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What were the central socio-political causes of the 2009 coup d’état in Honduras, and what are the principal
socio-political forces aligned against one another in the phases of its contested consolidation since 2009?
School of Politics and International Relations
Queen Mary University of London
By: Javier A. Medrano
120404935

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Acknowledgment
This Thesis is dedicated to the memory of my aunt, Judge Mireya Efigenia Mendoza Peña, who died for her
honesty, integrity, adherence to the laws. She will forever will be known to be one the greatest judges in El
Progreso, Yoro, Honduras. I will forever admire your hard work and I will forever remember the last words
you said to me “Today I love you more, much more than yesterday. I admire you, I love you and I respect
you my beautiful nephew!.” Rest in peace.
Reconocimiento
Esta tesis está dedicada a la memoria de mi tía, La Juez Mireya Efigenia Mendoza Peña, quien murió por su
honestidad, su integridad, el respeto a las leyes. Ella siempre será conocida por ser unas de las mejores
jueces en El Progreso, Yoro, Honduras. Siempre admirare su ambision de trabajar duro y lograr metas. Para
siempre voy a recordar las últimas palabras que me dijo " Hoy te amo mucho, pero mucho más que ayer. Te
admiro, te quiero y te respeto mi sobrino bello!”. Descansa en paz.

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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to explain the socio- political causes that inspired the coup against President Mel
Zelaya in 2009. It demonstrates how the causes and effects in the history of a country can still be seen to
have a profound impact more than half a century in the future. Governments may change and the citizens
may have different faces, but they still cry out for the same rights. The ideas of neoliberalism can seem an
appealing ideal in developing countries wishing to advance their economies but they cannot function without
the rule of law and in an environment of weak democracy. Many times the only beneficiaries are the
wealthiest group. When benefits are restricted to a select few, this can revolutionize a new movement that
starts from the bottom and pushes for new government to advance the interests of the common people. In
turn, when the elites feel threatened, they are motivated to take back power often with help from western
countries.
In Honduras, Zelaya was ousted from power because of his policies that were designed to benefit the people
and his reform of the ‘cuarta horna’ in order to be able to run president for the second time. This was seen as
a power grab and a leftist attempt to align with Chavez. The threat of socialism and a Chavismo domino
effect led to the coup in 2009. The country has only gotten worse since the coup, leaving the question now:
was this beneficial to the people and is not the current crisis now being ignored by western powers.

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Table of Content
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...pg 6
Chapter 1: The New Left (Literature review)………………………………………………....pg 9
• Section 1.1 The Left and Social Opportunities ……………………………….....…...pg 12
• Section 1.2 Understanding Right Wing Ideologies…………………………………...pg 15
Chapter 2: Honduras Evolution of Regimes…………………………………………….…….pg 17
• Section 2.1 The Start of Neoliberal Democracy……………………………………....pg 20
• Section 2.2 The Cause of a Neoliberal Era…………………………………………....pg 23
Chapter 3: Zelaya’s Domestic and Foreign Policy
The Rise of the New Power…………………………………………………..…..pg 26
• Section 3.1 Zelaya leans too far Left………………………………………………….pg 29
Chapter 4: Honduras an Inconvenience to the Imperialist Powers…………………………...pg 32
• Section 4.1 The OAS is undermined by Great Powers…………………………….....pg 34
• Section 4.2 ‘Cuarta Hurna’……………………………………………………………pg 36
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….…pg 38
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………..pg 40

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Introduction
Honduras stood as the second longest uninterrupted constitutional government in Central America
from 1981 to 2009 after Costa Rica. It was therefore a shock throughout Honduras that there could actually
be a coup in the 21st century. This was a country that for decades had been run by a military dictatorship and
influenced by the imperialist rule of the United States, which has always viewed Latin America as its
backyard. Not only Honduras but most of Latin America have been through military dictatorships but had
gradually moved to weak democratic institutions. The fact of elections has masked other aspects of
democracy that have not taken root. As Schumpeterian would argue: “a minimalist conception of
democracy, with its focus on procedure, classify countries as democratic as long as they have a free and
competitive elections” (Chavez, 169). A functional democracy will demand the existence of functional
governmental institutions and an executive power that promotes the rule of law, the openness to include
minority groups and civil society in the political process, the subordination of the military and giving the
right to citizens of information (Diamond, 1999).
Throughout the 1990s the small country of Honduras experienced a new wave of neoliberalism
promoted by United States. Before the push for neoliberalism policies, Honduras had gone through a
military dictatorship which was supported at time by the United States which was keen to protect its
interests in production in the country. Foreign investments were and still are at the point where most of
Honduran goods are exported. The intrusion of imperialist interests into Honduras have encouraged the
imposition of neoliberal polices to benefit their own needs in the country. This is not surprising since the
United States has supported coups in Chile and in Guatemala when the policies it wanted implemented were
not being followed. The weak democracy in Honduras help enable the coup against former President Mel
Zelaya in June of 2009. The new government of President Porfirio Lobo Sosa has undermined the rule of
law as in the same way as his predecessor Michelitte, with executive powers allowed to subordinate all
aspects of government.

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In this thesis I will analyse the central socio-political causes of the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras, and
the principal forces aligned against one another in the phases of its contested consolidation since 2009.
Some understanding of Honduran history is necessary in order to comprehend why and how the occurrence
of the coup in 2009 is related to the military regimes from the 1960s till 1981. There have been different
social forces that have created the pressures for the government to be replaced, including pressures to benefit
the population, to respond to the citizens' feeling that it is time for a change, or the interests of the elites who
carry the most power and seek to influences the government to their benefit. It can be argued that coups
occur when the elites feel threatened or when certain parts of the population feel oppressed and lack benefits
that are not provided by the government.
In Chapter 1, I will analyze the left wing movement in Latin America and how it has affected a new
evolution in Honduras politics. The rise of the new left in the region is seen by western powers as a threat
towards them as they lose influence and the power to invest in whichever way they desire. The right wing
movement is more aligned with western powers as they both try to protect status quo. The Right is
considered able to maintain inequalities and protect western interests, while as in the other tries to benefit
everyone equally. In Chapter 2, I will explain the leadership Honduras has had and its evolution. In a sense it
seems that not much has change; just different characters benefit in different ways from the system. The
Honduras government changed from a military to a democratic nation with neoliberal policies in the early
1990s but it was always influenced heavily by the United States. As a result of neoliberal policies. The new
policies set out by Callejas and pushed by the IMF and the United States were supposed to lower poverty
and improve the economy but in reality only a few were able to benefit from these.
In Chapter 3, I will look in depth at President Mel Zelaya's policies domestically and with regard to
foreign relations. This chapter It will explain how Zelaya shifted government policies from neolibereal right
wing ideas to policies that were perceived by the international community as socialist. President Mel
Zelaya's purpose was to help the poor and improve inequality. It will also describe the developments that
led to the coup by Micheletti and the elites in the country with covert help from the United States. It will
discuss the undermining of the OAS and how the United States hid behind the curtain during the San Jose
accord that was to bring stability back into the country. Many of the decisions made by the Western

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countries in Honduras will be understood in history as attempts to stop the spread of Chavismo in the region.
Latin America was not ready to accept the new government in Honduras as the United States and Canada
were the first to recogonze President Priforio Lobo. In Chapter 4 I will present an analysis of the new
government of President Lobo after the coup and address the question how it can be that the new
representatives still had policies similar to the ones Michelletti carried out during his de facto government. I
will also argue that many of the social policies had been implemented by Zelaya were continued. I will also
note the ncrease in human rights violations and the murder rate under the new dictatorship of President
Lobo. Honduras, we will see, has become a country with out law and a government without power.

