Research paper composed by Leo Rassieur with the mentorship of Gokh Alshaif at the University of California, Santa Barbara

1. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
The New Cold War: The United States’ Political, Economic, and Strategic Options for
Containing Russian Military Aggression in Eastern Europe
Leo Rassieur,1
Gokh Alshaif,2
1
Cupertino High School, 10100 Finch Avenue, Cupertino, CA 95014, USA
e-mail address: leorassieur@gmail.com
2
Department of Global and International Studies, UC Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
In 2014, Russia illegally annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, causing Ukraine to seek greater military
aid from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. This event, along with others preceding it,
has led regional experts to believe that tensions between the two Cold War-era adversaries—NATO and
Russia—may reach a breaking point within the next decade. Additionally, experts have argued that Russia’s
instigation of conflict in eastern Ukraine further demonstrates a desire to fragment the liberal democratic
world order. Multiple issues factor into the roles of NATO and Russia in the conflict—hegemonic
competition, national security, and domestic political support. Through reviewing academic literature,
policymakers’ statements, and news media, I attempt to understand the behavior of the actors involved in the
ongoing geopolitical confrontation between Russia and NATO. To resolve the conflict, this paper outlines
several options the United States has to contain Russian aggression and prevent global warfare.
Keywords: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, United States, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Cold War
I. INTRODUCTION
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many
Western nations hoped that the influence of its successor
state, Russia, would fade, allowing for a new world order
dominated by a single superpower—the United States.
Although most scholars would agree that we live in a
unipolar world, several critical assumptions in post-Cold
War triumphalism have now been disproven. Rather than
aligning with the European Union (EU) and NATO, many
Soviet-era satellite states and republics, such as Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, continue to look to Russia
as an economic and military partner.1
Ukraine, the epicenter
of the ongoing geopolitical competition between NATO and
Russia, best demonstrates the profound divide between the
two powers’ interests in the region.
Post-communist politics in Ukraine primarily center
around its conflicting reliance on Russian investment and
desire for Western economic and political assistance. This
schism has led to tremendous political instability in the
country, culminating in a pro-Europe coup d’état February
2014 in Kiev, the nation’s capital.2
Russia responded by
launching operations to annex the southern territory of
Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014 and instigate violent
pro-Russia protests in the southeast in April,3
the beginning
of the current civil war.
Moreover, conventional strategies used by the West—
military encroachment and economic isolation—have
produced unforeseen ramifications. Due in part to EU and
U.S. sanctions beginning in March of 2014,4
Russia turned
to China for economic partnership, inadvertently bolstering
another of the U.S.’s strategic adversaries.5
NATO’s troop
movements into the Baltic states have been met by
reciprocation from Russia, heightening the need for peace
negotiations before conflict inevitably erupts.
Through my research, I aim to uncover the historical
foundations of the conflict between NATO and Russia. I
begin by examining relevant literature to see what factors
motivate Russian foreign policy. I then track the
development of the conflict over time. In the following
section, I analyze the perspectives of each actor involved and
use their motivations to understand how to create a peaceful
resolution to the conflict. Thereafter, I outline the previously
proposed peace agreements, particularly the Minsk Protocol
and Minsk II. Then, I focus on the United States’s role as
Europe’s strongest ally in limiting Russian influence and
preventing conflict. Finally, I identify several strategies the
United States can implement to achieve its goals in the
region—conflict resolution, deterrence of Russian
aggression, and geopolitical dominance.
By examining the conflict through multiple lenses and
perspectives, I hope to challenge the unsuccessful
components of Russia-United States relations and adopt a
worldview that is consistent with the rapidly shifting global
political landscape. By adopting Russia’s viewpoint as a
rational actor, I will limit the potential for adverse
consequences from the policy options I outline. This will
ensure that my solutions are more effective than those
previously attempted in establishing peace and
accomplishing American foreign policy objectives.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Most authors on the subject of West-Russia relations
agree that the dominant motivating factor for Russia’s
military intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and beyond
is the desire to rebuild the historic Russian empire of the
Romanov (pre-1917) and Soviet eras. Ukrainian and Russian
historian Serhy Yekelchyk argues that a negative view of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and thus of the loss of ‘great

2. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
power’ status is at the core of post-Cold War Russian foreign
policy.6
Historian Richard Sakwa agrees with this
assessment, although he adds that the ‘anti-Russianism’ of
NATO and EU after 1991 also contributed to Russian
leadership’s antagonism toward the West.7
Sten Rynning, a
Research Fellow with the Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute, alleges that Russia’s moves against the West were
never improvised—rather, they were deeply rooted in the
nation’s imperial legacy as the dominant Eurasian power.8
Examining this idea, Dr. Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova
concludes that, in ignoring Russia’s tendency toward empire,
NATO and the EU inadvertently instigated Russian
aggression by ‘squeezing’ Russia out of its ties with key
Soviet-era allies. She additionally asserts that any U.S.
