A Powerpoint presentation detailing American resistance to intervene militarily on behalf of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

1. “No Sacrifice in Vain”Red China, Great Britain, the French Union and American Intervention at Dien Bien Phu Joseph Marchwinski

2. Background Indochina French Union Associated States Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam United States President Truman 1950 Eisenhower Operation Castor General Henri Navarre Dien Bien Phu November, 1953 The Siege March – May, 1954 Geneva Partition Elections Enter America

3. Historiography Melanie Billings-Yun Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 Ike’s three conditions (1954) John R. Nordell The Undetected Enemy: French and American Miscalculations at Dien Bien Phu, 1953 American support for Operation Castor (1953) Mark Atwood Lawrence Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam Truman’s decision (1950) Lawrence and Frederick Logevall The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis “The Same Struggle for Liberty”

4. Primary Sources President Dwight D. Eisenhower “Ike” The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower - The President: The Middle Way, Vol. XV. Louis Galambos and Daun Van Lee Ike’s Letters to a Friend 1941 – 1958 Robert Griffith “Swede” Hazlett The Council on Foreign Relations The US in World Affairs 1954 Richard P. Stebbins

5. Thesis Question Why did the United States refuse to directly intervene on behalf of their French allies at Dien Bien Phu? Thesis My primary documents indicate broader American national security interests, the limits of its Cold War hegemony and the importance of domestic core values to US foreign policy. National Security Lens Red China American fears of escalation – after Korea Hegemonic Lens Great Britain The ability of the United Kingdom to resist backing the US Core Values Lens France The contradictions of military defeatism, domestic disunity and colonialism

6. National Security: Red China “No More Chinas” 1949 “No More Koreas” 1950 – 1953 Ike’s Dilemma Avoid confrontation and resist communism “United Action” SEATO National Security Interests Asian land war with China Chinese backing of Viet Minh The “buffer” “Do more harm than good”

7. Hegemony: Great Britain Post-WWII American hegemony Political Military Economic But was it limited? Churchill’s Britain “Special Relationship” UK interests – “You and Me” The Empire Hong Kong Malay The Commonwealth Australia New Zealand Japan Markets Raw materials Final Analysis Britain believed its national interests were best served outside of “United Action” “Frightened” The House of Commons

8. Core Values: the French Union Military Prowess American fighting man “No substitute for victory” French fighting man Heroic but defeatist? Lacking support Domestic Unity American people 1950s consensus French government Political weakness European Colonialism Self-determination and Democracy Principles common to both France and US French imperial rule Regressive Resistance to internationalization

9. Conclusion Dien Bien Phu May 7, 1954 10,000 casualties esprit de corps Operation Vulture Geneva May 8, 1954 North and South Ike’s three conditions precluded intervention Congressional backing Fully independent Vietnam Concert of nations Why? National Security threat posed by Red China Limits of US hegemony as seen in the successful resistance of the UK Clashing core values between the French war effort and American ideals