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Chapter 1: The New Left
Latin America has witnessed a wave of anti-neoliberalism and the rise of a new left that has been
focussed on Venezuela and the growing development of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Ecuador as well as the rise of the left in Honduras. Seen as a whole, Latin America is a hotbed of radical
change working to bring an end neoliberalism and to the influence of the United States in the region. The
focus of the leftist movement has been a triad comprised of Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba which have
painted the United States as imperialist and strive to impose neoliberal ideas around the world.
The New Left movement in Latina America continues the old left elements; but with the addition of
new elements that have become an integrals part of the new movement. The primary differences are in
strategy, frameworks and social programmes but the movement remains concerned with the promotion of
equality. The emergence from the old left to the new left occurred in the late 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s. During which period these groups were classified as nationalist or popular left, communist parties
that maintained close ties with the Soviet Union. The guerrilla organizations had varying ideologies of social
extraction with close similarities to trade unions, campesino leagues, ecclesiastical base communities,
human rights organizations and other rural and urban movements (Barrett and Chavez et al., 2008).
This period of transformation was marked by three decades of socialist ideasd influence by the soviet Union,
which had inflected toward a new left in the 1990s. With the collapse of theBerlin Wall and the fall fo the
Soviet Union, the Cuban revolution that entered a ‘defensive phase,’ which made reformist and national
popular parties weaken there party system. As the region was ‘seduced by the neo liberal wave’ in the
1980s they had to adopt a variation of the ‘third party’ (Barrett and Chavez et al., 2008). It was a clear shift
that neo-liberal policies applied by social-democratic and national popular parties were making their way
through Latin America from the PRI under Salinas in Mexico, to Peronism under Menem in Argentina.
Within the views of socialist strategy there is a longstanding debate over whether the Left movement
has remerged from ‘matuarity of the productive force’ in the region and whether or not it is sufficiently

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advanced- in terms of the presence of resources, technologies, and skills-to realistically initiate an anti-
capitalist transformation immediately (Webber, 2013). The debate has been reflected in two conundrums
presented by Claudio Katz, in which one side classical Community Party lines in the region are still
followed. Presenting a statist theory of revolutionary transformation, this includes the idea prolonging a
period of progressive capitalism before leading to a socialist transition as a factor for cooperative maturing
of productive forces. It can be argued that the alternatives, as a socialist transition, adapts to productive
capacities where there is weakness in certain areas within the region (Webber, 2013).
It can be argued that Honduras went through a similar transition from neoliberals and capitalist ideas,
many influenced by the United State, when it first became standing democracy in the 1980s till early 2000s.
When President Mel Zelaya took the presidential oath in 2006 it was going through a socialist transition in
which activism developed from diverse group in Honduras. There was the possibility of a cultural revolution
in Honduras, but with the lack of fully developed industry that would provide the economic force to create
power within the social movements. To construct a society with immediate institution of socialism social
justice and equality, which is a process of transformation that must occur first by confronting corruption and
human rights violation that are sabotaging the state. It also has to develop within an economic sector that
allows an improvement in the lives of the population, since a strong economic foundation allows the growth
of the state and decrease corruption. As explained by Webber and Carr: ‘it is obvious that none of this can
be accomplished overnight, the transition nonetheless requires a rupture with the capitalist system today and
the substation of the pre-eminence of an economy regulated by exchange values toward one regulated by
satisfactions of social necessities. Or use values” (Webber, 2013; pg 10).
Regionally, Latin America’s position in the capitalist world system is largely due to its natural
resource, including mineral, hydropower, energy resources and an increase in industries following
agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA. It has used its sources to take care of real human needs around the
world rather than the needs of capital. Latin America historically has been integrated in the world markets
and taken part in the process of globalization as it has been successful in capital gaining. On the other hand,
within the region there is a significant distortion in the quality of development shown by the unevenness of
its account. Part of this situation has to do with excess surplus from the world economy and problems such

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as low productivity and having the highest inequality levels in the world. These are the result of a
destructive capitalist imperialism, an on going cycle that has not been easy to break (Webber, 2013). Such
phenomenon creates the space for the rise of social movements that re not strained with the conditions that
have prolonged inequality and the uneven distribution of wealth within the state. The ruling class are the
ones that benefit from capitalist policies as they advance their interest on a regional scale. They are the ones
who are the main supporters of neoliberal trade agreements and accords, such as Mercosur and NAFTA.
The new rise of the Latin America Left has led many leaders in the region to adopt socialist views
but they must think strategically in order to build a strong socialist region. The new left in Latin America has
varied widely from country to county, but all have maintained orthodox macroeconomic policies and liberal
democratic constitutions that were inherited from non-leftist governments and have broken away from the
Washington Consensus, following the pressure started by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. It has strategically
initiated accords such as the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (Bolivirian Alliance
for the People of Our America, ALBA). As it has a socialist orientation, it is committed to countering
capitalist conditions within the trade agreements for the purpose of profits. “The socialist option is not a
Keynesian program to turn around recessive markets trends. It is a platform to overcome the exploitation
and inequality inherent in capitalism. It seeks to abolish poverty and unemployment, eradicate
environmental disasters, and put an end to the nightmares of war the financial cataclysms the enrich a
minuscule percentage of millionaires at the expense of millions of individuals” explained by Kats, it can be
compared to the new agreements Set by ALBA (Webber, 2013; pg11).
A very similar story occurred in Honduras in 2009, President Mel Zelaya was seen to be a leader
with strong socialist view and was feared by the wealthiest Honduran. He has plans to raise the minimum
wage, close down the American military base and had signed the ALBA agreement, demonstration his
alliance with Venezuela and its leftist approach. President Mel Zelaya’s views are of New Leftist ideas on a
commitment to equality, social justice and popular participation with an open-ended struggle for social
movement. New Left governments in Latin America has various agendas but they are all committed to a
more equitable growth model, while some are more willing to break neoliberal orthodoxy- by using state
power to control markets and to ensure income is redistributed equally.

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Latin American political advance have affected by reversal of popular movements competing for
power with resurgent mass mobilization that are elements of the ruling or dominant class. The fight Latin
American political development political advances have been alter with affected by the reversal of popular
movements competing for power with resurgent mass mobilisation that are elements of the ruling or
dominant class. The fight of capital and of the ruling class regimes are strongly held by strong capitalist-led
economic recovery which is represented by the financial and industrial systems. They are part of the
business –led movement to keep a capitalist hegemony in the position of bourgeoisie. Trade unions, which
are taken over by ethnic, religious and groups of different sectors to challenge the capitalist state, are known
to be part of the horizontal division. They challenge the vertical division of the capitalist state in which they
compete over profits. The hegemonic leadership in Latin America, which is led by agro-export elites,
financial and mineral-based multinational s led by big business ‘backed by radical right-wing middle class
demagogues.’ They exert their authority over ‘vast sectors of the lower middle class, urban and rural poor
oscillates between the downwardly mobile proletariat’ who most of the time do not have much of a voice
(Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009). The social and political power of the ruling class has been able to sustain its
bourgeois standing through the economic recovery and the substantial growth rate that extends the
increasing inequalities to those affected by the economic crisis. As James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer,
explain: “The political pendulum shifts from radical left influence ‘in the streets’, to centre-left institutional
power, to a resurgence of right-wing Street and institutional power (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009; 3).
It is notable that the diversity of the leftist experiments hit a turning point in the new millennium, as
a result of numerous international. Factors as well as several common domestic policies. Most of these
factors developed under conditions of extreme social and economic inequality and also the permissive
international environment. The Left in Latin is no longer defined by its socialist model of development but
rather by its commitment to equality, social justice and popular participation with a view to social
transformation. Many of the new left governments in Latin America have pursued diverse agendas but they
are all committed to a more equitable growth model and increasingly willing to break with neoliberal
orthodoxy and increasing state power to regulate markets, alter property relations, and redistribute income.
Section 1.1: The Left and Social Opportunities