military action in Ukraine would escalate the conflict, as
Ukraine’s status as a buffer against NATO is a linchpin in
the Russian national security mission.9
Other sources highlight Russian security needs as a
driving rather than secondary factor in its reaction to the
Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. Political scientist Dr.
Agnia Grigas identifies the importance of reclaiming the
Russian diaspora to Russian President Putin, as the territory
and population of Crimea and east Ukraine are crucial to
countering NATO’s absorption of the Baltics, which are now
no longer ‘buffer zones’ for Moscow. Another important
facet Dr. Grigas analyzes is President Putin’s domestic
support, his military ambitions a successful attempt to revive
Russian nationalism and bolster his declining public
approval out of fear that the trend of movements demanding
regime change in the post-Soviet space could reach
Moscow.10
Contributing to this perspective, Professor
Elizabeth A. Wood suggests that the narrative of defending
‘Russian compatriots’ on Russia’s doorstep serves as Putin’s
backdrop for political crackdowns and shifts attention away
from domestic concerns. 11
However, Wood believes that,
despite the numerous political and strategic incentives for
Putin, the conflict was largely precipitated by economic
rivalry.
From a practical standpoint, duty-free EU trade with
Ukraine would circumvent Russian tariffs on European
goods meant to strengthen its Eurasian economic hub.
Perhaps more importantly, however, is Putin’s unwillingness
to relinquish Ukraine as a Russian economic satellite despite
the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution replaced a non-aligned
president with one who was overtly pro-West.12
Another
economic influence emphasized by authors J.L. Black and
Michael Johns is the West’s 2014 decision to sanction
Russia, which ‘hardened’ Moscow’s position by eliminating
economic ties.13
Dr. Grigas agrees that the Russia-EU
economic battle rewarded Putin’s military actions, but
ultimately disagrees with Black, Johns, and Wood,
contending that the failure of the sanctions to halt Russian
aggression disproves the idea that economic pressures
affected Putin’s decision-making in 2014.14
In recognizing the four central aspects of Russia’s
motivations in Eastern Europe—its imperial legacy, strategic
considerations, Putin’s popular support, and economic
relations—this paper seeks to clarify Russia’s foreign policy
objectives and thus propose options for resolution that ensure
the conflict’s key actor is compliant.
III. TIMELINE OF CONFLICT
DEVELOPMENT
2013
After decades of transition out of the Soviet system into
neoliberalism, Ukraine experiences its first violent anti-
government protests this year. Rather than immediate
transformation into a wealthy Western nation, the
introduction of capitalism to Ukraine led to massive state
corruption and lower quality of life—between 1991 and
2013, the national population decreases from 52 to 44
million,15
a decline greater than 15%. During the same time
period, the globe as a whole sees a population increase of
over 33%.16
Russophones and ethnic Russians looked to
Ukraine’s Westernization as the source of its economic woes
while pro-Europeans saw them as a sign of Russia
constraining Ukraine’s EU economic opportunities.
