Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response

LIAISONA JOURNAL OF CIVIL-MILITARY DISASTER MANAGEMENT & HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COLLABORATIONS
VOLUMEVII|FALL2015
UNOCHA’s
HuMOCC Platform
Civil – Military
Training & Education
Programs
Emerging Challenges to
Civil-Military Coordination
in Disaster Response

CONTENTS
Features
The HuMOCC
The Use and
Coordination of Civil-
Military and Defense
Assets in Nepal
Interview with
Josef Reiterer
Early Considerations
on Civil-Military
Responses to
Emerging Diseases:
Ebola
By Ronaldo Reario
Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and
Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons
Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police
Coordination and the Use of Foreign
Military Assets
7
15
By Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D. & Tino Kreutzer
19
By Judy Swann
28
7
Civil-Military Coordination Section,
United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs
Civil-Military
Team Building
24
By Col. James Reilly (Ret.), USMC
1

On the cover: Multinational military service
members, humanitarian aid organization work-
ers, and rescue and medical personnel unload
casualties from an Indian military helicopter to a
Joint Task Force 505 medical triage area at Trib-
huvan International Airport, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Photo by Gunnery Sgt. Ricardo Morales/ III MEF
Combat Camera
Departments
InEveryIssue
3 The Director’s Letter
4 Letters to the Editor
5 Contributors
63 Calendar of Events
Partners
Technology
Re-examining the Past
The Tyranny of Distance:
How Domestic Lessons can be
Applied to Other Nations within
the Asia-Pacific
31
By Kenneth Tingman
Operational Contract Support:
Mitigating Challenges Faced
with Civil-Military
Coordination in Disaster Relief
Missions
36
Building Resilience through
Partnerships40
By Taryn Ino
Civil-Military Coordination and
Information Sharing in a Digital
Humanitarian Age
50
Cooperative U.S.-Japan Disaster
Preparedness and Response:
A Progress Report
44
By Pete Novick
Civil – Military Cooperation
Training and Education
Programs
54
Civilian-Military Coordination
in Conflict and Disaster
Scenarios
59
By Julia Brooks & David Polatty
By Maj. Chris Hearl
44
31
54
15 59
2

Editor
Katryn Tuton
Art Director
Brian Miyamoto
Staff Writers
Philipp Jund
Leigh A Sholler
Researcher
Alan Aoki
Please direct all inquiries to:
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management
& Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA)
465 Hornet Avenue
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam
Hawaii, 96860-3503
Phone: 001.808.472.0401
Fax: 001.808.472.0382
Website: http://www.cfe-dmha.org
LIAISON is a publication of the Center for Excel-
lence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance (CFE-DMHA) and serves to inform its
diverse audience of current and emerging issues
related to civil-military relations across the
broad spectrum of disaster relief in order
to enhance understanding among civilian and
military practitioners and policy makers.
Content is prepared in accordance with the
Associated Press Style Guide. Contributions are
welcomed and highly encouraged. The editor
reserves the right to make editorial changes to any
material submitted as deemed necessary.
The authors in this issue of LIAISON are entirely
responsible for opinions expressed in their articles.
These opinions are not to be construed as official
views of, or endorsed by, CFE-DMHA, any of its
partners, the Department of Defense,
or the U.S. Government.
In addition to the editorial staff and contributing
authors, the editor thanks the following people
whose efforts made this publication possible:
Col. Joseph Martin, Alberto Morales, Jr., James
Kenwolf, Douglas Wallace, Mick Korman, Jim
Welsh, John Miller, Joyce Blanchard, Mike Sashin,
Mara Langevin, Rochelle Nae’ole-Adams, Dr. Imes
Chiu, Hilton Lim, Jeff Hensel, James Robinson,
Jesse Wolfe, Katie Greenlee, Jenney Tagorda,
Melissa Aaron, Allison Symmonds, Tammy
Makizuru-Higa, Monique Wheeler,
Laurence A. Duaine, Rod Macalintal, Dante
Mercado, Robert Reyes, Lloyd Puckett, Karen
Michel, Craig Jaques, Nelson Chang, Lt. Col. Grover
Harms, Lt. Col. Cecili Sessions and Jeffrey Blau.
LIAISONCol. Joseph Martin, USAF
This issue of the Liaison is
focused on emerging chal-
lenges to civil-military co-
ordination in disaster response. You
will see that the articles are written by
leaders in their field - humanitarians,
military leaders, academicians and
partner organizations - to provide a
balanced perspective for a way ahead,
which maximizes the strengths of
both communities.
Articles include a first-glance at
challenges and innovative coordina-
tion mechanisms faced in response
to the April earthquake in Nepal. An-
other article highlights how domestic
lessons learned can be leveraged in
international responses as a way to
better prepare our partners to over-
come the ‘tyranny of distance.’ This
can be mitigated to a degree through
joint exercises, training, and familiar-
ization with international guidelines
on the use of military and civil de-
fense assets (MCDA) in disaster relief
operations. Furthermore, the Austra-
lian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC)
looks at early considerations on
civil-military responses to emerging
diseases. This is indicative of how
the broad-partnered community can
share its knowledge and understand-
ing with a larger audience.
A recurring theme in this issue is
the need to develop new concepts to
optimize civil-military coordination
and to ensure sufficient opportuni-
ties for quality training are provided.
We have included three archived
articles for re-examination in today’s
atmosphere, including one on civil-
military courses available to U.S. and
international military and humani-
tarian personnel.
CFE-DMHA has focused its efforts
in the past year on the delivery of
expertise in training and education,
information sharing, and regional
civil-military engagements. This is
done in coordination with partner
organizations such as UNOCHA’s
Civil-Military Coordination Section,
while remaining postured to support
U.S. Pacific Command in planning
and response to natural disasters
involving U.S. forces in the Asia-
Pacific.
The Center would like to thank
all of our contributors to this issue.
Your insights enrich a diverse civil-
military dialogue that this publica-
tion seeks to enhance.
We will soon begin work on the
next issue of the Liaison. The theme
will be “Lessons from Nepal and Oth-
er Recent Disasters”, to be published
in Spring 2016. Submission ideas will
be due in November. We welcome
your comments, contributions and
suggestions. Please visit our website
at https://www.cfe-dmha.org to learn
more about our mission, partnership
and training opportunities.
TheDirector’sLetter
3 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015

Letters to the Editor
LIAISON is a journal of civil-military disaster management and humanitarian relief collaborations and aims to engage
and inform readers on the most current research, collaborations and lessons learned available. If you are interested
in submitting an article for consideration, please email your story idea to editor@cfe-dmha.org.
LIAISON welcomes article submissions
•Format. All submissions should be emailed to
the editor as an unformatted Microsoft Word file.
Footnotes are the preferred method of citation, if
applicable, and please attach any images within the
document as separate files as well.
•Provide original research or reporting. LIAISON
prefers original submissions, but if your article or
paper is being considered for publication elsewhere,
please note that with the submission. Previously
published articles or papers will be considered if
they are relevant to the issue topic.
•Clarity and scope. Please avoid technical acronyms
and language. The majority of LIAISON readers are
from Asia-Pacific nations and articles should be ad-
dressed to an international audience. Articles should
also be applicable to partners in organizations or
nations beyond that of the author. The aim is for
successful cases to aid other partners of the DMHA
community.
•Copyrights or licenses. All work remains the prop-
erty of the author or photographer. Submission of
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authorization to publish with proper attribution.
•Supporting imagery. Original imagery supporting
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LIAISON provides an open forum for stimulating
discussion, exchange of ideas and lessons learned
– both academic and pragmatic– and invites ac-
tive participation from its readers. If you would
like to address issues relevant to the disaster
management and humanitarian assistance
community, or share a comment or thought on
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ring. LIAISON reserves the right to edit letters to the
editor for clarity, language and accuracy.
iStocks
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 4

CONTRIBUTORS
Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D.,is director of the Resilient Communities Program, Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative. He has 20 years of professional and academic experience in international politics, humanitar-
ian action, civil-military engagement in emergencies, and the security of humanitarian aid workers. He has
spent the past 14 years at Harvard University in administration, teaching, and research. Current research
focuses on civil-military engagement during humanitarian emergencies, the security of humanitarian aid
workers, and on the professionalization of the humanitarian aid field. He has managed training and policy
development initiatives related to international humanitarian law, responsibility to protect, and peace-
building operations, and has designed security reporting systems and program evaluations for field security
measures in complex emergencies. He currently serves on the boards of Enhancing Learning and Research
for Humanitarian Assistance, Action Against Hunger, and the International Solutions Group.
Maj. Chris Hearl has more than 17 years of experience working in the Contracting and
Operational Contract Support (OCS) environment. He is currently the director of Small Business Programs
for U.S. Pacific Air Forces and deputy for the Operations Division, Air Force Installation Contracting Agen-
cy/KH. In this role, he serves as a primary OCS liaison with U.S. Pacific Command. He has served stateside,
and in Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East, and three tours to Afghanistan. He has a MBA from the Naval
Postgraduate School, participates in several civil-military organizations, and has directly contributed to over
a dozen humanitarian assistance and disaster response events around the globe.
Julia Brooksis a legal research associate at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, where she specializes in
international humanitarian law and policy for the Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action
(ATHA) of the Humanitarian Academy at Harvard. She previously worked at the Foundation “Remem-
brance, Responsibility & Future”, Adelphi Research & Consult, the German Parliament, and the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees as a senior fellow with Humanity in Action. She has also served at the Office of
the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in The Hague. She holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University, specializing in public international law, human security and transitional
justice, and a Bachelor of Arts in Public Policy from Brown University, magna cum laude.
Col. James Reilly (Ret.), USMC, retired from the Marine Corps in 2013 after having served 30 years.
During his career he served in all four Marine Divisions, deployed to the Middle East in support of contin-
gency operations, responded to humanitarian disasters in the Asia-Pacific, and held senior command and
staff positions. His last assignment in the Marine Corps was with Headquarters, Marine Forces Pacific,
where he served as the chief of staff from 2010 to 2012, and finally finishing his career supporting Pacific
theater engagement and Southeast Asia exercises.
Ronaldo Reario heads the Training and Partnership Unit of the Civil-Military Coordination Section,
Emergency Services Branch, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva,
Switzerland. He manages the global United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCo-
ord) Training Programme, develops and sustains partnerships with various organizations and institutions in
promoting and creating understanding on the principles and concepts of humanitarian civil-military coor-
dination, supports training and capacity development requirements of OCHA regional and country offices,
national disaster management organizations and other defense and military training institutions, including
peacekeeping training centers. As an United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination member and
UN-CMCoord course graduate, he has deployed to emergency missions in: Darfur, Sudan and Indonesia in
2004; Pakistan in 2005; Mongolia in 2005; Myanmar in 2008; Haiti in 2010; and the Philippines extensively.

