International Seminar on “Cyber Troops and Computational Propaganda in the Indonesian Presidential Election 2019” at CSEAS, Kyoto University Date: Saturday, July 20nd, 2019 Time: 16:00 -19:00 Venue: Kyoto University Inamori Memorial Hall, 2rd floor Seminar Room Presenter: Ismail Fahmi (Drone Emprit & PT. Media Kernels Indonesia) Moderator: Masaaki Okamoto (CSEAS Kyoto University) ABSTRACT: The last Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election shown a different landscape of cyber war compared to its previous 2014 presidential election. In 2014, the use of social media and online media to create propaganda during campaigns was relatively new. However, in 2019 the number of people engaged in the cyber war is significantly increased especially from the opposition side. The use of bots to manipulate public opinion by amplifying or combating political content, disinformation, hate speech, and junk news was also increased in both parties. In this presentation I will present how cyber troops from both parties (incumbent and opposition) engaged cyber wars to win their campaign messages. Furthermore using Drone Emprit, our big data analytics tool for online media and social media, I will show how computational propaganda using sophisticated bots, patterns, and techniques to trick the social media platforms was engaged. I also will explain our efforts using the Drone Emprit analytics, that regularly and continuously analyzed the conversation and shared our findings through article posts in social media and mainstream media during the campaign periods. Our purpose was to build public awareness about the situation of the cyber war in order to they can see how hidden teams conduct computational propaganda that was targeted to win their opinion. At the end of the presentation, I will conclude with lesson learned from the Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election.

1. Cyber Troops and
Computational Propaganda in
the Indonesian Presidential
Election 2019
Ismail Fahmi, S.T., M.A., Ph.D.
Director Media Kernels Indonesia (Drone Emprit)
Lecturer at the University of Islam Indonesia
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
CSEAS KYOTO UNIVERSITY - KYOTO
20 JULY 2019

2. KyoAni: MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY
Please accept my deepest condolences. My prayers are with you
and the families who lost their loved ones.
2

3. 3
1992 – 1997 Undergraduate, Electrical Engineering, ITB, Indonesia
2003 – 2004 Master, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2004 – 2009 Doctor, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2009 – Now Engineer at Weborama (Paris/Amsterdam)
2014 – Now Founder PT. Media Kernels Indonesia, a Drone Emprit Company
2015 – Now Consultant at Perpustakaan Nasional, Inisiator Indonesia OneSearch
2017 – Now Lecturer at the IT Magister Program of the Universitas Islam Indonesia
Ismail Fahmi, S.T., M.A., Ph.D.
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com

4. MATA NAJWA LIVE ‘HOAX VIRUSES’
4
confidential

5. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DEBATE 2019
5

6. #ILC SOCIAL MEDIA WAR (21 August 2018)
6

7. Kyoto Imperial Palace
7

8. BACKGROUND

9. COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
9
Since 2012 until now, we
have seen bots, algorithms
and other forms of
automation are used by
political actors in countries
around the world to
manipulate public opinion
over major social networking
platforms, such as Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, and
YouTube.

10. CYBER TROOPS
10
CYBER TROOPS: government,
military or political party teams
committed to developing or
manipulating public opinion
over social media.

11. THE PURPOSES OF CYBER TROOPS AND
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
11
Manipulates public opinion to
promote the interests of
government, opposition, or
trolls.
Interests Interests
TROLLS
Interests

12. 12
FACEBOOK TWITTER

13. FACEBOOK TARGETING
13

14. 14
FACEBOOK TARGETING

15. THE CASES OF TWO
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA
15
2014 2019

16. QUESTIONS
• How the cyber troops and computational propaganda started in
Indonesian political events?
• How they worked during the 2019 Indonesian Presidential
Election?
• Some pointers:
• The use of computational propaganda since 2014 in Indonesia
• The changes in digital polarization
• Bots and black campaign
• Cyber troops and supporters
• Information arbitrage
16

17. INDONESIA DIGITAL
IN A NUTSHELL

18. 18

19. 19

20. 20

21. 21

22. 22

23. 23
MILLENIALSGEN Z

24. 24
POLITICAL PARTIES
IN THE INDONESIAN GENERAL
ELECTION 2019

25. 25

26. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL
SOCIAL MEDIA POLARIZATION IN 2014 - 2017