On November 21, President Viktor Yanukovych
suspends seven-year talks on the landmark EU Association
Agreement over backlash from Russia,17
whose 30%
discount on natural gas and investment are crucial for
Ukraine’s struggling economy.18
Yanukovych’s government
had tried courting both the EU and Russia, but the EU forces
a decision between the Association Agreement and the
Russian Commonwealth Free Trade Area. As a result, mass
pro-Europe protests take place in the historic Maidan
Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), an event dubbed the
Euromaidan, which triggers the current Ukraine crisis. Amid
calls for the government to resign, both the West and Russia
mobilize to secure the future of Ukrainian politics. In
December, representatives from Germany, the EU, and the
U.S. travel to Kiev, communicating an overall pro-
Euromaidan message. President Yanukovych speaks with
opposition leaders, while on December 17 President Putin
announces another 30% natural gas discount and the
purchasing of Ukrainian government bonds, signaling
solidarity with Yanukovych.19
2014
In January, the Parliament of Ukraine, or Rada, begins
cracking down on freedom of speech and assembly while
hundreds of thousands of protestors engage in street violence
against the government, leading to the first few fatalities.20
After tens of deaths in February, France, Germany, Poland,
and Russia oversee a truce agreement between the
government and the opposition; this is quickly rejected by
Maidan protesters despite being signed by opposition
leaders.21
One day later on February 22, President
Yanukovych flees Kiev to the pro-Russia southeast for his
personal safety.22
This coup triggers an immediate response
from Russia, which sees the possibility of a West-aligned

3. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
Ukraine on its border as unthinkable for its national security.
On February 27, Russia begins covertly moving soldiers to
seize government and transit buildings in Crimea. Russian
operatives prompt the Crimean legislature to implement a
referendum to declare independence from Ukraine and join
Russia, which on March 16 allegedly passes with 97% in
favor with 83% turnout23
—although European observers are
skeptical of these values, the success of the referendum was
all but guaranteed by the locals largely being ethnic Russians
and Russophones.
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly votes in
March to condemn the Russian annexation of Crimea, and
the West begins implementing economic and diplomatic
sanctions on Russia, which are met by counter-sanctions.
Despite this, President Putin’s approval jumps to a record
83% due to national pride after the victory in Crimea and
China’s $400 billion energy deal with Russia helping ease
the effects of low oil prices on its economy.24
In the same
month, pro-Russian rebels organize independence referenda
in Luhansk and Donetsk, two Russia-aligned oblasts
(provinces) in eastern Ukraine collectively called the
Donbass. May sees the referenda pass and the election of
pro-West President Petro Poroshenko in Kiev, concluding
the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution.25
Ceasefires are attempted in
June and September, the latter of which being the Minsk
Protocol (see below), but both fail before one month’s time.
Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 crashes in the Donetsk Oblast
in July, killing the 298 on board. Both sides of the conflict
blame each other for the crash.26
The fighting in the Donbass
between Kiev and the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s
Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is
ongoing at the end of the year.
2015
The West and Russia continue to deliver humanitarian
aid to their allies in Ukraine. On February 12, France,
Germany, Russia, and Kiev sign Minsk II (see below),
aiming to withdraw troops and plan local elections in the
Donbass.27
By March, Putin openly admits to plotting the
annexation of Crimea as Kiev begins to waver in its
withdrawal agreement, citing continued separatist activity.28
The EU and Russia extend their prior sanctions in June,
justifying this move as conditioning for the success of Minsk
II and reciprocity respectively.29
By August, over 6,500
casualties have been reported30
in the now-sporadic conflict
and President Poroshenko’s constitutional amendments to
give the Donbass special status pass the first round of
approval in the Rada, leading to three deaths in the ensuing
violent protests.