Pete Novick,a career Surface Warfare Officer (Cmdr., U.S. Navy, Ret.), subsequently worked in Navy
Emergency Management as shore installation EM, Navy region EM, Navy Anti-Terrorism Force Protection
(ATFP) Assistant Program Manager and lead Navy representative to Joint Project Manager Guardian, and
finally as Navy ATFP Program Quality Assurance Manager, supporting command and control and physi-
cal security systems acquisition for Navy shore installations worldwide. He now lives in South Newfane,
Vermont and owns Hayama Cabinetmakers, LLC.
David Polatty has served as a professor at the U.S. Naval War College since 2008 and teaches numer-
ous courses on military strategy, crisis planning, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations,
and maritime security. Dave is cofounder and co-director of the NWC College of Operational & Strategic
Leadership – Harvard School of Public Health “Joint Civilian-Military Humanitarian Working Group,”
which explores academic collaboration areas that can improve humanitarian responses during disaster. He
is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Naval War College, and U.S. Joint Forces Staff College. He
continues to serve part-time as a commander in the Navy Reserve, and has commanded four reserve units in
U.S. Forces Korea, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating
WMD, and U.S. European Command. He served on active duty from 1992 to 2003.
Tino Kreutzeris a program manager at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, and Brigham and Wom-
en’s Hospital, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. At HHI, he coordinates the development of KoBoTo-
olbox, the leading data collection suite for humanitarian settings, where he is working with UNOCHA,
the International Rescue Committee and other humanitarian NGOs on improving speed and quality of
disaster assessments. He is also responsible for field implementation and training of HHI’s Peace and Hu-
man Rights Data Program. In 2014, he was seconded to the U.N. Mission for Ebola Emergency Response,
where he advised local response teams on data collection and data analysis in hotspot areas in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Guinea. Prior to HHI, he was an Information Management Specialist working for UNDP and
UNOCHA. He has 10 years experience working in humanitarian crises and recovery settings in Central
African Republic, DR Congo, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
Kenneth R. Tingman was a Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in the Pacific Area Office from 2007 - 2010. Dur-
ing his three years as an FCO, he deployed to 15 disasters across the nation, his final deployment being the
earthquake and tsunami in American Samoa, where he spent six months leading the disaster response. Be-
fore joining FEMA, Tingman spent 24 years in the U.S. Air Force as a communications officer. During his
time in the military, he served in a variety of locations and positions around the world, including serving as
a military assistant to the senior U.S. Diplomat on the United Nations staff in Kosovo and was the commu-
nications squadron commander at the Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudia Arabia, on September 11, 2001. He is
also a certified instructor for the National Disaster Preparedness Training Center.

THE HuMTyphoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and
Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-
Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets
Humanitarian and military staff members gather at the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre in Nepal to coordinate relief after a 7.8-magnitude

OCCNepal Earthquake:
By Ronaldo Reario, Humanitarian
Affairs Officer, Training and Partnership
Unit, Civil-Military Coordination Section,
Emergency Services Branch, United Nations
Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
earthquake struck the nation.
UNOCHA
Militaries have been increasingly involved in
humanitarian response operations in recent
large-scale natural disasters. They are par-
ticularly evident where affected states request, welcome
or accept international assistance, including foreign
military assets (FMA). Humanitarian organisations on
the ground inevitably interacted with them. This trend
creates significant coordination needs in terms of op-
timising the use of available military assets to support
priority humanitarian requirements. These may include
capacity gaps in the realm of logistics (transport, air and
seaport management, warehousing, commercial transport
information, etc.), medical/health (out-patient and in-
patient capacity, disease surveillance, public health inter-
ventions, etc.), communications (satellite-based voice and
data), information management (assessment information,
priorities in terms of goods-services-locations, potential
gaps within estimated timeframes), and other operational
issues that impinge the effective delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
The “Three Big Ones” in the Asia-Pacific Region
On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known locally
as Yolanda) made landfall in the Philippines. It was one
of the strongest and deadliest typhoons in recorded his-
tory. The scale and magnitude of the impact of Typhoon
Haiyan created overwhelming need in the hardest-hit
areas. On the ninth of November 2013, the government
of the Philippines accepted the U.N. offer of international
assistance and welcomed the deployment of FMA. Twen-
ty-two Member States deployed FMA in the Philippines.
However, only 12 stationed assets and deployed “boots
on the ground” consisting of various air, sea, medical,
engineering, communication assets and personnel.
On 13 March 2015, Cyclone Pam hit Vanuatu creating
widespread damage to property and sources of livelihood.
Cyclone Pam is considered as one of the worst national
natural disasters in the history of Vanuatu. On 14 March
2015, the Government of Vanuatu accepted offers of
international assistance and welcomed the deployment

UNOCHA
A Nepalese soldier reads a newspaper article on the 7.3-magnitude aftershock that
struck just weeks after a 7.8-magnitude earthquake hit Nepal’s capital of Kath-
mandu.
of FMA from seven Member States consisting of air, sea,
medical, engineering, communication assets and person-
nel.
On 25 April 2015, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake hit
Nepal’s capital of Kathmandu and its surrounding areas.
This was followed by a large number of aftershocks,
including a 7.3-magnitude aftershock on 12 May. The
Government of Nepal requested international assistance
through the United Nations Resident/Humanitarian
Coordinator (RC/HC) in Nepal. Eight Member States
deployed FMA into the country consisting of various air,
medical, engineering, communications assets and person-
nel.
The Typhoon Haiyan After Action Review (AAR)1
Recommendations
The Typhoon Haiyan AAR recommendations are used
as baseline for comparison and analysis to draw some
commonalities and differences among the “three big
ones.” The facilitating and hindering factors for effec-
tive civil-military coordination during the emergency
response were examined to develop solid and realistic
recommendations.
The recommendations deducted from analysis of facili-
1 The unabridged article, including a comprehensive list of facilitating and hindering factors,
can be found here at https://www.cfe-dmha.org/liaison/The-HuMOCC_Full-Article
tating and hindering factors are:
1. It is important to establish a humanitarian civil-
military coordination mechanism at the national level
to assist and inform the National Disaster Manage-
ment Authority and the humanitarian clusters in
order to establish and maintain common situational
awareness, as well as prioritize the use of FMA in sup-
porting humanitarian activities and operations.
2. A humanitarian civil-military coordination
capacity in domestic and international rapid response
mechanisms should be institutionalized in order to
optimize interaction and interoperability and con-
tribute to the establishment of a common situational
awareness. The humanitarian civil-military coordi-
nation capacity should also contribute to informed
decision-making and response activities as well as fa-
cilitate integration with response actors and activities.
3. FMA must deploy with competent liaison officers
that are able to explain available capabilities and limi-
tations as well as to extract valuable information to
define priorities. In this respect, it is important to keep
the line of communication or coordination simple. In
addition, the capabilities and complementary support
needed should be determined and it is important to
provide geographical, situational and actual informa-
tion and awareness. Liaison officers should also try to
avoid duplication and prevent confusion.
4. A co-location strategy for humanitarian civil-military
coordination, where appropriate and feasible, should be
adopted to understand host nation priorities based on
humanitarian needs through open, efficient, fast, and
transparent information sharing. A co-location strat-
egy promotes humanitarian civil-military coordination
effectiveness and efficiency and enhances deliberate
planning. It also enables rapid coordination, coopera-
tion, prioritization and decision-making based on needs.
In addition, co-location maximizes communication and
sharing of information among all stakeholders, actors and
key players from national and local government levels,
foreign and local NGOs, as well as foreign and national
military forces. All of these contribute to having a com-
mon situational awareness as the operation progresses
and the optimal utilization of unique military capability
to support humanitarian priorities.
5. An emergency response should include a simple,
transparent tracking system in order to keep national and
subnational level informed about military air transport
and activity and to contribute to the situational awareness
of the humanitarian community. Moreover, a tracking
system serves to inform the humanitarian community on
movements of relief items; it deconflicts operations with
civil aviation and can directly control ground time of
military aircraft.
6. Last but not least, it is important to invest in humani-