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What is “Left” is seen by many as an open question in Latin America when describing to its programmatic
objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). As mentioned earlier,
Left parties seek power to “redistribute wealth and/or income to lower-income groups, erode social
hierarchies, and strengthen the voice of disadvantaged groups in the political process” (Levitsky and
Roberts, 2011; 5). The leftist government sets policies of social protection, believing that market
competition is the cause of inequalities and concentrated property ownership depriving the poor of
opportunity. The left doesn't necessarily reject private property or market competition, it rejects the idea that
unregulated markets can be reliable and meet social needs on its own. It can also be argued that Latin
America Left has been slow to address the inequalities of minority groups that are rooted in gender, race, or
ethnicity.
The resurgence of the Latin American Left can be described as the “Third Wave” of democratisation
explained by Huntington (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). The new turn of the Latin America left is rooted in
different factors, some of which are long-term and structural and others short term and contingent. The
neoliberal right- wing shift to the new left occurred between 1998 and 2010, a period which was
characterized by structural factors, changes in macroeconomic conditions and in the focus on environmental
changes. One factor for the resurgence of leftist movements in Latin America is inequality. Throughout the
1990s, Latin America remained plagued by severe poverty and high inequality well into the 21st century.
Estimates have shown that in 2002, 221 million Latin Americans- 44% of the regional population - lived in
poverty, while income distribution in the region was the highest in the world (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011).
It cannot be argued that poverty and inequality has given the left its success, as conservative parties have
benefited from loyalties among the poor through religious identity and the appeal of growth. In the end,
poverty and inequality do create a potential electoral benefit for the left parties as they receive large pool of
voters who are likely to be more attracted to the ideas of redistribution. By the end of the 1990s, liberalized
economic agendas were seen as a failure, which was governed by a more right wing state, and the social
needs allowed the parties of the left to gain momentum and ‘re-politicise’ inequality. Another reason for the
Left’s ascendance was the institutionalisation of electoral competition. The leftist movement had been
known to restrict opportunities to contest power legally throughout the 20th century by restricted suffrage

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using mechanisms such as military intervention, proscription and repression. The emergence of the Left in
the 20th century was perceived by the elites as a threat to the socio- economic order on account of its views
on Marxism. Much of the fear by the elites and by the United States of the New Leftist movement has not
changed significantly. The influence of the left parties was not as strong in the 20th century, as they were
considered to be influenced by the Soviet Union and perceived as a potential threat to the United States'
security. In the 1990s the geopolitical environment in Latin America changed as the transition of democracy
took place and the Soviet Bloc collapsed. This created a sense in the Latin American Left that liberal
democracy could be embraced and capitalist philosophy accepted, lowering the fear the elites had of leftist
government. Eventually leftist governments were not seen as a threat to the United States as authoritarian
alternatives waned, and military regimes declined. For the first time in history, left parties could compete for
power through Latin America without much pressure from on other groups in the country or outside forces.
Leftist parties started to gain support in major cities in Latin America, such as, Sao Paulo, San Salvador,
Mexico City and Montevideo (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Having control of municipal government gave
the leftist parties the opportunity to solidify a support bases and develop administrative competence. High
inequality created a potential constituency for the left to mobilise by promising to redistribute wealth and
expand social programs.
There has been resurgence in radicalism across the region with different types of social groups. The
different social actors are new working classes, women, the peasantry or indigenous movements and also a
rising movement from LGBT groups. By early 2000s the indigenous movements were playing a major role
in Latin America, in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Central America. These movements are
often encouraged to create alliances by self-declared leftist ideas and to counter-act the patronage politics of
the right wing. In many cases the study of the indigenous politics analyses its left formation instead of the
imbedded root struggle. It is more accurate to perceive the indigenous movement as non- left, non- class,
rural, and ethnic phenomena , seeking to protect their rights by responding to the political party system and
to policies that are deeply flawed. In Honduras, for example, there has been a growing concern by the
indigenous groups of the growing globalisation Honduras is encountering. It decreases their power to protect
their lands and food security. Indigenous groups in Honduras are not only made by Amerindia but also

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Garifunas of African origins in the northern part of Honduras. The Garifunas fear the high insecurity of
losing their lands as the Honduran government tries to increase tourism by building resorts. This has been a
strong manifestation, taking place in both rural and urban areas. The movement cries out against the two
social costs of neoliberal economic structuring, racial oppression and social exploitation to imperialism.
Honduras is also a signatory of the International Labor Organization Convention 169, “the Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples Convention. It outlines the basic rights of indigenous peoples and allows for the right to
freedom from discrimination and the right to control their own way of life, economic development, land, and
natural resources” (Ifg.org, 2002). The Honduran government has found ways to get around the Convention
to declare indigenous areas 'protected' by forest reserves. Some movements are better interpreted as the
foundation of a reconstituted indigenous left as it takes a more liberal stand and abandons the question of
class. Jeff Webber and Barry Carr described, William I. Robison's argument, noting that “transnational
capital seeks to integrate indigenous into the global market as dependent workers and consumers, to convert
their lands into private property, and to make the natural resources in their territories available for
transnational corporate exploitation” (Webber, 2013; pg 15). They have been threatened by global
capitalism and by the lack of protection from the Honduran government. Indigenous resistance has been a
rising combination of ethnicity and class, which has become a new type of mobilisation. At times social
movement groups which have occupied and organised around factories and unproductive landed estates
have been easily displaced by new bosses and the forcible displacement of peasants, who have very little
knowledge of their rights. It becomes difficult at time for social movements to create an impact unless they
have a large group of support.
Section 1.2: Understanding Right Wing Ideologies
A definition of the Right can understand the term in three ways: ideologically, ecologically and
organizationally. Its ability to exert sufficient influence dependent on the degree of control it exerts
economically and politically. Many of its most influential achievements are the result of formal or informal
means. The contract of the left-right can be understood to as reflecting the importance of the values each has
in their platform.

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Many Latin American scholars argue that the right cannot be defined by its ideology. Norbeto Bobbio
argues that a “distinction between a left that is committed to equality and a right that is committed to
inequality seems applicable” (Domínguez and Lievesley et al., 2011). It can be argued that the right's
interests are based on the elites over those of others, causing an imbalance in terms of social, political and
economic capital. The left is considered to be the subordinate class and the right as the elites that have the
greatest material wealth. The two groups have struggled against each other through the existence of the
‘haves’ and ‘have not’ as the right has been determined to maintain the status quo and the left seeks to
reduce the difference. It can be reasonably argued that the distinction between the two can be persistent and
relevant, as Burton would argue: “some high level bureaucrats who support redistribution; the poor who vote
for the right; and social mobility from the subordinate to the dominant class.” The distinction of how many
in the population move between classes and their interests are few in number, and it is important to
differentiate both political party views (Domínguez and Lievesley et al., 2011). The right wing can be
broken down into different elements that include interest groups, movements and political parties. They are
able to aggregate their demands by creating coalitions among social and political groups while they
acknowledge by intra-elite differences. It is important for the right- wing to gain support from among the
poor and marginalised groups through the influence of conservative parties and business organisations in
order to gain power. A key to their success is the control of material and media resources.
It is evident that right has been skilful at exploiting social, economic and political power in recent
history in Latin America since independence. Much of Latin America, from the 1960s to end of the 1980s,
was politically formed by the military and was democratically ‘thin.’ During the Cuban revolution of 1959,
many in the dominant class became wary of the socialist threat. Many of the businessmen, industrialists and,
conservative politicians opted to repress regimes that divided the subordinate class by controlling political
activity (Domínguez and Lievesley et al., 2011).

