Foredraget fokuserer på hva som er god risikokommunikasjon og hvordan resultater fra en risikoanalyse brukes i risikostyring og beslutningsprosesser. Et case med involvering av ulike aktører i beslutningsprosessen for utbygging av et farlig anlegg presenteres.
English: Risk communication and how results from a quantitative risk analysis is used in the risk management process and decision-making is presented in this lecture. A case study where different stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process of developing a plant that handles hazardous material is presented.
1. Societal Security – Risk
communication – Dialogues on risk
issues
Professor Jørn Vatn, NTNU
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2. Topic for reflection
Does a true objective risk exist?
Under which conditions does it make sense to introduce the
concept of a true objective risk?
Is the main objective of risk communication to contribute
to making perceived risk equal to the true objective risk?
How could decisions be made in a societal security
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context with a basis in
An objective risk picture
A perceived risk picture
that are not consistent?
3. The challenge of the idea of a true risk picture
The idea of a true risk picture, will in most cases lead to a
discussion on what is the uncertainty in the risk analysis
“We do not believe in numbers”
In contrast to “numbers are used to express uncertainty related to
our concerns”
Adding “uncertainty” to the risk in the meaning that we do
not believe in the analysis, is extremely difficult in risk
communication
A more direct approach where focus is uncertainty
regarding whether accident will happen, and how serious
they are is reccomeded
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4. Risk communication - Dialogue processes
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Main objective
Obtain concerns regarding the analysis object among
stakeholders
Structure this wrt
Dimensions to take into account in the risk analysis
Factors to take into account in the risk analysis
Present the risk picture such that the main concerns are reflected
in the risk picture (established by accepted risk analysis methods),
and presented in an understandable manner
5. 4 domains as a basis for risk definition
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Real world domain
Observables such as number of gas leakages next year
Scientific cause and effect domain
What is the relation between the observables, which theories
exists?
We do not claim to possess true knowledge in this domain
Uncertainty domain (we do not know with certainty)
Lack of sure (certain) knowledge regarding future values of
observables, current values of observables, and cause & effects
Value and preferences domain
How desirable the various outcomes in the real world are
6. 6
What is risk?
Conceptual definition:
risk is to be understood as the uncertainty regarding the
occurrence and the severity of events
Operational definition (expressing uncertainty)
R = {<ei,pi,Si>}
ei = undesired events
pi, = an expression of the uncertainty regarding occurrence of
events, i.e., probability statements are the quantitative language to
express uncertainty (not an inherent property of the system)
Si = Severity of the event, also uncertain, i.e., we need probability
statements to express Si
7. The issue of conditional risk
A risk statement is never unconditional, it should reflect
many aspects
U = the relevant information, the theories, the understanding, the
assumptions etc. which are the basis for the risk assessor when
risk is assessed
D = the result of dialog processes and risk communication
processes conducted in order to agree upon which elements of
severity to focus on (e.g., fatality rate vs gross accidents)
“Ambiguity”
V = the result of the verification processes to verify the
correctness of the assessment given U and D
R = {<ei,pi,Si>} | D, U, V
Be as explicit as possible regarding D, U, V
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8. Background case study
The local energy provider Lyse was developing an LNG
(liquefied natural gas) facility at Risavika outside
Stavanger in Norway
Natural gas from the North Sea is transported through
pipelines to shore, and then being liquefied at a process
plant before it is stored in a huge tank
The LNG is distributed from the facility to local consumers
by LNG tankers and LNG lorries
The localisation of the plant has been a hot issue in the
region
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10. Project history
The LNG plant is under construction on a dismantled yard of a refinery
The yard was deregulated for new industry and several other enterprises are
also under development, including a foreign ferry terminal approx 300
meters from the LNG plant
The LNG facility was approved according to the development plan by the
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local authorities in June 2006
The authorization to store and treat inflammable goods was given by the
national directorate (DSB) in December 2007 based on a preliminary risk
analysis
In order to obtain the final authorization from DSB updated risk analyses
have to be provided showing that the risk of the facility as built is in
accordance to the acceptance criteria
SINTEF/NTNU engaged to assist on risk communication
A first quantitative update of the risk analysis is available 2008
There is significant resistance against the factory, and it has been claimed
that more or less all central actors have committed serious mistakes in the
approval process (Vinnem, 2008)
Test production started in 2010
The plant was official opened in October 2011
11. Risk communication approach (SINTEF/NTNU)
1. Mass meeting to inform about the process to come
2. Invitation to participate in focus groups
3. 4-5 focus groups representing different stakeholders
What are the threat scenarios, and what could be done to
counteract these (measures)
1. A second meeting where one representative for each
stakeholder group meet to discuss the findings in the
groups
2. The findings from the dialogue meetings are important
input to the risk analysis, i.e., D and U
3. The presentation of the risk picture in subsequent mass
meeting(s) reflects (i) the concerns, (ii) how it is
assessed, and (iii) the impact on the risk picture
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12. Risk analysis « Mass meeting « Dialogue groups
Purpose of the dialogue groups
Express concern
Bring forward factors affecting risk
Advocate decision criteria and what to focus on, D
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Issues that came up
Maintenance can not be guaranteed since DSB (safety authority) is
considered much weaker than PTIL (authority in the oil&gas)
Be explicit on worst case
RAC should be replaced by worst case consideration
Risk analysis
The concerns and risk factors were included in the considerations
The risk picture presented aimed to reflect these concerns D/U
Presenting worst case scenarios was appreciated by some of the
strongest opponents
13. Topic 1 – Risk acceptance criteria
In Norway it is common that the enterprises themselves
establish risk acceptance criteria (RAC)
Criteria are set both for individual risk for various groups, and for
societal risk
This is the case even for third person
Safety authorities gives final approval, but do not give
recommendations on RAC
For the particular case in Risavika, societal risk was one of
the most demanding issues
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16. How reasonable are the RAC?