tarian civil-military coordination capacity building to
improve interoperability, to increase mutual understand-
ing and to achieve and/or strengthen unity of efforts.
Cyclone Pam Observations and Lessons Identified
The Director-General or Director of the National Di-
saster Management Office (NDMO) in Port Vila, Vanu-
atu, chaired and instituted daily cluster coordination
meetings. It was clearly identified that the UN-CMCoord
officer was best placed within the NDMO structure to
have close liaison with the NDMO Director-General,
other relevant government staff, and the various cluster
leads to facilitate the effective use of FMA.
The civil-military coordination mechanism established
accurately recorded requests for the use of military assets
to fill-up humanitarian capacity gaps and support hu-
manitarian priorities. This mechanism incorporated an
approval process from the NDMO Director-General in
terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in
which the FMA (by country) is identified as best suited to
support the requests for assistance (RFA). At noon each
day, various requests for the use of military assets for the
delivery of humanitarian aid or essential passenger move-
ment were presented to the NDMO Director-General.
Upon granting authorization, the requests were given to
liaison officers (LOs) of the FMA identified as best suited
to perform the task. The task was then authorized that
afternoon via a delegate of the approving authority and
then actioned by the identified FMA. The expected turn-
around time for actioning the request was advertised
as 48 hours but often was achieved within 24 hours as
the system became more streamlined and efficient. This
system gave the transparency that was required by the
Vanuatu Government, showed that the use of the FMA
was essential in supporting the humanitarian response
efforts, and promoted effective and efficient use of FMA.
A hindering factor identified was the different decision-
making processes of FMA. Every nation that deployed
FMA had its own decision-making authority, which be-
came problematic and resulted in delays in accomplish-
ing urgent tasks requested by the clusters.
International humanitarian organisations, foreign
military forces and NDMO did not co-locate due to vari-
ous reasons including issues with the size of facilities.
However, the frequency and acceptance of both humani-
tarian-civil and military actors to take part in information
sharing, task division and planning activities contributed
significantly to achieving common situational awareness
and informed decision-making.
A good practice in respect to joint planning was in con-
ducting the second assessment to gather and/or validate
critical information in key clusters and thematic areas of
work. This involved the FRANZ Joint Task Force, Pacific
Military Partners, the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team,
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
(UNDAC) Team and UN-CMCoord officer. The plan
entailed the deployment of 22 teams to four provinces
within a relatively short window, which is only doable
through military transport assets. This planning process
showcased how humanitarians and militaries could work
together to achieve the same objectives. The assessments
provided a comprehensive picture of the humanitarian
situation in the affected areas, validating residual hu-
manitarian needs and gaps in life-saving assistance. The
assessment also gave a greater understanding of the over-
all loss and damages in properties and livelihoods, which
will feed into early recovery and longer-term reconstruc-
tion planning.
The FMA that deployed either engineers or medical
teams to the hardest-hit areas in the initial period of the
response were self-sufficient, using their own assets and
supplies for the duration of their mission in terms of
transport, fuel, food rations, water, sanitation and com-
munications.
A simple and transparent tracking system that accu-
rately recorded the request, assignment and identification
of military transport assets used was established with the
assistance of World Food Programme (WFP). All re-
quests were logged on a service request form (SRF) that
identified either goods (T) or passenger (P) movement.
The SRF was scanned and filed into a dropbox for per-
manent record. An Excel spreadsheet was also developed
which could easily identify the status of each request and
accessed by relevant entities.
The deployment operation emphasized the great coop-
eration between the Government of Vanuatu, the Vanu-
atu Humanitarian Team, UN-CMCoord and the foreign
militaries in Vanuatu at the time as a great success.
An invitation to attend the UN-CMCoord Course in
Fiji 6-11 September 2015 was extended to the command-
er of the Joint Task Force to allow senior Civil-Military
Cooperation (CIMIC) officers from the FRANZ partners
that deployed to Vanuatu to participate in the course.
Their attendance in the course will significantly reinforce
their experiences, enhance their knowledge and under-
standing of U.N. and humanitarian systems, and validate
their understanding of the principles and concepts of
humanitarian civil-military coordination as provided for
by the Oslo Guidelines and the APC-MADRO Guide-
lines. This will be an investment that will yield dividends
in future emergency response operations in the Pacific.
Nepal Earthquake Preliminary Observations and
Lessons Identified
Four civil-military coordination officers were deployed
to Kathmandu as part of the UNDAC Team. Three weeks
into the Nepal earthquake response operation, the RC/
HC decided that humanitarian hubs would be established

UNOCHA
UNOCHA
UNOCHA
in Gorkha and
Chautara. Follow-
ing this deci-
sion, dedicated
UN-CMCoord
officers were de-
ployed in each of
the humanitarian
hubs.
The Govern-
ment of Nepal
established a
Multi-national
Military Opera-
tions and Coor-
dination Center
(MNMCC). The
Nepal Army
chaired the
MNMCC with
the participa-
tion of foreign
military liaison
officers from
Algeria, Bangla-
desh, Bhutan,
Canada, China,
Israel, India, Ja-
pan, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, U.K. and the U.S.
UNOCHA was invited by the
MNMCC chief to have a permanent
liaison function within the MNMCC
to facilitate information sharing and
coordination, as well as common
situational awareness between the
MNMCC and the UNDAC Team’s
On-Site Operations Coordination
Centre (OSOCC).
The Humanitarian-Military
Operations Coordination Center
(HuMOCC) was established by the
UN-CMCoord team as part of the
Nepal Earthquake response op-
eration. It was co-located with the
MNMCC. The HuMOCC objective
was to provide a predictable human-
itarian-military-police coordination
platform. Complementary to the
OSOCC, the HuMOCC aimed to
provide the physical space dedicated
to facilitating the interface between
humanitarians, national and foreign
military actors, as well as the national
police.
As of 10 May, an Integrated Plan-
ning Cell (IPC) was created within the
MNMCC. The primary objective of
the IPC was to reinforce the plan-
ning and coordination “trading floor”
function that is usually activated as
part of the standard “MNCC” struc-
ture. The following representatives
composed the IPC: Nepal Army, WFP
Logistics Cluster and UNOCHA.
Other actors would take part in the
IPC on a case-by-case basis. As a
result of the establishment of the
HuMOCC and the IPC, a procedure
was initiated for the submission of
requests for assistance (RFA) coming
from humanitarian partners.
As part of the hand-over process,
the UN-CMCoord team leader
organized a debriefing session with
the team members to discuss the
UN-CMCoord strategy for Nepal
and formulate key recommendations.
Humanitarian and
military staff members
use the Multi-national
Military Operations
and Coordination Cen-
ter (MNMCC) and the
Humanitarian-Military
Operations Coordina-
tion Centre (HuMOCC)
in Nepal to coordinate
relief operations
after a 7.8-magnitude
earthquake struck the
nation.

Figure 1: Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu and the Nepal Earthquake were used to validate the Typhoon Haiyan after-action report recommendations.

Typhoon
Haiyan
AAR
Baseline
Recommendations

Relevance
of
Baseline

Recommendations

Cyclone

Pam

Nepal

Earthquake

1. Establishment
of
a
predictable
humanitarian
civil-‐military
coordination

mechanism
at
national
level
to
assist
and
inform
the
NDMO
and
the

humanitarian
clusters

ü
ü

2. A
humanitarian
civil-‐military
coordination
capacity
in
domestic
(national)
and

international
rapid
response
mechanisms
should
be
institutionalised
in
order

to
optimize
interaction
and
interoperability
and
contribute
to
the

establishment
of
a
common
situational
awareness.

ü
ü

3. To
deploy
FMA
with
competent
liaison
officers
who
are
able
to
explain

available
capabilities
and
limitations
as
well
as
to
extract
valuable
information

to
define
priorities.
In
this
respect,
it
is
important
to
keep
the
line
of

communication
or
coordination
simple.
In
addition,
the
capabilities
and

complementary
support
needed
should
be
determined
and
it
is
important
to

provide
geographical,
situational
and
actual
information
and
awareness.

Liaison
officers
should
also
try
to
avoid
duplication
and
prevent
confusion.

ü
ü

4. A
co-‐location
strategy
for
humanitarian
civil-‐military
coordination,
where

appropriate
and
feasible,
should
be
adopted
to
understand
host
nation

priorities
based
on
humanitarian
needs
through
open,
efficient,
fast,

transparent
sharing
of
information.
A
co-‐location
strategy
promotes

humanitarian
civil-‐military
coordination
effectiveness
and
efficiency,
and

enhances
deliberate
planning.
It
also
enables
rapid
coordination,
cooperation,

prioritization
and
decision-‐making
based
on
needs.
In
addition,
co-‐location

maximizes
communication
and
sharing
of
information
among
all
stakeholders,

actors
and
key
players
from
national
and
local
government
levels,
foreign
and

local
NGOs,
as
well
as
foreign
and
national
military
forces.
All
of
these

contribute
to
having
a
common
situational
awareness
as
the
operation

progresses
and
the
optimal
utilization
of
unique
military
capability
to
support

humanitarian
priorities.

ü
ü

5. An
emergency
response
should
include
a
simple,
transparent
tracking
system

in
order
to
keep
national
and
subnational
level
informed
about
military
air

transport
and
activity
and
to
contribute
to
the
situational
awareness
of
the

humanitarian
community.
Moreover,
a
tracking
system
serves
to
inform
the

humanitarian
community
on
movements
of
relief
items;
it
de-‐conflicts

operations
with
civil
aviation
and
can
directly
control
ground
time
of
military

aircraft

ü
ü

6. It
is
crucial
that
foreign
military
forces
and
organizations
should
be
self-‐
sustaining
during
the
duration
of
the
mission
in
terms
of
transport,
fuel,
food

rations,
water
sanitation,
maintenance
and
communications
so
as
not
to
create

additional
burden
on
the
host
local
governments
and/or
communities.

