"The Many Faces of Freedom:" by Tibor Molnar

The Many Faces of
‘Freedom’
Tibor G. Molnar
Philosophy Corner, 2nd
July, 2013.

© 2013 Tibor G Molnar – All rights reserved. 2
What is ‘Freedom’?
At first blush, we might say that we feel ‘free’ – in some-or-other ‘meaningful’
way – when/where
a) we are presented with multiple ‘real’ (actual) alternative courses
of action, from which we may choose,
and
b) we are at liberty, and able, to choose one (or none) of them.
Conversely, we typically feel that we are not free – constrained, “unfree” –
when/where
a) we have no choice – i.e., we have no ‘real’ alternatives to choose
from,
or
b) we are not at liberty, or unable, to choose.

For example: when we are presented at the candy store with a choice of, say,
caramels and liquorice allsorts, we are (at least in principle) free to choose
between them. And even if the store had only caramels, say, we would still be
free to choose between buying and not buying them.
This line of thinking led Jean-Paul Sartre to conclude
that:
a) we always have a choice (even if it is only
a “Hobson’s choice”),
and
b) we always exercise a choice, even when
we choose not to choose;
and hence that we are always fully responsible for all our actions (and inactions)
all of the time. In Sartre’s own words, “we are condemned to be free.” 1
1
Jean-Paul Sartre [1905-1980]: Existentialism and Humanism, tr. Philip Mairet (Methuen, 1948)

But… (in philosophy there’s always a “but”)… this doesn’t explain what it
means to be free. So, what is “freedom”? Or, more particularly,
What does it mean to have a “choice”?
Are our ‘choices’ real, or are they illusory?
What does it mean to be ‘free’ to choose?
What does it take to exercise a ‘choice’?
There are two very different ways of approaching these questions:
1) via Physics – i.e., via neuroscience and physical laws
and
2) via Metaphysics – i.e., via psychological, social & political norms.

‘Physical’ Freedom
Let’s start with the easy one – the scientific/physics approach.
‘Real choice’ entails the actual possibility of multiple (different and mutually
exclusive) events/outcomes issuing from one single physical circumstance or
state-of-affairs.
In other words, ‘real choice’ requires that events/outcomes be less than fully
determined/constrained by their circumstances/initial conditions – i.e., that
there must be real, one-to-many pathways between spatio-temporally adjacent,
physical states-of-affairs.
(After all, if different events/outcomes required different circumstances, then for
any one actual circumstance/state-of-affairs only one event/outcome
(commensurate with that actual circumstance) would ever be actually possible;
and other, albeit apparent/imaginable alternatives would not be realisable.)

Similarly, ‘real freedom-to-choose’ entails the actual ability of an agent to select
one action/outcome from among the multiple ‘real choices’ that are actually
available to it – via a selection process that is driven solely by, say, its own ‘Free
Will’; where that ‘Will’ is:
a) less than fully constrained by the agent’s external circumstances,
and
b) less than fully determined/constrained by its internal, physical state.
(After all, if enacting different selections required that the agent be in different
circumstances/states, then only one action/outcome at a time would ever actually
be available to it, and its ‘freedom-to-choose’ other, albeit apparent/imaginable
alternative would not be realisable.)
Hence ‘freedom-to-choose’ also requires there be real, one-to-many pathways
between the agent’s own internal spatio-temporally adjacent, physical states.

Thus on any physical interpretation, ‘choice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘freedom-to-choose’
all entail actual, physical one-to-many pathways between spatio-temporally
adjacent states-of-affairs. both within agents’ brains and elsewhere.
This is something that classical, ‘Lagrangian’ physics specifically denies!
In the 18th
century Pierre-Louis
Maupertuis derived, and later
Joseph-Louis Lagrange formalised,
the Principle of ‘Least Action’;
which shows that from any one
physical state-of-affairs, only one
event can ever be first to arise.2 3
2
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis [1698-1759]: Derivation of the laws of motion and
equilibrium from a metaphysical principle (1746).
3
Joseph-Louis Lagrange [1736-1813]: Mécanique Analytique (1788).

Undeterred by physical ‘reality’, some libertarian thinkers still maintain that we
inhabit a ‘one-to-many’ physical world.
For example, John Searle, Professor of Philosophy at UCB,
believes that the answer lies deep in Quantum Mechanics –
that actual, physical indeterminacy on the quantum scale
presents us with physically under-determined and under-
constrained ‘choices’, and that this provides the one-to-many
physical environment in which we locate our ‘freedom-to-
choose’.4
But… (and in philosophy there’s always a “but”)… Searle himself struggles to
shore up this argument – for to the extent that quantum indeterminacy enables
‘freedom of choice’, it also defeats our power to enact those choices.
4
John R. Searle [1932-]: Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and
Political Power (Columbia University Press, 2008) pp.74-78.