27. JANUARY 2014, JOKOWI AS THE JAKARTA’S GOVERNOR
MEDIA AND CYBER TROOP SUPPORTS
PRO
KONTRA
2014

28. FEBRUARY 2014, JOKOWI AS THE JAKARTA’S GOVERNOR
BEFORE REGISTERING THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
PRO
KONTRA
2014

29. MARCH 2014, JOKOWI AS THE JAKARTA’S GOVERNOR
JOKOWI PROMOTED AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
PRO
KONTRA
KONTRA
2014

30. JUNE-JULY 2014, JOKOWI AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
DURING A CAMPAIGN PERIOD
PRO
KONTRA
2014

31. APRIL 2015, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
FIRST YEAR
PRO
KONTRA
2015

32. APRIL 2016, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
SECOND YEAR
PRO
KONTRA 2016

33. SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2017, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
AFTER THE JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
PRO
KONTRA
2017
PRO

34. CYBER TROOPS IN
2017 DKI JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION

35. 35

36. JAN 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
FIRST DEBATE
36
2017
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-Sandi
Agus-Sylvi

37. 7-8 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
SECOND DEBATE
37
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-SandiAgus-Sylvi
MCA
2017

38. 12 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 1ST ROUND ELECTION
38
Agus-Sylvi
Anies-Sandy
Ahok-Djarot
MCA
2017

39. 17 MAR 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 2ND ROUND ELECTION
39Pro Anies
Pro Ahok

40. TRAFFIC: SEWORD (PARTISAN) SURPASSED
MAINSTREAM MEDIA
40

41. 41
Via Social Media:
Seword
Via Google:
Kompasiana
Antaranews
Tempo
MAINSTREAM MEDIA

42. 42
Via Medsos:
Seword
Posmetro
Via Google:
Portalpiyungan
PARTISAN MEDIA

43. COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA IN
THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

44. POLLING ROBOTS
44
Ater the leader of Mahaka Group,
Erick Thohir officially becomes
the head of the campaign team
for Joko Widodo-Ma’ruf Amin in
the 2019 Election, who you will
vote for?
1. Jokowi-Maruf Amin (Retweet)
2. Prabowo-Sandiaga (Like)

45. POLLING ROBOTS
Foreign
names with
0-1 followers

46. USERS BY NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS
#PrabowoSandi
19.51%
3.82%
10.84%
9.82%
#JokowiAmin

47. TWITS BY USERS WITH 0-3 FOLLOWERS
ABOUT JOKOWI

48. USERS BY NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS
IN CONVERSATIONS ABOUT PRABOWO
3.33%

49. TWITS BY USERS WITH 0-3 FOLLOWERS
ABOUT PRABOWO

50. BOTS WITH THOUSANDS FOLLOWERS
AVOIDING TWITTER SPAM DETECTION

51. TALKING ABOUT JOKOWI
Interaction Rate
2.91Pro 01
Pro 02
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots
Bots Iklan
Bots
Bots
Total Users
293,041

52. TALKING ABOUT PRABOWO
Interaction Rate
6.30
Pro 01
Pro 02
Bots Pro 02
Bots Nasdem
Bots MetroTV
Bots
Bots Iklan
Bots Pro 01 Pro 02
Total Users
177,394

53. TEST: #JKWTakutPaparkanMisiVisi v.s. #PrabowoTakutTesNgaji
Pro 01 Pro 02
#PrabowoTakutTesNgaji #JKWTakutPaparkanMisiVisi
Interaction Rate
12.13
Total Users
15,052
Interaction Rate
4.08
Total Users
10,956

54. INTERACTION RATE
TREN OF
CONVERSATION
VOLUME
TREN OF
INTERACTION
RATE

55. Engagement Types and Interaction Rates
IR = (RT + Reply) / Mention
Jokowi
Interaction Rate
2.91
Prabowo
Interaction Rate
6.30

56. BOTS IN THE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT JOKOWI

57. BOTS IN THE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT JOKOWI (2)

58. BOTS IN THE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT PRABOWO

59. BOTS IN THE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT PRABOWO (2)

60. COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA IN A
CYBER WAR

61. #FirehoseOfFalsehood02 v.s. #RussianPropaganda
02
01 #FirehoseOfFalsehood02
”Russian Propaganda”