ü
ü


The Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) process flow shows how straightforward and simplified the process is, yet flexible
enough to be tweaked to adapt to the national coordination structure of the affected state.
As of 16 May, the following foreign military forces were
present in the country: Bhutan, Canada, China, India,
Japan, Pakistan, U.K. and the U.S. It is expected that most
of these forces will be transitioning out from the opera-
tion by the end of May 2015.2
The focus of civil-military
coordination will therefore be placed on the dialogue and
interaction with the Nepal Army, the Nepal Police and
the Armed Police.
Preliminary Lessons Identified
1. One key lesson identified in relation to FMA pro-
vided by assisting Member States is that FMA should be
offered to the affected state and plugged into the existing
national coordination mechanisms. The bilateral alloca-
tion of FMA to specific clusters and humanitarian part-
ners posed challenges in the context of the Nepal opera-
tions. This modality does not promote the optimal use of
FMA to support the broader humanitarian priorities that
is beyond one cluster and/or humanitarian organisation.
Discussions about the modality for the request/offer/ac-
ceptance of FMA should be an integral part of the coun-
try preparedness planning process.
2 By 5 June Nepalese Army announced the departure of all foreign military personnel involved in
relief efforts.
2. Military-military coordination mechanisms such
as the MNMCC in the context of the Nepal earth-
quake response should have the capacity to contribute
to achieving common situational awareness, facilitate
joint planning and clarify task division. This means that
humanitarian priorities are given the first opportunity for
the use of FMA in the absence of civilian alternatives dur-
ing the critical period.
3. Requests for the use of FMA at the sub-national
(hub) level were passed through the MNMCC. Decision-
making and tasking normally takes place in Kathmandu
at the MNMCC for use of FMA at the hub level. This was
not seen as a robust mechanism that expedites decision
on requests to the MNMCC for tasks that are carried out
by FMA stationed at the sub-national (hub) level.
4. Another identified lesson is the limited understand-
ing of the national military forces at the sub-national
level about the presence of humanitarian actors and FMA
present in the area. This resulted in a minimum level of
coordination between the humanitarian actors and FMA
on one hand, and the national military on the other hand.
It was recommended that a civil-military coordination
cell be established at the sub-national level.

Nepalese military personnel speak
with United Nations and Inter-
national Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies staff to
coordinate relief operations after
an earthquake struck Nepal April
25, 2015.
UNOCHA
Way Forward
Figure 1 validates the Typhoon Haiyan AAR recom-
mendations in two different emergencies. “No two
emergencies are the same” is a common phrase we hear
from colleagues who have responded to multiple natural
disasters. I would add that there will always be constants
and variables in every large-scale emergency. The former
would be overwhelming humanitarian needs, need for
resources and the need for coordination among respond-
ing organisations; the latter would be more on the “how
much of which is needed by whom, where and when” or
“how to get the right assistance to the right people, at the
right time, in the most appropriate way.” Let me delve
on the “constant” that is the need for humanitarian and
military coordination in the context of natural disasters
in peacetime. The Humanitarian-Military Operations
Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) offers the predict-
able platform that can provide the space and a simplified
process that adds value to the work of others and also
strengthens humanitarian coordination in general.
Perhaps in preparation for the next big natural disas-
ter, the HuMOCC concept can be incorporated in the
preparedness planning processes and activities of natural
hazard-prone countries. Member States that tradition-
ally deploy FMA bilaterally or otherwise may also benefit
from understanding the HuMOCC concept.
I share the HuMOCC process flow on the pervious
page, which explains how straightforward and simplified
the process flow is, yet flexible enough to be tweaked to
adapt to the national coordination structure of the af-
fected state.
Acknowledgements
This article was culled from the Typhoon Haiyan AAR
Report of March 2014, Cyclone Pam AAR Report drafted
by Dale Potter, UN-CMCoord Officer, and the Nepal
Earthquake UN-CMCoord Mission Report submitted by
Viviana de Annuuntis, UN-CMCoord Team Leader.

L
ate morning, April 25, 2015, a magnitude-7.8
earthquake struck Nepal, followed by a second
devastating magnitude-7.3 earthquake on May 12.
Centered in the Ghorka District, the initial earthquake
destroyed entire villages, especially in Sindhupalchok
and Ghorka. The capital of Kathmandu was fortunate to
have escaped what would have been enormous destruc-
tion, had the epicenter been closer to the city. Despite the
distance, the earthquake still leveled homes and build-
ings, including many of the nation’s historical, religious
By Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D., Director, Resilient Communities Program
& Tino Kreutzer, Program Manager, KoBoToolbox, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
The Use and Coordination of Civil-Military
and Defense Assets in Nepal
and cultural monuments. As geologists predicted, the
earthquake’s complete destruction of 489,000 homes and
damage to another 260,000, underscored the country’s
inadequate level of preparedness.
Despite clear forecasts that an earthquake in Nepal was
inevitable, and plans in place to coordinate a response
with international humanitarian agencies and national
and international militaries, it still took in excess of
two weeks for aid to reach villages in Nepal’s moun-
tain regions. This is somewhat surprising given that the
International Committee of the Red Cross
A Red Cross volunteer checks on a woman shaken by Nepal’s devastating earthquake.

airport, major roads and bridges in
Kathmandu remained intact, and the
markets quickly reopened.
During the response to the initial
earthquake, forces from at least 18
foreign militaries were deployed to
Nepal. By May 15, 2015, militar-
ies from 10 countries had already
departed, all of whom represented
search and rescue, engineering, or
medical staff. As of May 15, the larg-
est presence was from China and
India (844 and 611 troops, respec-
tively). The U.S. presence included
at least 286 troops from Joint Task
Force 505, tasked with air support
and providing at least seven rotary-
wing and 12 fixed-wing aircraft.1
The
United States ultimately “delivered
about 114 tons of emergency relief
supplies, including plastic sheet-
ing, shelter kits, blankets, water,
medical supplies and emergency
and supplemental food in support
of USAID. In addition to delivering
aid, the task force transported 534
personnel and conducted 63 casualty
evacuations.”21
By contrast, China’s
military support had a very minor fo-
cus on air transport, with two helicop-
ters flying daily from a base in China
to Kathmandu airport to carry person-
nel and supplies to remote areas.
It is precisely in situations like this
that a major international military
response is expected: a natural disaster
in a relatively conflict-free country,
1 CDIR 26 May 2015
2 “Nepal Joint Task Force Begins Drawing Down,” in Joint Task
Force 505 News Release, accessed on May 29, 2015 at http://
www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128860
with widespread damage, a large
number of deaths and injuries,
and inaccessible or difficult-to-
reach villages in need of assistance.
Yet, despite the need for heavy lift
equipment to clear roads blocked
by landslides and rotary-wing
air assets to reach remote vil-
lages, there was a fairly modest
international military presence
in Nepal and a notably small U.S.
military presence. Although there
were roughly 1,000 personnel that
comprised the Joint Task Force in
Kathmandu, Okinawa, and U.S.
Pacific Command, the actual num-
bers of U.S. personnel operating in
the field in Nepal was small com-
pared to their Chinese and Indian
counterparts.
This is especially true when the
response is compared to those that
took place in Haiti in 2010 and the
Philippines in 2013. Part of this can
be explained at least in part by the
relatively easy accessibility of Haiti
and the Philippines compared to
the inaccessibility of Nepal. It is
also possible that close U.S. ties
with the Philippines, and Haiti’s
proximity to the U.S. explain the
comparatively much larger U.S.
efforts in these two countries as
compared to the limited presence of
the U.S. in Nepal. A better under-
standing of
why the Nepalese government
and the international humanitarian
community did not request greater
support through OFDA should help
explain why the U.S. military played
such a limited role in this disaster. As
the lead United States federal agency,
it is the Office for Foreign Disaster
Assistance, which through its Di-
saster Response Assessment Teams
(DART), assesses whether U.S. mili-
tary assistance is needed.
Challenges
In comparison to other recent di-
sasters, humanitarian relief efforts in
Nepal were late to arrive and faced a
multiplicity of hurdles that hampered
DART Member Mike Davis speaks to Nepali Army and the community in Bhaktapur, Nepal to figure
out where people may be trapped.
Natalie Hawwa/ USAID

