Mapping Irans Bio Warfare Complex

Draft Not for Publication

An Analysis of Iran’s Biological Warfare Complex and Biological Weapon Infrastructure
Drs. Jill Bellamy

“The revolution in molecular biology and biotechnology can be considered as a potential
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Andrew F. Krepinevich noted 10 RMAs in the history of
warfare. Four elements are required for a RMA: technological advancement, incorporation
of this new technology into military systems, military operational innovation, and
organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of
conflict.” 1

Bacillus anthracis2

Bacillus anthracis

1
Alexander, 192; Mangold and Goldberg, 158-63. From, Ainscough, Michael J., Next Generation
Bioweapons, The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm, (eds.) Col. Dr. Jim A. Davis and Dr. Barry R. Schneider,
USAF Counter Proliferation Centre, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air force Base, Alabama, March,
2002. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/biostorm/front.pdf
2
http://www.scottcamazine.com/photos/Anthrax/pages/02anthrax_jpg.htm

Introduction

Within the field of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and more specifically Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, Iran’s suspected nuclear weapon program
remains the focus of extensive assessment by Western and international intelligence
communities. While recent reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serve to
highlight Iran’s suspected nuclear weapon program, Iran’s biological and chemical weapon
capabilities, and the infrastructure which support this, have enjoyed far less scrutiny. A
comprehensive infrastructure analysis of any clandestine biological weapon complex includes
assessment criteria both at the laboratory/facility level as well as the state infrastructure level.3
Of specific significance to understanding the Iranian biological weapon (BW) complex is its
oversight by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the extraterritorial role of the
Qods Forces. Iran’s emerging biological weapon complex is infinitely more lethal, indiscriminate
and could be easily deployed with plausible deniability, particularly against civilians by Iran’s
elite military forces. The convergence of Iran’s BW complex, with command and control squarely
under the IRGC, and designation along side conventional armaments poses perhaps a greater
threat to global security than its nuclear complex at this point.

Historically, biological warfare is defined as the intentional use of micro-organisms, and toxins,
generally, of microbial, plant or animal origin to produce disease and/or death in humans,
livestock and crops.4 Twenty one states are suspected by US intelligence agencies of maintaining
and or conducting ‘offensive’ biological weapon research. Specific characteristics of a biological
weapon complex make it difficult to assess whether a state possesses such a program. Countries
such as Syria, Iran, and the DPRK have extensive bio-pharma infrastructures which could support
a bio-weapon complex. Understanding the discrete networks which support and are used as
cover for states developing biological weapons is critical to US and allied states’ national security
interests. While ‘proof’ of a program’s existence may be exceptionally difficult to extract, there
remain critical points within a national infrastructure, which contribute to the probability such
programs exist.

State ‘offensive’5 biological weapon programs pose an inherently different threat than that posed
by non-state-supported terrorists or organisations. Reasons for this include, but are not limited
to, the technical threshold required to produce mass casualty biological weapons, i.e., genetic
engineering, dispersal technologies, weapon testing, acquisition, processes involving
weaponization, i.e,. milling and aerosolization. It is generally accepted by most bio-weapon
specialists that mass casualty biological warfare remains largely the domain of state (military)
weapon laboratories. Therefore, the type of weapon developed and deployed and resulting kill
ratios, remain distinguishing factors with regard to the technical sophistication of the weapon
and not the psychological effects or possible terror it induces. This article does not address ‘bio-

3
Technical and other methods utilized for assessment criteria, which may fall outside the public
domain has been excluded from this review.
4
Da Silva, Edgar J., “Biological warfare, bioterrorism, biodefence and the biological and toxin
weapons convention”, Electronic Journal of Bio-technology, Vol.2, No.3, 15, December 1999.
http://www.ejbiotechnology.info/content/vol2/issue3/full/2/index.html
5
Under the Biological Toxin and Weapon Convention, ‘defensive’ weapon research is allowed,
while ‘offensive’ is illegal. The BWC bans: The development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and
production of: 1.Biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;" 2.Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles
"designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." The transfer of or
assistance with acquiring the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles described above.
“The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) at a Glance”, Arms Control Association,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc

terrorism’, nor the knowledge base or infrastructure required by terrorist organizations to
develop or maintain a weapon program. Rather, the focus is on state-based infrastructures
required to maintain a full scale offensive, biological weapon military complex. It traces the
historic structure of the Soviet Biopreparat program to current networks employed in Iran today.

“Any quantity of a high-consequence pathogen is strategically significant. One viable micro-
organism can be cultured and weaponized with common, commercially available
equipment. This circumstance, combined with the fact that pathogens emit no energy and
thus cannot be detected at a distance with currently available technology make BW agents
exceptionally dangerous.”
Renolds Salerno, Sandia National Laboratories

Biological warfare and the weapons employed are generally coveted as this is considered the
ultimate weapon for deniable operations. Additionally, a biological weapon program is cheaper
to run and maintain than a nuclear or chemical weapon program and is often perceived to ‘level
the playing field’ against governments which possess nuclear arsenals or overwhelmingly
superior conventional weapon capabilities. Plausible deniability also remains an enticing
characteristic in offensive bio-weapon development and potential use. BW can be highly virulent,
and when produced synthetically, whereby there are no known counter measures or
therapeutics, they can be multi-resistant to all antibiotics, they may have lengthy incubation
periods, and be highly transmissible. This substantially differentiates BW from chemical and
nuclear weapons. BW may also be employed in a number of non-lethal scenarios, used on civilian
populations, deployed as force reducers, target highly select sections of a population or location
(such as water, air, or transportation systems). Understanding future BW development in order
to protect military forces and civilian populations depends to an increasing extent on our ability
to identify and interdict clandestine laboratory networks.

Historic Structure of Biological Weapons and Programs

Weaponized smallpox

In 1991, Joe Esposito and the molecular biologist Craig Venter, who was at the National
Institutes of Health, sequenced the entire genome of the Rahima strain of smallpox; that is,
they mapped its entire DNA. They found that the virus contains a hundred and eighty-six
thousand base pairs of DNA (each base pair being a step on the ladder of the molecule), and
that the DNA contains about a hundred and eighty-seven genes-making smallpox one of the
most complicated viruses known. (The AIDS virus has only ten genes.)6

The intense secrecy and dual-use nature that surround offensive biological weapons programs
makes it difficult to accurately assess the structure, location, research and development of such
programs.7 Nearly any discussion of clandestine BW laboratories and resulting warfare programs
begin with a review of the massive Soviet biological weapon program known as Biopreparat.
Biopreparat was run by the Soviet Union beginning in the 1920’s. It encompassed many of the
same structural characteristics a modern-day clandestine BW program contains. Notably, the

6
A Reporter at Large, “The Demon in the Freezer, How smallpox, a disease officially eradicated
twenty years ago, became the biggest bioterrorist threat we now face”, Richard Preston.
http://mcdb.colorado.edu/courses/4350.2006/Biowarfare/The%20Demon%20in%20the%20Freezer.pdf
7
Guillemin, Jeanne, “Scientists and the History of Biological Weapons”, EBMO Reports, Vol.7, 2006.
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v7/n1s/full/7400689.html

structure was multi-tiered, with some facilities producing commercial animal and human
vaccines and other therapeutics, while simultaneously conducting research and development
applicable to offensive bio-weapon development. The programs were highly compartmentalized
and under the direct authority of the state security services. Although the basic infrastructure of
clandestine programs remains essentially the same, whether in Iraq, Iran, Syria or the DPRK,
what has changed is the nature of the biological weapon itself. Rapid developments in the life
sciences and bio-technology have led to marked and direct consequences to critical aspects
within clandestine biological weapons complexes.

