Naval Strategic Insight by Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY

IndraStra Global Naval Strategic Insight
2
By
Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.)
INDIAN NAVY

3
CONTENTS
SR.NO TOPICS PAGE NO:
A. Foreword 4
B. About The Author 5
1. Policy Level Intervention Imperative for Accelerating Indigenous
Manufacturing of Weapon Systems for Indian Navy
6
2. French Influence in the Indian Ocean Region - A Perspective 8
3. Anti-Submarine Air Armament: Decoded 11
4. Maritime Domain Awareness - Indian Context 14
5. Developing a Concept of Oceanic Domain Awareness for India 17
6. Aircraft Carriers in Indian Ocean Region 20
7. Rooting for a Sea Port in Thar Desert 22

4
It is with great pleasure that we present to you the Naval Strategic Insight by Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.),
INDIAN NAVY through the collection of 7 strategic articles pertaining to India’s role in maritime security apparatus of
Indian Ocean and beyond. We hope the readers will find this report both informative and interesting, that it will give
everyone a greater understanding of the work undertaken by the author and our organization.
This Naval Strategic Insight for the period July 2015 is ambitious and this is as it should be. As we prepare to meet
ongoing commitments of our contributors, it is important that our structures fit the overall strategy by providing effective
delivery of quality analysis as a primary goal. IndraStra Global has had a proud record of achievement in recent months
and we know that it has the people, the resources and the will to build on these successes and to face the future with
confidence.
IndraStra Editorial Team
JULY 26, 2015
NEW YORK CITY

5
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Rear Admiral S Kulshrestha is an alumnus of Jodhpur University with Gold Medal in Solid State
Physics in his Post Graduation. He joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and was awarded Silver Medal
at the Naval Academy, the Telescope and the Sword of Honour for being adjudged the best Naval
Officer during initial training. He did his specialisation in Quality Assurance of Naval Armament and
adorned various key appointments at Naval Command Headquarters, DRDO establishments, Ordnance
Factories and finally rose to become the Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at
the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy).
During his career spanning over three decades in the Armament Quality Organisation in the Indian
Navy, he has gained and attained thorough knowledge of Quality Assurance of sophisticated naval
armament, Quality Management Systems, Project Management, Negotiation on technical as well as
financial subjects and administration of defence as well as civilian workforce. As DGNAI, he was
directly responsible for timely availability of reliable and safe naval armament (which are sophisticated
complex systems, comprising of mechanical/ electrical/ electronic/ chemical components/ mechanisms/
circuitry) to the operational fleet of the Indian Navy.
As part of self development he has been engaged in the study of strategic aspects of acquisition of
Nanotechnology in India by both the public and private sector, with specific relevance to National
Security issues. He has two MPhil degrees pertaining to nanotechnology and associated issues from
Mumbai and Chennai universities and has a Doctorate from ‘School of International Studies’ at the
Jawaharlal National University (JNU). He is also an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence
College (NDC).He has superannuated from Indian Navy in 2011 and is currently unaffiliated. He has
been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation. He is a
Senior Fellow of New Westminster College, Vancouver, Canada, as well as an integral member of
“Brains Trust” at Hindustan University Chennai, India.

6
Weapon systems on a warship depend upon the
assigned role and mission of the warship in war.
Generally, warships carry weapons to cater for threats
emanating from the air, surface and underwater. For air
threats like sea skimming missiles and air attacks,
ships have surface to air missiles, guns in dual role,
and close in weapon systems/point defense systems
(multi barrel guns, short-range missiles). For surface
threats, ships have surface-to-surface missiles and
guns. For anti submarine warfare (ASW) ships have
torpedoes and ASW rockets. Warships carry decoys for
deception of enemy torpedoes and oncoming missiles,
these comprise of chaff dispensers, infrared (IR)
decoys, acoustic decoys etc. The warships also have
an extended weapon capability on the helicopters they
house on board; this could be a lightweight torpedo,
rockets, or small calibre guns. The advent of
weaponised unmanned vehicles is introducing another
facet of weaponisation.
Naval weapons are complex in design due to the
corrosive sea environment in which they have to
operate, severe space and weight restrictions, and
problems of stabilization as the ship rolls, pitches and
yaws. Further, as with all weapons, they cannot be
procured just by paying the currency required by the
manufacturers. The pricing of weapons is based upon
the need of the country, its relations with the producing
country, its position in the world at large and other
considerations like, foreign policy issues, type of
technology, availability of similar systems for sale in
other countries etc.
In case of India, it has been the experience that the
weapon systems it desires are not available for
purchase, alternates offered are exorbitantly priced,
and those affordable are invariably not required by
India.
The ideal solution is local availability of weapon systems,
which will ensure maintainability, timely upgrades, and
modularity for warship design. The indigenous effort has
still not matured to provide viable weapon system or even
subsystem solution within the time frame and the
budgeted costs. Economic viability, arms export policy
and non-availability of technological prowess, appear to
be the main reasons. India is left with no alternative but
to import and also prolong use of existing armament by
process of life extension, constrained with
improper/insufficient spares, inadequate documentation
and testing methods. Weapons thus continue to be
deployed well beyond their useful life without ascertaining
if or at all, or to what extent they meet the designed
parameters.
The Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP) has been
promulgated to enable the Armed forces to timely
procure the desired equipment with least drain on
national resources. The DPP is being regularly revised to
cater for changing Indian conditions. It has been
structured so that the Indian defense industrial base is
progressively strengthened by offsets, transfer of
technology, and joint venture regimes. ‘The Long Term
Integrated Perspective Plan’, LTIPP, of the armed forces,
is an indicative acquisition plan for the next 15 years but
without any commitment of funds or frozen requirements.
Policy Level Intervention Imperative for Accelerating Indigenous
Manufacturing of Weapon Systems for Indian Navy
The article was first published at IndraStra.com on May 16, 2015