‘Metaphysical’ Freedom
The metaphysical account avoids all these ‘physical’ difficulties by simply
ignoring them! ‘Metaphysicians’ of freedom simply assume that ‘choice’ and
‘freedom-to-choose’ are self-evidently and uncontroversially the case; and then
set about describing the psychological, social and political environments in
which various kinds of freedom are played out.
In the English-speaking philosophical literature, the ‘freedom’ debate started
with the Scottish philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who described freedom as the
“absence of interference”:
“Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the
absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean
externall Impediments of motion;) and may be
applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate
creatures, than to Rationall.” 5
5
Thomas Hobbes [1588-1679]: Leviathan (1651), Ch. XXI.

Freedom – the Absence of External Interference
Michel Foucault held a similar view.
He described the state of “unfreedom” as the result of
‘disempowerment’ – the result of active interference by
an external agent upon the body of an individual, such
that the individual’s power to act is prevented by force,
rendering alternative action impossible.6
But… (and in philosophy there’s always a “but”)… When a highwayman holds a
gun to your head and demands “Your money or your life!”, and you choose to
hand over your money (very willingly!), Sartre and Foucault insist that this is a
“free” choice – i.e., you are not physically restrained, and you do choose.
You could always choose to act otherwise, they say, even if at great personal cost.
And perhaps this is so, but would you be choosing ‘freely’?
6
Michel Foucault [1926-1984]: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975).

The English philosopher John Locke answered with an emphatic “No!” For
Locke, there are two aspects to ‘freedom’, and they must both be met:
“The natural liberty of man in is to be free from any
superior power on earth – to be under no restraint
except the law of nature.”
“The liberty of man in society is to have a standing
rule to live by (enacted by the legislature in
accordance with its mandate), a liberty to follow
one’s own will in anything that isn’t forbidden by
that rule, and not to be subject to the inconstant,
uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another
man.” 7
7
John Locke [1634-1704]: Two Treatises on Government (1689), 2nd
Treatise, ch. 4, para. 22
(paraphrased for brevity, see Endnote 1).

So, according to Locke,
(a) freedom is denied by the coercion of one’s Will, just as it is by the
physical coercion of one’s Body;8
and
(b) not only threats, but solicitations, bribes and promises are also
taken to be ‘coercive’, in the sense that they “bend one’s Will”.9
But… (and in philosophy there’s always a “but”)… this can’t be quite right
either…
Threats can be coercive, but bribes and promises can only ever tempt us. And, as
Sartre pointed out, we are forever ‘free–to-choose’ whether we are allow
ourselves to be tempted by them. So, how can temptations be coercive?
8
ibid., ch. 15, para. 176. (Full text at Endnote 2.)
9
ibid., ch. 19, para. 222. (Full text at Endnote 3.)

Our hopes, dreams and aspirations are the very essence of our Will – indeed our
Will is not merely “bent”, but formed, by them. Surely, then, the liberty to
follow our Will – to seek that which tempts us, to pursue those outcomes that
appeal to us – is the very essence of ‘freedom’!
And if this is so, then in what sense can the “bending of
our Will” – by temptations, promises, bribes, offers
and/or solicitations – be considered coercive?
The English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham,10
argued
that it cannot.
10
Jeremy Bentham [1748-1832] was a contemporary of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, and
is widely acknowledged as the father of ‘utilitarianism’ – the doctrine that ethical behaviour
should be weighed with a calculus that, on balance, will result in the greatest social good or the
least social harm, even at the cost of individual discomfort.

Bentham accepted that the Will may be ‘bent’ by both threats of punishment
and promises of reward, but added the following qualifications:
(a) the threat must be credible, serious and immediate – i.e., there must
be no escape, and hence that alternatives must be ‘ineligible’
(though not necessarily impossible);
and
(b) the promise must be ‘alluring’, though not
necessarily coercive.11
This was also the view adopted by the Russian-born
British philosopher, Isaiah Berlin.12
11
The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, eds.), (London:
University of London, Athlone Press, 1970).
12
Isaiah Berlin [1909-1997]: The Two Concepts of Liberty (1958).

Freedom – the Absence of Internal Interference
But… (and in philosophy there’s always a “but”)… John Stuart Mill thought
that there was more to be said about what we find “alluring”. Threats, bribes
and promises are all varieties of interference by external agents, Mill noted, but:
What about internal temptation/allure – i.e., interference
from within, by one’s own self? 13
After all, “bending of the Will” can also take the form of
involuntary compulsion/repulsion – as, perhaps, in acts
of:
(a) overwhelming passion
(b) inauthenticity
(c) false consciousness
or
(d) phobias and many other neurological/psychological mechanisms.
13
J.S. Mill [1806-1873]: On Liberty (1859) (Harvard Classics, P.F.Collier and Son, 1909) ch. 3.