The Soviet Biopreparat program was one of the largest known biological weapon programs to
date. It was spread over approximately 50 clandestine sites and employed between 50,000 to
60,000 workers. Structurally, the Soviet network of facilities involved in developing biological
weapons consisted of two primary sections: a section under military control, dating back to the
late 1920’s, and a second, top-secret program under civilian cover that was created in the early
1970’s.8 The Red Army opened the first laboratories for research on pathogenic micro-organisms
in 1928. BW facilities under the direct authority of the Soviet Ministry of Defence included the
Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology in Kirov (now Vyantka), the Centre for Military
Technical Problems of Anti-Bacteriological Defense in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) and the
Centre of Virology in Zagorsk (now Sergiyev Posad). These facilities were administered by the
15th Directorate for Biological Protection of the MoD. The Scientific Research Institute of Military
Medicine in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), reported to the Military-Medical Directorate of the
MoD. Vozrozhdeniye Island, in the Aral Sea, reported to the 15th Directorate and was the main
testing ground for biological agents developed at the MoD facilities. 9

Stepnogorsk Scientific and Technical Institute for Microbiology10

In the early 1970’s, the Soviet authorities began creating a new network of BW facilities parallel
to the military system.11 The basic structure of Biopreparat facilities included eighteen main labs
and production centres, these facilities were supported by a network of other institutes and
research centres. The list includes: Stepnogorsk Scientific and Technical Institute for
Microbiology, Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations, Vector State Research Centre of
Virology and Biotechnology, the Institute of Applied Biochemistry, the Kirov Bioweapons
Production Facility, the Zagorsk Smallpox Production facility, Berdsk Bioweapons Production

8
Bozheyeva, Gulbarshyn, Kunakbayev, Yerlan and Dastan Yeleukenov, “Former Soviet Biological
Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future”, Occasional Paper No.1, Chemical and Biological
Weapons Non-Proliferation Project, James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, June, 1999.
http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op1/op1.htm#bioprep
9
Ibid.
10
National Reconnaissance Office.
11
Bozheyeva, Gulbarshyn, Kunakbayev, Yerlan and Dastan Yeleukenov, “Former Soviet Biological
Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future”, Occasional Paper No.1, Chemical and Biological
Weapons Non-Proliferation Project, James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, June, 1999.
http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op1/op1.htm#bioprep

Facility, Bioweapons Research Facility in Obolensk, the Sverdlovsk Bioweapons Production
Facility (Military Compound 19), Poisons Laboratory of the Soviet Secret Services,
Vozrozhdeniya.12 A number of the institutes and programs to develop biological weapons had a
latent component, meaning that the capability existed to manufacture and produce biological
weapons at short notice. This remains a component of BW programs today.

While structural aspects of Biopreparat are still applied to clandestine bio-weapon programs,
advances in genomics, fusion toxins, proteomics, synthetic biology, molecular biology,
combinatorial chemistry and our understanding of microbial structure and replication will
considerably affect the type of weapon development from state laboratories and the network
required to support it.13

Vials: A total of 97 vials-including those with labels consistent with the al Hakam cover stories of
single-cell protein and biopesticides, as well as strains that could be used to produce BW agents-were
recovered from a scientist's residence.14

A good example of the covert structure employed to conduct offensive BW research is that which
occurred in Iraq. While it followed on the structure of the Soviet Biopreparat, although on a much
smaller scale, it was perhaps more indicative of how current and future programs are integrated
into commercial research and development and the Iraq Survey Group noted a disturbingly
similar structure within the Iraqi BW complex. UNSCOM reported the concealing of an anthrax-
weapon production facility as a routine civil biotechnological laboratory at Al Hakam. This type
of façade, whereby normal research is conducted to obscure research applicable to a BW
program, is routine in most nations with clandestine programs. Moreover, as technology
advances, infrastructure analysis of a BW complex has become more challenging than during the
Soviet era. The dual-use dilemma inherent in the inability to define what constitutes ‘offence’ and
‘defense’ oriented research and development becomes more difficult to assess.15 Under the
Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention ‘defensive’ research on biological pathogens, toxins and
pre-cursors are allowed and legal. Efforts by the Iraq Survey Group serve to highlight the
problems of searching for a stockpile verses assessing a highly compartmentalized network and
infrastructure, although there was awareness that such compartmentalization existed.

12
Ibid.
13
A Reporter at Large, “The Demon in the Freezer, How Smallpox, a disease officially eradicated
twenty years ago, became the biggest bioterrorist threat we now face”, Richard Preston.
http://mcdb.colorado.edu/courses/4350.2006/Biowarfare/The%20Demon%20in%20the%20Freezer.pdf
14
Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey
Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Source: http://
www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html
15
Da Silva, Edgar, J., “Biological warfare, bioterrorism, biodefence and the biological and toxin
weapons convention”, Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, Vol.2, No.3, 15, December, 1999.
http://www.ejbiotechnology.info/content/vol2/issue3/full/2/index.html

In a “Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey
Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee
on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”,
on October 2, 2003, it is noted that Iraq was found to be running several compartmentalized
pathogen programs. David Kay’s interim report specifically notes:

“We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say
definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our
only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons
based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis.” Why are we having such difficulty in finding
weapons or in reaching a confident conclusion that they do not exist or that they once existed but
have been removed? Our search efforts are being hindered by six principal factors:

• From birth, all of Iraq’s WMD actives were highly compartmentalized within a regime
that ruled and kept its secrets through fear and terror and with deception and denial
built into each program;
• Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation related to
weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans to post conflict;
• Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pre/trans conflict period and may have
taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with them;
• Any WMD weapons or material is likely to be small in relation to the total conventional
armaments footprint and difficult to near impossible to identify with normal search
procedures. It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are
searching for, in quantities we would expect to find, can be concealed in spaces not
much larger than a two car garage;

We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of
equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late
2002. Let me just give you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will
elaborate on later:

• A clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within Iraqi Intelligence Service
that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW
research.
• A prison laboratory complex possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi
officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare
to the UN.
• Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist’s home, one of which
can be used to produce biological weapons.
• New research on BW-applicable agents, brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic
Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN

With regard to biological warfare activities, which have been one of our two initial areas of focus,
ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-
applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities,
and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further
compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could
be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents.

Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of
laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to
the UN and was previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to which this
network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine
capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all
key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production. The IIS also played a
prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences,

according to Iraqi scientists and IIS sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-
applicable research. This was the only area of graduate work that the IIS appeared to sponsor.

Discussions with Iraqi scientists’ uncovered agent R&D work that paired overt work with non-
pathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents.
Examples include: B. Thurengiensis (Bt) with B. anthracis (anthrax), and medicinal plants with
ricin. In a similar vein, two key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq under the guise of
legitimate activity developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The
scientists discussed the development of improved, simplified fermentation and spray drying
capabilities for the simulant Bt that would have been directly applicable to anthrax, and one
scientist confirmed that the production line for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week
if the seed stock were available. Additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since
1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substances, but progress in this
area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for
crimes against humanity.”16

Advances in the life sciences, weaponization procedures and increasing technological
sophistication of delivery platforms mean a ‘stockpile’ is no longer required for an active and
highly sophisticated program to exist. In fact, it is no longer desirable given the clandestine
nature and protective measures such weapon programs must now embed to counter advances in
geospatial imaging and traditional methods of intelligence collection.

