1. SIGINT Challenges
This article focuses on the challenges to
SIGINT collection systems in the modern
era. Some of the challenges include
technology, linguistic barriers, ethics and
privacy as well as organizational structure
and culture.
SIGINT
Challenges
Contemporary Issues
Mark Raduenzel – INTL621 Jan. 2015

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MARK RADUENZEL – INTL621 JAN. 2015 Page 1
Introduction
There are many challenges facing signals intelligence today which are difficult for the
Intelligence Community to overcome. The advancement of technology can cause collection
agencies to fall behind and unable to properly collect intelligence data of value. Once the data
is collected by an intelligence agency, the sheer volume of global telecommunications messages
could amount to finding a needle in a haystack. To further compound the problem, most of the
collected messages need to be interpreted before their intelligence value can be assessed and
analyzed. This requires a skilled linguist corps ready and available which is critical given how
long it takes to train linguists to the required fluency.
The ethics of signals collection is also a significant challenge, especially with regards to
American civil liberties and concern for privacy. The signals intelligence agencies must
constantly balance the need to collect according to national security priorities without violating
U.S. citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. Further obstacles for signals intelligence today include
lack of information sharing due to organizational stovepipes, information leaks and the
politicization of intelligence by policy makers. These challenges will be reviewed in greater
detail below.
Analysis
One of the primary challenges facing signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection today is the rapid
change in global telecommunications technology. We live in an increasingly networked world
due to expanded access to the Internet. Mobility has added to the level of connectivity with
the mainstream usage of Wi-Fi connections, laptops, tablets and smartphones. This

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connectivity has increased simultaneously with personal encryption tools and privacy software
which allow users to encrypt text messages, personal phone calls, and other communications
among electronic devices (Don et al. 2007, 33). Voice-Over-IP (VOIP) connections and Virtual
Private Network (VPN) technology provide an extra layer of security and make it increasingly
difficult to monitor telecommunications.
The technological challenge to SIGINT collection is further complicated by the number of social
networking technologies to be monitored such as chat rooms, forums or sites like Facebook,
Twitter, Pinterest, WhatsApp, etc. Since each of these technologies uses a unique proprietary
message format, the National Security Agency (NSA) must implement a customized traffic
sniffer for each site to be monitored. Massive Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) can also be
used as avenues of communication and are candidates for SIGINT monitoring (Don et al. 2007,
15). Monitoring MMOGs is especially difficult because there can be tens of thousands of
members playing and communicating in each game in real-time. Just as with social media, in
order to monitor MMOGs the NSA must plug into each “world” and monitor the
communications at the server level.
The tracking of revenue streams to cutoff financing for terrorist groups has grown in complexity
as well. Don et al. point out it has been impossible to cut off financing for terrorist
groups. However, completely closing down revenue streams may not be in the best interest of
law enforcement since tracking financial flows to their final destination has been an effective
way to locate terrorist operatives and their supporters while simultaneously disrupting terrorist
plans (Don et al. 2007, 16). Challenges remain, however, when potential targets circumvent the

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monitoring of financial flows by using bitcoins (a semi-anonymous virtual currency), Internet
proxies and the Tor or I2P networks which increase anonymity.
These challenges are exacerbated by the vast quantity of data the NSA is required to monitor
on a daily basis. In 1992, former NSA Director William Studeman speaking on the volume of
collection and its impact on analysis explained “one intelligence collection system alone can
generate a million inputs per half hour; filters throw away all but 6,500 inputs; only 1,000
inputs meet forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are normally selected by analysts and only one report
is produced” (Dover 2014, 128).
Since 1992, although the ability to monitor global telecommunications has increased, so has the
number of messages sent daily. As recently as 2014, Gill reports between 1 and 2 billion records
are currently collected by modern SIGINT systems. The NSA and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) both claim the agency actually only touches “1.6% of internet
traffic and analysts ‘look at’ 0.00004%” (Gill 2014, 19). Even conservatively assuming only 1
billion records are collected per day, 16 million records are actually touched and a mere 640 are
ultimately examined by analysts. This whittling down of collected intelligence increases the
potential to miss items of intelligence value. Unfortunately, the overwhelming volume of data
may not allow intelligence collectors many options.
Keeping pace with the rapid advance of technology is vitally important for the intelligence
industry to perform its important mission of collection and analysis. Equally as important is
maintaining foreign languages capabilities within collection agencies. Foreign languages are a
valuable and often indispensable instrument during research and analysis across the