the efficiency of the response. There
were numerous logistical challenges
posed by the single runway at the
Kathmandu airport, an apron that
could not accommodate more than
six aircraft on the ground at any one
time, landslides along some road-
ways, persistent aftershocks, and a
second large earthquake. Even with
the Nepalese military at full deploy-
ment capacity, there were not enough
helicopters operating to deliver
humanitarian aid in the first weeks
following the disaster. As of May 8,
the United Nations had a total of two
helicopters at its disposal to deliver
aid and conduct missions in Nepal.
Both the Nepalese and supporting in-
ternational militaries had helicopters
(21 in total), but more were needed
to reach the many communities af-
fected by the earthquake.
While air transport is essential after
most natural disasters, the situation
in Nepal has shown that relief in such
a particularly mountainous area re-
quires a much larger pool of helicop-
ters, experienced pilots, and potential
alternative landing locations.
Even had enough helicopters been
available, there were other challenges
that would have made them difficult
to use, especially early on in the re-
sponse. For one, the logistical chal-
lenges mentioned were exacerbated
by the absence of a reliable register of
potential helicopter landing spots –
exposing crews to risks and slowing
down deliveries. In addition, the ter-
rain and extremely dangerous chang-
ing weather conditions in Nepal
reduced the speed of relief efforts, as
was highlighted in two crashes by the
Pakistani military on May 8, which
killed the ambassadors of Norway
and the Philippines, and a fatal crash
of a U.S. UH-1Y Venom helicopter
on May 12 that resulted in the deaths
of six U.S. Marines and two Nepalese
soldiers.
Despite the U.N.’s well-organized
and very well attended cluster meet-
ings across Kathmandu, aid agen-
cies also faced a frustrating set of
bureaucratic obstacles to the efficient
delivery of aid. These included the
build up of goods awaiting customs
clearance at the Kathmandu airport,
difficulties faced by some countries
in acquiring landing permits at the
airport, and restricted time slots
when flights carrying humanitar-
ian goods were permitted to land. In
NEPAL EARTHQUAKE: National and Foreign Military Air Assets (as of 12 May 2015)
OVERVIEW
The Multi-National Military Coordination
Centre (MNMCC) is coordinating all foreign
military assets through daily meetings. The
Nepalese Army has appointed a dedicated
liaison officer from the MNMCC to the
National Emergency Operations Centre of
the Ministry of Home Affairs.
The Humanitarian-Military Operations
Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) was
established to provide the physical space
dedicated to facilitating the interface
between humanitarian and military actors.
Creation date: 12 May 2015
Data source: UNDAC
Feedback: cmcoordnepal@gmail.com
www.unocha.org www.reliefweb.int
CHINA
3 x IL-76 aircraft
PAKISTAN
1 x C-17 Globemaster III 4x V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft 3 x UH-1 helicopters
USA UNITED KINGDOM
4 x Lockheed C-130 Hercules (C-130)
1 x C130 aircraft 3 x Boeing CH-47 Chinook (CH47)
3 x MI17 helicopters
NEPAL
8 military helicopters
INDIA
13 military aircraft* large military transport aircraft C-17, Ilyushin Il-76 (IL-76), C-130 *Data unavailable on number of aircraft types
14 military helicopters 8 x medium twin-turbine transport helicopter (MI17), 6 x advanced light helicopter (ALH)
SRI LANKA
1 x C-130 aircraft
BANGLADESH
1 x C-130 aircraft
RUSSIA
2 x Ilyushin IL-76 aircraft
In-country
Delivering cargo
(not positioned in-country)
Pending arrival
25 foreign military air assets
8 foreign militaries
AIR ASSETS IN-COUNTRY
A U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance infographic on Nepalese and foreign military air assets in Nepal as of May 12. Numbers
continued to rise as response efforts grew.

one of the cluster meetings, a British
official mentioned that there were
two Chinook helicopters ready to
be flown in from nearby India. As
of this cluster meeting (week ending
May 8), these flights were not given
clearance either to leave India or to
enter Nepal; the official did not say
which. There were also restrictions
on flights carrying relief items being
flown to Nepal over Indian airspace.
These flights had to stop in India first
for inspection. Finally, there was a
fleet of 25 trucks requisitioned by the
World Food Programme (WFP), and
stationed at the humanitarian stag-
ing area at the Kathmandu Airport,
which were underutilized in the
initial weeks.
In terms of civil-military coordina-
tion, it was also apparent from the
Multi-National Military Coordina-
tion Center meetings (MNMCC), at
least in the first two weeks, that the
Indian and Chinese militaries were
only marginally interested in utiliz-
ing this forum. Despite the fact that
both militaries had the largest foreign
military presence on the ground, they
operated within their own geograph-
ic areas of interest and were hardly
present in the MNMCC. This was de-
spite the fact that the Indian military
ran their operations from their own
command center a mere 50 meters
away from the MNMCC tent.
The setup of the MNMCC by
country-desks, rather than by func-
tional desks, may have encouraged
bilateral coordination and discour-
aged more multi-lateral discussions
by functional area. United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) did
demonstrate considerable flexibility
and creativity in the face of the nu-
merous logistical constraints men-
tioned, including the establishment
of a Joint Operations Cell to discuss
daily requests for logistics support,
medical evacuation, engineering re-
quests and security issues. This Joint
Operations Cell was to be comprised
of UNOCHA, WFP, and the Nepal-
ese military and Nepalese police.
As with many emergencies, the
location of multiple coordination
centers makes effective coordina-
tion across the response a challenge.
There were five major coordination
centers in Kathmandu alone, spread
out across the city, including the
Onsite Operations Center (OSOCC),
the National Emergency Operations
Center (NEOC), the MNMCC, the
Ministry of Health, and the humani-
tarian staging area at the airport, as
well as the urban search and rescue
team (USAR).
Technologies
Interestingly, the humanitarian
response in Nepal included the use
of an unprecedented number of
new technologies and information
applications. These included the
widespread use of digital data col-
lection tools (e.g. UNOCHA’s use of
KoBoToolbox in rapid assessments),
satellite-based mapping, real-time
satellite imagery provision from Digi-
tal Globe and Google’s SkyBox Imag-
ing, and the use of crowd-sourced
community mapping. The emergence
of large volunteer networks and com-
munity-based initiatives around the
world are transforming the humani-
tarian landscape – and they were
in full swing in Nepal. Moreover,
these groups are empowering local
communities to play an active role
in disaster response. For example,
in the aftermath of the earthquake,
Kathmandu Living Labs coordinated
more than 4,300 people to crowd-
source information on the disaster
in just one week. More importantly,
they were able to take the reports
they produced every two hours and
send them to the Nepalese military,
Nepalese governments agencies, and
international NGOs. However, the
accuracy and concrete applicability of
these reports in comparison to more
traditional forms of communication
remain to be evaluated.
The use of unmanned aerial ve-
hicles (UAVs), or “drones”, was an-
other notable feature of this response
that distinguished it from previous
responses. There were at least nine
independent teams flying drones
over Nepal (excluding journalists).
Drones are a promising technology
because of their ability to provide
high-quality imagery, virtually any-
where. Regrettably, drone operators
faced significant challenges in Nepal,
largely because they failed to properly
organize themselves and to adhere
to an emergent code of conduct put
together by the Humanitarian UAV
Network (UAViators). A number
of drone operators failed to register
with the Nepalese government and
faced arrest and confiscation of their
equipment. Moreover, an opportu-
nity to better coordinate with local
communities and to offer a shared
platform for the repository of imag-
ery being collected never fully ma-
terialized. Invariably, in the future,
these glitches will need to be worked
out, with drone operators profession-
alized and more formally folded into
the humanitarian architecture.
Whereas the response to Typhoon
Haiyan in the Philippines was
largely heralded as a success for civil-
military coordination – a textbook
response even – the same is unlikely
to be said about Nepal. Instead, a
number of lingering questions need
to be answered. Why, for example,
did it take two weeks or more for aid
to reach some mountain villages?
How did the Nepalese government
and the international humanitarian
community assess needs and pri-
oritize delivery of aid? Why was the
U.S. military presence so small and
restricted largely to the provision of
flights? What services did interna-
tional militaries provide and were
these effective?
A formal study of the civil-military
coordination and international and
domestic humanitarian response is
thus needed to better understand
what did and did not work well in the
response to the Nepal earthquake.

Early Considerations on
Civil-Military Responses
to Emerging Diseases:19 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015

T
he Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) is
an Australian Government initiative to improve
Australia’s effectiveness in civil-military col-
laboration for conflict and disaster management overseas.
ACMC hosts Quick Impact Workshops (QIW) - with
representatives from across government (Australian and
international), civil society, private sector and the Aus-
tralian Defence Force - to draw on the experiences and
observations of Australians who have been part of an
international response. The QIW supports civil-military-
police capability and understanding through multiagency
engagement, case studies and shared information.
In February 2015, the ACMC hosted a QIW on ‘Early
Considerations on Civil-Military Responses to Emerging
Diseases: Ebola as a Case Study’.
Overview - The International Response to the
Ebola Outbreak in West Africa
In August 2014, the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council declared the Ebola virus outbreak in the West
African subregion a ‘threat to international peace and
security’. The U.N. request for assistance from member
states resulted in the mobilization of technical expertise,
medical capacity, humanitarian assistance, and both mili-
tary and civil defense assets. The Australian Government
contributed approximately AU$45 million to the interna-
tional Ebola response, including the management of an
Ebola treatment center in Sierra Leone contracted to As-
pen Medical, and a regional Ebola response preparedness
package focused on the Indo-Pacific. Other countries,
including affected states, responded in a variety of ways,
some through civil-military intervention. The United
States and United Kingdom provided a civil-military
health response in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively.
The Ebola outbreak has again raised concerns about
the potentially devastating impact emerging diseases pose
EBOLAAs a
Case
Study
By Judy Swann,
Director Concepts and Capability,
Australian Civil-Military Centre
Simon Ruf/UNMEER
Staff of the United Nations Mission
in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United
Nations Mission for Ebola Emer-
gency Response (UNMEER) helped
an orphanage for Ebola affected
children with food, toys and cash
in March 2015.