Today’s clandestine networks utilize the commercial bio-pharma industry as a cover and the
dual-use nature generally ensures that program development remains, at best, speculative.
Unfortunately, advances in life sciences mean we may no longer have the luxury of erring on the
side of non-verification. We may no longer be able to simply ‘suspect’ a program exists, given the
future of biological weapons and developments in synthetic biology. However, if we accept
merely ‘suspecting’ a weapon program exists and hoping it doesn’t, which to some extent has
been the standard logic for the last twenty years, would this be accepted as the standard model
for conventional weapons? “It’s like mines in the sea…..if you find none, can you assume there
are none? However, if you find one, or more, when will you be sure that you have found all of
them?”17

Clandestine Network Identification at the Facility Level

Compartmentalization is a hallmark of nearly all clandestine biological weapon programs. It is
also a characteristic which has historically diverted identification of said networks. It should also
be noted that while most pharmaceutical firms are subordinate to the Ministry of Health or
Education, institutions suspected of conducting BW research are often subordinate to the
respective Ministries of Defense or state security services. Laboratory scientific teams may also
be drawn from sections of military elite as in the case of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC). The interface between military and civilian institutions, a sophisticated clandestine
network covering thousands of facilities and under the oversight of the IRGC or any other
military or security section, is highly concerning. At the facility level there are often, but not
always, specific indicators of a possible BW program.

The design of a production facility provides important information regarding whether the facility
is intended to produce pharmaceutical grade products or biological weapon grade materials. 18
Relevant design elements include containment, purification equipment, sterilization equipment,

16
Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey
Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Source: http://
www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html
17
Col. Marco Hekkens, NLMARFOR.
18
Pike, John, “Biological Warfare Agent Production”, Weapons of Mass Destruction,
GlobalSecurity.Org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/bio_production.htm

and ventilation and filtration systems.19 The following statements, presented by GlobalSecurity.
Org, define, at the facility and laboratory level, quite precise indicators for assessing a biological
weapon research and development program:

“The design of a biochemical processing plant is an important signal of covert biological agent
production. Containment of the biological material during processing is of special interest. There is
a clear distinction between processing materials for biological or toxin agent weaponization and
processing protective agents to be used for countermeasures or personnel performance
enhancement. For the production of biological agents for offensive military activities, the processing
containment requirement is to protect the environment from the agent because of its infectious
nature. For the production of biomaterials, such as vaccines, biological response modifiers,
antibiotics, and anti-viral agents, for defensive military activities, the containment requirement is to
protect the processed biomaterial from contaminating materials in the environment.”20

“Effectiveness of countermeasures is enhanced by achieving high levels of purity and cleanliness in
the product before it is administered to friendly personnel. By contrast, an unpurified biological
agent that will be used in BW is generally more stable than the purified agent that is needed to
produce vaccines and biological response modifiers (BRMs). Consequently, a proliferant does not
require a high level of purity if production is for BW use only.”21

“Generation of biological agents requires fermenters or single cell production capabilities including
smooth, highly polished stainless steel surfaces, self-containment capability, and negative pressure
conditions. The primary difference between the production requirements for biological weapons
and non-military commercial purposes lies in containment and contamination. During biological
agent production, efforts are generally made to avoid contaminating the environment with the
organism. Less concern arises about the contamination of the product. Conversely, the
pharmaceutical, brewing, and biotechnology industries are most concerned about protecting the
purity and quality of the product. This concern is reflected in the nature of the sealing joints,
positive or negative pressure chambers, and containment of venting systems. Utilities involving
clean steam, sterile air, and inert gas supply are most critical for containment in the processing of
biologically based materials for human use, which must meet good manufacturing practices (GMP).
Clean steam, generated from a purified water supply, must be supplied to all processing equipment
having direct contact with the product to ensure sterility and prevent the influx of environmental
contaminants.”22

“Steam sterilization is accomplished before product processing by direct supply to the equipment.
Steam is supplied to the equipment seals (e.g., sample ports, agitator shafts, raw material addition
ports) during processing as a primary barrier. Equally important is the removal of collapsed steam
or condensate formed on the equipment. This prevents the formation of pockets of standing water,
which promote bacterial growth, and maintains the high temperature necessary for sterilization.
The collected contaminated condensate can be channelled to an area for final sterilization or
inactivation before it is released into the environment. Efficient steam supply and condensate
removal requires pressure regulators, pressure relief devices, venting, and the capability for free
draining of all lines.”23

“Supplying sterile, inert gases to processing equipment is a method of containment. This can protect
oxygen-sensitive biomaterials and prevent aerosol generation of toxic products. Inert gases, such as
nitrogen, helium, and argon, are usually supplied directly to processing equipment through sterile,
in-line filters, maintaining a pressurized system or providing an inert blanket over the product in
processing vessels.”24

19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.

“To attain a higher level of containment, many bioprocessing industries have employed greater
degrees of automation. Potential contamination of purified product, human exposure to toxic
products or constituents, and the risk of human error are minimized. Processing facilities make use
of state-of-the-art computerized distributed control systems (ABB, Modicon, Allen Bradley Corp.),
which allow automatic control, control from remote locations, and automatic data logging and
trending.”25

“Another component in bio-processing is the design of ventilation within the primary and secondary
barriers of a process area. Ventilation at primary barriers (i.e., barriers separating product from
equipment operators and the rest of the processing area) is accomplished with dedicated, in-line
air/gas membrane filters. Ventilation across secondary barriers requires more complicated air
handling system design to allow for the maintenance of clean areas (rated by the number of
particles per volume of air) and maintenance of positive or negative pressure between the
processing area and the outside environment or between different processing areas in the same
facility. Equipment used in these designs includes high efficiency fans and high efficiency particulate
air (HEPA) filters.”26

“The procedure used for the actual replication of an organism is a function of the organism itself.
Techniques include cell culture, fermentation, viral replication, recombinant DNA, and powdering
and milling. Cell culture is necessary for the reproduction of pathogenic viruses and Rickettsiae
since they will not reproduce outside a living cell (e.g., chick embryo or tissue cultures). Single cell
growth chambers, including fermentation, are used for the production of bacteria and bacterial
toxins, although some bacteria (e.g., plague bacteria) can also be cultivated in living animals.
Recombinant DNA techniques are a preferred method to produce rare animal toxins. Because of the
complexity of this technique, the capability is not as widespread as the others. Powdering and
milling is the technique generally used to produce BW and toxin weapons (TW) agent particles
having diameters less than or equal to 10 mm, the size most effective for respiratory delivery.”27

“Toxins and pathogens that affect animals, such as anthrax, brucella, plague, and tularemia, are
widespread. Vaccines are widely produced and administered. The issue of the need for the same
toxic agent for either BW/TW production or countermeasure vaccine production emphasizes the
dual-use nature of the technologies. Indeed, initial processing of agents and processing of their
associated vaccines only differ by a few steps (e.g., the degree of purification and the type of
containment used).”28

Clandestine Network Identification at the State Level

Six pathogens, throughout the history of biological warfare, have been considered the most
deadly and therefore the most suitable as weapons: anthrax, botulinium, plague, smallpox,
tularaemia and viral hemorrhagic fever(s), of these, only smallpox has no other known host,
but humans.

While the laboratory of facility level offers significant insight into the research objectives of the
given lab, the dual–use nature of biological weapons present specific intelligence challenges
which other weapon classes, even chemical and nuclear, do not. Offensive biological weapon
programs typically involve both military and civilian assets, both human and veterinary
institutions, and a range of military, academic, and bio-pharmaceutical institutions.29 Some of
these assets or precursors are innocuous in and of themselves, (i.e,. veterinary vaccine research
facilities, agricultural production lines, pharmaceutical factories, down to the very pathogens and
technologies being utilized), but taken as a whole, constitute an offensive biological weapon
program. It therefore may be difficult to assess, but not impossible. Moreover, “it should be

25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
It should be noted that with the exception of variola major (smallpox), most Category A
pathogenic agents suitable for warfare are zoonotic.

noted, that although the existence of a defensive biological weapons research capability would
suggest interest and expertise in the field of biological weapons, it does not imply nor confirm the
existence of an “offensive” biological weapons program alone. Nor does capability unequivocally
equate to intent.”30 BW programs with a ‘latent’ capacity or ‘crash’ programs which can be
quickly activated are still ‘active’ sections of any BW program, particularly those which are highly
compartmentalized.