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Chapter 2: Honduras Evolution of Regimes
In 1985 President Suazo himself precipitated a constitutional crisis by seeking to retain power. The armed
forces, the labor movement, and the United States applied counter pressure and blocked Suazo’s efforts to
amend the constitution. The reduction in military power signalled a critical change in the rules of the game
and effectively reduced the military’s role within the regime. We believe that these changes marked 1996 as
the year of Honduras’s effective transition to civilian democracy (Booth and Wade et al., 2006).
Honduras was governed by the armed forces well into the 1980s;, its military regime shared the
characteristics of El Salvador, Guatemala, and pre- revolutionary Nicaragua. Unlike its neighbouring
authoritarian regimes, Honduras managed mostly to maintain a low level of violence and it preserved its
relative stability in a manner similar to Costa Rica years after. The Honduran government made policies to
alleviate some of the effects ‘of eroding popular living standards, and withers avoided or ameliorated brutal
political repression’ (Booth and Wade et al., 2006). External pressure from the United States and
international organisations affected Honduras’s economic policies bringing them to harmonies with
neoliberal rules entering an international economic game that put pressure on the political system.
Throughout history, Honduras has encountered few rebellions or guerrilla warfare comparable to its
counterparts Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemalan, but also remained the poorest. Until the 1970s,
Honduras was the calmest country in Central America’s troubled waters. Political parties and the military
elites were often under pressure by foreign actors such as the United States, who intervened in Honduran
political waters. There were several factors that contributed to the relative political and social stability in the
face of mass poverty. Honduras' powerfully privileged and elite class was not as wealthy as the elites in its
neighbouring countries. Also, coffee only became one of the biggest exports in the country, unlike the rest of
Central America, after World War II, with the paradox that it did not drive much wealth accumulation or
significantly shape social classes. Later in the twentieth century there was the introduction of commercial

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banana production, introduced and managed by non-Honduran foreigners. Most of the banana industry was
developed along the sparsely populated northern coast. The land was poor in quality but was very plentiful
and many of the poor peasants would find free or cheap land to farm. The fact that there were no real
ramifications of these economic developments meant that there was no need to quell an angry, exploited
rural working class. This in turn made the Honduras army rather weak well into the twentieth century. Also,
the banana industry was important in the development of labor relations; because the industry was foreign-
owned, the Honduras governments were not keen on keeping the workers’ wages down. Labour Unions
were not formally legalised till 1954, when they were able to grow politically more potent than any other
Central American country. By contrast, the Honduras debate on Liberal and Conservative parties started
much later than the rest of its neighbouring countries.
The liberal vision was first expressed in the late 1800’s by Marco Aurelio Soto, with the ideal of
modernisation to build better infrastructure and state apparatus and attract foreign investors. However, the
standards were still backwards compared to other Central American countries. By the 1950s there was a
rapid expansion of the labor union movement with the increased strength of the Liberal Party. The power of
the Liberal Party only lasted until 1956, when power was seized by the military. The military relinquished
power after a one year, when PLH candidate Ramon Villeda Morales swept the 1957 election. Villeda had
many policies to modernise Honduras, such as social policies, including social security, labor, and agrarian
reform laws. He also signed the Central American Common Market accords. However, despite many of the
policies set in place, Honduras remained the poorest country in Central America, and from the mid twentieth
century onward, developed severe economic problems. One of the first problems was land hunger which
was a very acute problem at the beginning. Much of the problem was caused by the appropriation of peasant
occupied lands by landholders as they took advantage to increase the internal and external commodity
markets ((Booth and Wade et al., 2006). There was also a sudden increase in population due to improved
public health conditions, which in turn created a higher demand for land in the 1950s and 1960s, leading to
increased class tensions and increasing peasant mobilisation. An additional problem was the involvement of
the military in the political system. The military was supported by the United States as a strategy to contain
“communism” due to labor unrest in the banana plantations that was believed to be fomented by the Soviet

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Union. The United States “concluded several agreements to train and equip the loosely organised armed
forces of Honduras, and from the early 1950s through 1979 more than 1,000 Honduran personnel had had
U.S. training” (Booth and Wade et al., 2006). During this time there was virtually no guerrilla opposition to
the Honduran government but the United States persisted in training the military and focusing on
counterinsurgency, with a strong emphasis on “national security.”
United States' aid to Honduras increased sharply well into the 1980s, especially military assistance.
Other factors also increased military power nationally, such as increasing factionalism and conflict within
the liberal and national parties. The political party conflicts drew the armed forces deep into the political
spectrum. By 1956 the military had seized power for four decades and ruled the nation directly influencing
civilian rulers from just offstage. The military acted more as an arbiter between political groups than as an
agent of a ruling class (Booth and Wade et al., 2006). The military in Honduras did tolerate labour, peasant,
and political organisations and allowed the Catholic Church clergy to carry out their duties in towns around
the country. The Military government was keen on socio-economic reforms, specifically after the Alliance
for Progress and Central American Common Market. By 1963 the head of the Air Force Col. Oswaldo
Lopez Arellano over threw Villeda Morales and assumed power with the support of the National Party
(known to be conservative). The military regime begun to repress labor and peasant activism and they were
able to enlarge and also strengthen the armed forces. The conservative party, under the new military regime
of Lopez Arellano, implemented new economic reforms that created a disadvantage for trade relations built
to into the Central American Common Market. The 1969 war against El Salvador, known as 'the Football
War', created a growing unrest which ended Lopez’s presidency. Col. Lopez’s Arellano was not out of
power for long as the national-Liberal coalition could not deal properly with the growing national turmoil
that gave Lopez Arellano an advantage that prompted him back to power. This time he received support
from labour, peasant groups as he implemented several populist programs, including an agrarian reform.
Throughout the 1970s the military participation in rule changed character and by 1975 Lopez embarrassed
by bribery scandals and corruption transferred power to Col. Juan Alberto Melgar Castro. He abandoned
Lopez’s populist reforms and imposed restrictions on civilian participation.

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In 1978 Col. Policarpio Paz Garcia overthrew Melgar. Garcia's new regime of Garcia continued many of the
policies of its predecessors by promoting national economic development and not giving support to social
programs. The regime was relatively respectful of basic human rights and permitted certain civil and
political liberties, but on many occasions ignored questions of social justice. Garcia's military was losing
national power as they proved inept as rulers and economic managers. The regime was also involved in
corruption scandals followed by economic difficulties and regional problems in neighboring countries like
Nicaragua where the Somoza regime collapsed. It also came under external pressure from the United States
as President Carter did not give military assistance. Ultimately the administration's pressure forced General
Paz to relinquish power. Under internal and external pressure the military called an election in 1980 for a
new government that would rewrite the constitution. By November 1981 Honduras held its first presidential
election which was won by Liberal candidate Roberto Suazo Cordova. To the surprise of many observers the
election was won by a clear majority and the armed forces did not interfere or favor their erstwhile PN
allies(Booth and Wade et al., 2006).
Following the election, Honduras became notable as a more democratic nation than its still military-
governed neighbours in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The United States, under the new Reagan
administration, saw this as an opportunity and put heavy pressure on Honduras to exert efforts against the
Sandinista in Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerillas. The U.S. military summarised it’s there policy for
being in Honduras: “Honduras is the keystone to our policy down there” as it could control the situation in
neighbouring countries from the new military base in Honduras (Booth and Wade et al., 2006). The military
leaders under President Cordova accepted the presence of U.S. forces in the country. The U.S. took
advantage of this by setting up a military base and even training Salvadoran troops in Honduras.
Section 2.1: The start of neoliberal democracy
James Dunkerley would describe the neoliberal consolidation in the 1990s as “pacification of Central
America” (Dunkerley, 1988). This was a period in which the Cold War had come to an end, the Sandinista
revolution in Nicaragua had been defeated and also the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala also
brought to an end. By 1990, Honduras entered an era of neoliberal policies and, with the pressure of outside
forces, was set to become a more globalized nation. With the selection of President Rafael Callejas as the