First, ‘interference from/by the self’ may arise from an
overwhelming Passion – a powerful urge that overrides our
Reason. As Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam recounted:
“In his Timaeus, Plato describes a two-part ‘soul’ – one
part immortal and divine, the other subject to various
disorders such as pain, fear, anger,
lust, love, passion, and desire for
pleasure. Reason can be overthrown by passion and the
other weaknesses, but true happiness in life consists in
repressing these disorders and letting the highest part of the
soul – reason – rule over the mortal part, especially the
digestive and sexual appetites, the parts most likely to rebel
against reason.” 14
14
Desiderius Erasmus [c.1467-1536]: “Of the Outward and Inward Man”, Enchiridion militis
Christiani (tr. as ‘Handbook of a Christian Knight’), (England: William Tyndale, 1503), ch.4.

Immanuel Kant echoed Plato, describing Passion as “an
illness of the mind […] that can hardly, or not at all, be
controlled by Reason”.15
Acts of passion are not ‘free’, Kant explained, because
Passion overrides the freedom of the selection process
whereby a ‘reasoned’ decision or choice might be made.
But… (and in philosophy there’s always a “but”)… is Passion really an “illness
of the mind”? Isn’t this a bit extreme?
Well, yes and no… A little passion is probably a good thing… but ‘freedom-to-
choose’ is difficult to reconcile with an obsession, say – with an excess of passion.
So, how much passion is OK; and where do we draw the line?
15
Immanuel Kant [1724-1804]: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), ed. Robert
E. Louden (Cambridge University Press, 2006), italics added.

At a minimum, deciding how much passion is “too much” is a matter of
perspective:
What felt to Ernesto “Che” Guevara [1928-1967], from the
inside, like a passionate fight for freedom and equality,
appeared to the US authorities, from the outside, as crazy!
For, as the old saying goes,
“One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist”.
Similarly, one man’s passion (for food, drink, gambling, or even trainspotting) is
another man’s addiction, obsession, or compulsive behaviour (mental illness).

Or, indeed, one woman’s passion…
… for how else might we describe
Imelda Marcos’s ‘passion’ for
shoes? 16
16
Filipino politician and widow of the former Philippine President (1965-1986) Ferdinand
Marcos [1917-1989], Imelda R. Marcos (née Romuáldez) [1929-] is variously reported as
owning/having owned between 1,200 and 2,700 pairs of shoes.

Second, interference from/by the ‘self’ may also be due to ‘inauthenticity’ – to
failing to be “true to oneself”. Even when exercising our ‘freedom-to-choose’,
our choice is only truly ‘free’ when it is authentic – when it is fully in accord with
our own moral and aesthetic sense.
And somewhere in the middle of the 19th
century, the quest for this ‘authenticity’
became the central force behind a new movement in Continental European
philosophy, now called “existentialism”.17
Partly as a reaction to the Church’s failure to save us from ourselves, the
principal doctrine of ‘existentialism’ is that human existence matters most of all,
and hence that we are accountable for our actions primarily to ourselves and to
each other, rather than to God.
17
Emerging from the theological musings of Søren Kierkegaard [1813-1855] and the
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl [1859-1938], ‘existentialist’ thought reached its zenith in
the 1940s and 1950s, amid the philosophical despair of post-WWII Europe. Main exponents
include Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre. (See Endnote 4.)

It was this relegation of God to second place that moved Friedrich Nietzsche to
lament that
“God is dead.
God remains dead.
And we have killed him.” 18
And, in a Godless, otherwise indifferent world, moral responsibility ultimately
falls to us! What matters is what we do; and while we are free (at liberty) to do
whatever we wish, we are also responsible for everything we do.
18
Friedrich Nietzsche [1844-1900]: Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882), tr. as “The Gay Science” by
Walter Kaufmann, sect. 125.

So, freedom cannot simply be about choosing to do whatever takes our fancy:
“[…] free will, and freedom more generally, is not characterized by the
ability to do whatever you want, whenever you want; because if it
were, it would be a meaningless concept. One who indulges their
every whimsy is really just one who is a slave to her own impulses.19
Rather, we must act responsibly, and courageously:
“Freedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves. It is to preserve
the distance which separates us from other men. To grow more
indifferent to hardship, to severity, to privation, even to life itself.” 20
19
Cody Gray [online at philosophy.stackexchange.com], paraphrasing from Nietzsche’s Twilight
of the Idols (1888) and On the Genealogy of Morality (1887).
20
Friedrich Nietzsche: Twilight of the Idols (1888)

Indeed, for Nietzsche,
“[…] true free will is more accurately characterized by ambition and
achievement. It is the ability to set a goal and act in such a way as to
achieve it. […] This is ‘agency’ free will rather than ‘deserts-based’
free will: it is the expression of one’s ‘Will to Power’ – striving to
reach the highest possible position in life.” 21
Nietzsche’s ‘übermensch’ (“superman”) does just this! Neither master nor slave,
he is his own God – free from all external constraints and/or interference – a
master of self-discipline, acting passionately and independently in accord with
the highest values and moral standards as he himself deems these to be.
Like so much of Nietzsche, this is powerful, impassioned, stuff! So, what should
we do?
21
Cody Gray: ibid.