Iran’s Suspected Biological Weapon Complex and Infrastructure

Several state intelligence agencies and outside analysts have accused Iran of either attempting to
develop and/or of stockpiling the following agents: bacillus anthracis, botulinium toxin, ricin, T-2
mycotoxin, and smallpox virus (Variola major).31 It is impossible to judge with certainty the level
of advancement in Iran's alleged ability to deliver biological weapons. In the past, experts
accused Iran of pursuing sophisticated delivery techniques for BW agents with aircraft and Scud
missiles. Reports also indicated that Iran may have attempted aerosolization of BW agents. 32
With regard to Iran’s suspected biological weapon facilities, there are unconfirmed reports which
identify a number of sites as BW sites. Iran has a growing biotechnology sector that is already
one of the most advanced in the developing world. 33 Iran has long been recognized as a leader in
Southwest Asia in several fields, including pharmaceutical, vaccine R&D, and agricultural
biotechnology.34

While the following facilities are noted by NTI, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
and the National Council of Resistance of Iran, as supporting a biological weapon program,
conceivably this list constitutes only a fraction of what may be far greater and clandestine
network of laboratories and facilities. Only facilities with a clear biological capacity were
included and suspect labs such as those with ‘End User’ designations only were not included, nor
were all the subsidiary businesses and firms listed as ‘associated’ with each of these institutions.
A strict interpretation of biological facilities and institution was thus taken in approaching the
construction of this list and network. Had these facilities been included, they would number in
the thousands.

Amir Kabir University of Technology located in Tehran, Iran. AKU is comprised of fourteen
engineering departments, five research centres, and an associate university complex located in
Tafresh near Tehran. In 2002, AKU and Damascus University signed a mutual scientific
cooperation agreement that called for broadened scientific, educational, and research
cooperation between the universities. AKU's Biomaterials Laboratory is the largest university
laboratory fostering research in the area of synthesis, processing, and modification of materials
for use in biological environments. This laboratory is especially active in the area of polymeric
materials with the objective of modifying the physical, chemical, biological, and mechanical
properties of polymeric materials to render them biocompatible. The laboratory's specific
research areas include the design and processing of systems for controlled and targeted delivery
of bioactive agents.35

30
NTI, “Biological Overview”, Syria Profile, James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies, September, 2009.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/Biological/index.html
31
NTI, “Biological Overview”, Iran Profile, James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies, June, 2011.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Biological/index.html
32
"Biological Warfare: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb-Iran," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1, March
1999.
33
Office of the Secretary of Defence, Proliferation: Threat and Response, U.S. Department of
Defence, January, 2001, pp. 33-35. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf
34
35
Ibid.

Akbarieh Company, located in Tehran, Iran. Imports and distributes pharmaceutical products
and medical equipment.36

Alnasim Control Company, location not noted. Identified by the British government in February
1998 as having procured goods and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs, in
addition to doing non-proliferation related business.37

Bandaran Company, location not noted. Identified by the British government in February 1998
as having procured goods and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs in the
bio-chem field, in addition to doing non-proliferation related business.38

Beasat Industrial Co., located in Tehran, Iran. Listed as an entity of concern for military
procurement activities in an early warning list distributed by the German government to
industry in May 2007; the German government urged caution when initiating commercial
dealings with this entity, and suggested that because this entity is involved with both military
and civilian projects, civilian use must be shown by specific and verifiable evidence; produces
biotechnology-related equipment sold by the Defence Industries Organization (DIO - see separate
entity record); manufactures medical, laboratory, and pharmaceutical products, including
microbiological hoods.39

Biotechnology Institute of the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology,
located in Tehran, Iran. IROST established the "Culture Collection of Industrial and Infectious
Microorganisms" (the Persian Type Culture Collection). The engineering group is now working to
perfect production equipment, such as fermenters. The centre also coordinates the research on
fermentation agents produced by the Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines. Parts and
equipment needed for the centre were imported through Dubai and Singapore. According to the
National Council of Resistance of Iran, the Biotechnology Research Centre is one of Iran's main
bodies for biological weapons production.40

Caspian Tamin Pharmaceutical Company, located in Tehran, Iran. Designated by the Canadian
government in July 2010 as an entity contributing to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or to its development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery
systems.41

Persian Gulf Marine Biotechnology Research Centre, located Queshm (Qeshm) Island in the
Persian Gulf. The institute provides training, research, and production facilities. The centre is
guarded by the Pasdaran (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-IRGC).42

36
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Akbarieh Company”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,
Date Entered, 1, January, 2010, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/akbarieh-
company.htm
37
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Alnasim Control Company”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control, Date Entered, 26, January, 2004, Washington D.C.
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/alnasim-control-company.html
38
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Bandaran Company”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,
Date Entered, 26, January, 2004, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/bandaran-
company.html
39
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Beasat Industrial Co.”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,
Date Entered, 3, September, 2010, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/beasat-
industrial-co.html
40

41
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Caspian Tamin Pharmaceutical Company”, Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, Date Entered, 1, January, 2010, Washington D.C.
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/caspian-tamin-pharmaceutical-company.html

Darou Pakhsh Company, located in Tehran, Iran. Listed by the British government in 2008 as an
entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, and has had export licenses both
granted and denied by that government; reported producer, distributor, importer and exporter
of raw pharmaceutical materials and manufactured medicine in Iran; "partners" include: Darou
Pakhsh Holding, Darou Pakhsh Manufactory, Darou Pakhsh Distribution Company, Exir
Pharmaceutical Company, Aburaihan Pharmaceutical Company, Razak Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Darou Pakhsh Trade Promotion Company and Zahravi Pharmaceutical Company.43

Defence Industries Training and Research Institute, located in Parchin, Iran. According to the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Defense; according
to NCRI, formerly involved in the nuclear and biological projects of the Ministry of Defense.44

Damghan, located approximately 375 miles to the southwest of Mashhad. US intelligence
sources suspect the facilities in Damghan launched operations in 1989 and were meant to
produce agents for ballistic missile warheads. According to unconfirmed reports, Damghan is the
site of a biological weapons research laboratory constructed with Russian assistance.45

Davar Moharek Co., located in Tehran, Iran. Designated by the Canadian government in July
2010 as an entity contributing to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to its
development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery systems; designation
prohibits Canadian parties from providing goods or financial services to the entity or dealing in
property held by the entity; listed by the British government in 2010 as an entity of potential
concern for WMD-related procurement; provides maintenance and spare parts for gas turbines.46

Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), located in Tehran, Iran. The
German government in 2005, noted that the DTSRC was mainly civilian institution which also
conducts military research and development, posing a risk of scientific facilities being misused as
cover addresses for military imports, and as an organization involved in the procurement of
biotechnology equipment potentially useful in biological weapons production; identified by the
British government (as ERI) in February 1998 as having procured goods and/or technology for
weapons of mass destruction programs, in "addition to doing non-proliferation related business;"
reportedly included (as ERI) in a February 1994 German Federal Ministry of Research and
Technology (BMFT) list of entities which, "because of harmless-sounding appellations having to
do with research, training, or science, belie the fact that they are wholly or in part devoted to
military projects, and are engaged in procurement activities for these projects, with the aim of
supplying know-how, equipment, or materials".47