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intelligence spectrum (Mead 1950, 45). This requirement for foreign language capabilities was
clearly identified as early as World War II.
The importance of foreign languages in SIGINT is easily apparent when the process of collecting,
processing and disseminating signals data is examined. Most likely, only a small portion of the
signals data collected is in the English language. As Mead elaborates, during World War II a
large portion of collected intelligence was in foreign languages “and because of the wide-
spread theaters of war, these latter included all the major and many of the minor tongues of
the globe” (Mead 1950, 45). The ability to quickly and accurately interpret the collected data
was vital to its usefulness in the war effort and still remains crucial to this day.
During SIGINT collection, coded messages are first decrypted by the collection agency. The
decoded messages are in the original foreign language and must be translated before they can
be assessed and evaluated to find their intelligence worth; therefore, speed and accuracy are of
utmost importance especially in wartime. In the spring of 1944, just the Naval Intelligence
Operation alone processed on average 18,000 translations per month, with just over 400
translated during an eight hour watch (Footitt 2010, 272). To handle the potential amount of
processing, skilled linguists must be available and ready to translate once the messages are
collected and decoded.
Unfortunately, these linguistic requirements were not deemed necessary during peacetime and
subsequently those skills were largely lost after World War II. The Intelligence Community paid
for this mistake after the start of the Korean War when “a dearth of linguists, photo
interpreters, equipment, and aircraft all contributed to the scarcity of information in the early
stages of the conflict” (Morton 2012, 42-43). Because it can take months or even years to build

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a corps of linguists, it is critical to identify the specific area in which hostilities are likely to break
out. If the problems on the Korean peninsula had not taken the Intelligence Community by
surprise, steps could have been taken to ensure proper training well before they were needed.
In addressing why the Intelligence Community fails to retain linguistic capable analysts in
peacetime as well as wartime, Mercado theorizes “the U.S. Intelligence Community suffers
from America’s general indifference to foreign languages and ideas” (Mercado 2014, 124).
Ironically, languages Americans are least familiar with and rarely want to learn are the very
languages which are most needed by the Intelligence Community: Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Chinese
and Korean, for example. Unfortunately, the Intelligence Community mainly draws from a
university base where most students study Romance languages (Spanish, Italian and French)
which are not in great demand.
Technology and language training are only two challenges facing SIGINT collection today. Ethics
and privacy concerns also test the Intelligence Community in its collection mission. Executive
Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan, outlines the responsibilities and authorities of
the Intelligence Community regarding SIGINT collection and includes Congressional oversight to
ensure American civil liberties are protected. However, this does not alleviate the privacy
concerns of the general public, in part because of continuing revelations of telecommunications
surveillance programs implemented by the NSA.
Edward Snowden’s disclosure of the PRISM program in June 2013 led to a public outcry against
the current intelligence collection practices in place today. Much of the data collected by
SIGINT agencies today are not considered private under the letter of the law and are collected
legally. This holds true for the PRISM program since the system simply collects metadata and

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not the actual content of messages. When this intelligence data is collected, the NSA records
that a cell phone number placed a phone call to another phone number without recording the
contents of the phone conversation, which itself would be protected under privacy laws (Müller
2009, 530). While the public may not understand the details or agree with this SIGINT collection
practice, the program itself is entirely legal. But does that mean such collection is ethical?
While the privacy of U.S. citizens is protected by the Fourth Amendment, there is considerable
debate as to when it is acceptable to conduct SIGINT collection within U.S. borders. Conducting
SIGINT collection abroad is generally accepted without many reservations, but can lead to
political embarrassment such as when Edward Snowden disclosed foreign intelligence
collection efforts targeting German Chancellor Angela Merkel. With SIGINT collection, it is
necessary for standards and laws to maintain a proper utilization of SIGINT capabilities while at
the same time respecting civil liberties. During collection, the abuse of privacy based on free
speech or demographics rather than facts can lead to the deprivation of liberty, property and
even life in some instances (Bignami 2007, 668).
Adequate information sharing is another challenge of the Intelligence Community and one of
the greatest inhibitors to sharing is commonly referred to as “stovepipes”. Mark Lowenthal
explains these stovepipes through an analogy in which he relates the consumer (policymaker)
and producer as two related tribes. In this scenario, “the consumer-producer relationship
resembles that of two closely related tribes that believe, mistakenly, that they speak the same
language and work in the same manner for agreed outcomes. Reality, when viewed from either
perspective, suggests something wholly different” (Lowenthal 1992, 159). Stovepipes are also a
barrier which prevents one intelligence agency from sharing with another.

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Stovepipes are not the only reason for the breakdown of information sharing and
communication. Information leaks can have a devastating effect on the sharing of information
amongst parties because of the mistrust it breeds within the system. The emphasis on a
“transparent” government does carry with it the need to share information with the public.
However, some worry that policy makers politicize intelligence, which can make members of
the Intelligence Community skeptical of sharing information in an effort to protect sources or
collection capabilities.
These communication problems can also have negative effects on collection priorities as the
gaps in intelligence are not always obvious. Neither policymakers nor analysts are eager to
admit lack of expertise on a matter, but there is a clear advantage to the entire community
when both parties are willing to accept areas of ignorance. Policymakers often have a tendency
to believe the Intelligence Community knows everything or is able to gain the knowledge
instantly and without cost. As Lowenthal describes, “policymakers tend to think that experts
and information on just about everything resides somewhere within the intelligence
community, an expectation that ignores budgetary and bureaucratic reality” (Lowenthal 1992,
165). The Intelligence Community must continuously manage the expectations of policy makers
in order to better serve them and keep the two parties aligned.
Conclusion
Any intelligence agency engaged in collecting SIGINT today faces a number of challenges. The
rapid advancement of technology has greatly impacted global telecommunications and SIGINT
collection. With an increasingly networked world where access to the Internet through tablets,
smartphones and laptops is commonplace, SIGINT collection is challenged to stay abreast with

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these changes. Easily available encryption tools, VPN connections, and privacy software are all
different areas which can be used to frustrate SIGINT collection efforts. Global connectivity has
vastly increased the number of potential avenues for communications and threatens to
overwhelm the Intelligence Community with collected data.
Maintaining foreign language capabilities is as important as remaining technologically current.
Being able to quickly and accurately interpret intercepted messages is vital for any intelligence
organization. Unfortunately, due to the length of time it takes to build a corps of skilled
linguists, this can leave the Intelligence Community short-handed at a time when linguists are
needed most, such as during a national security crisis.
Ethical and privacy concerns are also a challenge to SIGINT agencies in their collection mission.
While attempts have been made to protect American civil liberties, the ongoing revelations of
global telecommunications surveillance has led to dissatisfaction among the American public.
Arguments that signals data collected is not considered private has done nothing to mollify the
people who still see data collection on American citizens as an unethical practice.
Information sharing and stovepipes within the Intelligence Community are further obstacles to
SIGINT collection today. Information leaks can have a chilling effect on the sharing of
information because of the mistrust it generates within the system. It may be necessary at
times to share information with the general public, however, the benefit of transparency must
be weighed against the protection of sources and SIGINT capabilities. The desire to politicize
intelligence, unfortunately, will most likely trump sources and collection methods leaving the
Intelligence Community another hurdle to overcome.

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