The Danish philosopher and theologian, Søren Kierkegaard, had no idea… at
least not in 1835:
“What I really need is to get clear about what I must
do, not what I must know, except insofar as
knowledge must precede every act. What matters is
to find a purpose, to see what it really is that God
wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth
which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am
willing to live and die.” 22
But then again, he was only 22… and how many 22-year-olds know what they
really want to do?
22
Søren Kierkegaard [1813-1855], widely acknowledged as the founder of ‘existentialist’
thought, writing in his Journal, 1st
August, 1835.

By 1843, Kierkegaard worked out that
“The highest and most beautiful things in life are not to be heard
about, nor read about, nor seen; but, if one will, are to be lived.” 23
but this did little to quell his ‘existential angst’:
“If there were no eternal consciousness in a man, if at the bottom of
everything there were only a wild ferment, a power that twisting in
dark passions produced everything great or inconsequential; if an
unfathomable, insatiable emptiness lay hid beneath everything, then
what would life be but despair?” 24
Yet, for poor Kierkegaard, an answer was still not forthcoming…
23
Søren Kierkegaard: Either/Or (1843), italics added.
24
Søren Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling (1843)

But this much is certain: whatever it is that we feel we must do, it must at least
be ‘authentic’ – true to our selves; to our own moral and aesthetic sensibilities.
For it is ‘inauthentic’ to submit to the opinions/customs/mores of another person
– or of the broader society – even for the sake of a more comfortable/congenial
existence.
Pericles said as much, back in c.440 BCE:
“Make up your minds that happiness
depends on being free, and freedom
depends on being courageous.” 25
25
The Funeral Oration of Pericles [c.495-429 BCE], recounted in Thucydides [c.460-395 BCE]:
The Peloponnesian War (431 BCE) (Penguin, 1954), 2.34-2.46. (Painting by Philipp von Foltz.)

Much more recently, Martin Heidegger said it again:
“Anyone can achieve their fullest potential: who we are
might be predetermined, but the path we follow is
always of our own choosing. We should never allow our
fears or the expectations of others to set the frontiers of
our destiny. Your destiny can't be changed but, it can
be challenged.” 26
Amen to that!
26
Martin Heidegger [1889-1976]: The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy (1930,
1982), paraphrased.

And third, interference from/by the ‘self’ may also arise through ‘false
consciousness’ – through having a false/misguided account of one’s own
interests. This may arise, in extremis, via brainwashing or even capture-
bonding;27
but occurs most commonly through simple seduction by propaganda
or advertising.
As both Karl Marx [1818-1883] and
Jürgen Habermas [1929-] would
surely agree, ‘consumerism’ – in the
sense of shopping behaviour
altered/distorted by advertising –
cannot be considered truly ‘free’.
27
Also known as Stockholm Syndrome (after the robbery in 1973 of Kreditbanken at
Norrmalstorg in Stockholm), capture-bonding is a psychological phenomenon in which
hostages become emotionally attached to their captors. Examples include the development of
Patty Hearst’s relationship with her abductors, the Symbionese Liberation Army.

Freedom – as ‘Self-Realisation’
But… (and in philosophy there’s always a “but”)…
So far, this discourse on ‘freedom’ has focused primarily on (variants of) the
negative interpretation of Freedom – of ‘freedom from’ – of freedom understood
as the “absence of interference”.
The German “idealist” philosopher, Georg Hegel [1770-1831], called this into
account. He asked,
What is the positive of the dialectic of Freedom?
Rather than Freedom from […], what is Freedom for?
And what about Freedom to […]? What does it mean
to be free to do and be?

Hegel maintained that human nature is ‘normative’ – that there is within each of
us an essential ‘self’ that determines how we ought to live.
Thus, to have freedom is to be acting in accord with the essence of our (inner)
nature; and ‘history’ is the record of our struggle to overcome the impediments
(both human and otherwise) that prevent us from becoming what/how we feel
we ought to be:
“The history of the world is none other than the progress of the
consciousness of freedom.” 28
Or “the consciousness of the absence of freedom”, perhaps?
28
Georg Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1837), tr. J. Sibree (Dover, 1956), p.19.