Tehran University Institute for Biochemistry and Biophysics Research (IBB) is located in
Tehran, Iran. It has 15 laboratories: Biochemistry, Biophysical Chemistry, Biophysics,
Biomaterials, Bio-Organics, Cell Research, Cytogenetics, Electrophysiology, Electron Microscopy,
42
43
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Darou Pakhsh Company”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control, Date Entered, 31, October, 2008, Washington D.C.
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/darou-pakhsh-company.html
44
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Defence Industries Training and Research Institute”, Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date Entered, 12 May, 2009, Washington D.C.
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/defence-industries-training-and-research-institute.htm
45
46
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Davar Moharek Co.”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,
Date Entered, 1, March, 2011, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/darou-pakhsh-
company.html
47
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC)”,
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date Entered, 26, January, 2004, Washington D.C.
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/defense-technology-and-science-research-center-%28dtsrc
%29.html

Genetic Engineering, Immunology, Micro-Analysis, Molecular Biology, Physical Chemistry of
Macromolecules, and Tissue Repair. Although, there is no evidence to link IBB to WMD research
and production, some people suspect that BW research is being carried out throughout Iran in
laboratories associated with Iranian universities like this one. The Tehran University of Medicine
works in close cooperation with the Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines, another suspected
BW research centre. 48

Tehran University of Medical Sciences (TUMS), located in Tehran, Iran. Listed by the Japanese
government in 2007 as an entity of concern for proliferation related to biological and chemical
weapons; identified by the British government in February 1998 as having procured goods
and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs (specifically biological), in
"addition to doing non-proliferation related business."49

Industrial Development Group, location noted as ‘Iran.’ Listed by the German government in an
early warning document distributed to industry in May 2007 as an entity of concern for military
procurement and procurement of dual-use biotechnology equipment; the German government
urged caution when initiating commercial dealings with this entity, and suggested that all
purchases by this entity must be assumed to serve military aims unless the contrary can be
shown by specific and verifiable means.50

Institute for Pestilence and Plant Disease Research, location, Tehran, Iran.
Situated on a 32-hectare estate in Tehran, the institute's buildings are more than 2,200 square
meters in area with 12 separate units. Throughout the provinces, the institute has 28 research
departments and 5 laboratories. Between 1961 and 1981, the institute established provincial
units in Tabriz, Urmia, Bandar-e Enzeli, Tonokabon, Gorgan, Mashhad, Varamin, Esfahan, Shiraz,
Bandar Abbas, Rafsanjan, Sabzevaran, Ahvaz, Kermanshah, and Karaj.

The institute's research topics include the following:

• the biology, ecology, and physiology of agricultural pests,
• the genes responsible for the production of insecticide toxins for the biological control of
agricultural pestilence and disease,
• biological resistance in plants,
• formulation, effects, and residues of agricultural poisons,
• techniques of spraying and testing new poisons,
• the effects on cultivation and ecosystems when they are introduced to agricultural
pestilence and disease,
• mycotoxins (to preserve crop yields),
• the production of antiserums and plant viruses and the creation of an antiserum bank,
and

It should be noted that while none of these activities are different than agricultural research
being conducted at universities throughout the United States, all of these activities could be
useful for a BW program.51

48
49
Iran Watch, “Tehran University of Medical Sciences (TUMS)”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/tehran-university-of-medical-sciences-%28tums%29.html
50
Iran Watch, “Iranian Entity: Industrial Development Group”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/industrial-development-group-%28tehran%29.html
51

Institute for Plant and Seed Modification Research, located in Karaj, Iran. There are eight
research divisions in Karaj, and more than 80 research facilities nationwide. The primary goals of
this institution are to address problems related to agriculture. The Institute has specifically
established a biotechnology department to conduct research on genetic transformation in major
crops, genetic analysis, and transfer of desirable genes into desirable agronomic backgrounds.52

Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology, located in Tehran, Iran. IROST,
includes seven research departments (electrical and computer, biotechnology, chemical,
mechanical, agriculture, materials and metallurgy, and the department of technical development
studies). In addition, IROST also maintains research centres in Arak (a research centre and an
industrial centre), Esfahan, Tabriz, Shahrood, Shiraz, Kerman, Gilan, and Mashhad. IROST was
established in 1980.53

Iran Sanitary & Industrial Valve (ISIV) Co., located in Tehran, Iran. Designated by the Canadian
activities or to its development of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or their delivery
systems.54

Marestan, located in Tehran, Iran. Identified by the British government in February 1998 as
having procured goods and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs, in
addition to doing non-proliferation related business. 55

Malek Ashtar University, located in Isfahan, Iran. According to the NCRI, Dr. Teimourian, head
of the chemical group at the university, works with Abbas Soliemani, an engineer, and Dr. Nasser
Ehsani on mixing beryllium with Polonium 210 for a neutron initiator; according to the NCRI, a
biological weapons centre formed by Iran's Ministry of Defense to conduct research on biological
weapons; according to the NCRI, carries out genetic cloning, led by Dr. Maqsudi, head of the
Centre for Scientific and Growth Technology; according to the NCRI, cloning project based in the
Lavizan-Shian Technological Research Centre; reportedly, according to the NCRI, houses the
Centre for Genetic Biotechnology and Engineering Research (Research Centre for Genetic
Biotechnology), a key facility in Iran's bioweapons program.56

Research Centre of the Construction Crusade (Jihad-e Sazandegi), located in Tehran, Iran.
The entire Ministry has twelve different divisions and a number of organizations, directorates,
offices, and companies. Research centres were established in 20 provinces throughout the
country. According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, there are four affiliated research
institutes in the cities of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashhad that are involved in biological
weapons research and production. According to reports by US experts and Israeli sources, the
facility near Tabriz is being used to store stocks of bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin. The
National Council of Resistance of Iran reports that the Research Centre is manufacturing an
advanced fermenter designed by its scientists. Directly accountable to the Majlis, the Minister of
Jihad-e Sazandegi (Minister of Construction Jihad) is a member of the President of Iran's
cabinet.57 [Cabinet Ministers are administratively accountable to the President in Iran but
ultimately to the Supreme Leader – but not to the Majlis (parliament).]

52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Iran Watch, “Iran Sanitary & Industrial Valve (ISIV) Co.”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control, Date Entered, 2, March, 2011, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/iran-
sanitary-industrial-valve-isiv-co.html
55
Iran Watch, “Marestan”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date Entered, 26, January,
2004, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/marestan.html
56
Iran Watch, “Malek Ashtar University”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date Entered,
26, January, 2004, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/malek-ashtar-
university.html
57

National Research Centre of Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (NRCGEB), located
sixteen km west of Tehran. The centre conducts research in biotechnology and the biological
sciences. Other labs, research centres and universities in Iran outsource work on DNA primer
synthesis, protein sequencing, freeze-drying and glass blowing to the centre. A series of basic and
applied research projects have been funded in molecular biology and biotechnology. Current
projects include biotechnological production of protein-based drugs; production of monoclonal
and polyclonal antibodies; Molecular genetics studies; and Studies on the agricultural
applications of biotechnology. Of particular interest are the NRCGEB's:

• Creation of a cell bank, as well as the production and storing of cell lines;
• Evaluation of a recombinant DNA hepatitis B vaccine;
• Product design and production of recombinant growth hormone; and
• Work to create a recombinant hepatitis C vaccine.