The RAC are in accordance with values recommended by
the HSE in the UK
Similar RAC in the Netherlands are much stricter
How does the RAC relate to “historical” gross accident risk
level in Norway?
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19. Conclusions, RAC
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In relation to “historical” events,
the applied RAC do not impose
significant additional risk
Provided not too many enterprises
are balancing on the edge between
red and yellow
It is not obvious that “natural events”
should be used as a basis
However, it is hard to argue that the criteria are
unreasonable
The Dutch criteria are much stricter
Note the history of the Dutch criteria: A calibration
was done to give a reasonable risk level for 2000
LPG stations in the Netherlands
20. Should one use RAC?
The way RAC were used, the decision problem is seen as
a decision problem where one accept any severity level if
the assigned probability is sufficient low
Some of the stakeholders claimed that this is not the
correct focus, there are some consequences that are
unacceptable independent of their probabilities
This calls for a deterministic approach (Perrow?)
Regulations in Norway does not support such ideas
The topic was indeed discussed during the dialogue
meetings, and the mass meetings
This may relate to what Aven & Renn denotes ambiguity
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21. Topic 2 - Results from quantitative risk analysis
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The results from the QRA
shows that the risk is in the
ALARP region
The main contributor to the
risk is the ferry terminal
An ALARP process has
been run to obtain efficient
risk reducing measures
The decided risk reduction
measures will not bring
risk to the Dutch level
22. Topic 3 - Additional risk reducing measure
A drifting gas cloud is the main contributor to gross
accident risk
A remote operated fire water pump that can establish a “curtain”
of water that may stop the drifting of LNG gas
Forced ignition of drifting LNG gas
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ALARP process
In the ALARP region we should implement all possible risk
reducing measure unless they are impractical, or the cost
of the measure is disproportional to the risk reducing
effect
For the fire pump to produce the protective “curtain” of
water, the benefit/cost ratio is found to be approximate
1:30, hence it may be argued that this is a rather costly
measure
25. Forced ignition of the gas cloud
If there is a huge gas leakage at the plant, it is a possibility
that the gas will not ignite immediately
Thus, a gas cloud may drift away from the plant towards
the ferry terminal 300 metres away
If the gas cloud ignite when passing the ferry terminal this
could cause up to 1000 fatalities
In order to reduce the consequence of this scenario it is
proposed to ignite the gas cloud intentionally before it
reaches the terminal building
This measure was rejected by Lyse
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26. Effect of the measure
The measure may reduce the probability of an accident
with 1000 fatalities with one or two decades depending
on the reliability of the ignition unit
Hence, the measure will bring the risk in the direction of
the Dutch criteria
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Negative aspects:
Personnel fighting against the leakage will be exposed to an
additional risk demanding ethical issue
Increased expected material damages because ignition will for
sure make huge material damages, whereas a non ignited gas
cloud may drift away without any damage
27. Risk communication: Forced ignition
Forced ignition is a measure that was considered to
reduce the risk with an order of magnitude or more
Not recommended by Lyse (i.e., Scangass AS)
The measure was proposed from one of the stakeholder
groups
The measure was serious evaluated
One of the public critic of the plant (Norwegian risk
analyst) used the following term in a feature article:
The plant is so “risky” that one has to implement such a dramatic
measure
He did not claim: To approach the ALARP region all measures
were considered….
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28. LNG leak in Risavika, 2014 (preventor.no)
The 130 kg LNG leak in early May 2014 from the ferry
bunkering facility revealed severe faults, and confirm a lot
of the criticism made by Prof Vinnem and others over the
years. The main deficiencies according to DSB:
ESD system did not function as specified, isolation took too long
time
It could not be documented that operators had required
competence, nor had been given relevant training in order to
conduct bunkering in a safe manner
It could not be documented that risk assessment had been
conducted before deviations from procedures were decided
The fire brigade was never informed about the leak.
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