Today, it seems as unlikely as ever that this “progress” is ever going to arrive at
its ultimate goal. Hegel must have been at his ‘idealist’ best when he wrote:
“At the end of history, there is universal acknowledgement not that
some are free and others in bondage but that man as such is free.
[…] freedom is gained only by exchanging the mastery of some over
the lives of others for humankind’s presumed freedom over history
itself.” 29
I’m not holding my breath…
29
Leslie P. Thiele paraphrasing Hegel in “Heidegger on Freedom: Political not Metaphysical”, in
The Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., vol. 88, No.2 (1994), p.289

For Hegel, ‘Freedom’ is not an all-or-nothing affair – it is present by degrees. It
emerges not via the absence, but via the self-transcending, of constraints:30
“Freedom grows with comprehensiveness, and with ever higher
degrees of realized self-determination. Thus, an animal is freer than
a physical object, a man freer than an animal, the family freer than
the individual, the State freer than the family […]”
On this interpretation, freedom is a kind of “capacity”: describable (and
perhaps even quantifiable) in terms of the number of “degrees of freedom” that
an agent is able to exercise. Hence,
“Freedom is the fundamental character of the will […] That which is
free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word.” 31
30
Georg Hegel: Science of Logic (1812), tr. A.V. Miller (Humanity Books, 1989), p.146.
31
Georg Hegel: Philosophy of Right (1821).

The English ‘Idealist’ philosopher, Thomas Green, also argued that a man’s
‘will’ is necessarily free:
“… since in all willing a man is his own object to
himself, the object by which the act is determined, the
will is always free … [that is] willing constitutes
freedom.” 32
In other words, for Green, self-satisfaction is always free,
and is always the object of the will.
32
Thomas Hill Green [1836-1882]: Different Senses of ‘Freedom’ as Applied to Will and the Moral
Progress of Man (published posthumously), p.1. The essay appears in P. Harris and J. Morrow
(eds.), T. H. Green: Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

In other words, says Green, freedom (of will, to act) arises out of self-motivated
self-determination; where
a) the motive for an “act of will” is neither arbitrary nor externally
determined; it lies within the person himself.
b) self-determination is the identification of the self with such a
motive.
c) willing entails deliberation. In willing, an individual seeks “to
realise an idea of his own good which he is conscious of
presenting to himself”.33
d) action which occurs without deliberation – unthinking action – is
not an act of will and hence is not free.
33
T.H. Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. A.C. Bradley (Oxford: Clarendon, 1883) §106.

Thus, for Green, “freedom” is constituted not by our supposed ability to do
whatever we choose, but in our power to identify our ‘selves’ with what our
reason reveals to us to be our ‘true nature’:
“To be free is to have realised that which you have within you to become.” 34
This is all very well, but what is our “true nature”? In the Western tradition, we
have inherited two ways of thinking about this:
The classical, Aristotelian, view 35
is that the essence of
human nature is social/political; and most fully realised
when we are acting in the public arena exercising the talents
and capacities that society and politics requires.
34
T.H. Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. A.C. Bradley (1884).
35
Aristotle [384-322 BCE]: Politics, 1252b.

The other, Augustinian, view 36
is that the true essence
of human nature is Divine – it still plays out in the
social arena (as in the classical view), but is only fully
realised when we are acting in the service of God.
Here we have a clear paradox: On either view, freedom entails an element of
servitude – either in the form of service to the community, or in service to God.
Now, what kind of ‘freedom’ is that?
36
St Augustine of Hippo [354-430]: De libero arbitrio (tr. as “On Free Choice of the Will”).

“The only kind”, said the German-born American political theorist, Hannah
Arendt, perhaps the most vocal exponent of “freedom as politics” in
contemporary philosophy:
“Freedom is politics. […] only in doing politics are
we truly free.” 37
And it’s true… Only through our social interactions –
through our engaging with others in some-or-other
political discourse – does the question of “freedom”
ever arise.
37
Johanna “Hannah” Arendt [1906-1975]: “What is Freedom”, in Between Past and Future: Six
Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking, 1961).

The Canadian ‘Idealist’ philosopher, Charles Taylor,38
agreed:
“Freedom resides at least in part in collective control
of the common life, because it is in the exercise of
such control that the essence of our humanity is most
fully realised.” 39
38
Charles Mulgrave Taylor [1931-], is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Philosophy at
McGill University, in Montreal, Canada.
39
C.M. Taylor: Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Harvard University
Press, 1989).

