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ANCILLARY MARKETS

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ANCILLARY MARKETS

  1. 1. ANCILLARY MARKETS Rajesh K. Mediratta Director (B.D.) , IEX 10th Apr,13/ New Delhi
  2. 2. In this presentation• Introduction• Proposed Market• Market Design Parameters
  3. 3. In this presentation• Introduction• Proposed Market• Market Design Parameters
  4. 4. Electricity- Charactersitics • Electricity cannot be stored – TIME LINE OF PARTICIPATION – Spot & Forwards • Quantity- Private good ; Quality- public good – Any buyer or seller cannot control quality – Quality is result of collective response of all buyers/sellers – No one-to-one physical relationship between Buyer-seller – Need System operator to ensure quality Transactions needs to be done close to real-time
  5. 5. Electricity as Commodity–market structure Long Term (MO) Capacity Markets Energy Markets - Futures & Forwards Short Energy Term (MO) OTC Trading Exchange based Near Real-time (MO) Day-Ahead Intra-day Real-time (TSO) Balancing Market Reserves Market
  6. 6. Ancillary Service categories Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) • Maintain frequency • Load following/imbalance management Network Control Ancillary Services (NCAS) • Voltage control • System Protection System Restart Ancillary Services (SRAS) • To restart the system in case of whole or partial system black out
  7. 7. NR frequency… Resources with high ramp-up/down, short periodsSource: NRLDC, 25th May, 2012
  8. 8. Next step in the market developmenttrajectory Financially Indian market is here settled Derivatives Capacity OTC Exchange/ Market Derivatives OptionsMaturity AncillaryMarket Market Spot Markets on Exchanges OTC Markets Multiple buyers - sellers Individual Buyer /Seller Time
  9. 9. Enablers formarket based Frequency Control Ancillary Services Large pool of bottled up generation (~2000MW capacity) Liquid Day-Ahead Markets Adequate number of right sized generators available MW available from each such generator is also adequate High ramp-rate generators(CCGTs) available Strong National/Regional Grids
  10. 10. Volume (MWh) 0 100000 120000 140000 160000 20000 40000 60000 80000 1-Jan-13 2-Jan-13 3-Jan-13 (Jan’2013) 4-Jan-13 5-Jan-13 6-Jan-13 7-Jan-13Purchase Bid (MWh) 8-Jan-13 9-Jan-13 10-Jan-13 11-Jan-13 12-Jan-13 Daily Bids received at IEXSell Bid (MWh) 13-Jan-13 14-Jan-13 15-Jan-13 16-Jan-13 17-Jan-13 18-Jan-13 19-Jan-13 20-Jan-13Constrained MCV (MWh) 21-Jan-13 >1000 MW Sellers unutilised after DAM 22-Jan-13 23-Jan-13 24-Jan-13 25-Jan-13 26-Jan-13 27-Jan-13 28-Jan-13Unconstrained MCP (Rs/KWh) 29-Jan-13 30-Jan-13 31-Jan-13 0.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 2.00 Rs./kWh
  11. 11. In this presentation• Introduction• Proposed Market• Market Design Parameters
  12. 12. Proposed Market process DAM Final Solution by 3:30 PM Qualified generators submit bid for ancillary service Results Bids arranged in Merit Order stack and sent to NLDC /RLDCs Sellers on the TSO’s list to remain available for the day NLDC/RLDCs to direct seller to operate plant as required Payments released on the basis of Schedule
  13. 13. Salient features Qualified generators only participate Non-performance by Enabled generators to be penalised Selected generators (in stack) to receive small availability fee Schedules issued to Generators for some minimum periods irrespective of system normalisation
  14. 14. Eligibility for Qualified Generators(QGs) Minimum quantity to be specified (say 50MW or 0.1% of system size) Minimum period of operation specified (say 6 time blocks) Minimum Ramp rate (say 10MW/min) Ramp constraints to be indicated at the time of registration No. of start/stops and period between two start/stops
  15. 15. In this presentation• Introduction• Proposed Market• Market Design Parameters
  16. 16. Should there be qualifification criteria ? Qualified Generators only • Participation by generators with high ramp/down, fast start capability • Selected resources should perform to meet TSO’s requirement All Resources • All unutilised generation can participate • Performance may not match TSO’s requirement
  17. 17. Auction Type DAM Auctions • Leftover Sellers • Confidentiality of DAM results may be hampered Re-auction • PXs can arrange bidding • Allow qualified generator to post different bid based on Average cost and not Marginal cost • Balance capacity can bid
  18. 18. Merit Order Stack Basis Synchronous interconnections • Bids stacked on the basis of common frequency area • Area may/may not be interconnected due to congestion Congestion area specific • Bids stacked on the basis of congestion area • Allow to select generators on the basis of area suffering most congestion to least congestion
  19. 19. Regulation Type Upward Only • Allow generators to bid for increasing gen or demand to bring down demand (Demand Response) • Only valleys are handled Downward and Upward Regulation • Generators to increase/decrease generation • Loads to decrease • Peaks and valleys are handled
  20. 20. Price Discovery Pay-as-you-bid • Resources to be paid price quoted by them • Sellers to strategise bidding Uniform Price • All utilised resources to be paid price of highest enabled generators • Generator may quote near marginal cost to be a part of the ‘stack’
  21. 21. Uniform Price Discovery MechanismBalancing power -sorted in merit order Price Highest up regulation Price = Sales price Upward RegulationDownward MWRegulation Lowest down regulation Price = Purchase price,
  22. 22. Market design parameters Auction /Re- Residual from Re-auction auction DAM auctions Participation Qualified All Resources by Resources Generators Synchronous Merit Order interconnections Congestion area Stack basis (common specific frequency areas) Regulation Downward & Upward only Type Upward Price Discovery Pay as you bid Uniform Price
  23. 23. Features of the proposed market design • NLDC (in consultation with CERC) to Selection of ascertain rules for selection of Qualified Generators Generators who then register with NLDC/RLDC Incentive for • Those who appear in TSO’s list for the day should receive a nominal Availability Fee to availability remain available for the day Penalty • Non-adherence should be subjected to UI • Re-bids may have ceiling price = UI (max) Price Fixation rate • Counter-party is a POOL and therefore Commercial payment to be made by the TSO Settlement • Those who create such situation to pay TSO
  24. 24. Demand Response • Direct Load Control – Load Shedding by utilities – Involve the remote interruption of customers energy usage during peak hours – Value of lost load high, resort to DG sets which is costly • Pricing Incentive – Variable electricity rates to encourage customers voluntary curtailment during demand response events – Utilities use a variety of pricing schemes including peak time rebates, critical peak pricing, and time of use rates to curtail usage

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