7
The weapon procurement procedure commences with
drawing the staff requirements, which the Defence
Research and Development Organisation and industry
claim are unrealistic, the armed forces justify it since
weapons are used over decades and therefore once
procured they should remain current and amenable to
technological upgrades as long as possible.
Perhaps the only way the Government of India can resolve
this issue is through policy level intervention. One of the
suggested ways is by categorizing external threats at two
levels depending upon their severity & extent and
thereafter specifying two types of procurement, one (say
P1) to the staff requirements of the Armed Forces and the
other to a level (say P2 through local sources only) which
meets at least 75% of the staff requirements. Kill-ability
studies may be carried out to assess the numbers (with
sufficient redundancies) of P1 and P2 types required to
meet the threats in their entirety. Further, it can incentivize
the P2 procurement by increasing the defense budget
proportionately and set up an accountability mechanism
for timely delivery, maintainability, and function-ability of
the same.
It suffices to state that weaponisation of warships is
undergoing a change today forced by factors like
economic slowdown, emergence of littoral threats,
reduction in blue water engagements, development of
powerful sensors and weapons as well as advent of
unmanned vehicles on the horizon. It is imperative that
policy level intervention be initiated in procurement of
weapons to ensure that the Defense Industrial Base in
India is strengthened to levels where it can sustain the
requirements of the Armed forces.
______________________________________

8
Art
French Influence in the Indian Ocean Region - A Perspective
The Article was first published at IndraStra.com on May 20, 2015
The Foreign Legion detachment in Mayotte has
strength of 270 personal and can act as a rapid
reaction force. This contingent exercises mainly with
Madagascar armed forces, adds to security and
maritime surveillance of the Mozambique Channel
and can be used for humanitarian assistance tasks in
the area. Mayotte has an EEZ of 63,078 sq kms.
Reunion (La Reunion) is an island ~120 kms SW of
Mauritius and East of Madagascar. Reunion provides
a convenient access to sea lines of communications
(SLOCS) in eastern and southern coast of Africa.
France maintains a small naval presence at Reunion
islands through its naval base at Point des Galets,
which has a frigate, a support ship and some patrol
craft. Reunion has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
of 31, 5058 sq kms.
Reunion (La Reunion) is an island ~120 kms SW of
Mauritius and East of Madagascar. Reunion provides
a convenient access to sea lines of communications
(SLOCS) in eastern and southern coast of Africa.
France has continued to cultivate and nurture its
influence in the Indian Ocean Region through its
geographical presence, naval ties and inter-
dependencies developed through military equipment
sales. France has its out posts at Mayotte & La
Reunion and military bases in Djibouti and Abu Dhabi.
The Mayotte archipelago consists of two major islands
and a number of small islets between NE
Mozambique and NW Madagascar in the Mozambique
Channel. Though geographically it is a part of the
Comoro Islands, its people preferred accession to
France in 2009.
MAYOTTE ISLANDS REUNION ISLAND

9
AL
CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI
In 2011 France has signed an agreement with Kenya
for cooperation in the fields of international security,
economic partnership, and scientific collaboration
amongst others. France has also gifted a patrol boat
for helping Kenya in its fight against sea piracy. France
has nurtured its relationship with South Africa with
which it holds regular military exercises. Both countries
are looking for greater cooperation in ensuring
maritime security in association with other countries.
France, Mozambique and South Africa carried out
‘Operation Oxide’ an anti-piracy naval exercise in
2011.
France maintains a small naval presence at Reunion
islands through its naval base at Point des Galets, which
has a frigate, a support ship and some patrol craft.
Reunion has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 31,
5058 sq kms
Republic of Djibouti is strategically located in the horn of
Africa, with Gulf of Aden and Red Sea as its eastern
borders. It shares its borders with Somalia, Ethiopia and
Eritrea. Djibouti’s location offers a controlling position
over the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Its Camp
Lemonier military base (ex France) has been leased to
USA and is being upgraded by an investment of $1.4
billion to house over 1000 US Special Forces. France,
under a defence treaty, pays €30 million/year for keeping
up to 3000 troops under the Forces Françaises de
Djibouti. France has also stationed marine, air force and
army units at Djibouti with fighter aircrafts at Ambouli
airport. Djibouti provides a military access to SLOCS
between Red Sea and Indian Ocean, which carry the bulk
of French energy supplies. Interestingly, since 2012,
China too has got a foothold in Djibouti, as its China
Harbour Engineering Company is executing a $64 million
project of constructing an ore terminal for export of salt to
SE Asia.
In 2009, France signed an agreement with Emirates to
operate a military base at Abu Dhabi. The naval base is at
port Mina Zayed and can berth French naval ships except
aircraft carriers.
The air force base is at Al Dhafra which can house fighter
aircraft. The Army base (Urban Combat Training and
intelligence) is at Zayed and the famous 13th Démi-
Brigade de la Légion Étrangère has been relocated to this
base from Djibouti, without diluting the French military
presence at Djibouti. Abu Dhabi is located near the
junction of Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. This
base provides France access to the SLOCS in Persian
Gulf and ensures safety of its oil supplies.
AL DHAFRA AIR BASE, UAE

