture of peace
should be combined with concrete social cohesion by bridging
divisions and building ties between conflicting groups through
shared interests.
45
See example of The Agency for Finance in Kosovo (AfK)
46
Based on reports of Gauron (2004) and Schlemmer (2005) evaluation refugee return assistance
programs in Kosovo in “Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition”, 8.
47
See Mission Statement on CBM Webpage in bibliography: 23.

BIBLOGRAPHY
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failure of international peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Devic, Ana. “Transnationalization of civil society in Kosovo: Internation-
al and local limits of peace and multiculturalism. Ethnopolitics, 5
(2006): 257-273.
Donais, Timothy. “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local
Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes”, Peace & Change,
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Hehir, Aidan. “Autonomous province building: identification theory and
the failure of UNMIK”. International peacekeeping, 13 (2006): 200-213.
Holohan, Anne. Networks of democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Af-
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tion of Democratic Civil Societies." International Political Sociology 5
(2011): 349-366.
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Narten, Jens. "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Dy-
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Issue 1 37
Online Documents
Kursani, Shpend and Deda, Ilir, “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic
Reconciliation in the Northern Part of Kosovo”,
Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Policy
Paper Series (2012/03)
available online on:
http://www.kipred.org/advCms/documents/65788_Grassroots_approac
hes_to_inter-ethnic_reconciliation_in_northern_Kosovo.pdf [Last ac-
cessed March 2014]
Llamazares,Monica and Reynolds Levy, Laino, NGOs and peacebuilding
in Kosovo, (University of Bradford : Department of Peace Studies; 2003).
Available online on:
http://www.centreforconflictresolution.org.uk. [Last accessed March
2014]
Sterland, Bill, “Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies:
The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo”, International
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http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/21691 [Last ac-
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“Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition: An International NGO’s Experi-
ence” Mercy Corps Discussion Paper, 2007, 8.
http://www.mercycorps.org.uk/sites/default/files/file1170359339.pdf
[Last accessed March 2014]
NGO Websites
Community Building Mitrovica
http://www.cbmitrovica.org/en/ [Last accessed March 2014]
Mercy Corps Kosovo
http://www.mercycorps.org/kosovo [Last accessed March 2014]

POWER-SHARING, MINORITY RIGHTS
AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP IN NIGERIA
AND MALI
The self-determination of colonial countries and
the pursuit of national unity by African leaders
The right to self-determination: “All peoples have the
right to self-determination”,1
enshrined in the UN Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966), is a collective right expressed by
a national group. Nonetheless the UN Declaration Granting Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) reveals a
shift in the interpretation of ‘self-determination’ from a right
claimed by a people, forming a more or less homogenous nation,
to a principle applicable to all colonial countries and the people
who inhabit them,2
thus disregarding the issue of minorities in
ethnically diverse societies. Moreover, the notions of state sover-
eignty and inviolability which are part of the international law of
states, further entrenched the colonial boundaries as the sole
form of national self-determination in order for African states to
be accepted on the international stage.3
In the attempt to create
legitimacy for the postcolonial state in the eyes of their constitu-
ency, nationalist leaders underlined the need for cohesiveness
and unity often based on the predominance of one ethnic group.
In Mali, this took the form of a one-party state, Union Sou-
danaise- Rassemblement démocratique africaine (US-RDA),4
while in Nigeria the political strength of the Hausa-Fulani in the
North persisted via the unequal federal structure inherited by
colonialism.5
The attempt to create state legitimacy via national
consciousness failed due to the imposition of unnatural bounda-
ries, the absence of norms concerning minority rights and the
mobilisation of political support via ethnic or regional loyalties
on behalf of politicians.
BY DIANA FACCIO
The principle of the right to self
-determination has been re-
stricted via the UN
“Declaration Granting Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples” (1960) and grant-
ed solely to peoples living in
colonised countries, disregard-
ing their heterogeneity and the
existence of diverse national
groups within state boundaries.
The absence of international
norms of group-specific rights
during the decolonisation peri-
od hindered the ability of Nige-
rian politicians to construct a
federation providing equal
representation, and equal citi-
zenship to all individuals in the
region. Analysis of two African
countries in the immediate
post-independence period,
reveals how decolonisation,
pursued according to European
concepts of national self-
determination and character-
ised by the absence of a dis-
course on minority rights, hin-
dered the political and cultural
rights of minorities.
The case studies of Mali and
Nigeria underline how power-
sharing was avoided both
where the minority was numer-
ous and united - the Tuareg,
and where some minorities
were represented within a fed-
eral structure- the Ibo and Yo-
ruba. Although indigenous
factors contributed to the dis-
regard for the role of minorities
in the political structure: the
use of clientilism, the impact of
international norms concern-
ing the application of princi-
ples of self-determination and
state inviolability, enshrined in
the Organisation of African
Unity Charter, severely limited
the adoption of power-sharing
agreements. 1
‘UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 19 December 1966 <http://
www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html> [accessed 1 December 2013]
2
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(Cambridge, 1990), p. 75.
3
Cristopher Clapham, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival
(Cambridge, 1996), p. 34.
4
Nicholas S. Hopkins, ‘Socialism and Social Change in Rural Mali’ in The Journal of Modern African
Studies 7 (1969), p. 458
5
Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966 (London, 1973),
p. 41.
“All peoples have the right to self-
determination”

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