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National Party leader, Honduras embarked on a neoliberal restructuring in the country. Callejas was part of
the bourgeoisie of Honduras and his National Party they was dominated by neoliberal technocrats. Callejas
introduced many new economic policies such as the first of three structural adjustment packages by agreeing
to obey measures set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank and
the World Bank (Jeff pg 358). He let the economy become unregulated by liberalizing price controls and the
privatization of various state-owned enterprises. These were measures that orientated the political economy
of Honduras in the direction of free markets that increased tourism and non-traditional exports, and
promoted maquila (clothing manufacturing). Other Presidents followed the same economic policies as
President Roberto Reina (1994-98) who promulgated the Great National Transformation Project (Wiseman,
1998). This initiative propelled the country into a far reaching globalisation with the promotion of non-
traditional exports. It created a Super Free Trade Zone in the majority of the country that increased vast
infrastructural and energy projects that would better international investors. “The primary objectives are
designed to satisfy the needs of the international community and not the needs of the domestic market,”
noted Roger Marin, who was in charge of the project under Reina’s government (Robinson, 2003; 130).
These economic policies were followed throughout subsequent presidencies well into the early 2000s by
Conservative President Ricardo Maduro.
The next five new governments after 1990s followed Callejas' neoliberal policies generating high
foreign direct investment. Most of this was sponsored by export processing zones and privately run
industrial parks where many of the workers were low-paid, female and non-unionized (Robinson, 2008).
One of the largest industries in Honduras was the maquiladoras (factories), the majority of which were
operated by foreign investors who sought to increase profitability. The workforce in the maquiladoras
increased from 9,000 in 1990 to 20,000 in 1991, then 48,000 in 1995, and 100,00 by the early 2000’s “as the
country went from a banana republic to a sweatshop republic” (Robinson,2008:120). The maquiladoras
became the second most important source of foreign exchange from the United States as the sector
amounted to $1.2 billion US comparable to the US influence in the midst of the 20th century in the banana
production in Honduras. The figures, of course, date from before the global economic crisis. After the crisis,

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there was a fall in U.S. demand for Honduran- manufactured produce as lower-cost production was
preferable in Asia.
Honduras was being praised for its pace and character of neoliberal reforms by the influx of foreign
direct investment and its international financial institutions. The macroeconomic growth in Honduras did not
advance at the speed of international investment in the country. During the 1990s growth remained under 4
percent, except for one year that it peaked at 5.0 percent in 1997. Honduras was becoming more clearly
distinct from the rest of Latin America, which was not suffering as harshly from microeconomic growth
(Ocampo and Rada et al., 2009). Honduras was able to qualify for debt relief in 2005 as part of the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) due to its high commodity prices. The goal was to reduce poverty in
Honduras as part of United Nation Millennium Development Goals, with a debt relief of $1.2 billion
between 2005 and 2015 (EIU, 2008:17). It was a way to combat poverty and to reform Honduran public
policies. Among the most urgent needs were the institutional reforms in the 1990s, the needs left after
Hurricane Mitch (more than 11,000 people were killed and two million were left homeless out of a
population of 7 million) and the process of debt forgiveness. The global vision consisted of accelerating
economic growth, increasing the distribution of wealth, reducing inequalities and substantially reducing
poverty. The strategic goals included increasing human capital, and creating opportunities in the market to
increase productivity and access to better infrastructure economically and socially (Estado y violencia
criminal en América Latina Reflexiones a partir del golpe en Honduras, 2013). Permitted suspension of
payments amounted to $4.4 billion, which had consumed 46 percent of the annual budget. There was
international pressure specifically from the IMF for Flores administration to implement neoliberal polices
that complicated reducing poverty and unemployment after Hurricane Mitch. President Flores was also
pressured to privatize the telecommunications and energy industries and to sell the airports. Many of the
privatizations failed and the IMF decided to freeze the distributions of loans (Booth and Wade et al., 2006).
President Flores was best known for persistent poverty, sluggish growth and a violent crime wave at a
crucial time when Hurricane Mitch caused problems that set the country back half a century.
Before the economic crisis of 2008, Honduras was able to accelerate its gross domestic product
between 2003 and 2007 at times surpassing six per cent. Contrast to the high growth rates, social conditions

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did not improve but remained abysmal and even worsened in some areas. Honduras ranked 112 on the
United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI). Among other Latin American
countries, only Bolivia (113), Guyana (114), Guatemala (122), Nicaragua (124), and Haiti (149) registered
worse results (UNDP, 2009).
Statistics following the start of the neoliberalism policies set in place in the 1990s show figures of
regression rather than progress in Honduras' national income distribution. Even as the country had an
outstanding economy for radical redistribution from 2003 and 2007, the wealthiest 10 percent of the
population was distributed to the next highest 20 percent of the population between 2002 and 2007. The rest
of the population were not able to profit from such distribution as the poorest 40 percent of them were still in
the same poverty in 2007 that they been in the 1990s; there was no social mobility within this group. During
the economic boom at the turn of the twentieth century worsen there capital gain as many of their gains were
lost from what they acquired in the 1990s (Webber, 2013).
Distribution of National Income in Honduras
Year Poorest 40% Next 30% 20% Below Richest 10% Richest 10%
1990 10.2 19.7 27.1 43.1
1999 11.8 22.9 29.0 36.5
2002 11.4 21.7 27.6 39.4
2006 8.8 22.5 29.3 39.3
2007 10.1 23.5 29.5 37.0
Section 2.2: The Causes of a Neo-Liberalist Era
Many people living throughout out the country resisted the neoliberal assaults as their way of living
was changing from the 1990s well into the 2000s. The majority of the population suffered from the “war on
crimes” and the “war on gangs" that left thousands of people dead, a number that is increasing every year.
There has been a growing peasant movement which is a social force in Honduran politics. One of the largest

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peasant movements in the world, known as Via Campesina, is located in Tegucigalpa. The majorities of the
peasants work in the country and use their lands to survive everyday life as agrarians. On many occasions it
has been difficult for them to resist the reigning political power structure power moguls who have frequently
influenced Honduras Miguel Facusse can take away land from those who have no power. Many peasants are
murdered for their lands and no attention is paid. Peasant leader Matias Valle Cardenas was murdered as he
tried to protect the rights of peasants and it was a clear understanding that “private banking and agro
industrial interest are not willing to relinquish the multi-million African palm business” (Www6.rel-uita.org,
2011). Cardenas and the United Peasants Movement of Aguan (MUCA) were presented by the Finance
Secretariat public and private bank loans to purchase 4,000 hectares of land, pursuant to agreement set by
landowner Miguel Facusse. This was a proposal to resolve an acute land conflict that has taken many lives
but it was a scheme to strangle MUCA finically. As MUCA General Secretary Yoni Rivas explained “It is a
scheme to undermine our struggle and eliminate us. They failed in their attempt to exterminate us with guns,
so now they taking another shot us and trying to strangle us financially to drive us off our lands”
(Www6.rel-uita.org, 2011). The agreement would leave MUCA in a total debt of two billion lempiras (105
million U.S. dollars), a plan seen for an opportunity for large landowners to take their lands back. The land
is occupied by three thousand families that are part of MUCA and if in debt, they would be practically
owned by the banks that are under the influenced of Miguel Facusse. He and the banks would be the only
ones to profit from the proposal as they would receive 540 million lempiras (28.5 million U.S. dollars) all
from the sales of the land, which would eventually, further impoverish peasants. The peasants are the ones
who lose in trying to keep their lands, and if some protest to protect their lands, they end up being murdered
and no justice is done.
In the labour sector there has been a great social movement throughout the country. There has been
an increase of maquilas since the neoliberal policies set by President Callejas. The term ‘maquilas’ refers to
the portions of grains and flour or oil that are used to miller. It is now used as term of production caused by
globalisation. Poor countries are used as maquiladoras as they assemble clothes, computers and other items.
The poor work long hours in terrible conditions in exchange for low salaries (Impacto del Libre Comercio
en los Derechos Laborales de las Obreras de la Maquila Textil, 201; pg 161). The majority of the labour

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force in the maquilas are women who make up 69% of the total work force of 130 thousand people. Many of
them join the maquilas as this is their only way of employment and there has been a growing debate about
the issue of human rights in the labour force (Derechosdelamujer.org, 2013). The majority of the women
working receive lower wages than their male counterparts (a wage that is already around 6 dollars a day),
are sexually harassed, and are sometimes made redundant for no reason(La Situacio de la Mujer en
Honduras, 2013). In order to confront the struggles arising from being seen and treated as inferiors, a
growing new women’s group has arisen, with worker and peasant organisations coming together to fight for
basic rights (Robinson,2003:132).
There has been a growing insecurity in the country that has affected the rural and urban classes and
questioned the authority of the Honduran government. One of the largest cities in Honduras, San Pedro Sula,
is categorised as the most dangerous city in the world with a toll of 58 deaths for every 100,000 habitant.
After the coup in 2009 there was an increase of 30% (Estado y violencia criminal en América Latina
Reflexiones a partir del golpe en Honduras, 2013). The country is experiencing a booming drug trade
because it is geographically located in the center between Mexico and Colombia and gang activities increase
violence in the streets. This has led to a remilitarisation of the state but as a means to “ameliorate plebeian
violence” (Webber, 2013; 362). In many ways the militarisation is a coercive way to keep a neoliberal order
and is understandable in a state that has had many remilitarisations such as the ease with which Roberto
Michelette organised and orchestrated a coup against former President Manuel Zelaya.