In September, NATO establishes military command
posts in Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria,
and Russia develops a base near its border.31
At this point
Minsk II looks to be effective at mitigating the scale of the
conflict, although withdrawal of military presence has not
fully occurred. Kiev continues to request weaponry from
NATO, but only technical assistance with military
organization and countering Russian propaganda is
provided. In October, the Dutch Safety Board publishes a
report attributing the crash of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17
to a Buk missile fired from the pro-Russian east.32
Kiev
withdraws the first small weapons, but by December the
conflict sees minor escalation and economic ties between
Russia and Kiev deteriorate.33
2016
In February President Poroshenko announces a troop
buildup on the border with Crimea, signaling his intent to
retake the territory from Russia. Talks in Paris during March
fail to see either side commit to Minsk II, with a key area of
contention being local elections in the separatist regions; a
NATO-Russia Council meeting in April again fails to reach
any agreement.34
However, a meeting on April 29 between
Russia, Ukraine, and representatives from the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) succeeds in
having both parties agree to a ceasefire starting on Easter.35
Despite this, the fighting in the Donbass continues almost
immediately following the announcement of the peace
agreement.36
An announcement from the speaker of the Rada in June
states that Ukraine is fully committed to joining NATO.37
The EU unanimously agrees extends its sanctions on Russia
in June until January 2017, although Italy, Greece, and
Hungary question their effectiveness in changing Russian
policy in Ukraine.38
An August UN report concludes that
both sides continue to use heavy artillery, in violation of the
ceasefire agreements.39
Peace seems more attainable in
September, as President Poroshenko takes steps to pass
constitutional amendments through the Rada to grant
autonomy to eastern Ukraine and the head of state of the
DPR, announces a unilateral ceasefire in support of the
Minsk agreements. France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine
meet again in October, making minimal progress.40
The
election of President Donald Trump in the U.S. on
November 8 produces concern in Kiev, which had
previously relied on the Obama administration’s hardline
stance on Russia; Trump, meanwhile, had made several pro-
Russia statements during his presidential campaign. The EU
again extends sanctions on Russia for six months in
December.41
2017
President Poroshenko in February plans a referendum
for Ukraine joining NATO, which looks to succeed as
violence in the east sees an uptick.42
Later in the month,
President Putin issues a decree recognizing passports from
the LPR and DPR.43
In March, Poroshenko halts all freight
transit between the government-controlled Ukraine and the
separatists, aiming to punish their seizure of Ukrainian
businesses in the region.44
As the conflict currently stands in
mid-2017, the West and Russia are still at an impasse.
Economic ties between the two continue to fragment,

4. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
harming each nation involved, while covert military buildup
continues.
IV. ACTORS’ PERSPECTIVES
1. NATO—Central and Western Europe
NATO member states in Central and Western Europe,
most notably France and Germany, are most interested in
supporting Ukraine’s transition into a Western economic
power, establishing peace in Ukraine, and upholding
international law on state sovereignty.
For NATO’s most powerful leaders, Germany’s
Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s President
Emmanuel Macron, reconciliation with Russia is unlikely to
be possible in the near future. Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s
sovereignty in Crimea and the Donbass, as outlined in the
1975 Helsinki Final Act signed by the U.S., most of Europe,
and the Soviet Union,45
indicates a blatant disrespect for
Western liberal norms. Moreover, Putin’s repeated
deceptions regarding the extent of Russian interference in
Western elections and in Ukraine makes it unlikely Merkel
will have the goodwill to concede any Ukrainian territory.46
Strategically, Russia does not pose a credible threat to
nations in Central and Western Europe due to its moderately
weak military and the buffer zone of Eastern Europe between
the two.47
Indeed, a purpose of NATO expansion westward was
making the threat of a Russian attack both less likely and less
effective. By limiting Russian influence in Eastern Europe,
European leadership hopes to expand international trade and
strengthen the global economy, and ultimately spread the
Western democratic system of government. This grand
vision begins with Ukraine integrating with the EU and
cutting off economic ties with Russia, a goal made more
likely to succeed by the European funding of Kiev.
Continued missions to train the Ukrainian military makes it
clear that Merkel and Macron are unwilling to surrender
eastern Ukraine to Putin.48
A contributing factor in this is the considerable time
spent by Germany and France in fostering the Minsk
agreements; their failure would reflect poorly in the eyes of
the European public. For these nations, a diplomatic victory
with Russia to resume EU expansion and uphold
international law on sovereignty would be the ideal
resolution to the conflict, codifying the role of Europe as the
center of the international community.
2. NATO—Eastern Europe
NATO member states in Eastern Europe, most notably
the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Poland, are most
interested in avoiding conflict with Russia and maintaining
NATO’s defense credibility.
Unlike the other NATO member states, Eastern Europe
perceives Russia as a credible and dangerous security threat.
In the case of conflict escalation, the Baltics, where the U.S.
and Germany have positioned a substantial number of
troops, would see the most conflict. Another scenario, in
which Ukraine were to become a pawn of Russia over the
course of years of EU withdrawal, would allow Russia to
place troops on Poland’s border. Both circumstances
represent an unacceptable existential threat to Eastern
Europe. As such, these nations are reliant on assistance from
the U.S., Germany, France, and others in maintaining
NATO’s defense spending and resisting Russia.