10
In addition to the above, the French presence also
comprises of its Territory of the French Southern and
Antarctica Lands , which have Scattered Islands
(around Madagascar),Crozet Islands (South of
Madagascar), and the St. Paul, Amsterdam and the
Kerguelen Islands in southern Indian Ocean. Further,
south, it has its claims in the Antarctica. The Combined
EEZ of all the French territories in the Indian Ocean
amounts to nearly 1 million sq kms! The claimed EEZ in
the Antarctica region is about 1.7 million sq kms.
Thus it can be seen that France has a significant
strategic presence from Emirates in the Persian Gulf,
Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden, off Madagascar and down
to the Kerguelen islands in the Southern Indian Ocean
Region. Further, it has ensured that its national interests
in its energy supply lines and the extensive EEZ are
carefully monitored and guarded.
The French sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean
region has been shaped by a combination of its own
energy and EEZ security requirements as well as by
forging long-term relationships with countries through
supply of military equipment. Its major competitor
today is the United States, with which it has friendly
relations. However, with China ramping up its own
influence in the region by providing lucrative arms
deals, affordable infrastructure and a rapidly growing
PLA Navy, France would face a serious contender
since it is unlikely that it would be able to match the
attractive financial packages offered China in the
Indian Ocean Region-IOR.
______________________________________

11
Anti-Submarine Air Armament: Decoded
The Article was first published at IndraStra.com on June 8, 2015
The evolution of a standoff anti submarine warfare
solution involving use of aircraft in detecting a
submarine at sea and attacking it with depth charges
and air launched torpedoes has its genesis in the
devastation caused by the German submarines during
WWI. The armament carried today by maritime aircraft
and helicopters includes, anti ship cruise missiles,
lightweight torpedoes, depth charges and bombs. The
aim of this article is to focus on anti submarine air
armament currently in use by major navies.
Air Dropped Depth Charges. Finland was the first to use
air dropped depth charges from its Tupolev SB aircraft
in 1942. Subsequently the methodology was adopted by
RAF Coastal Command. Later depth charges were
designed for aerial deployment and have recently once
again come into focus because of the ASW threat in
littorals. These can be very effectively utilized for
flushing out the lurking diesel submarines. Two depth
charges are worthy of mention, these are the MK 11
depth charge of UK and the BDC 204 depth charge of
Sweden.
The Mk 11 depth charge was developed by British
Aerospace (now BAE Systems) for air delivery from
maritime aircraft and helicopters.
The Mk 11 depth charge was designed for shallow water
operations against submarines on the surface or at
periscope depths. It is fully compatible for carriage and
release from a wide range of ASW helicopters and fixed-
wing maritime patrol aircraft. The Mod 3 version
incorporates a 4 mm mild steel outer case and nose
section, which is designed to withstand entry into the water
at high velocities without distortion. It has been cleared for
carriage on Lynx, Merlin, NH 90, Sea King, and Wasp
helicopters.
The BDC 204 depth charge was developed by Bofors
Underwater Systems (now Saab Dynamics) for air delivery
from maritime aircraft and helicopters of the Swedish Navy.
It was designed for use against submarines operating in
shallow waters or at periscope depth, and in order to cover
a wide range of applications was produced in four different
weight categories and with different sinking speeds ranging
between 5.2 and 6.8 m/s. The depth charge can be
deployed in patterns, with different depth charges set to
detonate at different depths to achieve profound shock and
damage to submarines. The BDC 204 family of depth
charges is fitted with standard NATO suspension lugs and
their design allows them to be carried as a high drag
general purpose bomb or torpedo. They have been cleared
for carriage on the Boeing Vertol 107 helicopter and CASA
C-212 Aviocar maritime patrol aircraft.

12
Air Launched Torpedoes: Few of the prominent air
launched torpedoes are described below.
Stingray is a LWT manufactured by BAE Systems. It has a
diameter of 324 mm, weight of 267 kg, and length of 2.6 m.
Its speed is 45 kts with a range of 8 km and its warhead is
45 kg of Torpex. It can dive up to 800 m. Stingray is fed with
target data and other associated information prior to its
launch, after entering water it searches for target
autonomously in active mode and on acquiring the same,
attacks it. It is carried by Nimrod aircraft. Stingray Mod 1 is
reported to have a shaped charge warhead and improved
shallow water performance.
Mk 46 Mod 5 torpedo is the mainstay of US Navy’s air
launched lightweight torpedoes. It is manufactured by
Alliant Tech systems. It has a diameter of 324 mm, length of
2.59 m, with a weight of 231 kg. It runs on Otto fuel, has a
range of 11km with a speed of 40 kts and can dive up to
365 m. It has a PBXN-103 warhead of 44 kg. It has an
advanced digital computer control system with a built in
logic and tactics for search and re-attack. It has effectively
performed in both deep and shallow waters and can attack
both the nuclear as well as the smaller diesel submarine.
Over 25000 MK 46 torpedoes have been supplied to
customers till date. Interestingly the Chinese YU-7 torpedo
is said to have been developed from the MK 46 Mod 2.
The Mk 54 Lightweight Torpedo is a hybrid of
technologies taken from MK 46, MK 48 and MK 50
torpedoes. It is supposed to have homing and
warhead of the MK50 and propulsion package of the
MK 46 torpedo. It has incorporated COTS processing
technologies for an advanced guidance and control
system. It is stated to have sophisticated shallow water
capabilities for littoral threats. It is understood that the
MK 54 torpedo has been requested for P8i aircraft by
India.
The A244/S developed by WAAS and currently
manufactured by the Euro Torp consortium is a 324
mm diameter, 2.8 m long, and 244 kg weight torpedo.
It has a cruise/surge speed of 30/39kts, with a range of
6 km and depth up to 600 m. Its Homing head can
function in mixed, active or passive modes. It has
special signal processing to distinguish target from
decoys.
A244/S Mod.3 is the latest upgrade of the A244/S. It
has more powerful propulsion battery, with an
increased number of cells, which ensures a 50%
increase in the endurance of the weapon to13.5 km. It
has an Advanced Digital Signal Processor module to
counter sophisticated torpedo countermeasures .The
homing head has preformed multiple transmission and
reception beams and multi-frequency operating
capability. It can classify and track several targets
simultaneously, and discriminate between the target
and countermeasures.
MU 90/Impact is in mass production for 6 major NATO
and Allied Countries. The MU 90/IMPACT torpedo is
323.7 mm 'NATO Standard' caliber, 2.85 mm long with
a weight of 304 kg.