The centre also offers workshops on gene expression in prokaryotic cells, molecular biology,
recombinant DNA, the use of computers in genetic engineering and molecular biology, gene
copying, translation of mRNA, protein synthesis, high volume protein purification, gene
transmission and expression, gene expression in eukaryotic cells, and the molecular analysis of
gene products. The Centre’s laboratories consist of two main laboratory rooms, cell and bacterial
culture rooms, cold and warm rooms, dark room and photographic lab, washing and sterilization
room, and centrifuge centre. Also at the centre are an animal house, a green house, and a
computer room. Two other main laboratories and other facilities are under construction.

The laboratories are equipped with advanced equipment for research in genetic engineering and
biotechnology, including a DNA synthesizer, a DNA extractor, chromatographic systems, a protein
sequencer, orbital shakers, incubators, a PCR machine, incubator shakers, a lyophilizer (freeze-
dryer), fermenters, centrifuges, a culture propagation system, microfuges, a spectrophotometer, a
gel-scanning system, an ultracentrifuge, instruments for DNA sequence spectroscopy, a
spectroscope, a high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) electrophorus, and -C 70° and -
C 20° freezers. Currently underway is a pilot plan for a workstation to study recombinant
proteins. The workstation equipment consists of a homogenizer, fermenters, centrifuges,
preparative chromatography columns, ultrafilters, freezers, cold and warm rooms, and
specialized tanks for the preparation of buffers and culture media.58

Pasteur Institute, located at the Iranian Science Centre for Biotechnology and Molecular Biology
in Tehran, Iran. The Institute was established in 1920-21 as a primary centre for researching
infectious diseases and producing biological products, vaccines, and serums. A vaccine for pox
was the first product of the Institute. In 1993-94, Cuba and Iran signed a biotechnology transfer
agreement that brought Cuba's recombinant DNA hepatitis B vaccine industrial production
equipment to the Pasteur institute. Once the production unit is up and running (five sections,
14,000 square meters), the Pasteur institute will be able to produce 10 million hepatitis B
vaccine doses per year. This institute is the only one of its kind in Iran capable of producing new
biotechnology products in an industrial capacity.

The Pasteur institute is involved in the development of new vaccines; vaccine production;
research in microbiology, biochemistry, virology, medicine and epidemiology; teaching; and post-
graduate training. For organizational purposes the institute is split among its production,
support, and research departments. The 16 research departments at the institute's Tehran
facilities focus on biotechnology, biochemistry, infectious disease, microbiology, and
immunology. The institute also teaches in these fields. At its production facility along the Tehran-
Karaj highway, the institute prepares biological products, serums, and vaccines. Examples of the
vaccines produced there include BCG, cholera, typhoid, hepatitis B, and livestock anti-rabies
vaccines. The institute also produces tuberculin solutions and injection serums, anti-serums,
culture mediums, and an HIV diagnostic kit. The institute is currently working on a new
generation of vaccines for hepatitis and leishmaniasis.59

58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.

Persian Type Culture Collection, located in Tehran, Iran, supplies Cultures to research,
industrial, hospital, and educational laboratories, although the Biotechnology Institute reserves
the right to refuse requests. The PTCC does maintain a significant collection of bacteria and fungi
that could be used in a biological warfare (BW) program. For instance, the PTCC maintains
cultures of Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis—both of which have been weaponized by other
countries in the past. The PTCC also maintains cultures of Bacillus cereus, Listeria monocytogenes,
Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, Salmonella paratyphi, Vibrio cholarae, Yersinia enterocolitica,
Salmonella typhimurium, Shigella dysenteriae, Shigella boydii, Shigella blexneri, and Cryptococcus
neoformans. PTCC maintains cultures of Bacillus subtilis, Serratia marcescens, and Bacillus
thuringiensis. While these agents are not dangerous to humans, they have been used in
bioweapons programs in other countries in the past to simulate biological weapons. For instance,
B. thuringiensis is very similar to B. anthracis and has been used by other countries to perfect the
equipment and techniques necessary to produce and disseminate it. The first project undertaken
by IROST appears to have been the cultivation, pilot production, and dissemination of B.
thuringiensis. The technologies used for this project would have been directly applicable to the
cultivation, production, and dissemination of B. anthracis.60

In addition to these programs, the Agricultural Biotechnology department also has conducted
significant research on species of Fusarium, fungi that attack wheat crops and produce T-2 and
other trichothecene mycotoxins. In 1988 and 1989, Iranian scientists contacted Canadian and
Dutch research institutes in an effort to purchase strains of fusaria. These efforts were blocked by
the Canadian and Dutch governments for fear that Iran may have planned on using the fungi to
develop T-2 mycotoxin for a BW program.[1] In the years following these attempts, Russian and
US intelligence speculated that Iran maintained an active BW program focused on the
development of mycotoxins.[2] However, it is unclear if these speculations were solely an
extrapolation from the 1989 Canadian and Dutch purchase attempts or if the allegations rely on
other classified intelligence.61

Revolutionary Guards Baqiyatollah Research Centre, location not noted. According to the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a Revolutionary Guards Genetic Engineering
Center, affiliated with the Guards Baqiyatollah Hospital, which works on biological weapons;
according to the NCRI, headed by Dr. Karami, a member of the Guards Corps Imam Hussein
University’s Scientific Staff who has been working on biological weapons for 18 years.62

Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines, located in Karaj, Iran. The Institute is considered Iran's
leading centre for biological research and production. It manufactures 21 human and veterinary
vaccines in commercial quantities and several other biological substances. The Institute exports
human and animal vaccines to more than 16 countries (mostly Moslem countries) as part of
Iran's humanitarian aid program. According to the director of the Institute, it produces 1.7 billion
doses of 57 types of vaccines, serums, and antigens annually. The department is currently
attempting to create recombinant vaccines through genetic engineering, as well as develop
antigens and diagnostic kits for medical and veterinary labs. For vaccine production, the
Institute uses locally produced fermenters. The National Council of Resistance of Iran claims that
there is a biological research centre at the Razi Institute, which is capable of producing “at least
three microbes, useful for germ and biological warfare."63

Sharif University of Technology Biochemical and Bioenvironmental Engineering Research
Centre, located in Tehran, Iran. The Biochemical and Bioenvironmental Engineering Research
Centre has three main functions:

60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Iran Watch, “Revolutionary Guards Baqiyatollah Research Centre”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear
Arms Control, Date Entered, 26, January, 2004, Washington D.C.
http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/revolutionary-guards-baqiyatollah-research-center.html
63

1. production of organic acids, amino acids, industrial enzymes, and single cell proteins in
quantities ranging from lab to semi-industrial use;
2. biotechnology research, and
3. Graduate-level education in various areas of biotechnology.

Although there is little evidence to link the centre to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
research and development, many in the West suspect that biological warfare research is being
carried out throughout Iran in laboratories associated with Iranian universities like this one.
Middle East Defense News reports that Sharif University of Technology has been used as a front
company to purchase the following equipment from the United States for its WMD programs:
precision measuring instruments from Leybold Inficon Inc, radio spectrum analyzers from Kay
Elemetrics Corp., VAX Computers from Digital Equipment Corp., and precision instruments for its
nuclear engineering department from Canberra Industries, Inc. The centre cooperates closely
with universities and research centres throughout the country, including Amir Kabir University,
Tehran University's Technical College and College of Sciences, the National Centre for Genetic
Research, the Pasteur Institute, and the Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines.64

Science and Technology Group, location Tehran, Iran. The Science and Technology Group (STG)
allegedly oversee Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs. The National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI) states that this group of the president's advisors "...oversees the
regime's plans and projects in the area of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons.” NCRI claims
that under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group, Iran's ruling mullah's have:

• formed the Revolutionary Guards’' 24th Bessat Brigade for Chemical Attacks;
• stockpiled huge quantities of nerve agents;
• expanded biotechnology research centres and the NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical)
Special Industries Organization;
• hired Chinese, Korean, and Russian experts under cover of research projects, and;
• procured the required materials and technology from European countries through the
use of dual-use technology.