Worse yet is the possibility that Putin will circumvent
Western authorities by using covert tools against Eastern
Europe, as it did in Ukraine. Cyberattacks, targeting of the
sizeable Russian ethnic minorities49
in these post-Soviet
states through the media and sending paramilitary operatives
to seize government buildings or initiate referenda are all
grave concerns for the leaders of the Baltics—Estonia’s and
Latvia’s populations are 30% and 34% Russian-speaking,
respectively.50
The likelihood of these dangers was amplified
by the Russian abduction of an Estonian counterintelligence
officer in September 2014, who Moscow claimed was
planning espionage. Through strengthening NATO’s troop
presence in these countries and punishing Russia for illegal
intervention in Ukraine, Eastern Europe hopes that the
Ukraine crisis will not become the first in a series of Russian
destabilization operations in NATO member states.51
3. NATO—United States
The U.S., as a member of NATO, is most interested in
keeping open opportunities for future collaboration with
Russia in Syria and beyond and establishing peace in
Ukraine.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 made
Russo-American relations significantly more complex.
During the détente between the West and post-Soviet states
in the 1990s, the U.S. perceived Russia as no longer being a
strategic threat to its status as a global superpower, and
nuclear warfare remained unlikely due to mutually assured
destruction. However, Russia’s apparent unwillingness to
cede its imperial past has again made the country a focal
point in American politics. Under the Obama Administration
between 2009 and 2017, a policy of containment was
implemented which saw little potential for cooperation with
President Putin; by moving troops into NATO’s eastern
border in the Baltics and levying sanctions, Obama’s Russia
policy demonstrated agreement with Europe. Critics point to
the failed negotiations with Russia over the Syrian Civil War
as evidence that the Obama Administration was nonetheless
distracted by the potential for cooperation, precluding a
credible hardline stance in Ukraine.52
The Trump Administration has opened new dialogues
for collaboration with President Putin in both Syria and
Ukraine. Although Trump’s campaign promise of
‘friendliness’ with Russia was largely shattered by the
reinstatement of Obama-era sanctions and missile launches
against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a longtime ally of
Putin, current Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stated that
the Minsk agreements should not be a burden to Ukraine

5. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
negotiations. This sudden departure from NATO’s insistence
on the implementation of Minsk reveals Trump’s greater
foreign policy vision—to reset relations with Russia and
become independent from the current European unity against
Russia.53
Unfortunately for Trump, this vision has been
weakened by legislation passed by Congress on July 25,
2017 containing new sanctions on Russia and preventing
Trump from lifting them.54
The U.S.’ European allies are doubly concerned by
Trump’s threat to disengage from NATO, another keystone
promise in his 2016 presidential campaign. This split from
decades of American coalition-building is based on the
failure of weaker NATO states to contribute to defense
spending, and Trump’s desire to disengage from
international organizations and efforts. In May 2017,
however, American foreign policy representatives have
asserted their commitment to the common defense principle
of NATO.55
Undoubtedly, European leaders such as
Germany’s Merkel are troubled by the U.S.’ simultaneous
courting of Russia and of NATO.
This seeming contradiction exposes Trump’s belief that
trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Europe, and Russia
is both possible and crucial for accomplishing America’s
mission in Ukraine. In line with international withdrawal,
ceding the Donbass and Crimea to Russia is a possibility for
the Trump Administration, particularly if it would allow a
victorious collaborative effort in Syria. These two
accomplishments would bolster Trump’s ideal image as a
political outsider who will erase years of failed, archaic
foreign policy by bureaucrats in Washington and forge a new
international order with the U.S. and Russia as allies. The
two critical assumptions underpinning this worldview are
that eastern Ukraine is unimportant strategically for the
U.S.56
and that NATO is not critical to the future of Russo-
American relations.57
4. Ukraine—Government (Kiev)
The Kiev-based government of Ukraine is most
interested in retaining political influence in Crimea and the
Donbass, avoiding military escalation with Russia, and
integrating with the EU and NATO.