13
It is powered by an Aluminium-Silver Oxide sea water
battery using dissolved sodium-dioxide powder as
electrolyte with a closed-loop electrolyte re-circulation
system, the torpedo is propelled by an electronically
controlled high-RPM brush-less motor driving a skewed
multi-blade pump jet propulsion allowing a continuously
variable torpedo speed automatically selected by in built
logic of the torpedo. The control and guidance electronics
has embedded operational and tactical software including
the signal processing, the data processing and the torpedo
guidance algorithms, which enable the MU 90 to
continuously self-adapt its configuration and tactics. The
inertial system is based on 'strap-down' technology
enabling all-attitudes capability including bottom following
capability. The warhead consists of V 350 explosive, fully
insensitive, shaped charge warhead, with an impact type
exploding device, incorporating two mechanical and six
electrical independent safety devices.
Low Cost Anti Submarine Weapon (LCAW) A200/A is a
miniature torpedo developed by WASS. LCAW has been
developed as an intermediary between air launched
torpedoes and conventional depth charges. It is a low cost
option which provides propulsion and guidance to a depth
charge without the costs of a torpedo. The air dropped
version A200/A is deployed from aerial sonar buoy
dispensers. The weapon is primarily designed to engage
targets in shallow water, like midget submarines. The
A200/A version has a length of 914.4 mm, weight of 12 kg,
and a diameter of 123.8 mm. The warhead is a 2.5 kg PBX
shaped charge and the LCAW has an operating depth from
15 m to 300 m. It has a speed of about 18 kts with a range
of 2 km.
______________________________________

14
Maritime Domain Awareness - Indian Context
The oceans are complex mediums whose nature provides
ample opportunity for an enemy to avoid detection—
weather, sea states, and coastal land masses all present
considerable challenges to modern sensors. Peacetime
economic use of the seas complicates this problem
enormously. The oceans are the world’s foremost (and
most unregulated) highway, home to a vast and wide
variety of international neutral shipping that possess no
apparent threat. Determining the enemy in such a
crowded and complex environment is difficult during
conventional war, during an asymmetric conflict such as
the global war on terror (GWOT), it is a formidable task.
It is the asymmetric nature of terrorism that forms the
core of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). In
conventional naval war the enemy is relatively well
defined and almost universally a combatant. Pursuit of
GWOT, where literally any vessel could be a potential
enemy or weapon carrier, or when any maritime event
can have an impact on the security of India, demands a
much higher level of awareness than that normally
required in a conventional naval conflict. This
is recognized by the formal definition of MDA as
articulated by the US government vide their document
National Security Presidential Directive 41, 2004:-
“Maritime Domain Awareness is "the effective
understanding of anything associated with the global
maritime environment that could impact the security,
safety, economy or environment of U.S.
This is accomplished through the integration of
intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation
systems into one common operating picture (COP) that is
accessible throughout the U.S. Government".
Unlike traditional naval operations, it is apparent that the
goal of MDA is far more than simply looking for potential
maritime enemies poised to attack India. The implications
of “Anything associated” with the maritime environment
that can impact the security, safety, economy or
environment go far beyond a classic maritime threat. As
per the US interpretation, these include smuggling of
people or dangerous cargoes, piracy, proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), identification and
protection of critical maritime infrastructure, oil spills,
weather, and environmental concerns among other
events.
Maritime events that could potentially impact India are not
the only wide-ranging element of MDA it is also essential
that threats be identified as early and far from the coast
as possible. The global nature of MDA activities occurring
overseas and in foreign ports is very much a part of MDA
For example, if a cargo is loaded in Aden and its ultimate
destination is India (via several other international ports),
the loading, transport, security, and all matters associated
with that container would be part of MDA.