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Chapter 3: Zelaya’s Domestic and Foreign Policy and
the Rise of New Power
The Honduran army, very well armed, following the orders of the Minister of Defence, entered the home of
President Jose Manuel Zelaya on the 28th of June 200 at 5:00 in the morning. The stripping him of his
presidential powers and took him in his pajamas to the airbase of Hernan Acosta Mejia. From there they
transported him from Tegucigalpa to Costa Rica in a military plane. On that same day the Foreign Minister,
Patricia Rodas, was deprived of her rights by the Honduran military and together with the Ambassador of
Venezuela, Armando Laguna, of Cuba, Juan Carlos Hernandez, and from Nicaragua, Mario Duarte, was
beaten by the military forces and later freed (Honduras: Tres Informes sobre Derechos Humanos, 2010; 31).
Honduras had become a government without laws and power, where anyone with enough power and money
could cause an un-peaceful transition in the country. In the early mornings electricity was cut off throughout
the country for five hours leaving radios and news channels not able to give information about the coup
d'état that had just happened.
The National Congress proceeded smoothly with a celebratory session that same day, preceded by
the Secretary reading a letter from President Zelaya resigning his position on account of “erosion policy and
health”. The Congress decided to adopt the Legislative Decree No. 141-09 which orders that “It strips away
from Citizen Manuel Zelaya as the President” and “names constituently to the citizen Roberto Micheletti
Bain as the Constutional President of the Republic for the timeremaining to finish the current period
(Honduras: Tres Informes sobre Derechos Humanos, 2010; 32). This was all a show in which the
government had created a scenario seemingly impossible to imagine in the 21st century. One of the main
master minds of the coup was Roberto Micheletti who presided over the National Congress and who had
become the next in line to be President. He had previously failed three times to become President through

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the electoral process. There was accusation against President Mel Zelaya for betraying the country, abuse of
power, and functions to the detriment usurpation and the Supreme Court had ordered his arrest on account of
his crimes.
Manuel Zelaya was a wealthy ranch owner, involved in businesses that include the logging industry.
His father how was a well- known right winger who had sympathies with the military regime and who had
provided his ranch for the assassination of peasants known as the “massacre de Los Horcones.” When
Zelaya was running for President, this was used in the political campaign against him, but it was not
successful because it was not reported in the media. He assumed the President's office in January 2006 and
ran as the leader of the Movimiento Esperanza Liberal (Liberal Hope Movement) within the Liberal Party.
Before running as a presidential candidate he had been a Liberal congressperson for three consecutive terms
between 1985 and 1999. He was also head of the World Bank-funded Fondo Hondureno de Inversion Social
(Honduran Social Investment Fund, FHIS) (Webber , 2013). He campaigned against the National Party
Challenger, Porfirio Lobo Sosa. They campaigned around the issues of violent crime and youth gangs.
Candidate Lobo Sosa pledged to continue former President Ricardo Maduro's policy of ‘mano dura’ seen as
zero tolerance toward gangs and criminals, and also to reintroduce the death penalty, which had been
abolished in 1937. Zelaya took a different approach and opposed the death penalty, viewing it as a law that
could exacerbate the country’s crime. He saw the solution to the problems as being new social programs to
lower high levels of poverty and unemployment as he believed as these were the major factor for youth
joining gangs.
Mel Zelaya had assumed power at a time when Latin America was experiencing a shift politically
and socially towards the left after having decades of various crises in neoliberal government and a strong
international influence. After he took office and during his presidency there was a growing dissatisfaction
from the right wing and efforts to take back control. Once taking office he made a progress towards number
social and economic reforms. There has been for years a social movement from teachers who have gone on
strike from teaching because of low wages and the terrible conditions at schools. President Zelaya raised the
minimum wage for teachers and introduced free school enrolment (EIU, 2008). The average Honduran was
earning $6 per day, but Zelaya raised the minimum wage to $9.60 per day and was criticised by many top

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corporations in Honduras for increasing expenses in the country, as well as arguments that raising the
minimum wage would increase the cost of production (Grandin, 2009a). Zelaya also introduced policies to
protect the environment to be approved by Congress as the Forest Law act to prevent the devastation of an
ecological collapse as well as a plan to protect 87.7 percent of Honduran national territory. He also
introduced mining legislation to protect the extraction of natural resources as many Canadians and American
companies would bribe local government for access to the mining fields (EIU, 2008:12). He has also been
the only president to apologise for the executions of street children in the 1990s many of whom were viewed
as gang members. In addition, he has advocated the legalisation of some narcotics to increase pressure on
the “war on drugs”. Zelaya also refused to privatised the state-owned electricity company, Empresa
Nacional de Energia Electrica (ENEE), standing up to pressure from many in his right wing party and from
business groups (Webber, 2013).
It cannot be overstated that the Liberal Party made an enormous jump to the left under the Zelaya
administration. A significant shift in neoliberalism took place when in April 2006, Honduras joined the
Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with the United States. This
was an accord to encourage foreign investment and also to abolish tariffs with the member states. This is of
strategic importance for Honduras because it has an export-orientated economy and the United States is its
biggest exporter. Two years after the signing of the DR-CAFTA the Zelaya administration agreed with the
IMF to an arrangement that “commits the government to maintaining macroeconomic stability, lowering
current spending (particularly the government’s wage bill), achieving a fiscal deficit of 1.5 % of GDP, and
focusing public expenditure on infrastructure and poverty reduction” (EIU,2008:10, Webber 363). The
influence of revolutionary left ideologies and liberation theology was the force that pressured peasants,
students and trade unions to take to the streets to demand change resulting in President Zelaya's undertaking
to enact new policies to help the common people in Honduras. There were many protests against Zelaya for
signing the DR-CAFTA agreement as there were no fewer than 722 official social conflicts during part of
his presidency against privatisation and free trade (Hernandez Navarro, 2009). This however did not stop
him from later on forming partnerships with Hugo Chavez. When Zelaya became too close to Hugo Chavez,