President Poroshenko faces substantial pressure from
constituents to accelerate integration with the EU and assist
the nation’s troubled economy. The faults in the Ukrainian
economy go beyond endemic corruption; the severance of
freight transit and financial cooperation between the west
and the separatist east has severely disrupted domestic
production. The economic damage is expected to cost tens of
thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in 2017.58
This
would hamper the country’s chances of acceding to the EU,
which is still in the stage of assisting with economic reforms
in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the civil war still prevents outright
joining the EU, as the organization will not admit a nation
with a territorial dispute.
In order to achieve long-term economic growth, Kiev
needs to make peace with the separatists and Russia, and
move towards the reforms that the EU and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have proposed. Resumed economic
interaction between the east and west will help to ease
economic stability as well. To accomplish this, Kiev seeks to
grant the Donbass and Crimea greater autonomy,
recognizing that a return to 2013 is unrealistic. Kiev
perceives Russian control of these territories as violations
that should not go unpunished; otherwise, this would set an
unfortunate precedent for the sovereignty of the country and
its Eastern European neighbors in the future. By courting the
U.S.’ President Trump, Poroshenko hopes that he does not
consider a direct deal with Putin to exchange east Ukraine
for cooperation on Syria, for instance.59
5. Ukraine—Separatists (Donbass)
The Donbass separatists in Ukraine are most interested
in integrating with Russia, political independence from Kiev,
and avoiding military escalation with NATO.
The motives for the insurgents in the Donbass and the
voters in Crimea to seek reunion with Russia are both
cultural and historical. In 1954, the Presidium of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved a motion to
transfer control of Crimea from the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic. At the time, Soviet leaders assumed that
the Soviet Union would never fall, making the transfer of
Crimea, with a 75% ethnic Russian majority, simply a matter
of proximity and goodwill to the Ukrainian leadership. This
territory transfer, however, laid the ground for the pro-
Russian separatists’ feelings of cultural divide.60
The Donbass is home to Ukraine’s most influential
oligarchs—artifacts of the post-Soviet republic’s graceless
fall into capitalism—and sorely lacks a modernized
economy.61
The conflict has led to the displacement of over
one million citizens, with many others lacking access to
food, water, and educational and vocational opportunities.62
The hope for the leaders of the DPR and LPR is to end the
conflict as soon as possible to allow humanitarian aid access
while also retaining autonomy from Kiev. Reunion with
Ukraine would, moreover, allow Donbass citizens to have a
meaningful voice in the Rada and help restore Ukrainian
economic ties with Russia to their 2013 state. However, the
ideal resolution is to join Russia, as the separatists most
identify with Russian culture and their history as a part of the
greater Russian empire, both Romanov and Soviet.
6. Russia
Russia is most interested in retaining jurisdiction over
Crimea, establishing the Donbass as a buffer zone with
NATO, preventing Ukrainian integration with the EU and
NATO, and avoiding military escalation with NATO.
Russia’s foreign policy is dictated by President Vladimir
Putin, who faces an election in 2018.63
The upcoming
election has seemingly pushed Putin to revive Russian
nationalism with a state media-run narrative of defending
Russian compatriots in Ukraine, who are allegedly under

6. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
attack by Ukrainian nationalists at the state level. This
campaign bolsters Putin’s approval among Russians,
encouraging him to either prolong the conflict or seek a
resolution where Russia retains control of some or all of the
separatist Ukrainian territories.64
Past 2018, Putin has a much larger objective for his
Ukrainian policy. Taking back the territories of the previous
Russian sphere of influence and intimidating Russia’s
western neighbors into economic cooperation accomplish
several goals in Putin’s eyes. The Russian nation-state has
historically desired regional hegemon status, which is being
denied by NATO and the EU’s anti-Russia expansion
mission. Secondly, strengthening Russia’s now-weak
economy through trade and investment and Putin’s Eurasian
Customs Union will dramatically improve the lives of
Russians and fund its government. This is critical for the
sustainable growth of Russian defense spending, a tool Putin
needs to maintain a credible strategic threat against NATO
member states. In addition, stronger domestic support for
Putin’s foreign policy would further guarantee his reelection
bid passing without protest.