cessful outcomes of the response in West Africa. Civil
Society engagement was crucial. The Red Cross and
Medecins Sans Frontières were key first movers and were
operating on the ground instantly. They were quickly
supported by international advocates (including the U.S.
and U.K.) and were direct in their expectations and ad-
vice about where Australia could and should best support
other efforts.
Private sector engagement – It is becoming increasingly
clear that the private sector is an active responder in crisis
situations. The Ebola Treatment Center established by
Firestone Natural Rubber Company in Liberia became a
best-practice example of a quick and effective response.
The Australian Government’s engagement of Aspen
Medical to deliver services in Sierra Leone also highlights
the flexibility and availability of the private sector to sup-
port a government crisis response. Building understand-
ing and partnerships with the private sector, both domes-
tically and overseas, would enhance Australia’s ability to
respond more effectively to crises in the region.
Command and control structures – The establishment
of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency
Response (UNMEER) and insertion into affected coun-
tries saw some confusion about mandates and responsi-
bilities. Clear lines of responsibility and reporting must
be established from the outset if a mission is to operate
effectively. For Australia, this means ensuring robust in-
teragency coordination structures, as well as governance
mechanisms for working with international partners. Ef-
fective command and control arrangements are essential
to avoid duplication and counter-productive effort.
Interagency coordination - The Ebola crisis underlined
that Australia’s interagency planning and response is
highly effective. The Australian Government Interdepart-
mental Task Force (IDETF) model is well developed and
works well. DFAT’s coordination of overseas response is
central to managing Australia’s international assistance
efforts. However, it is also important to note that line
agencies may be called on to lead (e.g. in this case the De-
partment of Health), and good practice indicates that ear-
ly centralized coordination of effort is essential including
early identification of lead agencies and points of contact.
This process supports coordinated planning, timeliness of
decision-making and coordination of resources.
Planning and preparedness – Tactical off-the-shelf
contingency plans play an important role in operations
but there is a requirement for strategic flexibility and agil-
ity in planning. Early in the Ebola response, the Austra-
lian Government established clear direction on priori-
ties. However, as international priorities and responses
changed, it was important for civil-military agencies to be
flexible while strategic direction was being realigned with
international partners.
Good practice also indicates that there is a need for
to human and economic welfare. The response in West
Africa has highlighted the need for robust regional health
architecture, and indicates a likely role for the military
(either within affected states or through international
assistance) following an outbreak or pandemic in the
Indo-Pacific region.
The unfolding of the crisis – initially a health response
and then a ramping-up as it became more than a health
crisis – enabled Australia to build its response according-
ly, including the development of National Health Guide-
lines to manage domestic preparedness and management
arrangements at the border. Notably, the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) had a minimal role in this instance,
but would likely be involved in a health crisis response in
our region.
The following key observations were drawn from the
workshop presentations and discussion.
Key Observations
International and Regional Health Architecture
Global health architecture - The global health architec-
ture is increasingly seen as not ‘fit for purpose’. There is
a global capacity gap in response mechanisms for global
infectious disease outbreaks, including in coordinated
planning, decision-making, resource sharing, resource
management, and communications and information
management. The current reform of the World Health
Organisation may go some way to address this; however,
it will remain a technical/standards agency with emer-
gency response dispersed across the organization.
Health security risk in the Indo-Pacific region – Un-
derdeveloped and stretched health systems in the region
make Australia’s immediate neighborhood particularly
vulnerable to a major health security risk. The Indo-
Pacific region has experienced increased travel, trade
and urbanization based on recent economic growth. At
the same time there are concerns with increasing drug
resistant malaria and tuberculosis in the region. Aus-
tralia is working to help strengthen regional cooperative
mechanisms for health security to address this, and other,
potential health risks.
Operational Learnings
Stakeholder relationships - Work should continue
to proactively build and nurture relationships in non-
crisis periods. Well-established, long-term relationships
were central to ensuring Australia was able to respond
effectively, both domestically and internationally. Re-
lationships between the Commonwealth and State and
Territory Governments were important, particularly in
Australia’s early response when the focus was primarily
on domestic protection and information to travellers.
Bilateral relationships with international governments,
military-to-military cooperation, and international and
domestic health partnerships all contributed to the suc-

long-term transition planning in
every crisis. In the case of Ebola,
Sierra Leone and other affected coun-
tries will have to grapple with a false
economy over coming months that
has been generated by substantial
hazard-pay for medical teams, as well
as dealing with the recovery of main-
stream health systems.
Communication management –
The media response in any crisis
will deal with perceptions more than
reality, as was the case with the Ebola
crisis particularly in local communities and regarding
international travel. Effective crisis management requires
careful attention to messaging, media management and
communications. These are necessities in achieving a
successful outcome and must be factored in at the start of
every crisis response.
Media and messaging – Media pressure in a crisis can
lead to ineffective allocation of resources, particularly if it
leads to ‘being seen to act’ taking priority over good plan-
ning and the coordination of response efforts. Crisis re-
sponders, both government and nongovernment, need to
establish as quickly as possible common clarity of vision
as the basis of their respective engagement with domestic
and inter-
national
media.
Informa-
tion shar-
ing – There
is common
theme in
recent crises
response
that management of information, analysis of data and
sharing knowledge is increasingly important in inter-
agency international operations, and increasingly com-
plex. Protocols and procedures for multi-stakeholder
Sgt. 1st Class Nathan Hoskins/ U.S. Army
UNMEER
(Above) From right, Sam Sells, military
liaison officer, U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, Lt. Col. Lee Hicks,
JFC-UA command engineer, Armed Forces
of Liberia Capt. A. J. Halley Moore, 1st Bat-
talion commander, Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky,
commander of the Joint Forces Com-
mand - United Assistance, Scott Dehnisch,
military liaison officer, USAID, and Gregg
Gross, engineering contractor, talk to local
medical officials Nov. 3, 2014, about the
placement of a planned Ebola
treatment unit in Ganta, Liberia.
(Right) U.N. Secretary-General Special Rep-
resentative Anthony Banbury speaks with
medical personnel from Médecins Sans
Frontières in Ebola affected countries.

communication management and
information sharing should be in-
corporated in all crisis management
planning.
Cultural sensitivities and gender
considerations – The international
Ebola response highlighted the im-
portance of gender, civilian protec-
tion and cultural considerations,
particularly in areas such as women’s
healthcare, and safe and dignified
burials. Every crisis response needs
to take account of cultural sensitivi-
ties and gender considerations. Rapid
identification and protection of the
most vulnerable in the community
(e.g. children, the elderly, pregnant
women and lactating mothers)
should be a priority.
Learning from others - The Ebola
response in West Africa highlighted
several best-practice models from
across civil-society, the private
sector, U.K. and U.S. military, and
government. The U.K. and the U.S.
responses, led by DFID and USAID
respectively, chose to deploy substan-
tial military assets in West Africa.
There is potential to consider these
models as a template or framework
should an ADF response be required
in the region. The sharing of lessons
reports domestically and interna-
tionally maximizes opportunities for
continuous improvement.
Managing resources - Placing
the right people in the right jobs is
essential and experienced human re-
sources are fundamental to effective
outcomes. Effective coordination of
resources on the ground in overseas
operations is also key. For infectious
disease outbreak, there are consid-
erable duty of care issues relating
to deployments. The management
of resources should include robust
arrangements for the wellbeing of
personnel.
Alignment of strategic priorities –
The priorities of the Australian Gov-
ernment are unlikely to fully align
with those of the host nation, the
international community, the U.N.
or nongovernment organizations. In
formulating policy advice to govern-
ment, Australian agencies need to
articulate how our contributions can
do the most good, while balancing
the needs and expectations of the
wide range of interested parties.
Engagement with the U.N. - The
effectiveness of U.N. missions is
contingent, not only on their inter-
nal leadership, but on national and
international engagement with those
missions. This means that national
agencies need to expose their staff to
U.N. training programs and multi-
national U.N.-focused exercises. It
is too late to build this capacity once
an operation has commenced. More
staff needs experience in providing
operational leadership for complex
missions, including where the source
of authority may be unclear or non-
existent.
Conclusion
The ACMC’s role in identifying
lessons from interagency interna-
tional operations is growing. Each
crisis and operation is fundamentally
different but our experiential learn-
ing indicates similarities in many ar-
eas. Robust planning, integrated and
straightforward advice and central
government coordination are the key
lessons arising from recent opera-
tions. Australian agencies can learn
from these operations and increase
their preparedness to lead future
Australian contingencies.
More information on the ACMC,
and a summary of the workshop can
be found on www.acmc.gov.au
StaffSergeantTomRobinson/UKMOD
British military personnel of 22
Field Hospital arriving in Sierra
Leone as a part of Britain’s
military response to the Ebola
epidemic in West Africa on
October 16, 2014.

Civil-Military
Team BuildingBy Col. James Reilly (Ret.), USMC

ing and exercising this relationship. However, given the
differences in government culture, personal experiences
and preconceived prejudices, building the relation-
ship between civilian and military personnel tends to be
harder than expected, compounded by the ad-hoc nature
and stressful circumstances under which a FDR opera-
tion is executed. To mitigate some of these distractions,
I believe the adoption, or consideration, of the following
leadership-based intangibles will contribute to the devel-
opment of a successful civil-military relationship.
I found there are three universal intangibles a civil-
military team needs to focus on when developing their
relationship in support of a FDR operation: (1) trust that
all stakeholders are professionally adept and uniquely
qualified in their field; (2) develop a mutually respectful
relationship based on that trust; and (3) capitalize on the
perspectives and expertise that each stakeholder brings
to the success of the team. None of this is rocket sci-
ence, and has been
addressed by more
qualified people
than myself, but
we are constantly
relearning what
should be a natural
effort. We have now
come to a point
where the civil-
military relationship
has been operation-
alized and exercised
both in conflict and
in response to hu-
manitarian support
operations through-
out the globe. The
capabilities, ca-
pacities and cultural
uniqueness each
individual brings
to the civil-military
team have been
tested time and
again. Consequent-
ly, we now have a
generation of service
members, humanitar-
ians and diplomats with enough experience working in
these civil-military environments that developing and
enhancing these relationships should be second nature.
Unfortunately, it remains a struggle.
In that light, the following are observations of best
practices learned during my experiences in support of
FDR operations, and executing U.S. Pacific Command-
W
hile serving on active duty, I participated in
a number of foreign disaster response (FDR)
operations in key leadership and senior staff
positions in the Philippines and Thailand, and in support
of operations in Burma and Japan. These experiences
offered me the unique opportunity to view civil-military
relationships from the tactical to the theater strategic lev-
els. My positions included serving as the officer-in-charge
for the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Disaster
Response Assessment Team (DRAT) in the Philippines
and Thailand; commander, Combined Support Group-
Thailand and senior CSF 536 liaison officer to the U.S.
Embassy Jakarta during Operation Unified Assistance;
future operations officer, U.S. Marine Component during
Operation Provide Comfort; and chief of staff, Marine
Forces Pacific during Operation Tomodachi. The pur-
pose of this article is to convey those intangibles I believe
contribute to the development of solid civil-military
relationships.
Published doctrine provides the accepted framework,
architecture, mechanisms and authorities to enable a suc-
cessful civil-military relationship. Mid-level and senior-
level military education addresses this doctrine, military
exercises familiarize and train to the doctrine, and civil-
military training emphasizes the importance of establish-
Col. James Reilly (third from left), commander of Combined Support Group – Thailand, briefs Ambassador to Thailand Ralph
Boyce and Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman on disaster response actions to date.
Courtesy Photo