In his 1991 Massey Lecture 40
– The Malaise of Modernity – Taylor argued that
“[…] individuals arise within the context of a society; and hence that
understanding the ‘self’ entails understanding the social framework
in which human actions gain relevance and meaning.” 41
‘Positive’ freedom, he said, is primarily concerned with “agency”: our capacity
and/or ability to act independently according to our will – to make our own (free)
choices – given our social (and physical) situation/circumstances.
40
The Massey Lectures are an annual series of lectures on a cultural, political or philosophical
topic delivered in Canada. Co-sponsored by CBC Radio and Massey College in the University
of Toronto, te lectures were founded in 1961 in honour of the Right Honourable Vincent
Massey [1887-1967], Governor-General of Canada (1952-1959).
41
Charles Taylor: The Malaise of Modernity (House of Anansi Press, 1991). Reprinted in the US
as The Ethics of Authenticity (Harvard University Press, 1991).

Following Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Taylor argued that our understanding of
the world – the knowledge that we acquire through living and for living – is not
composed of premises, propositions and rules, but makes sense to us only against
an unarticulated ‘sense of things’, or ‘background’.42
Taylor associates our interpreting and understanding of the
world with this unarticulated ‘sense’, which dwells within us
in the form of habits, dispositions, and tendencies. Thus, as
Wittgenstein said,
“Obeying a rule is not a choice, but a practice.43
42
Charles Taylor: To Follow a Rule.
43
Ludwig Wittgenstein [1889-1951]: Philosophical Investigations () (italics added).

Isn’t there an element of circularity in this positive dialectic of ‘freedom’? After
all, as Isaiah Berlin observed,44
a) “I am a slave to no man” is a statement about
freedom in the negative sense – as freedom
from interference by others,
while
b) “I am my own master” is the same statement
expressed in the positive sense – as
freedom to choose one’s own destiny.45
44
Isaiah Berlin [1909-1997]: The Two Concepts of Liberty (1958).
45
Charles Taylor [1931-]: “What’s wrong with Negative Liberty” (1985), in Law and Morality,
3rd
ed. (University of Toronto Press, 2008), pp. 359-368.

No, said Taylor, ‘positive freedom’ is not just the opposite of ‘negative freedom’:
•••• Negative freedom is an “opportunity-concept”: one possesses negative
freedom if one is not enslaved by external forces, and has equal
access to a society’s resources.
•••• Positive freedom is an “exercise-concept”: possessing this positive
freedom might mean one is not internally constrained either – it is
the ability to act according to one’s higher self – as directed by
one’s reason.46
But… (and in philosophy there’s always a “but”)… As before,
One man’s self-realisation is another man’s compulsion!
46
Charles Taylor: “What’s wrong with Negative Liberty” (1985), op. cit.

Freedom – as ‘Independence’
According to Professor Quentin Skinner,47
something is still
missing from this story: the concept of ‘freedom’ not as
opposed to interference, but in contrast to slavery:
A slave is ‘unfree’ ex hypothesi; but not necessarily because
of coercion or interference. After all, a slave who willingly
does his master’s bidding may never suffer any actual
interference at all!
Rather, a slave is ‘unfree’ because of the sheer fact of having a master – of living
dependent on, and/or under the arbitrary will/power of, some master.
47
Quentin Robert Duthie Skinner [1940-] is Barber Beaumont Professor of the Humanities at
Queen Mary, University of London (2008-); and former Professor (1979-2008) and Pro-Vice
Chancellor (1999) of Cambridge University.

Hence freedom entails positive ‘independence’ – i.e., “non-dependence” – which
is somehow more than just the absence of interference.
For the mere fact of your dependence takes away your freedom – in at least two
ways:
(a) you have no autonomy – you are in a position of servitude,
and
(b) the mere awareness of your dependence causes you to exercise self-
censorship.
In other words, you are ‘unfree’ – i.e., somehow ‘enslaved’ – if you are denied
full autonomy in both thought and deed.

And, on this interpretation, one is ‘unfree’ if, for example, one lives under a
dictatorship (or any ersatz dictatorship, e.g., a monarchy).
Dictators/monarchs often have wide-ranging discretionary powers; hence true
independence/freedom is only possible in a republic.
It was this line of thinking that gave
rise to the classical republicanism of
the English Civil War (1642-1651).48 49
History abounds with examples of such
civil uprisings; for example the
overthrow of Nicolae Ceauşescu in the
Romanian Revolution in 1989.
48
James Harrington [1611-1677]: The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656). Painting by Peter Lely.
49
John Milton [1608-1674]: The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth (1660).

One is also ‘unfree’ if one is the subject of a state colonised by a foreign power.
For example, the American
War of Independence 50
(1775-
1783) was a revolt by the
“Thirteen Colonies” of the
newly-formed United States of
America against their colonist,
Great Britain.
50
Painting by John Trumbull [1756-1843], c.1795.

Until the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the
‘Colonies’ were “enslaved” by Britain – entirely at
the mercy of the British Parliament with respect to
the levels of taxation imposed upon them.
History abounds with such
struggles for independence. 51
51
John Trumbull [1756-1843]: “Declaration of Independence” (1795).

