Analytical Simulation Exercise

BRUNEL ANALYTICAL SIMULATION EXERCISE
This paper was discussed by the Joint Intelligence Committee and approved on 28 Apr
2016.
Key Judgements
I. The most likely belligerents in a possible conflict in the South China Sea (SCS)
region are Vietnam and China, it is very unlikely that any other ASEAN country
would engage in any large- or small-scale conflict with China in the next 3-5
years.
II. The largest concentration of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Indian nationals
reside in the Philippines, but the likely belligerents for the conflict mean a Non-
Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) would concentrate on those living in
Vietnam.
III. Small-scale conflict is a realistic probability and Indian nationals working on
Vietnamese oil block 128 and gas block 0.61 are the most at risk. Therefore
they have a lower threshold to trigger an NEO. A naval task force with an
aircraft carrier would be a sufficient force to both evacuate nationals whilst also
deterring unintended involvement in conflict.
IV. In the unlikely event of large scale conflict between China and Vietnam, NRI’s
and nationals in Vietnam could be extracted from four main airports in both
Laos and Cambodia using commercial aircraft.
V. In case of a conflict, traversing the SCS is highly likely to cause unintended
involvements with third parties for naval NEO units. The existence of surface-to
air-missile (SAM) batteries on Woody Island and Chinese missile ships are also
an operational risk to aircraft.
VI. The importance of India’s oil and gas blocks are outweighed by our substantial
trade with China and our need to utilise the SCS as a shipping route. Therefore
economic interests are best safeguarded by avoiding involvement in hostilities
and engaging regional partners in discussion to deescalate the conflict.
28 APR 2016 JIC (16)001 Copy 1 of 1
PP5579 BASE Team D (Final)
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE ASSESSMENT
Threat to the Security of Indian Nationals in the SE Asia
Region
Assessment Base
The judgements reached by the Joint Intelligence Committee are based primarily on secondary
source information gathered through both highly reliable academic sources and news media
sources. There is some information gathered from open source government documents and
primary source interview data. Due to language barriers and secrecy we found issues in getting
sources directly from the Indian government and military; however a suitable number were located.
Most of the information gathered is from the last 12 months with the oldest going back to 6 years
ago. An interview was conducted with a regional expert in order to ascertain the possible conflict
scenarios in the region.

Threat to the Security of Indian Nationals in the SE Asia Region
The South China Sea Dispute.
1. The South China Sea has been a contentious region for decades between China
and ASEAN countries such as Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Vietnam. All countries claim a portion of the SCS as their own territory whilst China
claims it all. The situation has intensified in recent years due to an abundance of
fishing stocks and potential oil and gas reserves in the area. This has led to an
increase in hostile behaviour from both China and ASEAN countries, and
involvement from non-regional state actors including the US and India.
Belligerents
2. Militarisation activities in the SCS are likely to heighten the level of crisis. China has
expanded their presence on disputed islands and installed SAMs in the area,
possibly to implement an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) above the SCS
(See Fig. 1 to Fig 3). The United States continues to engage in Freedom of
Navigation Operations (FONOPS) near these islands to dissuade Chinese territorial
expansion. Vietnam is investing in its navy with support from India and Japan,
whilst their public continue to protest and condemn China’s aggressive expansion.
3. The most likely belligerents are China and Vietnam, as they have had small-scale
military clashes before over the SCS. They also both claim important oil and gas
blocks as their own. Vietnam has refused joint oil exploration on disputed blocks in
the SCS with China and therefore China has responded by auctioning them off, and
claims all exploration by Vietnam is illegal. Rhetoric between the two countries is
usually negative, and their citizens have conducted protests and violent actions
over these issues.
4. A conflict between the two could be triggered over control of oil block areas. The oil
blocks are hotspots for hostilities between the two countries, including the blockade
of Chinese oil vessels by Vietnamese coastguards or Chinese oil rigs being towed
into Vietnamese-claimed oil blocks. These clashes have turned violent in the past
and it is a realistic possibility that one could escalate into a conflict in the next 3-5
years
NEO Plan and Scale of Conflict
5. The private Indian Oil company ONGC Videsh Ltd has workers in oil and gas
blocks who would be most at risk. ONGC’s contract with PetroVietnam for oil
exploration has recently been extended until 15 June 2016. The ONGC have
publicly declared that despite a lack of hydrocarbon prospectivity in the oil block,
they continue to hold onto it to secure India’s national, strategic, and economic
interests. We therefore consider it likely that they will renew their contract at the end
of its term. The contract applies to Vietnamese Oil block 128, but the company is
also involved in the exploration of natural gases in block 0.61 with the Russian
energy company Rosneft (see Fig. 4).
6. Small-scale conflict is the realistic probability and any significant naval clash in
these zones is highly likely to meet triggering conditions for an NEO of the ONGC
workers. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would be likely to make contact with
Vietnam and China about the intention to evacuate nationals peacefully. It is likely