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he was criticised by top business corporations in the country and by the United States as he seemed to be
moving too much to the left.
Section 3.1: Zelaya Leans to Far Left
Throughout Zelaya’s presidency his ideals were generally understood to reflect an ideology of social
liberalism as his speeches “for all system benefits go beyond where they are most needed: women, men,
children, peasants, farmers” (Hernandez Navarro, 2009). Zelaya turned to Chavez as an ally for economic
help when there was an economic downturn in 2008 associated with the spiraling global crisis. The crisis
affected Honduras as the United States was its biggest trading partner. Hugo Chavez had formed
Petrocaribe, an accord made of various Caribbean countries, by acquiring petroleum from Venezuela
financially by paying fifty percent within 90 days and the rest within twenty five years with an interest rate
as low as one percent. Honduras' economy, which had been growing at a rate of six percent for several
years, had a turnaround in 2008. During the economic crisis it slowed down due to its close ties with the
United States. Zelaya opted to join the Bolivarian Allaince for the Americas (ALBA). According to the deal:
“Venezuela …offered to buy Honduras bonds worth $100 million, whose proceeds will be spent on housing
for the poor. Mr.Chavez had also offered a $30 million credit line for farming, 100 tractors, and 4m low-
energy light builds…Cuba will send technicians to help to install them, as well as more doctor and literacy
teachers” (Economist, 2008b and Webber, 2013; 364). It appeared to be an ideal proposal for a nation that
was suffering extreme poverty and lack of social cohesion and also a government that was having
difficulties obtaining financial support from the international community. The growing influence of left
wing socialist ideas from Cuba and Venezuela with their approaches to controlling poverty and addressing
the disparity between social classes was a spreading throughout Latin America, and it was an added
advantage to them that they were able to provide financial assistance. While Zelaya received much criticism
for his evolving views, there were also supporters such as Rafael Alegria, Coordinator of la Via Campesina
Centro American, who said that “social movements have the right to build a new law that benefits all social
sectors of the country that have always been excluded and marginalized. Therefore, we advocate in favor of

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the referendum. The new Constitution should serve to rebuild the State and give all power to the people,
who are the sovereign "(Hernandez Navarro, 2009). Zelaya was motivated by the fight for social movement
but many international observers viewed his changing ideologies as “a matter of ideological association, but
rather one driven by financial need” (Economist, 200b). This remains is a contested argument among those
international observers but it is nonetheless a movement that stimulate momentum from the bottom to
defend the President who was ousted.
When Latin American elites and conservative militaries have gained too much power and abuse their
status to oppress groups who do not have much of a voice, it creates a momentum within the oppressed
groups. They adopt social revolutionary measures to challenge the interests protected by the elites. The
different sectors of the oppressed groups build up to become one and march down the streets demanding for
their rights and for more equality. Once there is tension the suprerior group will use force to keep their
interests protected, often creating a compulsion to acts of violence. Zelaya was feeling empowered by the
social movement and its relation with Hugo Chavez, and by the end of June 2009 he ordered the distribution
of ballots for a referendum. Asking citizens to vote “la cuarta urna” would give the President the right to run
for a second term, since currently a President in Honduras is only allowed a four year term. The Supreme
Court had ordered that the Zelaya referendum was illegal, but after the order given by the Court he called on
the military to distribute the ballots throughout the country. Mark Weisbrot (2009) argues in Support of the
Coup “that the preside dent violated the law by attempting to go ahead with the referendum after the
Supreme Court ruled against it. This is a legal question; it may be true, or it may be that the Supreme Court
had no legal basis for its ruling. But it is irrelevant to what has happened: the military is not the arbiter of a
constitutional dispute between the various branches of government.” The head of the Honduran armed
forces, General Romeo Orlando Vasquez, refused to distribute the ballots. He was dismissed from his
position by Zelaya, which led to the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Angel Orellana. Many in the
National Congress started to question Zelaya's decisions and seemed to become eager for more power. One
of the most influential of the Liberal Party, Roberto Michelette, turned against the president and became the
main actor during the coup along with General Romeo Orlando Vasquez. Many social conservatives viewed
it as an opportunity to overthrow many of Zelaya's policies that were seen to be too left wing. “Conservative

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evangelicals and Catholics- including Opus Dei, a formidable presence in Honduras- detested him because
he refused to ban the ‘morning after’ pill. The mining, hydroelectric and biofuel sector didn’t like him
because he didn’t put state funds and land at their disposal. The law and order crowd hated him because he
apologized on behalf of the state for program of ‘social classing’ that took place in the 1990s, which
included the execution of street children and gang members. And the generals didn't like it when he tried to
assert executive control over the military” (Webber, 2013). There was enough of the opposition to go against
Zelaya and his administration with the help of some in the international community.

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Chapter 4: Honduras an Inconvenience to the Imperialist powers
Obama declared at the Summit of the Americas at Trinidad and Tobago in 2005, which most of Latin
America's Presidents attended: “No wonder, then, that demagogues like Hugo Chavez have stepped into this
vacuum. His predictable yet perilous mix of anti-American rhetoric, authoritarian government, and check
book diplomacy offers the same false promise as the tried and failed ideologies of the past” (Thenation.com,
2009). The White House viewed Chavismo as a threat to Latin America and to United States' influence in
the region through the influence Chavez was trying to gather along with Cuba to spread socialist ideas. The
rise of Chavez had to do with the neglect of the empire and the disasters that neoliberal policies impacted on
the region. When the coup against Zelaya occurred in June 2009, it provided the United States with an
opportunity recover some of its influence in the region. Latin America have always been the “back yard” to
the United States but American influence in the region had narrowed as its foreign policy became more
absorbed with the Middle East and Central Asia. When professor Greg Grandin, a professor of history at
New York City University and the author of Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United and the Rise of
the New Imperialism, was asked by Benjamin Dangl “if another US-backed coup- such as the one that
happened against Chile’s socialist President Salvador Allende in 1973--would be possible in today’s Latin
America, he replied: "I don't think it would be possible. There isn't a constituency for a coup. In the 1970s,
US policy was getting a lot more traction because people were afraid of the rise of the left, and they were
interested in an economic alliance with the US. Now, the [Latin American] middle class could still go with
the US, common crime could be a wedge issue that could drive Latin America away from the left. But US
policy is so destructive that it has really eviscerated the middle class. Now, there is no domestic constituency
that the US could latch onto. The US did have a broader base of support in the 1970s, but neoliberalism
undermined it” (Thenation.com, 2009).

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The new concern of the United States was the rise of Hugo Chavez in the region and the new rise of
the left. The Obama administration quietly supported the Honduran coup as a means to check Chavez and
the Bolivarian Revolution and keep them undermined in order to ensure a continuity of neoliberal trade and
investment in the region. The Obama administration worked to keep its influence in the region by increasing
its military power by establishing seven military bases in Colombia, and creating a stronger political
alignment with Colombia and Peru which have poor records of human rights. It has also supported right
wing movements in the region to depose political leaders in a violent way and also control the rise of social
movements if they were not aligned with the neoliberal status quo (Webber, 2013). The United States saw
an opportunity in the Honduran coup to restore its influence despite its affront to liberal democratic norms.
While American aspired to undermine the power of Zelaya,it did not express a clear voice for or
against the coup. It permitted the assault on liberal democracy in Honduras when many in the region
condemned the coup. When there were attempts to restore tranquility by allowing Zelaya to return into the
country, if imprisoned in the Brazilian embassy, Americans and Canadians took the back seat and urged for
the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord between Michelette and Zelaya as well as the fraudulent elections in
November 29, 2009. The Obama administration succeeded in keeping Zelaya out of power and applauded a
new 'liberal democracy' with a neoliberal agenda, though all its support was done behind the scenes.
Information published in Wikileaks confirmed that the United States was the mastermind in crafting the San
Jose accord as a means to resolve the crisis even while, in the eyes of the world, they hid behind the curtain.
It was not difficult to truncate Zelaya’s presidency when Michelette was successful in keeping his strong
posture in office with some support of the United States while the left wing supporting Zelaya protested and
the right wing forces felt confident in the success of the coup.
During the coup Obama called on “all political and social actors in Honduras to respect democratic
norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic Charter” (White House, 2009). It is
significant that Obama was calling for the restoration of democracy and of fair play but did not call for the
return of Zelaya to power and did not single out thoses responsible for the coup. In the eyes of the
international community, the Obama administration is viewed less in terms for what it did and more in terms
of what it didn't. Only after the OAS, the European Union, the UN General Assembly and other Latin

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American nations denounced the coup and declared the restoration of Zelaya as president, did the Obama
Administration also issue such a statement. The United States declaration was a statement without much
support. Once the OAS threatened to suspend Honduras as a non- standing member, Micheletti did not
hesitate to stand his ground and remove his government from the organization, and declaring that it would
not be bullied (Cockburn, 2009).
Section 4.1: The OAS is Undermined by Great Powers
The United States, together with Canada, were worried about the OAS decision to suspend Honduras and
tried to minimize the exclusion by preventing sanctions and engaging in negotiations outside the OAS. The
United States had planned an accord to be take place in Costa Rica with President Oscar Arias as the
negotiator between Zelaya and Micheletti, but the United States took the back seat to avoid the impression
that they were influencing the negotiation. As the San Jose mediation took place there were many criticisms
by regional presidents who saw the negotiation as undermining the OAS and its credibility.
The OAS had summoned an extraordinary session on 28 June 2009, to adopt a resolution known as
953/(1700/09) ‘Situacion Actual en Honduras’ (Current situation in Honduras) (Honduras: Tres Informes
sobre Derechos Humanos, 2010). In the resolution the OAS condemned the coup and the expulsion of
President Zelaya and also declared that the only recognised government would be that of Zelaya. There was
a mandated request for the de facto government to return President Zelaya back to power. The de facto
government of Micheletti did not allow the return of Zelaya into Honduras and it undermined the request
from the OAS as it did not have much support from the United States. It was also negotiated that Zelaya
would not request a constitutional reform, so it did not matter if Zelaya was to return to power because he
would have been beaten and his social reform agenda defeated (Honduras: Tres Informes sobre Derechos
Humanos, 2010). Much pressure was put on Zelaya to negotiate with the coup opposition to request his
return back to Honduras, but Michelette was not making it very easy for his return. Zelaya was also under
scrutiny from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who “would remind Zelaya that he brought the coup on
himself because of supposedly reckless and inflammatory behaviour” (Webber, 2013). Such comments
undermined Zelaya's credibility as a former president and his chances of returning to Honduras and
returning to office.

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Senior Official and Special Envoy for the Western Hemisphere, Otto Reich, claimed “What happens
in Honduras may one day be seen as either the hight water mark of Hugo Chavez’s attempt to undermine
democracy in this hemisphere, or as a green light to the continued spread of Chavista authoritarianism under
the guise of democracy” (Pine, 2010:20). The Obama administration might have claimed that Zelaya was the
rightful president of Honduras but it was not going to do much for his representation and it allowed
Micheletti to take charge by making negotiations more difficult. At the start the Obama administration
seemed to have a new friendship with its southern neighbour through Obama's “New Partnership for the
Americas,” and his commitment to reduce poverty, hunger, and global warming and also relax restriction
and remittances to Cuba (Webber, 2013). At the same time the administration attacked Chavez demagogues,
as he viewed Chavez as spreading his influence to the other countries in Latin America and trying to spread
Chavismo ideologies. The White House used stactics such as appointing Hugo Llorens , who had held the
Andean desk at the National Security Council during the failed 2022 coup against Chavez, as Ambassador to
Honduras, and Jeffery Davidow, advisor for the Summit of the Americas, who served as Ambassador to
Chile during the coup against Salvador Allende (Ross and Rein, 2009). These appointments indicate the
desire of the United States to keep things under control in the region and to preserve its influence, just as it
opened seven military bases in Colombia, a neighbouring country to Venezuela, as tensions were growing.
In Honduras it became obvious that the de facto government led by Micheletti was not going to
allow the return of Zelaya back into the country. The Obama administration was not taking a firm position to
condemn the de facto government until the international community started pressuring them. Secretary of
State, Hillary Clinton, announced it would be cutting aid to Honduras and freezing the visas to some of the
de facto government. The result of Clinton’s announcement was the revoking of the visas of four members
and a cut in aid to Honduras, which did not include the military who were in charge of the coup (Grandin,
2009a). Even with the ‘restriction’ proposed by Clinton, the U.S still allowed for the coup regime to survive
and ignored the human rights violations that were occurring in the country, including the censorship of the
media. Clinton tried to undermine the situation in the international sphere, as the State Department blame the
anti-coup forces for committing crimes. It also promoted Micheletti’s authority and its legitimacy as forces
working to stabilise the situation in Honduras. And Zelaya continued to be blamed for his fate.

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Richard Lugar, senior Republican senator on the Senate Foreign Relations, signed by Assistant
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Richard Verma, stated that he was not “supporting any particular
politician or individual” but that “Zelaya’s insistence on undertaking provocative actions contributed to the
polarisation of Honduras society and led to a confrontation that unleashed the events that led to his removal”
(Litvinsky, 2009)Information spread by the United States in such ways does not support the legitimacy of
Zelaya, and it strengthens the de facto government, implying that it has the right to take over a troubled
administration, in the same way a. As arguments that Zelaya was power -hungry and was aiming to be
president longer than his proscribed term (similar to what Chavez had done in Venezuela). Such arguments
gave a popular credibility for the Obama administration to take action to restore democracy in Honduras.
Micheletti felt empowered to oppress the anti-coup supporters without any objection from the United
States. The San Jose accord was seen as a successful development for the United States because it was
viewed as a means to restore democracy, but it would only receive international support if Zelaya was
allowed back into the country. The accord did not reinstate Zelaya but included arrangements formulated by
Congress for him to share power with the coup supporters. It would have only given Zelaya two months left
in power before the election. President Zelaya withdrew from the accord because he viewed it as being
without a value. The Obama administration was seeking ‘democracy’ but this would not provide what the
Honduran people were fighting for, improving the lives of the working class and reducing poverty. Before
the November elections there was an increase in human rights violations and repression.
Section 4.2: La Cuarta Hurna
On November 29, 2009 the Honduran people went to the ballots to vote for a new democratic president.
Clinton argued that “by voting in the Novemeber 29 presidential election in Honduras…the Honduran
people expressed their commitment to a democratic future for their country. They turned out in large
numbers, and they threw out, in effect, the party of both Presidential Zelaya and the de facto leader,
Mr.Micheletti” (Joyce, 2010:10). The Obama administration used the new election as a pretext for a return
to a constitutional democracy and the introduction of the new government of President Lobo. Despite the
introduction of a new president, it was still represented by pro-coup supporters and conditions in the country

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only worsened. In the first month of President Lobo's term at least eight journalists and six campesinos were
murdered. Hillary Clinton would still continue to argue to the OAS General Assembly that Honduras has
undergone a reconciliation and for the hemisphere to accept the new government by inviting it to the
community (Clinton, 2010). The elections of November 29, 2009, were clearly fraudulent as the Honduras
Electoral Tribunal records showed a 60 percent turn out, a figured that was obviously inflated. Other
nongovernmental organisations such as Hagamos Democracia calculated a turn out of 47.6 percent. The
election was an attempt to consolidate the coup, as it was still subject to resistance from protestors around
the country and a fear from military repression. Most of the Latin American governments did not recognised
the newly elected government.
Those who spoke out against the new government would suffer consequences, and often be
murdered. The Comite de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras (Committee of Family
Members of the Disappeared of Honduras, COFADEH) documented 250 human right violations following
Lobo’s inauguration and the FNRP claimed 130 activists were assassinated.

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Conclusion
Honduras has struggled against imperialism from the United States since the 1980s but it also had a
strong hold during the period of military rule when American corporations had too much to lose in the
country. This thesis has sought to provide the historical background of Honduras from its military rule in the
1960 till 1981. From the 1980s throughout the 1990s and the early 21st century the influence of the United
States and international organisations exerted pressure on Honduras to follow neoliberal policies and to open
its markets more to the international community. Honduras became part of CAFTA to become integrated in
a free trade agreement. It is evident that during the right wing era there was a growing inequality in the
country as the wealthiest ten percent were benefiting the most, while there were also a growing human rights
violations when the government enforced a 'cleansing' policies murdering hundreds of children who were
suspected of being part of ‘maras’ gangs.

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Agreed Mark