62. TREND: #FirehoseOfFalsehood02 v.s. #RussianPropaganda
#FirehoseOfFalsehood02
”Russian Propaganda”

63. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA: MOST RETWEETED

64. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA: TOP INFLUECERS

65. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA: TOP IMAGES

66. #FIREHOSEOFFALSEHOOD02: ENGAGEMENT TYPES
BOT FIRST, THEN SUPPORTERS
FAILED TO GET A NATURAL ENGAGEMENT

67. #FIREHOSEOFFALSEHOOD02: SPAMS (1)

68. #FIREHOSEOFFALSEHOOD02: SPAMS (2)

69. #FIREHOSEOFFALSEHOOD02: SPAMS (3)

70. #FIREHOSEOFFALSEHOOD02: TOP IMAGES

71. BOTS IN A BLACK CAMPAIGN

72. SCANDAL: A BLACK CAMPAIGN ATTACKING A
CANDIDATE
72

73. SCANDAL: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
73

74. TREND: HOW THE BLACK CAMPAIGN
DELIVERED
74
INITIALLY, BOTS POST THE MESSAGES
RESPONDED BY THE TARGET
REPORTED
BY MEDIA

75. ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS: BOTS GET NO
RESPONSE
75
TWITS WITH NO RESPONSE
TWITS WITH
RESPONSES

76. THE BEGINNING OF THE BLACK CAMPAIGN
76
ROBOT WITH 0-3 FOLLOWERS

77. A BAD BOT FOLLOWS GOOD BOTS
77

78. A GOOD BOT AND A BAD BOT USE THE SAME
PROFILE PICTURES
78

79. MOST ACTIVE BAD BOTS AND THEIR FRIENDS (GOOD BOTS)
79
Follows
Profile Pic
sama

80. INFORMATION ARBITRAGE

81. SOCIAL NETWORK BEFORE DEBATE
02
01

82. SOCIAL NETWORK DURING DEBATE
02
01
01
01 EXTRA
CYBER TROOPS

83. SOCIAL NETWORK DURING DEBATE WITH TOPICS
02
01
01 EXTRA
CYBER TROOPS

84. ONLINE NEWS: INFORMATION ARBITRAGE

85. ISSUES DURING 2019 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN

86. ISSUES ON JOKOWI
Unfulfilled Promises
Claiming other’s works Anti Islam and Ulama
PKI
China
Leadership

87. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON JOKOWI

88. ISSUES ON PRABOWO
Hoaxes
Lack of experiences
Religion
Khilafah
Temperamental
Human Rights

89. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON PRABOWO

90. TOP MEME ON MRT MEETING 2019

91. MRT MEETING: 13 Juli 2019
Pro Petahana Pro Oposisi

92. IDEA FLOW

93. IDEA FLOW:
MESSAGE DIFFUSES ACROSS PLATFORMS
93

94. Current Situation:
Vicious cycle of noises
94
Government
Noise
Opposition
Noise
Buzzers Buzzers

95. Proposed Solution:
Increasing S/N Ratio
95

96. IDEAL SITUATION:
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
96
Government
Big Data Analytics
Signal
Response,
engagement
Policy & PR

97. DRONE EMPRIT ACADEMIC
BIG DATA ANALYSIS

98. DRONE EMPRIT ACADEMIC
FREE SOCIAL MEDIA (TWITTER) DATA ANALYTICS
98

99. JOIN DRONE EMPRIT ACADEMIC
https://dea.uii.ac.id
99

100. TOPICS BASED ON SDGs
(Sustainable Development Goals)
100

101. EXAMPLES /1
101

102. HOW IT WORKS
102
STEPS:
• Registration
• Propose keywords
• Analysis and publication
Dashboard
Access
REQUIREMENTS:
• Publish their analysis for public
using any medium.
USERS
• Students
• Researchers
• Lecturers
• Journalists
• Blogger
• Hoax buster
Admin

103. BOOKS “READING INDONESIA”
103

104. SUMMARIES

105. SUMMARY
• Cyber troops and computational propaganda has been used in
Indonesia since as early as 2012.
• The main drivers of the activities are political events, especially
general elections.
• However, after the 2014 presidential election, the polarization is
getting bigger, supported by many new cyber troops and better
computational propaganda techniques.
• The platform mainly used by cyber troops and computational
propaganda is Twitter, then incorporates blogs, Facebook, IG,
YouTube, and now WhatsApp to disseminate their messages.
• In the future, cyber troops and computational propaganda will
likely still be used with better techniques and platforms.
105

106. THANK YOU FOR LISTENING
106