that there will be no more than 200 oil and gas workers on both platforms.
Evacuation options include sending an aircraft carrier with a naval escort to
Vietnamese waters near the oil blocks, then using helicopters to evacuate workers
from the platforms. If the Russian Government were to request assistance it is
highly likely we would be able evacuate their own citizens from oil block 0.61 and
return them with our own nationals to Malaysia for onward travel home.
7. There is a realistic possibility that a small scale conflict could escalate to a large
one between China and Vietnam. In this situation any troop mobilization near the
border or attack on the mainland would be highly likely to trigger an NEO of Indian
nationals and NRI’s in Vietnam. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) could liaise
with Chinese and Vietnamese authorities to signpost our NEO intentions.
Evacuating Indian citizens and NRIs directly from Vietnam could create significant
risk for the NEO due to the possibility of unintended targeting of Indian air or naval
vessels. A successful NEO is almost certain to require the MEA working with
overland travel operators to coach Indians and NRI’s from Vietnam to airports in
Cambodia and Laos for onward travel, as it is likely China would enforce a no fly
zone. Any NRI’s or nationals south of Dong Ha would be chartered via Cambodia to
ensure that we evacuate citizens away from the Northern border with China (see
Fig. 4).
8. It is highly likely that we would be able to evacuate all of our 2690 citizens and
NRIs in Vietnam within a minimum of seven days, and retain capability to evacuate
an allied country’s citizens if required to. Airports chosen for the operation would
need to have a minimum of 2,200m runway length. The four airports chosen have
paved runways between 2,200m to 3000m. Phnom Penh International Airport and
Siem Reap International Airport in Cambodia meet these requirements, as do
Wattay International Airport and Luang Prabang International Airport in Laos (see
Fig. 4). The runways will allow us to land commercial airplanes from our Air India
fleet. We consider it unlikely that this NEO’s viability would be negatively affected in
the next 3-5 years.
Operational Risks
9. It is a realistic possibility that an NEO aircraft or naval unit may be targeted
unintentionally in either a large or small scale conflict scenario. China has HQ-9
SAMs on disputed islands (see Fig 3.) and has missile boats in the SCS. In the
event of an NEO taking place in resource blocks 128 and 0.61, we assess that our
aircraft carrier and escort would dissuade unintended targeting whilst protecting our
nationals. The risk to a large scale NEO would be mitigated by utilising overland
travel through Laos and Cambodia.
10. Another operational risk that can impede the NEO significantly is poor structure of
Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laosian roads. During the monsoon seasons (May to
October) roads can be flooded or degraded and pot holes occur frequently slowing
traffic. This could lead to delays in transporting citizens, especially in the poor and
remote areas of all three countries.
Regional Alliances and Concerns
11. India’s most important economic interests are in its trade relations with disputants
and keeping the SCS trade route open. India’s number one trade partner is China
and 50% of India’s Maritime Trade passes through the strait of Mallaca annually.

The risks India faces in losing passage in the SCS or trade relations with China far
outweighs the risk to losing our oil and gas blocks.
12. It is almost certain that diplomatic dialogue with the two disputants will result in the
best outcome for Indian economic interests. Our close alliance with Vietnam would
mean that encouraging a diplomatic dialogue would help safeguard our economic
and political interests with them. By pursuing a diplomatic de-escalation it is unlikely
that China would break trade with India or try to blockade the SCS region. In the
highly unlikely event that China does blockade the area then India’s strong
relationship with the US would also mean that we could engage in FONOPS jointly
as a deterrent.
13. India’s alliances in the area with the US as well as ASEAN members such as
Vietnam, the Phillipines, Malaysia and our strong trade relations with China mean
it is likely we shall have cooperation from them in order to achieve a successful
NEO. In the event that China and Vietnam engage in conflict, it is highly likely that
China will not want to engage with any non-regional powers in order to avoid
conflict escalation and protect their economic relations.
14. The US are in the middle of an election year and therefore it is likely that China will
capitalise on this to militarise quickly. Any outgoing president is highly unlikely to
want to engage in conflict during their last months in office as it will damage their
party’s election chances. China is therefore likely to increase their militarisation in
the SCS and increase pressure on ASEAN members up until November 2016,
when they are likely to reassess strategy depending on the election outcome.
28 Apr 2016 This assessment has been approved
On behalf of Team D
Signed Patrick Shortis
Chairman of Team D

Figure 1. Fiery Cross Reef I – (9.6228° N, 112.9330° E)
This image shows Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea’s Spratly Islands before
the Chinese began building on it.
Fig 2. Fiery Cross Reef II – (9.6228° N, 112.9330° E)
The Chinese have developed a seaport, a 3,300m airstrip and several other facilities
on top of the reef. The airport was completed in January 2016 and is the most
southern airport of all China’s territory.
Annex A – Maps and IMINT

Fig 3. Woody Island - (16.8366° N, 112.3368° E)
This OSINT source shows that the Chinese have deployed HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles
to Woody Island in the Paracel Islands. HQ-9’s have a maximum range of 200km and a
flight ceiling of 27km.

Fig 4: Regional Oil Block and NEO Map
The map demonstrates the location of our Vietnamese Oil Blocks, the oil and gas
platforms our nationals are working on, and the various airports we will evacuate from.
Indian nationals south of the blue line would be evacuated through Cambodia whilst
everyone north of it would be evacuated through Laos. This minimises the amount of
citizens we have near the potentially dangerous Vietnam-China border area.

ACH Matrix 1 – Likely Belligerents
ACH Matrix 2 – Scale of Conflict
Annex B – ACH Matrices

ACH Matrix 3 – Unintended involvement Vs. Direct targeting
ACH Matrix 4 – Evacuation from Vietnam Vs. from Laos and Cambodia

ACH Matrix 5 – Citizens and NRI’s most at risk
ACH Matrix 6 – Best solution to safeguard Indian economic assets

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