And one is also often “unfree” if one is a woman.
Women often live – at least economically – at the mercy of
men; upon whose goodwill they are dependent for their
livelihood. 52
Indeed, as J. S. Mill to wrote,
“I see no difference between the condition of a
woman in England now, and a bond-slave.” 53
52
Mary Wollstonecraft [1759-1797]: A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792).
53
J.S. Mill [1806-1873]: The Subjection of Women (1869), Ch. 1.

Contemporary examples of dependence on arbitrary power are abundant even
in modern-day democracies:
•••• domination by bosses – e.g., in the treatment of non-unionised labour,
or of illegal immigrants.
•••• domination by the State – e.g., in the invocation of “emergency
powers”, sedition laws, etc.
•••• domination of the State by large corporations – via
lobbying, securing permits, preventing
unfavourable legislation, etc. – and the exercise
of self-censorship by the State for fear of what
corporations might do. Recent examples
include Australia’s MRRT legislation (2012),
and Rupert Murdoch in the UK press scandal.

Multiple different ‘unfreedoms’ can prevail simultaneously, so the outcome of
the struggle for freedom from one form of oppression often ends up as another
kind of ‘unfreedom’. Again, examples abound – present-day Zimbabwe,
Pakistan, Egypt, and even South Africa.
For, here’s the rub:
In a world with finite resources, one man’s independence is often
dependent on another man’s dependence.
So, as a final step, let’s put this whole story together…

So, what does ‘Freedom’ Mean to Us?
Quentin Skinner (2012)

So, What is ‘Freedom’?
First, at a minimum, we might say this:
If we perceive (rightly or wrongly)
(a) that in some situation we were presented with multiple options –
i.e., with more than one possible courses of action, each of which
was a ‘real’ (actual) candidate for enactment,
and we are aware (again, rightly or wrongly)
(b) that we could and did ‘deliberate’ – i.e., that we considered the
alternatives and evaluated them without impediment against our
personal preferences,
then it seems reasonable to us to conclude/declare that our ‘choice’ of action
is/was a “free” act.

But note that on this interpretation, ‘freedom’ is an attribution – a perceived
phenomenon, an artefact – and not necessarily an inherent property/quality of
any actual (physical) action or agent.
Second, we seem readily to acknowledge that ‘freedom’ entails all of the
following:
•••• the absence of interference,
•••• the absence of coercion,
•••• the exercise of self-realisation (i.e., self-expression),
•••• independence, and
•••• autonomy in thought and deed.
Take away any one of these, and we would not be ‘free’.

However, libertarian freedom of a causally ‘under-determined’ sort – of the sort
that assumes a one-to-many physical world and claims that “we really could
always have acted otherwise” – remains an illusion.
To imagine that our so-called “free will” (a) is a causal agent in the physical
world and (b) is itself uncaused – i.e., disconnected from the causal chain of
worldly events – is to mistake an attribution for a cause.
It simply has to be an error – an error of reification – for,
as Arthur Schopenhauer argued,
“Where there is Will, there is no Freedom.” 54
54
Arthur Schopenhauer [1788-1860]: On the Freedom of the Will (1839)

Even the self-declared “compatibilist”,55
Daniel Dennett,56
solves the ‘free will’
problem only by effectively defining ‘freedom’ out of existence:
“Free will is not the capacity to do something, but
the capacity to know that something is being done
in your name.” 57
55
Compatibilism – the doctrine that the freedom of the Will is compatible with the strictures of
causal determinism.
56
Daniel Clement Dennett III [1942-] is Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and
Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University.
57
D.C. Dennett: Freedom Evolves (Viking, 2003), italics added.

So, perhaps Spinoza was right, and should have the last word:
“[…] men believe themselves free, simply because
they are conscious of their actions, and
unconscious of the causes whereby those actions
are determined.” 58
58
Benedict de Spinoza [1632-1677]: The Ethics (1677), tr. R.H.M. Elwes (Digireads.com, 2008)
Part III, Postulates, Proposition II.