directed humanitarian assistance and disaster response
security engagement exercises and seminars. These ob-
servations are based on primary and secondary relation-
ships where I was in a position to either directly contrib-
ute to or benefit from well-defined and equally beneficial
civil-military relationships.
Setting the Atmosphere. From the outset, I found
that the initiation of the civil-military team concept was
driven by the shared singularity of the mission. Add-
ing to the concept was the extended strategic view of
post disaster engagement through the identification of
second and third order effects, and their impacts to both
the affected nation’s and the U.S. and United Nation
Country Teams’ future recovery, reconstruction and
development efforts. The success of this relationship is
primarily balanced on trust, respect, engaged civilian
and military leadership, and a shared understanding
between stakeholders.
This aspect was most visible when I observed Lt. Gen.
Rusty Blackman (USMC), U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce
of Thailand, and U.S. Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe of
Indonesia set the conditions for success during Operation
Unified Assistance. Their shared vision and visibly solid
relationship directly influenced and positively impacted
the development of a cohesive civil-military team. Fur-
thermore, the vulnerability aspect of bringing together a
disparate group in a high-stress environment was dimin-
ished when everyone was treated as a key member of the
team. An appreciation for open and frank discussions led
to transparency, a greater awareness of the problem, and
was necessary to ensure a unified purpose.
Trust and Respect. This point is worth emphasiz-
ing only because it is the foundation for all relation-
ships, both personal and professional. Without trust
and respect, and an appreciation for one’s capabilities
in their chosen field, everything that follows is a wash.
The uniqueness of experience and personality should be
viewed as a strength and seen as a conduit to the develop-
ment of a strong and diverse team, not a detriment.
Having worked with both Tom Dolan, U.S. Agency
for International Development Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), and Sebastian
Rhodes Stampa, U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance, during multiple operations and
exercises in Thailand and the Philippines, I was able to
observe both gentlemen approach their relationships with
the military in a constructive, respectful and mutually
supporting fashion. Their approach went a long way to
facilitating the development of a strong and united effort
with the military task force. These two gentlemen imme-
diately established a level of trust and respect with their
military counter-parts, not only due to their extensive
experience and acknowledged credentials, but also by the
manner in which they presented themselves.
Inclusion. Inclusion is not merely providing a liaison,
but involves consistent and constant leadership engage-
ment and discussion. Establishing doctrinally correct
organizations, centers and agencies does not, in and of
itself, describe inclusion. Inclusion is the effort taken to
invite either a civilian or military person into the folds of
the team, more from a relationship-building point of view
rather than as an organizational necessity. Giving equal
say to recommend direction and decisions is the founda-
tion of teamwork and unity of effort.
While commanding 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade
during an FDR operation in the Philippines and as the J-3
Combined Task Force 536, Lt. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) Ken
Glueck was very adept at ensuring all stakeholders were
welcomed into the team. He accomplished this in a vari-
ety of ways, to include personally welcoming new mem-
bers to the team, making himself and his staff available to
everyone equally, and conducting team-building events
outside of the work environment to solidify the inclusive
nature of the ad-hoc command.
Acknowledged Authorities and Responsibilities.
USAID/OFDA is the designated U.S. federal agency to
coordinate foreign humanitarian assistance. Under this
designation, OFDA’s ability to fulfill this responsibil-
ity resides in its ‘coordinating authority’ relationship
between departments and agencies, which provides the
ability to ‘compel’ but not the authority to ‘direct.’ For the
most part, all stakeholders understand this authority and
the subsequent relationships it generates. However, dur-
ing a disaster it is easy to misinterpret compelling from
directing, and vice versa, thus creating a level of mis-
understanding that may lead to an increased separation
between a civilian and military unified effort.
Additionally, the public assumes that the military is the
default organization in charge of U.S. disaster response
Civilian and military personnel discuss Operation Unified Assistance tsunami relief
efforts in the Combined Support Group – Indonesia operations center.
Courtesy Photo

efforts. This misconception can be
explained by the very visible capabili-
ties the military possesses, the news
attention the military receives, and
the organizational structure the mili-
tary is known for. Eliminating this
misunderstanding becomes the mili-
tary’s responsibility. It is important
for external agencies to understand
the United States disaster response
authority, and for the military to
ensure that the doctrinal authorities
are not impacted by the military’s
influence.
Where I saw the civil-military
relationship truly benefit both parties
was OFDA prioritizing and validat-
ing the requests the U.S. military ex-
ecutes. This role protects the military,
while also validating OFDA as the
face of U.S. coordination efforts with
the affected nation and the inter-
national humanitarian community.
Due to the very visible presence of
the U.S. military in FDR operations,
there is a natural tendency for inde-
pendent humanitarians, local organi-
zations, and even the affected nation
to go directly to the military, primar-
ily because the military possesses the
capability to accomplish the task im-
mediately. Having a proactive OFDA
presence alleviates this pressure on
the U.S. military and allows the mili-
tary to focus solely on executing the
approved requests for assistance.
This fact was most noticeable
when 3d Marine Expeditionary
Brigade executed a FDR operation
in the Philippines in December
2004. U.S. Embassy Manila assigned
their political-military advisor to
the Philippine National Disaster
Management Agency to assist in the
prioritization of Philippine requests
for support from the military joint
task force. By the embassy’s direct
involvement with the Philippine
relief effort, they were able to convey
a realistic expectation of support,
assist in the prioritization effort,
position the Philippine Government
for recovery and reconstruction ef-
forts, while concurrently freeing the
military joint task force to execute
the requested assistance.
To paraphrase Lt. Gen. Blackman
when he served as the
commander of CSF
536: the military’s
goal is to depart the
stage while the audi-
ence is still applaud-
ing. That audience
is both the affected
nation and the U.S.
Embassy Country
Team. The objective
is for the U.S. mili-
tary to work them-
selves out of a job
while also posturing
the affected nation,
the U.S. Embassy,
and the interna-
tional humanitarian
community for future
success during the
recovery and reconstruction efforts.
A strong civil-military team will
work together to ensure that not only
are the immediate response require-
ments synchronized and aligned, but
the enduring post-disaster require-
ments are addressed also.
In conclusion, there is no cookie-
cutter approach to establishing a
solid civilian-military relationship.
Quite frankly, what works for one
set of individuals, or in one environ-
ment, may not work for another. It
all comes down to putting one’s ego
aside and recognizing that the United
States is represented by a multitude
of agencies, all experts in their field,
all oriented towards achieving the
objectives – meeting the needs and
requirements of the affected na-
tion – while simultaneously acting as
a trusted and valued partner to the
world. Our list of successful disaster
response operations far exceeds those
of our failures, with the deciding
factor being the strength of the team,
a team forged on solid leadership,
trust, respect, acknowledged roles,
and an inclusive shared vision.
U.S. Army medical personnel and staff from International Medical Corps
work together to treat victims after Haiti was devastated by an earth-
quake Jan. 12, 2010.
Courtesy Photo

LIAISON Staff
Interview with Josef Reiterer,
Civil-Military Coordination Section Chief,
United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
U
nited Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Civil-
Military Coordination Section Chief Josef
Reiterer has spent the better part of two decades working
to improve civil-military coordination. Beginning his
international career with the civil-military community in
1991, he served in Syria as a military observer and later
as a weapons inspector. He joined the UNOCHA office
in Geneva in 1999 where he led the training program on
humanitarian civil-military coordination for nearly eight
years. In June 2008, he spent the next two years with the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, also leading a
training program before returning to UNOCHA in 2010.
Since June 2013, Reiterer has spearheaded the U.N.-
system’s focal point on humanitarian civil-military
interaction in his current position in Geneva.