The NCRI claims that beneath the STG are four sections: the Defense Ministry's Special Industries
Organization, the Jihad Construction Research Centre, the Revolutionary Guards' study centre at
the Imam Hoseyn University, and the Biotechnology Research Centre. The National Council of
Resistance on Iran reports that in only one branch of the STG, the regime has already developed
three biological agents—VX (though in fact a chemical agent), aflatoxin, and Bacillus anthracis—
with the help of at least 18 Russian, Chinese, and Korean experts. The same source believes there
are many more individuals working on these projects.65

Samamicro Co., located in Tehran, Iran. Listed by the British government in 2008 as an entity of
potential concern for WMD-related procurement; listed by the Japanese government in 2008 as
an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and biological weapons; seeks to import
dual-use biotechnology equipment, according to an early warning document distributed by the
German government to industry in July 2005; may be the same as Samamicro Ltd., which was
listed in the same document as an entity of concern for missile procurement activities.

Distributes and services laboratory and research equipment from Western manufacturers,
including atomic absorption equipment, FTIR spectrometers, chromatography, balances, cold,
thermostatic, climatic and plant growth chambers, particle size analyzers, fermentation systems,
freeze dryers, centrifuges, shakers, incubators, and glass chemical process units; distributes and
services testing and measurement products from Western manufacturers, including quality
control and calibration labs, complete piezoelectric systems, stress screening test chambers,
thermal shock test chambers, high pressure and high humidity test chambers, laser imaging
systems such as high speed cameras, power and energy meters, cutting machines, mounting

64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.

presses, polishing and grinding machines, and hardness testers; managing director is Abbas Pour
Tehrani Fard - Vahid and commercial manager is Abolghasemi - Mohsen. 66

Scientific Medical Technology LLC, location Iran. Listed by the British government in 2008 as
an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement.67

Special Industries Organization (SIO), located in Tehran, Iran. Reports published in Russia,
apparently based on information developed by the Russian Federal Security Service, claim the
organization is located at the Gostaresh Research Centre northeast of Tehran. A report claimed
the SIO was set up by President Rafsanjani as a 250-man agency within the Presidential Services
in 1993 to develop chemical weapons. This agency is independent of the Council of Ministers.

The SIO oversees and coordinates various scientific programs. The Biological Research Centre is
the branch dedicated to biological weapons development. The Laboratory, also located in Tehran,
is another branch of the Organization.[2] Camouflaged by trees, facilities known as Shahid
Meisam were reportedly built alongside the Tehran-Karaj expressway as storage sites for
artillery shells filled with chemical products en route to Revolutionary Guard units. Due to lax
safety measures, a number of the 1,000 workers in the storage facilities are said to have fallen ill
and died. Dr. Abbas Pour, one of the president's advisors and the head of the Vira Laboratory,
was named head of SIO. Dr. Gholamhossein Riazi heads the fermenter project. According to the
NCRI, the project has succeeded in producing several fermenters with a capacity of more than
100 litres.[3] Brigadier General Mohammad Fa'ezi, head of the Special Industry Training Centre,
is said to be in charge of handling the affairs of the foreign specialists who have been recruited to
work on Iran's biological warfare program.

Two Swiss firms, Bio Engineering (a subsidiary of Bayer AG) and MBR Company, had been selling
fermenters to Iran in the 1990s that were claimed to be entirely for civilian use. Company
officials insisted that the Iranian purchasers were the Ministry of Agriculture and an entity they
identified as MIDSPGIC Co. However, the People's Mujahadin of Iran (PMOI) claimed that
MIDSPGIC is an abbreviation for the Special Industries Organization of the Defense Ministry. Bio
Engineering was attacked two times in 1992, once at its office outside of Zurich (apparently by a
terrorist group) and once at its Munich-based delivery company. Equipment destroyed in the
attacks included a 15-liter lab fermenter and a 750 production fermenter, similar to those used
by Iraq for its BW program.68

Vira Laboratory located in Tehran. Also known under the name of Sina Industries it operates
ostensibly focusing on agriculture and medical research, but actually its main function seems to
be as the chemical laboratory of the Defence Ministry Special Industries Organisation.69

Shifa Pharmed Industrial Group Company, located in Tehran, Iran. Designated by the
Canadian government in July 2010 as an entity contributing to Iran's proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities or to its development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their
delivery systems; listed by the Japanese government in 2010 as an entity of concern for
proliferation relating to biological and chemical weapons; an entity that seeks to import dual-use
biotechnology equipment, according to an early warning document distributed by the German

66
Iran Watch, “Samamicro Co.”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date Entered, 16,
January, 2008, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/samamicro.html
67
Iran Watch, “Scientific Medical Technology LLC”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,
Date Entered, 30, June, 2008, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/scientific-
medical-technology-llc.html
68
69
Eshel, David, “Iran’s National Deterrent Weapons of Mass Destruction Program”, Defence Update
News Analysis by David Eshel, 4, April, 2004. http://defense-update.com/2004/04/irans-national-
deterrent-weapons-of.html

government to industry in September 2007; manufactures antibiotics, including erythromycin
ethyl succinate, azithromycin, clarithromycin, and roxithromycin.70

Sina Industry located in Tehran, Iran. According NCRI, "one of the most important biological and
chemical laboratories of the Iranian regime"; Sina Industries is also associated with Vira
Laboratory; uses medical research as a cover for its biological weapons activities; controlled by
the Organization of Special Industry (Special Industries Group), which is a subsidiary of Iran's
Defense Industries Organization (DIO) (see separate entity records); reportedly has conducted a
research program on producing mycotoxins; reportedly has worked on producing soil-
contaminating microbes that would attack agriculture; reportedly has conducted animal testing;
according to the NCRI, headed by Dr. Yousefi.71

Sina Darou Laboratories Company, located in Tehran, Iran. Designated by the Canadian
activities or to its development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery
systems; designation prohibits Canadian parties from providing goods or financial services to the
entity or dealing in property held by the entity; produces pharmaceutical products, including
inhalation aerosols; formerly known as Dopar Pharmaceutical Company; established in 1962.72

Sohban Pharmaceutical Co., located in Tehran, Iran. Designated by the Canadian government in
July 2010 as an entity contributing to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to its
development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery systems; listed as an
entity that seeks to import dual-use biotechnology equipment in an early warning document
distributed by the German government to industry in July 2005, but was not re-listed in 2007;
develops and produces pharmaceutical products; a subsidiary of Alborz Holding; established in
2004.73

Conclusion

“In the past 40 years, the intelligence community has had difficulty assessing intentions of
hostile nations, but has had considerably better success in accessing capabilities. In the 21st
Century, assessing capabilities may become as difficult as assessing intentions. Even after
four years of the most intrusive arms control inspections ever implemented, the United
Nations Special Commission did not learn of Iraq's extensive BW program until a key official
(Saddam's son-in-law) defected. Likewise, the International Atomic Energy Agency had
certified Iraq to be in compliance with all treaties and guidelines just months before its
invasion of Kuwait. Following the Gulf War, a UN inspection team discovered that Iraq was
well down the road to becoming a nuclear power. The disturbing result of its discovery was
that Iraq was not building one or two nuclear weapons; the Iraqi program was designed to
build more than 100.”74