Acknowledgement
This presentation draws heavily on a lecture by Professor
Quentin Skinner – delivered on 30th
August 2012 at the
University of NSW – entitled:
“So, What Does Freedom Mean to Us?”
The lecture is available online at:
audio: http://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/so-what/lecture-23-prof-quentin-skinner/
video: http://tv.unsw.edu.au/5442FC80-FAE0-11E1-ABFD0050568336DC

Thank You
Tibor G. Molnar
Centre for Continuing Education
University of Sydney
email: info@brainwaves.com.au

Endnotes
1.: John Locke: Two Treatises on Government (1689), 2nd
Treatise, Chapter 4,
Paragraph 22.
THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and
not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law
of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other
legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor
under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative
shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert
Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to
live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men under
government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that
society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my
own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the

inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of
nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.59
2. John Locke: Two Treatises on Government (1689), 2nd
Paragraph 176.
That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and
unjustly invades another man's right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to
have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by all men, who will not
think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire over whomsoever they
have force enough to master; or that men are bound by promises, which
unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my house, and
with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him,
would this give him any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has an unjust
conqueror, who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is equal,
whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. The title of
the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference in the offence,
59
Treatise Ch.4, Para.22

unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers punish little
ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with
laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in
this world, and have the power in their own possession, which should punish
offenders. What is my remedy against a robber, that so broke into my house?
Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and
cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all
means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my son, when
able, may seek the relief of the law, which I am denied: he or his son may renew
his appeal, till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their children, have no
court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Iephtha did,
to heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of
their ancestors, which was, to have such a legislative over them, as the majority
should approve, and freely acquiesce in. If it be objected, This would cause
endless trouble; I answer, no more than justice does, where she lies open to all
that appeal to her. He that troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished
for it by the justice of the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven
must be sure he has right on his side; and a right too that is worth the trouble
and cost of the appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived,
and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath

created to his fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is
plain, that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the
subjection and obedience of the conquered.60
3. John Locke: Two Treatises on Government (1689), 2nd
Paragraph 222.
The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and
the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws
made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of
the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and
member of the society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the
society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one
designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted
themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators
endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce
them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war
60

with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and
are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against
force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption,
endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute
power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust
they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary
ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original
liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think
fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are
in society. What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds
true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in
him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law,
acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law
of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the
force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and
gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to
their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or
otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have
promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate

candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut
up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security?
for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives,
as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might
always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of
the commonwealth, and the public good should, upon examination, and mature
debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear
the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing.
To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared
abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-
makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a
declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with.
To which, if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the
same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy
all that stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to
betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What
power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust
went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but

see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be
trusted.61
4. Existentialism.
Rather less than a philosophical ‘movement’ in its own right, Existentialism was
more a cultural phenomenon – a philosophical lament, a gesture of protest
against academic (analytical) philosophy, and a flight from the “iron-cage” of
reason. 62
Existentialism emerged from the ‘phenomenology of consciousness’ developed
by Edmund Husserl [1859-1938]; evolved through the writings of Søren
Kierkegaard [1813-1855], Friedrich Nietzsche [1844-1900] and Martin
Heidegger [1889-1976]; and eventually flourished in the 1940s and 1950s, in the
philosophical despair of post-WWII Europe.
61
62
Crowell, Steven: “Existentialism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010), Edward
N. Zaita (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/existentialism/

Adopted as a self-description by Jean-Paul Sartre [1905-1980], major
philosophers identified as “existentialists” also include Martin Buber [1878-
1965], Karl Jaspers [1883-1969], Maurice Merleau-Ponty [1908-1961] and
Simone de Beauvoir [1908-1986].
What distinguishes Existentialism is not its concern with “existence” in general,
but rather the claim that thinking about human existence requires new
categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought:
human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties,
nor as subjects interacting with a world of objects.
On the existential view, to understand what a human being is it is not enough to
know all the truths of natural science. Existentialism does not deny the basic
categories of physics, biology, psychology and the other sciences; it claims only
that human beings cannot be fully understood in terms of them. Mind/body
dualisms and moral categories are also deemed inadequate. Rather,
Existentialism holds that a further set of categories, governed by the norm of
‘authenticity’ – of self-identity/self-definition through freedom, choice and
commitment – is necessary to grasp human existence.

“Authenticity” is the condition of significant, emotionally appropriate living; as
contrasted (especially in Heidegger) with “inauthenticity” or “alienation”: a
state in which life, stripped of purpose and responsibility, is depersonalised and
dehumanised.63
Acting ‘authentically’ was interpreted as meaning to act in the full light of the
open space of possibilities that the world allows. In Heidegger, this theme turns
into scholastic ontology; in Sartre, into an exploration of choice and stress; and
in the theologians Rudolf Bultmann [1884-1976], Paul Tillich [1886-1965], and
Karl Barth [1886-1968], into a device for reinventing the relationship/s between
people and God.
Existentialism never took firm root outside continental Europe; and many
philosophers have voiced mistrust with, for example, the libertarian flavour of
its analysis of free will.64
63
Blackburn, Simon: Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (OUP, 1996)
64
ibid.

My personal view is that existentialism is not a philosophical “movement” as
such, but a “rebound psychology” 65
– an anti-authoritarian reaction to the
despair and devastation of two World Wars.
65
M.K.C. Chan (2013).

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