15
MDA must therefore be exercised over all oceans
worldwide, and potentially cover all maritime interests that
ultimately impact India. Putting in place an effective MDA
is a herculean task viewing the range of potential security
challenges and enormous geographic area represented
by the maritime domain. In India a plethora of agencies
possessing a wide range of operational and intelligence
capabilities would require information fusion under the
over-arching MDA.
Although many factors are considered in MDA, its core
process is ultimately the monitoring of vessels and the
vessels’ cargo, crews, and passengers to rapidly
generate geo-locating information on vessels of interest.
This is an analytical process that includes tracking, data
base searches for unknown linkages and anomaly
detection. Fundamental to this is the detection,
monitoring, tracking of vessels. This tracking process is
comprised of five elements designed to focus on a narrow
area of tactical dimension where threats can be identified
and isolated namely; maritime surveillance, detection,
tracking, classification & identification and targeting.
Targeting involves interpreting detection and identification
information fused with intelligence to sort vessel
intentions and determine risk.
MDA’s core is applying the vessel tracking process to a
layered defence model centred on the coastline of India,
the ultimate goal of which is to detect potential threats
early and as far away from the Indian coastline as
possible. As there is no single high value unit to protect
MDA “layers” are expanded to include an entire coastline
with the overall goal of coordinated surveillance. Not all
areas in these “layers” are considered equally, but rather
additional attention is given to areas that are potential
targets for the terrorist/enemy.
The US has the 2000 nm limit of the Maritime Detection
and Identification Zone-MDIZ it is based on the legislated
96 hour notification requirement for foreign vessels
entering U.S. ports. A vessel travelling 20 kts will arrive
at its destination in roughly 96 hours. MDIZ’s aim is to
gather more timely information on the vessel as it
approaches closer to the U.S. coast. When entering the
MDIZ, positions every four hours are the norm while in
territorial waters the goal is to obtain positional data
every 3 minutes. There are many systems that could
provide a high degree of surveillance and tracking data,
but the actual fusion of this data remains a problem area.
In order to derive a comprehensive MDA picture,
information needs to be fused, correlated, and analysed
and for it to be relevant to national security it must be
designed to operate cohesively at tactical, regional and
strategic levels.

16
Structure of the Indian MDA
The 26 Nov 2008 attack on Mumbai has been analysed
and security gaps addressed to formulate the MDA. The
fundamental principle for the MDA has been the
application of data fusing to get actionable intelligence
inputs to measure, compare and identify and engage and
prevent sea-borne criminal activities. The number of
different agencies at central and state level involved is 13,
and therefore effective coordination is an issue. Some of
the initiatives include:-
- Launch of GSAT7 satellite in geosynchronous orbit by
lSRO, with Rukmani terminals (ex Israel) placed on Major
warships for instantaneous data transfer to meet the
requirements of the Navy. ISRO is also likely to put in
place by 2013 the Indian Regional Navigation Seven
Satellite System (IRNSS) which would provide data within
1000 miles of India.
- Setting up of The National Command Control
Communication and Intelligence network (NC3IN).
- The setting up of a radar chain (X band AIS receiver
VHF and Electro-Optics) of 46 sensor stations being
linked with the AIS inputs (Covering the entire Indian
coast), LRIT (Long Range Identification & Tracking) and
VTMS (Vessel Traffic Management Systems). Coastal
plots are maintained by the ICG Regional HQs to support
the Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) set up next to naval
maritime operations rooms (MORS) in all naval
commands and at New Delhi.
- Setting up of Multi Agency Centres (MAC) for
intelligence inputs and reports.
- Registration of fishing vessels by states, and provision of
battery operated Distress Action Terminals (DATs) for
vessels below 300 tons. DG Shipping would provide
smaller fishing boats with AIS transponders which has
enforced ISPS code for Port security with port security
plans. Also, providing Biometric Identity cards for
fishermen which can be identified on a machine on board
surveillance platforms.
- Setting up of a Marine Police force with 73 Coastal police
stations across 9 states and provided with 5 and 10 ton
craft which can patrol inshore waters.
- A continuous synopsis of record of shipping with World
Customs Organisation has been enforced and MARSEC
(Maritime Security) levels are exercised and coastal
villagers educated on need to be vigilant by the IN and
ICG.
- The Indian Navy has instituted Marine Commandos
Rapid Reaction Forces and a Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) of
100 seamen who are being equipped with 80 fast
interceptor craft (FICs) for protection of naval bases, VAs
and VPs. UAVs and Aerostats are also planned for
induction.
- Coordinated coastal and offshore asset patrolling has
been strengthened by the IN and the ICG.
- All steps for MDA are networked with the Indian Navy’s
fleet of ships, submarines and MR aircraft.
The Government of India has put in place a formidable
plan for MDA, and the individual systems are being setup
prior to final integration and fusing of data. It is expected
that the MDA would be fully functional by 2015.
______________________________________