LIAISON: How does the Civil-Military
Coordination (CMCoord) section fit
into the overall coordination picture?
Josef Reiterer: The objective for
our section is clear: we work with
international civilian and military
organizations to bring appropri-
ate aid faster to the people in need.
Now, how our coordination work
fits into the overall coordination
landscape is a bit more difficult; in
most circumstances, a coordination
umbrella exists with the humanitar-
ian coordinator and the Humanitar-
ian Country Team. In some situa-
tions, in particular where crises do
not recognize international borders,
it becomes more complicated. I am
not saying that humanitarian civil-
military coordination becomes an
end in itself, but it takes a
different dimension when we
are trying to deconflict re-
gional military action from a
more localized humanitarian
aid system. At the local level,
we are responding in small
pockets, whereas the military
traditionally responds to the
whole region.
L: How can U.S. and for-
eign militaries best plug into
UNOCHA’s coordination
initiatives?
JR: Here, we must do much
more on our side; good
initiatives are underway. We
would wish that every nation
intending to respond with
military forces to humanitar-
ian crises participated in our
global forums on humanitarian
civil-military coordination. We do
not see nations being fully repre-
sented at this moment. This is one
area at the strategic, global level. On
the operational level, we would ask
all responding militaries buy into a
predictable interface where assistance
is prioritized based on humanitar-
ian principles and criteria. On the
tactical level, we would wish that
foreign military forces deploy with
knowledgeable civil-military liaison
officers.
L: What challenges do you see
repeatedly between civilian organi-
zations and the military in disaster
response operations?
JR: An inconsistency of ap-
proaches; this starts with adherence
to existing guidelines and policies on
humanitarian civil-military coordi-
nation, continues with the infrequent
collaboration with on-site coordi-
nation platforms, and ends with
the lessons to be learned from joint
response operations. The challenges
have changed over time: two decades
ago we were discussing if interna-
tional militaries should or should not
be involved in humanitarian work,
now we are mainly discussing how
best to coordinate with them. By de-
fault, militaries are on-site already.
L: How has the coordination envi-
ronment evolved over the course of
your career? Have there been im-
provements in specific areas?
JR: Since I joined in 1999, it has
evolved quite a bit, if not to say it
is completely different. In the 90s,
we were mobilizing military and
civil defence assets for international
disaster relief operations. From 2000
to 2010 our focus was mainly on the
coordination challenges related to so-
called integrated peacekeeping mis-
sions, and after 2010 we are involved
in access negotiations and talking
to armed, non-state actors. Just by
looking at the three major eras, it is
obvious that the skill set of a humani-
tarian civil-military coordinator was
completely different in 1999 from
the one required in 2015. In 1999
we were really emergency managers.
Now we are diplomats, mediators,
negotiators, we are focusing much
more on communication techniques
with talking to people all across the
spectrum of actors one can find in
a humanitarian crisis. And, we have
made huge improvements, in par-
ticular at the policy side, but also on
building a coordination capacity to
respond.
L: Have you seen any lessons
learned become best practices in the
UNOCHA personnel discuss humanitarian aid operations in the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination
Center in Nepal.
UNOCHA

international disaster response envi-
ronment? If so, where?
JR: Yes. I think some military forc-
es are buying into the Multi-National
Coordination Centre (MNCC) con-
cept – this is progress. This provides
us with a clear starting point when
we want to establish the dialogue
with the humanitarian international
responders and the host nation.
On communications and informa-
tion technology, many militaries
deploy with an open, unclassified sys-
tem. This helps us a lot, since we are
working with a simple virtual plat-
form to coordinate. There are many
more areas such as joint training and
exercises where we made progress
and prepare our people better to
respond jointly.
L: Are there any civ-mil challenges
that are specific to the Asia-Pacific?
JR: Speed! The Asia-Pacific is the
most disaster prone region in the
world. The more sudden an emer-
gency occurs, the faster the response
must be. In protracted humanitar-
ian crises hours do not count, in
earthquakes they do. The only way
to be fast now is training and capac-
ity building, response preparedness,
joint training, joint exercises, and
the other preparedness work of the
regional UNOCHA office and actors.
L: Do you think it is easier for the
military to plug into the humanitar-
ian structure or for humanitarians to
plug into a military structure?
JR: It won’t work. The military
has specific needs for coordination
and the humanitarians have spe-
cific needs for coordination. So one
concept, which is under develop-
ment and was now applied for the
third time in the Nepal crisis is the
Humanitarian-Military Operations
Coordination Center (HuMOCC).
It’s a concept, which bridges from the
military MNCC to the humanitarian
response operations. Maybe the way
forward is to provide a gateway - the
humanitarian-military gateway – a
concept that comes from Haiti and
Haiyan, Vanuatu, and now Nepal,
which we are trying to conceptualize,
so we can navigate from one platform
to the other without becoming one
and the same.
L: Are there any new challenges
that are emerging with the military
response to mega-disasters?
JR: Yes, there are. When I started
my work as a civil-military coordina-
tor in the 90s, I could not imagine
that 15 years later I would be sitting
on a Chinese medical ship. What I
want to say is there are new actors
responding to mega-disasters. Some
for the right reason, some out of geo-
political interest. We are not ques-
tioning any of the decision-making
processes back home leading to the
deployment of military forces, we are
dealing with the massive challenges
on-site when military forces less
trained in international disaster relief
operations hit the ground.
L: Moving forward, what would
you like to see to improve coordina-
tion?
JR: When we tour around the
world and visit our military training
and learning institutions, we still see
us – UNOCHA – teaching humani-
tarian civil-military coordination
policies and guidelines. Learning
does not happen with one speech of
an UNOCHA staff. The Oslo Guide-
lines, the Military and Civil-Defence
Assets (MCDA) Guidelines in com-
plex emergencies, the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee Reference Paper
on Civil-Military Interaction and the
Guide for the Use of Armed Escorts
must become part of the learning
curriculum of all militaries sup-
porting humanitarian action - and
preferably before and not after an
operation.

PARTNERS
C
. S. Lewis, the great British author once wrote, “True friend-
ship begins when one person says to another, `What, you
too? I thought I was the only one.’” Around the world,
when personnel involved in disaster and emergency management
domestically share experiences with others who work internation-
ally, they may experience this sentiment. I write this based on a spirit
of friendship and partnership borne from experiencing a common
problem, which transcends unique circumstances.
Emergency management personnel domestically and abroad expe-
rience many of the same challenges as they prepare and respond to
disasters. In a practical sense, individuals performing disaster re-
sponse activities speak the same language, regardless of country, pro-
gram, agency, funding source or type of disaster. In the profession
of disaster and emergency management, domestic and international
humanitarian disaster responses are frequently viewed as distinctly
separate, however, this article postulates that there are more criti-
cal similarities than differences and it behooves all of us to learn and
share information, build and foster relationships with international
partners, and recognize we may be able to improve outcomes for
disaster relief victims and responders.
In recent months, two events have reinforced my belief that
domestic and international disaster work are similar, have applica-
bility to each other and are not mutually exclusive. The first was a
presentation I attended at the Civil-Military Interaction Workshop,
organized by the Australian Civil-Military Centre and hosted by the
By Kenneth Tingman, Retired Federal
Coordinating Officer, Pacific Area Office,
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Malaysia Peacekeeping Centre. One of the speakers was
a Malaysian Army physician, Lt. Col. Mohd Arshil. Lt.
Col. Arshil spoke about his disaster experiences, which
included the Indian Ocean Tsunami, United Nations
missions in East Africa and East Timor, the International
Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, as well
as domestic disasters in Malaysia. He spoke passionately,
intelligently and universally, drawing no distinctions
between his disaster work at home and his disaster work
abroad. On the contrary, his emphasis was the common
experiences in all of his work. Specifically, he shared that
most of the medical work and many of the cultural chal-
lenges were the same for him at home and abroad. I had
never heard anyone talk so seamlessly about domestic
and international disaster response.
The second event was the 2015 International Tsunami
Symposium, “Making the Pacific Ready for the Tsunami
Threat” at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA) Headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Ha-
waii. Laura Furigone, NOAA deputy assistant adminis-
trator for Weather Services and deputy director, National
Weather Service, spoke about the United States domestic
program known as NOAA’s Weather Ready Nation. The
program addresses building community resilience in the
face of increasing vulnerability to extreme weather and
water events. She highlighted that she intended to take
this program global and include other nations.
I was again energized at the prospect of a domestic
disaster program being modelled for use internationally;
that a domestic disaster program could have applicability
beyond the borders of one country and be used to help
equip disaster responses internationally.
In the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility
(AOR) international disasters occur on a frequent basis.
In addition, there are a number of significant condi-
tions that all disaster responders must meet head on
and eventually overcome in the AOR to be successful. I
would offer that in the Pacific there are more commonali-
ties based on the unique AOR than there are differences
based on domestic policies. For example: the “tyranny
of distance”; logistics; Pacific Island Nations (the insular
nature); culture considerations; language considerations;
unique military perspective; unique sheltering; host na-
tion fatigue; unity of effort; lead federal agency; disaster
declaration process; and employment of the humanitar-
ian principles. As the Federal Emergency Management
Agency federal coordinating officer (FCO) in the Pacific
Area Office from 2007 – 2010, I faced many of these chal-
lenges. In 2009, the earthquake and tsunami that struck
American Samoa was my last disaster as an FCO.
The earthquake and tsunami struck early in the morn-
ing of September 29, 2009 and wrapped around the main
island of Tutuila. Thirty-five people were killed, with
hundreds injured; 2,750 houses damaged; 275 houses
and 28 rental units destroyed; four schools substantially
damaged; one school destroyed; and the Satala Power
Plant was substantially damaged and inoperative. I be-
lieve the disaster response to the earthquake and tsunami
in American Samoa has applicability to future disaster
responses in the Pacific and I offer the following observa-
tions.
Disaster Declarations and Leadership
The “tyranny of distance” will complicate disaster re-
sponses in the Pacific, both domestically and internation-
ally. As a result, the Solomon Islands include a discussion
on the tyranny of distance in their domestic disaster
response planning. One of the best ways to mitigate the
tyranny of distance is to ensure that a disaster declara-
tion is granted as quickly as possible. A timely declaration
will energize personnel, funding and outside assistance,
but without this first step all other steps are delayed. It
is incumbent upon government personnel at all levels to
be familiar with the thresholds and processes required
to request a disaster declaration from either regional or
national leadership.
In response to the earthquake and tsunami in American
Samoa, we were able to get a Presidential Disaster Decla-

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