Currently, however, an invasion and occupation of
western Ukraine would expend too much of Moscow’s
economic and human capital to be tenable.65
With a new
opportunity in President Trump, Putin will likely attempt to
negotiate surrender of part of Ukraine back to Kiev in return
for lifting of sanctions and U.S. collaboration elsewhere,
such as in Syria. Alternatively, Putin can reduce support for
Syria’s President Assad in order to procure Trump’s
recognition of Russia’s jurisdiction over Crimea and the
Donbass. Such a scenario is tantalizing for Putin, as a splinter
between Europe and the U.S. would destroy the Western
monopoly on control of international conflicts. An emerging
multipolar world, Putin hopes, involves Russia just as much
as it does Germany or China. The autonomy of Crimea and
the Donbass also serves key strategic interests. Positioning
the Russian Navy in the waters near Crimea and having a
porous border between the Donbass and Russia will serve to
coerce Ukraine into preferring Russia and the EU equally
economically, if not Russia first.66
V. PREVIOUSLY ATTEMPTED
.PEACE FRAMEWORKS
1. Minsk Protocol
The first robust ceasefire agreement, the Minsk
Protocol, is signed by Kiev, the DPR, the LPR, Russia, and
a Swiss observer from the OSCE on September 5, 2014. The
critical points of the agreement are as follows:67
1. A full and immediate ceasefire to be reviewed by the
OSCE;
2. Implement legislation for decentralization of power
3. OSCE monitoring and securing of the Ukraine-Russia
border;
4. Progress toward normalizing relations between Kiev
and the separatists (exchange of detainees, amnesty for
combatants, humanitarian aid, and recovery of
economic activity in the Donbass);
5. Early local elections in particular districts of the
Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
6. Facilitation of an ‘inclusive national dialogue;’
7. Dismantling of illegal military groups.
The implementation of Minsk I failed within a matter of
days as violence simply continued after September 5.
Combat resumed full-scale by early October. Moscow’s
delivery of humanitarian aid was believed by Kiev to
actually be a shipment of heavy weaponry, a violation of the
agreement, highlighting the lack of accountability and severe
distrust between the negotiating parties.68
2. Minsk II
Following the almost immediate collapse of Minsk I in
September 2014, Minsk II is signed on February 12, 2015 by
Kiev, the DPR, the LPR, Russia, France, and Germany. The
critical points of the agreement are as follows:69
1. A full and immediate ceasefire in particular districts of
the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
2. Withdrawal of heavy weaponry (i.e. artillery) from the
line of conflict;
3. A dialogue on local elections in particular districts in
the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts based on Ukrainian
law;
4. Demarcation by the Ukrainian Rada of which territories
in the Donbass attain special self-governance status;
5. Progress toward normalizing relations between Kiev
and the separatists (exchange of detainees, access to
humanitarian aid, amnesty for combatants, and
cooperation on financial systems);
6. Granting full control of the national border to Kiev
following the local elections and by the end of 2015;
7. Pullout of all foreign troops and arms;
8. Dismantling of illegal military groups;
9. Constitutional and legislative reform to grant special
status to particular districts of the Luhansk and Donetsk
Oblasts.
Minsk II was substantially more effective than its
predecessor, leading to a moderate reduction in fighting for
several months. This was largely due to it being brokered by
Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s
President François Hollande. However, tensions have been
exacerbated by the question of local elections, which Kiev
perceive as a threat to its territorial integrity. However, the
greater concern for peace prospects is that the end of the
conflict remains opposed to Russian political and security
interests. Territorial disputes in Ukraine prevent accession to
the EU and NATO’s desire to partner with it, both victories
for Moscow.70
Russia’s responsibilities in upholding Minsk II have
been made conditions by the West for lifting sanctions.
However, the unilateral nature of the sanctions all but
guaranteed their failure. Intended to isolate Russia from
international business, they only encouraged non-Western

7. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
nations and organizations, such as China, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, and BRICS, to take advantage of
new trade and investment opportunities with Russia.71
Furthermore, the effect of the sanctions was minimal enough
to be ignored in the face of Putin’s broader geopolitical goals
in Ukraine, as low oil prices likely played a bigger role in the
Russian economic crisis than a reduction in trade swiftly
offset by Putin’s allies in Asia.72
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
Potential objectives for U.S. foreign policy regarding
the conflict in Ukraine are as follows:
1. A permanent end to the violence in the Donbass;
2. The strengthening of economic and political alliances
with European nations;
3. Russian cooperation on international conflicts;
4. Intervention on behalf of international law;
5. Prevention of future security crises in Eastern Europe.
Policy options for U.S. intervention in the conflict in
Ukraine are as follows:
1. Negotiate with President Putin, President Poroshenko,
and European leaders to fully implement Minsk II.