17
Developing a Concept of Oceanic Domain Awareness for India
India has put in place a formidable structure for major
elements of maritime domain awareness (MDA) in area
of its immediate interest however; in my opinion should
be the aspiration of the Indian Navy to acquire
formidable sea denial and sea control capabilities. It is
opined that the terms Sea watch/denial/ control are likely
to expand and transform in to ‘Oceanic space watch/
denial/control’. The term Oceanic space denial/control
would embrace a cylindrical space in 3D+ dimensions;
that is the sea surface, the atmospheric volume above,
the outer space at least up to low earth orbiting satellite
heights, the water volume up to the sea bed, the sea bed
itself and also security of the deep sea mining assets in
the EEZ.
The above premise implies that a broader oceanic
horizon is inclusive of not only extensive and broader
spatial operating arena, but also much wider and
broader foray in to the verticals below the surface to the
sea bed and above up to periphery of the atmosphere.
Unless implications of this nature are anticipated and
factored in, technological forecasts themselves would
trail behind the rapid advancing pace of technology and
the synergies being achieved due to harmonization and
adaptation inter and intra scientific fields. Therefore, it is
imperative that holistic perspectives into the ‘information
consciousness’ arena include the oceanic domain
awareness as well as it’s connect with India’s security
and MDA.
Oceanic Domain Awareness (ODA)
Scientific study of the oceans originated in U.S. essentially
as a function of national security. Investigations that
focused on the tactical and operational impacts of the
fluid, geophysical, chemical and biological marine
environment upon U.S. Navy operations successfully
addressed many challenging naval requirements; but
oceanographic inquiry in support of naval needs also
triggered unexpected results. In many instances, the
knowledge of the oceans that was acquired through
directed studies - and through complementary lines of
inquiry that were enabled by tools developed for naval
oceanographic research - further affected national security
in ways that were not anticipated and which transcended
tactical and operational significance and could be
considered of more strategic consequence.
The primary impetus to the rapid development of
oceanography during its 20th century days as a science is
without a doubt the submarine and the fundamental
changes that occurred when naval warfare became truly
three-dimensional. Prosecuting submarines was feasible
principally through the transmission of underwater sound,
actively by sonar to echo-locate targets and passively by
listening hydrophones and triangulation.

18
The scope of oceanographic efforts in the pursuit of the
submarine opened all of the oceanographic disciplines
(physical, chemical, biological, and geological
oceanography) to increased investment, research effort
and importantly to integration. Twentieth-century
oceanography was fundamentally a security-
based endeavour to reduce the opacity of the oceans
to antisubmarine warfare in WWI, WWII and the Cold War,
and harness that opacity for offensive submarine
operations, along with a host of other security based naval
concerns.
Fundamental progress in basic knowledge of the ocean
sciences has occurred due to advances in sensor
technologies. Understanding of plate tectonics and sea
floor spreading was discovered during large-scale mapping
of the sea floor after the World War II. This led to the
revamping of theories of evolution and structure of the
earth. Subsequently, the investigation of mid-ocean ridges
carried out by submersibles and towed deep sea vehicles
led to detection of many unknown forms of life in the
hydrothermal vents and microbes below the seabed at
great depths. In the past Ocean geologists, physicists,
biologists, and chemists, have used an array of tools, from
deep-sea drilling to instrumented buoys, to improve their
understanding of role the ocean plays in controlling longer-
term climate change and weather.
Scientists have now commenced a long term exploration of
the chronological variations in ocean systems both for very
short and prolonged time periods. Advances in
technologies that have spurred this study are primarily
based upon:-
-Availability of new sensors which can be placed and report
upon chemical, biological and physical characteristics.
-Advances in computers and software that has enabled
storing, retrieving and manipulating large volumes of
sensor data. Real time data is available to large number of
research communities for interpretation, modelling,
simulation and prediction.
-Advances in telecommunications through undersea cables
and satellites allowing real time control of sea based
sensors and transmission of bulky sensor data.
Technologies (e.g., robust sensors and infrastructure,
autonomous vehicles) need to be developed to enhance
data collection in all weather conditions to support high-
spatial resolution and near-real-time forecasting
throughout the Open Ocean and coastal zone. Providing
accurate and comprehensive environmental information
will require expanding observational networks to monitor,
record, and present real-time, surface-monitoring data
(e.g., high-frequency, coastal-based radars).
This expansion will require advancing sensor and
technology development, particularly for autonomous
and persistent observations, as well as for long-term
observing systems; expanding real-time or near-real-
time data collection on environmental variables by
incorporating observational capabilities of crafts of
opportunity (e.g., fishing, cargo, and passenger vessels);
and enhancing automated and autonomous bottom-
mapping capabilities for change detection to improve
rapid, full-scale survey scheduling.
Data collected by the observing systems must be
accessible through a comprehensive national data
network, either through a single system or a distributed
network. Developing this data network will require new
methodologies that address gaps in data collection,
sharing, and interoperability of technologies, and should
permit integration of existing research into operational
systems (e.g., systems providing real-time navigation
data to vessels). This data network should be able to link
with other databases, such as those focusing on
ecosystem data, and developed in accordance with
international standards for data exchange.

19
The national data network will also provide the data
needed for models simulating multiple scenarios to better
understand potential impacts, weather events or man-
made disruptions on marine operations, and to support
operations restoration plans.
The coast and Open Ocean are critical domains for the
security of a nation with sea as boundaries, both at home
and abroad. National-security operations in the ocean
take place globally and often require continuous, near-
real-time monitoring of environmental conditions using
tools such as autonomous sensors, targeted
observations, and adaptive modelling. These capabilities,
combined with improved understanding of the ocean
environment enabled by other ocean science research
activities, will support accurate ocean-state assessments
‘and allow future forces to conduct joint and combined
operations in near shore and deep-ocean operating
environments, anywhere and at anytime’.
The differentiating aspects between MDA and ODA need
recapitulating. The MDA focuses upon the maritime
security environment specific to naval operations; the
ODA focuses upon the overarching oceanic environment.
Both are technology intensive and require sophisticated
sensors and computational capabilities. MDA has
tactical, regional and strategic components whereas the
ODA is strategic knowledge based architecture. Both
require elaborate data and information fusing interface
with myriad of interconnected agencies. The MDA
primarily needing vast inputs from commercial,
intelligence and security agencies and the ODA from
advanced research, academic and scientific
communities.
In view of the above, it can be appreciated that the MDA
needs to be integrated within oceanic domain awareness
for completeness of maritime knowledge, the lack of
which can lead to serious consequences. This has been
reflected in a recent assessment of naval exercises and
weapon firings in the US, where it was found that over
90% of them were affected adversely due to imperfectly
assessed or little known environmental factors. In an
actual conflict, these would have led to mission failures.
This along with the sinking of HMS Bounty (a fifty year
old replica of the 18th century square rigger HMS Bounty)
due to the hurricane Sandy when it was 160 miles away
from the eye of the storm, off North Carolina, only under-
pins the gaps in oceanic knowledge that need to be
bridged and fact that Oceanic Domain Awareness is an
enabler for the future and an ‘imperative’ for a nation like
India.
______________________________________