70
Iran Watch, “Shifa Pharmed Industrial Group”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date
Entered, 2, March, 2011, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/shifa-pharmed-
industrial-group-company.htm
71
Iran Watch, “Sina Industry”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date Entered, 31 August,
2009, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/sina-industry.html
72
Iran Watch, “Sina Darou Laboratories Company”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,
Date Entered, 1 November, 2010, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/sina-darou-
laboratories-company.html
73
Iran Watch, “Sohban Pharmaceutical Co.”, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Date
Entered, 2, May, 2011, Washington D.C. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/sohban-
pharmaceutical-co.htm
74
The National War College, Elective Course 5994, Homeland Security, Fall 2002.
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/nwc.pdf

Quds Force's ranks are believed to comprise the cream of Iran's elite operations and intelligence
officers. Photo / AP

As expected, Iran’s biological weapon complex is far more scientifically advanced and
sophisticated than Iraq’s was at the time of the Gulf War. The structure of Iran’s BW Complex
incorporates the primary structure utilized by Biopreparat; however it has improved on
Biopreparat in the sense that it retains a highly flexible structure, which appears to make it
impervious to ‘end-user’ designations or sanctions aimed at curbing proliferation. If one
considers the core infrastructure to be well established sites such as academia, military
instillations, pharmaceutical institutions, there remains, what appears to be a deliberate and
dedicated structure established on the periphery which supports the BW complex but is not
necessarily permanent. Some evidence suggests that suppliers and subsidiary firms and
institutions may only be used once or twice and not retained. It further appears that this
structure insulates the BW complex from sanctions and end-user designations. As the IRGC
oversees IROST, any given firm may be designated to acquire specific data, equipment; pathogens
etc. do it once and never procure another piece of equipment or pathogenic agents again. That
type of flexibility makes it an exceptional program. Western intelligence services are less capable
of countering the threat posed by this weapon complex, than that of Gulf War period Iraq. This is
partially due to Iran’s infrastructure, partially to advances in weapon development (i.e,. synthetic
biology and dispersal technologies) and partially due to strict oversight of the programs by the
IRGC. While the infrastructure reflects that of the former Soviet Biopreparat program, perhaps of
far greater concern is the role of the IRGC and Qods Forces.75

The IRGC has close ties to the foreign operations branch of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS).76 According to Anthony Cordesman,

“The Ministry of Intelligence and Security was established in 1983 and has an extensive
network of offices in Iranian embassies. It is often difficult to separate the activities of the
IRGC, the Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar, and the Foreign Ministry, and many
seem to be integrated operations managed by a ministerial committee called the “Special
Operations Council” that includes the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, President, Minister
of Intelligence and Security, and other members of the Supreme Council for National
Defense. Other elements of the IRGC can support proxy or covert use of CBRN weapons.
They run some training camps inside Iran for outside “volunteers.” Some IRGC still seem to
be deployed in Lebanon and actively involved in training and arming Hezbollah, other anti-
Israeli groups, and other elements. The IRGC has been responsible for major arms
shipments to Hezbollah. The IRGC plays a major role in Iran’s military industries. Its lead
role in Iran’s efforts to acquire surface-to-surface missiles and weapons of mass destruction

75
The Quds Force - with between 5000 and 15,000 agents and field tacticians by various estimates -
sits atop the vast military and industrial network of the Revolutionary Guard, the defenders of Iran's ruling
clerics. The Guard effectively has a blank cheque. It controls most major programmes - including nuclear,
missile development and biological and chemical weapon programs - as well as a millions strong paramilitary
corps known as the Basiji. Quds Force's ranks are believed to comprise the cream of Iran's elite operations and
intelligence officers. Brian Murphy, “Plot claims cast light on Iran’s shadowy strike force”, NZHerald.co.nz, 15,
October, 2011. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10759181
76
Cordesman, Anthony, H., “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence
and Paramilitary Forces”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 16, August, 2007,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf

gives it growing experience with advanced military technology. As a result, the IRGC is
believed to be the branch of Iran’s forces that plays the largest role in Iran’s military
industries. The Quds seems to control many of Iran’s training camps for unconventional
warfare, extremists, and terrorists in Iran and countries like the Sudan and Lebanon. In
Sudan, the Quds are believed to run a training camp of unspecified nature. Troops are
trained to carry out military and terrorist operations and are indoctrinated in ideology.”77

With respect to Iran’s BW complex, the role of these elite forces is critical to understand in the
same way that KGB control of the Soviet program was—and for the same reasons. The IRGC
controls not only Iran’s nuclear complex, but its bio and chem programs as well as the Iranian
missile delivery systems, making Iran’s BW complex far more dangerous than that of other
nations suspected of developing BW. Of specific and perhaps unique concern regarding Iran’s
BW complex are the extraterritorial activities of the Qods Force. The Qods Force is directly
tasked with liaison, training, funding, arming and logistics, among a range of other
responsibilities related to Iran’s terror network which include, but are not limited to, support for
al-Qa’eda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and terror networks in Syria, Venezuela,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and a host of other nations. While the Qods Force operates primarily
abroad, it is subordinate to and at least nominally under the command and control of the IRGC
high command in Iran. Qods Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani also enjoys a direct,
personal relationship of trust with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as does the IRGC
Commander, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari. While the Qods Force operates primarily abroad,
the domestically-based IRGC network within Iran’s universities, labs, vaccine and pharmaceutical
facilities, etc., develops Iran’s BW programs. While Iran is not known to have transferred WMD to
any terrorist group yet, the closeness of its relationships with both al-Qa’eda and Hizballah, as
well as the existence of complex delivery channels for other weapons, including advanced rockets
and missiles to Hizballah, and sophisticated IEDs and EFPs to both Shi’ite and Sunni terror
militias in Afghanistan and Iraq, give plenty of cause for concern. Al-Qa’eda has made no secret of
its long quest for WMD and Hizballah has received virtually every other advanced weapons
system Iran has ever possessed. Were Iran to take the decision to share its BW or other WMD
capability with either al-Qa’eda or Hizballah, it is likely it would be the Qods Force that would be
given responsibility to deliver it, as it already does other weaponry which the Supreme Leader
Khamenei decides to provide it to designated terror organizations. 78

Biological weapons are the ultimate deniable weapon and it would not be unreasonable to
consider that the Qods Force or other trained proxy forces (such as Hizballah) could break out
and deploy biological weapons either in conjunction with conventional advanced weaponry, or in
covert operations, against western targets.”79 Iran’s clandestine biological weapon complex, and
its oversight by the IRGC, in addition to Iran’s support of state organized, proxy terrorist groups,
make its bio-weapon programs potentially lethally dangerous in the current highly-charged geo-
strategic environment.

Iran’s BW programs are exceptionally well-embedded within an extensive architecture of
legitimate research, industry, and academic infrastructure. Future biological weapon programs
will require far more sophisticated interdiction techniques and a critical review of the criteria
necessary to identify infrastructures associated with such programs; specifically, when such
identification must generally occur in a remote or stand-off environment. “In the British and
American context, the failure of the Iraq Survey Group to find Saddam’s much vaunted secret
laboratories, or his stockpiles of WMD, highlights the weaknesses of conventional collection
methods [ ]80.” Future inspection regimes must draw on the failures of the Iraq Survey Group and
successive UN missions (UNMOVIC and UNSCOM). Unfortunately, rapid advances in the life
sciences are likely to enable, not inhibit, evasion of detection and interdiction technologies—a
fact that will not go unnoticed by Iran’s IRGC and Qods Force.

77
Ibid.
78
Clare Lopez, 13 December, 2011.
79
Ibid.
80
Kouzminov, Alexander, “Biological Espionage: Special Operations of the Soviet and Russian
Foreign Intelligence Services in the West”, Greenhill Books, London, UK, 2005.

Mapping Irans Bio Warfare Complex

Mapping Irans Bio Warfare Complex

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