President Trump’s involvement in negotiations will
increase accountability on both sides, just as Merkel and
Hollande’s involvement in the original February 2015
process improved on Minsk I. Poroshenko will be
pressured by the U.S. to uphold the agreement or face a
decrease in Western support. Likewise, Putin will likely
see Trump’s commitment as a display of goodwill, and
take the opportunity to deescalate the conflict once
additional concessions are made to the separatist
territories, such as greater autonomy or surrender of
Crimea. This is the lowest-risk course to maintain strong
diplomatic ties to both Europe and Russia. The
probability for future conflict would be low as the
reintegration of the pro-Russians into Ukraine would
give Putin the political and strategic buffer he needs in
Ukraine. This is the recommended course of action, as
it is the only one which lacks the potential for immediate
negative consequences if it fails. The other two courses
of action described below should be attempted if this
strategy consistently fails.
2. Negotiate with President Putin to cede the Donbass in
return for his cooperation in Syria and/or elsewhere.
Once Poroshenko stops receiving aid from the U.S., he
and his Western backers would inevitably be forced to
retreat from the separatist-held regions. Putin would
likely accept this bargain, as the cost of funding the
separatists is taking a toll on the Russia government.
The ideal exchange would involve Russia no longer
supporting the Assad regime in Syria; sharing military
intelligence in the fight against the Islamic State is still
unlikely to occur. EU leaders will no longer view the
U.S. as a reliable ally against Putin, although American
contributions to NATO are likely too significant to
ignore when Trump next asks for assistance. This
negotiation has the potential to backfire if Putin
backtracks on his promise to align with American
interests in Syria. This course of action is currently
unlikely to be taken by Trump due to his involvement in
the ongoing Russian election meddling scandal.
3. Deploy U.S. Marines to reclaim the Donbass from the
pro-Russia separatists. The humanitarian crisis in the
Donbass will likely motivate the rebels to surrender
once troops arrive. Regardless of whether the separatists
surrender, this will result in a decisive victory for the
U.S., reassuring its allies in Europe. President Putin will
reject cooperation in Syria and continue to turn to China
as an economic ally. Furthermore, Kiev will exhaust its
economic resources rebuilding the Donbass following
its reclamation, particularly if the war is prolonged.
Granting the Donbass autonomy will be necessary to
prevent a resurgence of protests, but their new
representation in the Rada will limit Ukraine’s
integration with the West. Russia will perceive the U.S.
troops presence on its border as a grave security threat;
Putin will not retaliate due to U.S. possession of nuclear
warheads, but may instead move troops to the border,
committing to a new Cold War, potentially recreating
the conditions for another proxy conflict to occur. For
these reasons, this conflict resolution option is not
highly recommended except as a last resort.
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. is now at a crossroads; President Trump must
choose between upholding the status quo of Western
solidarity against Russian aggression, or a multipolar world
in which the U.S. may withdraw from its role as a
superpower, allowing Russia and China to fortify their
spheres of influences in Eurasia. It is clear that the current
situation will result in thousands of more lives lost and
continuing damage to the economies of Ukraine and Russia.
Moving beyond Ukraine to prioritize defeating the Islamic
State is yet another reason to swiftly take action to end the
civil war. The burden on the Trump Administration is
unenviable: the way in which the U.S. answers the questions
at the heart of the Ukraine crisis will define the international
order for decades to come.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my mentor, Gokh Alshaif, for
giving me direction in my research and encouraging my
progress. I additionally thank Dr. Lina Kim for giving me the
opportunity to conduct this research and pursue my academic
goals. I thank Zach Rentz for his helpful feedback on my
work. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends
for supporting my interest in international relations and
political science and being positive influences in my life.

8. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
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