20
Aircraft Carriers in Indian Ocean Region
The Article was first published at IndraStra.com on May 30, 2015
Recently the Government of India cleared the funds for
the construction of India’s second indigenous aircraft
carrier the 65,000 tonne INS Vishal. In 2014 July, the
Modi government had released funds to complete the
construction of the first indigenous aircraft carrier INS
Vikrant being built at Cochin Shipyard. In 2013
December, it was revealed through Duowei News that
the Chinese planned to commission two Liaoning class
indigenous aircraft carriers Type 001A by 2020 and the
contract for the same had been awarded to the China
Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.
So why does an aircraft carrier mean so much to navies
with blue water aspirations? Firstly, a Carrier strike group
(CSG) does not need permissions from any sovereign
power for landing/overflying its aircraft, when it is
operating in international waters. Secondly, a CSG is a
sovereign territory of the country to which it belongs and
can position itself in international waters in close vicinity
of expected conflict zones.
This provides it with tremendous flexibility of operations
and makes it a powerful diplomatic negotiating tool. It can
declare presence, project power ashore or actively
associate in stabilising a conflict environment. An aircraft
carrier is akin to a mobile naval air station along with 70 to
80 fighters, bombers and support aircraft, which can sail
to any place on the earth within a span of about two
weeks travelling 650 to 700 nm per day.
An aircraft carrier is however vulnerable to attacks from
air, sea and underwater and therefore it normally travels
with a protective consort comprising of two Guided missile
destroyers capable of firing missiles like the Tomahawk,
two destroyers, a frigate, two submarines and a supply
ship. This group of ships along with the aircraft carrier is
called a CSG.
The composition of a CSG is mission centric and can vary
depending upon the situation and foreseeable threats that
may be encountered. Thus the CSG has at its disposal,
about 9/10 ships, 70/80 aircraft and about 7500/8000
trained naval complement to accomplish its designated
task. The air element of the carrier comprises of strike
fighter jets (e.g. F/A-18 Hornet), fighter jets for gaining air
superiority (eg.F-14 Tomcat), an electronic warfare
aircraft (eg. EA- 6B Prowler), A tactical warning and
control system aircraft (e.g. E -2C Hawkeye), A subsonic
anti submarine jet aircraft (eg. S -3B Viking), and an ASW
/SAR helicopter (e.g. SH-60 Sea Hawk).
A CSG is a formidable, awe inspiring, force centre
representing its country. It is one of the reasons, why
China had shelved its plans to convert Varyag ex Ukraine
in to a floating casino and refurbished it for naval use as
Liaoning. A researcher at the Chinese Naval Research
Institute, Senior Captain Li Jie has said “Aircraft carriers
are incomparable and cannot be replaced by other
weapons;" If a big power wants to become a strong
power, it has to develop aircraft carriers." Needless to
state that when Liaoning is fully operationalized and
deployed in South China fleet it will considerably shift the
balance of power in the territorially disputed region.

21
Status of Aircraft Carriers in the Asia Pacific Region
A look at the status of aircraft carriers in the region only
underpins the fact that it may be in the best interests of the
countries in the region to ensure that balance of power does
not tilt in favour of China later. Of the countries in the Asia
Pacific region, there are only two regional powers capable
of operating aircraft carriers, namely India and Thailand.
The Chinese Aircraft carrier Liaoning is understood to be
currently operating under training mode.
India: currently operates two carriers (INS Viraat & INS
Vikramaditya) which are reasonably potent and can project
sufficient power to cover India’s areas of interest. However,
with a third carrier (indigenous) joining in a couple of years,
India will become a potent regional force in the coming
decade.
Thailand: currently operates HTMS Chakri Naruebet,
however since the Sea Harriers were retired in 2006, it
operates only helicopters.
China: It is anticipated that it may be a couple of years
before PLAN is able to operationalized Liaoning for power
projection role. There are reports of indigenous Chinese
Japan: Japanese Izumo-class helicopter
destroyer 22DDH 183 is the first of the two new type of
helicopter carrier ships being constructed for the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The ship can
carry up to 14 aircraft however, but only seven ASW
helicopters and two search and rescue (SAR)
helicopters have been initially planned. This has given
rise to the speculation that in future it may be able to
support STOVL (short take-off, vertical landing) aircraft.
Japan already has the F-35 A (Lockheed Martin F-35
Lightening II) and it would be logical for it to go in for the
STOVL version F-35 B if the need arose.
Aircraft carriers under design/ construction, which would
take some time to be inducted.
USA: currently have three carriers in the region with one
based in Japan. The Asia – Pacific shift would entail
pivoting of 60% of its naval forces to the Asia – Pacific
region, implying thereby that 5/6 aircraft carriers can be
mobilised for power projection at very short notice. This
amounts to about 45 squadrons of fighters (~ 350 a/c).
The region will become a beehive of activity with US
regional maritime exercises, port calls, disaster relief
operations etc.
"Elements of China's military modernization appear
designed to challenge our freedom of action in the
region." - Admiral R Willard, U.S. Navy.
Russia: does not have an aircraft carrier positioned in
the region. The economics of the region and Anti
Access/ Area-denial perception brings to fore the need
for the United States of America to keep projecting its
power from the sea if wants to maintain its supremacy in
the area. Needless to assert that the US will have no
option but to keep its navy active in the Asia – Pacific
region for a long time to come.

22
Rooting for a Seaport in Thar Desert
The Government of India has granted ‘in principal’
approval to the Sagarmala project. This project
envisages promotion of port led direct and indirect
development as well as creation of an efficient cost
effective goods transportation infrastructure. The aim is
to develop new regions with enhanced connectivity to
main economic centers and beyond through extensions
of rail, inland water, coastal and road services.
In view of the foregoing the aim of this article is to project a
preliminary case for creation of a sea port in the Thar
region in the state of Rajasthan by constructing a
navigational channel from Lakhpat (near Kori Creek) in
Rann of Kachchh, Gujarat to Sanchore (Jalore District) in
Thar desert region of Rajasthan, India.
As per studies carried out by A S Gaur, et al, Harappans
were considered to be great mariners and businessmen;
since their society was mainly agrarian their interest in
inhabiting the poor quality land of Kachchh could have
been due to reasons of procuring minerals, lime stone,
lead and agate. These have been found in the Harappan
sites and could have come from Pachchham or Khadir
islands in the Rann. Since the weight of lime stones found
there is about 100 kg, these could have been transported
using sea/riverine routes if the Rann was sufficiently
inundated by sea during those times. The Harappans sites
have been discovered around Little Rann and on the
southern border of the Great Rann.

23
Sedimentation rate studies in Little Rann indicate that it
used to be submerged throughout the year until about
2000 years ago. In fact, the little Rann was navigable up to
the 16th century. Similar results are applicable to Khadir
Bet in Great Rann of Kachchh. The Rann of Kachchh was
thus connected via Little Rann and Nal-Bhal to Gulf of
Khambhat. Other evidences also support the theory that
the Rann was navigable and an extended Gulf up to the
early times in Christian era.
The Sanchore area in Jalore district is a low-lying area
located at the northern tip of Rann of Kachchh. The
navigational channel would traverse a distance of about
300 km from Lakhpat to Sanchore in an area which is
sparsely populated, under developed, and comprises of
large tracts of barren land. The navigational channel would
run parallel to the border with Pakistan well within the
Indian Territory, and provide an efficient patrolling medium
for the paramilitary forces. The excavated earth can be
utilized for raising the level and reclaiming land adjacent to
the canal for utilization in various ways.
The seaport at Sanchore would be a boon to the land
locked states of Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Uttranchal, Madhya Pradesh, Jammu and
Kashmir. It would also reduce the load on the existing
ports, roads, railways and provide a viable and cost
beneficial transportation alternative for a variety of goods
using the inland sea port. Development would get an
impetus in the near barren landscape of Rann of Kutch as
well as drought prone arid regions of Rajasthan.
Along the route of the navigational channel, minor ports
can also be developed at suitable locations along with
desalination plants. Agriculture can be planned utilizing
drip irrigation techniques for bio fuel species like Jatropha.
Chemical industries, salt pans, and salt water based
Pisciculture can be set up in areas with population to
provide stable livelihood. As far as power generation is
concerned, it can be done on the lines of the famous
‘Canal Solar Power Generation Project’ on the Narmada
Canal in Gujarat. Under this project, it is claimed that the
one MW plant, set up over a 750 meter-long stretch of
the canal, will generate 1.6 mn units of clean electricity
and prevent evaporation of 9.0 mn litres of water from
the canal annually. The Navigational Channel would
thus provide an ideal base for locating the solar panels
and generating electricity much in excess of the
requirement of the port and could feed the national
power grid if required.
Interestingly the above proposal ties in comfortably with
the declared tenets of the Sagarmala initiatives that it
“would also strive to ensure sustainable development of
the population living in the Coastal Economic Zone
(CEZ). This would be done by synergising and
coordinating with State Governments and line Ministries
of Central Government through their existing schemes
and programs such as those related to community and
rural development, tribal development and employment
generation, fisheries, skill development, tourism
promotion etc. In order to provide funding for such
projects and activities that may be covered by
departmental schemes a separate fund by the name
‘Community Development Fund’ would be created”.
It is understood that a bird’s eye view of viability of such
a project has been undertaken by some agencies
(including one headed by an Admiral of the Indian Navy)
and keen interest has been evinced in the same by
national and international conglomerates. The
preliminary development costs for a 350 km navigational
channel and an inland seaport at Sanchore with 12
berths and 8 moorings is likely to be in the region of $ 2
billion. The project warrants serious consideration and
detailed studies by the government agencies so that the
long overdue development of the barren Rann of
Kachchh and the Thar Desert regions of Rajasthan can
be earnestly undertaken with the construction of the
inland sea port at Sanchore and its linking navigational
channel from Kori creek.
______________________________________

24

Naval Strategic Insight by Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (10)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (9)

Similar to Naval Strategic Insight by Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY

Similar to Naval Strategic Insight by Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Naval Strategic Insight by Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY