2.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator2
Purpose and background
The purpose of this
presentation is to support
Ericsson employees in creating
Customer Value
Part 1, ”The Economics of
being a Mobile Operator”
creates an increased operator
business understanding
Part 2, ”Translating benefits in
to Monetary Values” show how
Ericsson product and services
could improve operator
business
External sources rather than Ericsson internal
sources have been used for assessments
and forward looking statements
3.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator3
Agenda part 1
The Economics of being
a Mobile Operator
– The Big Picture
– Revenues
– Operating Expenses
– Capital Expenditure
– Margins
– Cash Flow
– Challenges
4.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator4
The Big Picture
Market size
Overall business model
Level of profitability
Some definitions
5.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator5
The whole picture of an operator’s
business
Knowledge of both the
revenue and the cost structure
is necessary to understand the
dynamics of a mobile operator
Levels and trends for the main
revenue- and cost sources are
included in the presentation
REVENUES
CAPEX*
VALUE
OPEX**
Network
Frequencies
Buildings
Implementation
Terminals
Office and staff
Subsidies
Distribution
Customer care
Churn
Advertising
Commissions
Service offering
Tariffs
Subscription growthTraffic growth Competition
Subscriber retention
Quality
Brand
Market share
Interconnect and roaming
Network operation
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
* Capital Expenditure, CAPEX = Investments,
e.g. the mobile network. Visible as depreciation
and amortization in the Income Statement.
** Operating Expenses, OPEX = Running Costs,
e.g. salaries and selling expenses
6.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator6
Recouping the investment
It usually takes 3-5 years to
generate positive EBITDA
margin, and 5-10 years to
become cash flow positive
when setting up a mobile
operation
When setting up new
services, its margins can be
very high, if successful. The
typical pay back time is 0-4
years
time
time
EBITDAmargin(%)
0-4 yrs 5-10 yrs
0-3 yrs 3-5 yrs
New service
New service
Mobile operation
Mobile operationIndicative
Acc.freecash
flow
Indicative
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
7.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator7
Mobile operator margins are on
average high
Depreciation and
Amortization
Interest and
Taxes
Net
Income
Typical Income Statement
for a mobile operator
Revenue OPEX
15%
15%
10%
100% EBITDA Margin
~ 40%
EBIT Margin
~ 25%
Gross Margin=Revenues – Cost of Sales (e.g. airtime costs and terminals)
EBITDA=Earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation, and amortization
EBIT=Earnings before interest and taxation
15%
Cost of sales
Gross Margin
~ 85%
45%
Referred to as OPEX
Net Margin
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
8.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator8
Mobile Operator Revenues
Size
Categories
Typical ratios
Trends
9.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator9
Telecom is big business
Net Sales (BUSD 2004) comparison for selected companies
Source: Infinancials (2005 )
65 12
285285
101
194
Telecom Operators
67
20
52 29
2219
10.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator10
The largest operators by Net Sales
Top 20 represented >60% of global revenues 2004
Operators by Net Sales 2004 (billion USD)
78,4
73,9 71,3
64,6 63,9
45,0 42,8 41,1 40,8
35,0
31,0 30,5
27,4 27,2
23,3 20,7 20,3 19,5 17,6 16,2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
DT
NTTexcl.
DoCoMo
Verizon
Vodafone
FT
DoCoMo
Telecom
Italia
Telefonica
SBC
excl.Cingular
BT
NewCingular
incl.AWE
AT&T
Sprint
Kddi
ChinaMobile
MCI
Bellsouth
excl.Cingular
China
Telecom
TIM
KPN
Sources: Infinancials (2005), Annual
reports (2005), Investment banks
(2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Based on our Operator Monitor,
which includes >40 operators and
>80% of global operator revenues.
Fixed
Full Service
Mobile
11.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator11
Revenue structure: Voice is still the
dominant revenue source
Estimated average revenue distribution for mobile
operators in W. Europe and the US (2004)
Source: Strategy Analytics (2004), Ericsson analysis (2005)
DATA
OUTGOING VOICE
ROAMING
INCOMING
23,2%
6,7%
4,3%
40,2%
17,3%
15,8%
74,8%
13,8%
2,6%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
WE US
Interconnect Roaming Voice Subscription Activation Data
Bucket
pricing
trend
There are regional
differences but voice
represents the major
share of revenues
worldwide
In some markets,
incoming call termination
is an important revenue
source, e.g. in WE.
12.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator12
Average revenue per user (ARPU)
A performance indicator to be used with caution
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Early adopters
Early majority
Late majority
Average
Illustrative
ARPU
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
ARPU AMPU
Smart (Phi)
Wind (Ita)
KDDI (Jap)
Telefonica Mov
(Spa)
Average Margin per User
Q404 in USD
Source: Merril Lynch (2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
ARPU can hide underlying trends and mislead
ARPU
ARPU does not take into account profitability
Dilution effect
Comparing apples with pears! Find out what is included in the ARPU.
End user fees and interconnect? What about terminal sales?
13.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator13
Revenue growth drives value
But what is driving revenues?
Value
growth
Revenue
growth
Performance
& margins
=
+
Subscriber
growth/mix
Traffic
growth
New
services
Fixed traffic
substitution
Termination
and roaming
Tariff
development
Competition
Regulatory
authorities
Capital +
Investors
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
14.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator14
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1Q
02
2Q
02
3Q
02
4Q
02
1Q
03
2Q
03
3Q
03
4Q
03
1Q
04
2Q
04
3Q
04
4Q
04
MonthlyARPU(USD)
Japan China Russia Sweden US Brazil
Several reasons to great variations
in ARPU between markets
High ARPU when
Early stage of market adoption
Limited competition
High GDP per capita and high telecom
share of pocket
Innovation - services with consumer value
ARPU’s fall when
reaching late adopter market segments
competition increases - tariff pressure
services become commodities
increasing inactive subsciptions
multiple subscriptions
decreasing termination fees (regulatoy)
Strong underlying like-to-like traffic growth
and increased spending usually increases
ARPUs as markets start saturating
Source: Merril Lynch (2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Saturation, increased usage
Competition
Innovation
Competition
Strong volume growth compansating price pressure
Low spend, dilution effect
15.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator15
Shifting from ARPU focus to CRM
and market segmentation
Which are the most valuable customers?
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Early Adopters
Early Majority
Late Majority
It is better to segment users based on attitudes, spending and behaviour than way
of paying bill (postpaid-prepaid) or who pays bill (consumer-business)
Source: Strategy Analytics (2003), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Indicative ARPU difference per user segment
€perAnnum
WE revenue per market segment
16.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator16
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
1Q00
3Q00
1Q01
3Q01
1Q02
3Q02
1Q03
3Q03
1Q04
3Q04
USDperminute
Global Average USA Japan Sweden UK
US vs global
average
W. Europe
postpaid
USA
Development of Revenue per Minute
Competition is pressuring tariffs, driving usage
Sources: Credit Suisse First Boston (2004), EMC World Cellular Database (2004), Merril Lynch (2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Competition has forced tariffs in the US to come down much lower than most other
markets. Usage is also much higher as a result of this.
European price cuts have not reflected in the same increase in usage. The
increasing price pressure in Europe can still lead to a sharp increase in usage.
17.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator17
Increasing traffic is very profitable
~80% margin on incremental traffic
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
Illustrative example with per minute tariff
Provided available network
capacity:
Very high operational
gearing with on average
~75% margin per
additional traffic minute
On data the margin on
additional traffic is ~90%On own NW
~20% of traffic
~100% margin
To other mobile
~10% of traffic
~65% margin
To fixed
~25% of traffic
~95% margin
Incoming
~45% of traffic
~100% margin
Revenue /
Cost (€)
Revenue
Cost
Average
RPM
Average
CPM
18.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator18
Operator A
50% market
share
Operator B
25% market
share
Operator C
25% market
share
0.10
Fixed operator
0.01
0.08
0.08
0.01
0.10
0.10 0.10
Termination fees are a significant
part of revenues and margins
The mobile termination rate (MTR) is the price for interconnecting
operators for the provision of mobile termination service. Mobile
termination is an interconnect service between an MNO’s point of
interconnection and the mobile subscriber being called.
Illustrative
Lower termination rates
enable lower tariffs
Regulators are driving rates
towards cost based pricing
Mobile interconnect rates in
average 15 times fixed rates
(2004) – how does that
compare to the difference in
the cost of call termination?
Sources: OVUM (2004), Ericsson analysis (2005)
19.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator19
Outgoing traffic
Mobile to fixed
Mobile to mobile
Source: Strategy Analytics (2004), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Incoming traffic
Fixed to mobile
Mobile to mobile
Illustration of traffic flows (based on Europe, 2004) Mobile to fixed traffic flows at lower cost
than fixed to mobile, which results in a
good margin for mobile operators
No termination fees on on-net traffic -
margins increase with market share
The profile of outgoing call volumes
continue to shift towards mobile to
mobile traffic flows at higher cost than
mobile to fixed
Margins increase with market share
Traffic patterns affect profitability
Call termination
at lower cost
20.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator20
Few operators score high on both
size and share of data revenues
Trend of increasing data share of revenues everywhere
Sources: EMC (2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Data revenues in % and BUSD Q404
E-plus
T-mobile Czech Rep.
T-Mobile UK
Bouyges France
T-Mobile Germany
Orange UK
SK Telecom
China Mobile
KDDI
NTT DoCoMo
Smart
Globe
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Data share of revenues (%)
Datarevenues(BUSD)
Operators with >15% data
share of revenues are included
Mainly SMS
Mobile data leaders
Trend
Revenues from new
services vital for future
growth as voice gradually
becomes a commodity with
flat rate or bundled pricing
Global trend of increased
share of revenues from
data services
21.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator21
Sources: OVUM(2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
KDDI, Japan: Flat rate tariff on data
lead to a sharp increase in usage
Perceived cost control is key for usage of new services
Increased take up and usage
make investments in capacity
necessary
First mover advantage slightly
reducing churn and increased
portion of gross adds
Increased take up of data
services has also resulted in
increased sales of premium
content
Some cannibalisation effect on
voice usage from increased
usage av data communication
Freecashflow
time
CAPEX & NW OPEX
Premium Content
Higher data take up
Reduced churn & Increased Market share
Revenue cap from flat rate
22.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator22
Landline voice use fell for the first time in 2002
in W. Europe, trend continued in 2003-2004.
Mobile voice represents a larger share of
revenues, than traffic
Tariffs and availability of fixed network
service influence.
Portugal has >50% mobile share of voice
traffic. By ~2009, mobile is expected to
overtake fixed voice traffic in Europe.
Mobile phone users start impacting
fixed traffic trends
Source: Strategy Analytics (2004), Analysys (2004), Ericsson analysis (2005)
European example: ”True mobile penetration” Same trend in all markets, but from different levels
23.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator23
There is life after 90!
Still good growth in subscriptions in saturating markets
Penetration varies between age segments.
Youth penetration likely to grow and subscription
will be kept for life, leading to higher penetration
in older segments
Sources: Strategy Analytics (2003), Merril Lynch (2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
80 85 90 95 100 105 110
3Q04
Penetration (%)
Ireland
Finland
Denmark
Netherlands
Austria
Spain
Taiwan
UK
Czech Rep
Norway
Greece
Hong Kong
Portugal
Israel
Italy
Sweden
Reasons for >90% penetration are:
more than one SIM card per person
m2m
non active subscriptions
other
Presently 16 countries with >90% penetration
24.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator24
Mobile Operator Operating Expenses
Size
Categories
Typical ratios
Trends
25.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator25
Business operation is increasingly
in focus
SUBSCRIBER ACQUISITION
(18.8%)
SUBSCRIBER MGMT (9.4%)
SUBSCRIBER RETENTION (7.9%)
G&A (6.8%)
MOBILE NETWORK
CALL TERMINATION (~20%)
ROAMING (~5,7%)
TRANSMISSION
POWER, SITE RENTAL
O&M, OTHER
OTHER
MARKETING & SALES (11.4%)
Commissions, Distribution (10.3%)
Terminal Subsidy (8.5%)
NETWORK
OPERATION
(20%)
DEPRECIATION
AIRTIME
FEES
(25.7%)
G&A, SUB MGT.
(16.2%)
SUBSCRIBER
ACQUISITION &
RETENTION
(38.1%)
CAPEX
BUSINESS
RELATED
54.3%
AIRTIME &
NETWORK
RELATED
45.7%
THE
“MINUTE
FACTORY”
OPEX~
60-65% of
revenues
CAPEX~
15% of
revenues
Recent
trend
Please note: This estimate is for
European mobile operators, and is to
serve as an OPEX structure example
Source: Strategy Analytics (2004), Ericsson analysis (2005)
26.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator26
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Business related
Power
O&M
Transmission
Site rental
Other
Network operation share of
OPEX estimated to have
increased
Number of sites will typically
drive network OPEX
Variations in the cost split as
transmission may CAPEX or
OPEX, and the cost of power,
labor and site rental is market
specific
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
Breakdown of network operations
cost is very company specific
Complexity+
3G/NGN
networks in
parallell with
2G/legacy
27.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator27
Subscriber acquisition cost (SAC) is
the most important EBITDA influencer
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
Investment: terminal, commission, SIM
card, distribution, advertising, selling)
Monthly ARPU: traffic,
subscription fee, other
CAPEX, monthly OPEX: capacity,
billing, customer care, other
Terminal revenue,
connection fee Typical levels are 100-150€ in
Europe and 350-400 € in the US
Average SAC may increases with
competition, change in bargaining
power towards terminal suppliers,
new feature rich terminals, (e.g. 3G)
with higher ASP, increased share of
postpaid gross additions
SAC
28.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator28
High spenders value may be eroded
by subsidies on contract extensions
Time for break-even
(months)
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
NPV late adopter on prepaid NPV early adopter on postpaid
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ........................................................................
Contract expiry vs. Subsidy value
“Late Adopter” (low spend)
lower acquisition cost
generates a positive NPV sooner
generates a lower long term value
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
Focus is shifting from acquiring
new subscribers to retaining the
most valuable customers
The retention budget must be
spent in accordance with the
preferences of the targeted
customer segment
Which subscriber is preferable
depends on the subscriber
lifetime (churn)
Scenario: Subscriber Lifetime Value
“Early Adopter” (high spend)
subsidies on contract extension erodes value
29.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator29
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 24%
Annual churn rate
Costofchurn(millionUSD)
W. Europe APAC USA
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
Even a small churn reduction has
very high value
The cost of churn equals the
cost of replacing the subscriber
with a new (SAC)
Important reasons for churn
are price, quality (coverage and
capacity) and brand. New
handset can trigger the decision
Avoiding churn can have
higher value for a new service
than the NPV it adds to the
business
Example: Annual cost of churn for an
operator with 10 million subscribers
30.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator30
Changes in churn has a significant
impact on a company’s financials
Operators with high churn
tend to have lower EBITDA
margins
Churn rises with the
competitiveness in the
market, which also drives
the unit SAC
Churn can be used as an
indicator of an emerging
profitability issue
Correlation between churn rate and EBITDA margin
for 92 operators worldwide in Q404
Source: Merril Lynch (2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
0,0% 0,5% 1,0% 1,5% 2,0% 2,5% 3,0% 3,5%
Monthly churn Q404
EBITDA%Q404
31.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator31
Regional churn development
Source: Merril Lynch, Ericsson analysis (2005)
Churn has been fairly stable, but may increase depending on
competition and changes in the handset replacement life
Monthly Churn (weighted averages)
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
3,5%
4,0%
4,5%
5,0%
Q102 Q202 Q302 Q402 Q103 Q203 Q303 Q403 Q104 Q204 Q304 Q404
NAM
LAM
WE
China
Japan/Korea
Other APAC
CEMA
GLOBAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Sharp increase in churn in India,
Indonesia, Philippines (various reasons,
e.g. price wars, reaching low end
segments with less loyalty, heavy
promotions)
Flat rates for voice and data
32.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator32
Mobile Operator Capital Expenditure
Size
Categories
Typical ratios
Trends
33.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator33
CAPEX to Sales has decreased
to ~15%; but slight increase 2004
CAPEX to Sales vs. EBIT %
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Capex/Sales % EBIT %
Sources: Infinancials (2005), Annual
reports (2005), Investment banks
(2005), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Averages of the world’s top 44 operators, representing >80% of global revenues (fixed and mobile)
34.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator34
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004E
Europe
North America
APAC
Latin America
Global Average
APAC and LA (growth markets)
show highest CAPEX ratio
Reasons for overall decrease of
the CAPEX ratio:
operators shift from building coverage
to capacity
price pressure
compensation for previous over-
investment
declining subscriber growth
There is growth of CAPEX in
absolute terms, and equipment
CAPEX growth may be higher
Source: UBS Warburg (2004), Ericsson analysis (2005)
CAPEX to Sales per region
35.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator35
~50-75 of mobile operator CAPEX
is spent on the network
Equipment for the mobile network and
other assets, e.g. frequency license,
cars and buildings
Installation and site establishment is
usually included
CAPEX depreciation shown as cost in
profit- and loss statement
hardware ~5-10 yrs
software ~3 yrs
frequency license ~10-20 yrs
buildings ~30 yrs
Mobile
network
CAPEX
Other
CAPEX
ACCESS NETWORK
CORE NETWORK
TRANSMISSION
NETWORK BUILD
SERVICE NETWORK
CAPEX~15%
of revenues
Illustrative
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
36.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator36
Mobile Operator Margins
Size
Categories
Typical ratios
Trends
37.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator37
On average, mobile business
shows good margins
Global Wireless Ebitda Margin
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1Q99
3Q99
1Q00
3Q00
1Q01
3Q01
1Q02
3Q02
1Q03
3Q03
1Q04
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
2002 2003 2004E 2005E
EBITDA(%)
China Mobile China Unicom Vodafone Group
Telefonica Moviles TIM America Movil
EBITDA margin of some key Ericsson customers
Sources: UBS (2004), Ericsson analysis (2005)
38.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator38
Capital intensive industries enable
high margins
R2
= 0,818
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
EBIT margin %
Capex/sales%
Telecoms 04
Utilities 04
Energy 04
Basic Materials 04
Technology 04
Consumer, Cyclical 04 Industrial 04
Consumer, Non-Cyclical 04
Sources: Ericsson analysis (2005), UBS Warburg (2004)
Telecoms vs. other industries
Telecom has been able
to deliver high margins,
demanding high capital
intensity
Top line growth slows,
decreasing capex ratio
and potentially margins
Industry needs to focus
on value creation to find
growth and maintain
margins
Trend*
39.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator39
Challenges
Differentiation
Growth
Scale and operational
excellence
40.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator40
Different needs in different stages
Sources: Merril Lynch (2003), Ericsson analysis (2005)
Different
phases are
characterized
by different
business
needs, which
put different
requirements
on vendors
Investment Growth Maturity
Heavy expenditures
• New infrastructure
• Market investments
• Risk/opportunity analysis
• Early adopter strategy
Expansion
• Positive return
• Building brand
• Mass market channel
strategy
Best-in-class
• Economies of scale
• Cost effectiveness
• Maximize return
• Service differentiation
Business
Issues
Yearly Returns
Pioneers Early and Late
Majority / Laggards
Consumer
Adoption
Early Adopters /
Early Majority
Telecom
1999?
Telecom
2004?
Telecom
2009?
Cooperation / ConsolidationFragmentation
41.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator41
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Revenue growth in 2003 and 2004
EBITDAmarginin2003and2004
Growth of revenues is stagnating
Margins stable, but slightly down 2004
General decline of growth rates. EBITDA margins pressured in competitive market (USA, Japan) and
growth markets, e.g. China. Consolidation and operational excellence is likely to increase margins again.
Total market
China TelecomChina Mobile
Bell South
AT&T
KDDI
Telekom Italia
Deutsche
Telekom
KPN
Telefonica
France Telecom
VodafoneSBC
Verizon
Cingular
BT Group
DoCoMo
Sources: Infinancials, Annual reports, Investment banks, Ericsson analysis (2005)
42.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator42
BUSINESSCONCEPT
GROWTH
Source: Ericsson analysis
Operators are starting to explore
alternative growth strategies
NEWEXISTING
ORGANIC MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
Operators enter related
business segments, e.g. by
triple play bundles
Mobile TV launched in several
markets
Most operators still show risk
aversion
DoCoMo is exploring growth in the
credit card and venture capital
businesses
Major consolidation in the US
market to grow business and ease
competitive pressure
Signs of increased activity from
multi-country operators, looking to
expand in EU, CEMA, LA and Asia
Increase usage and ARPU by tariff
schemes, data and enhanced voice
services
Focus shifting to subscriber retention,
and 2G to 3G migration
Fixed substitution initiatives by mobile
operators, convergence by integrated
43.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator43
Source: Ericsson analysis (2005)
Responding to growth stagnation
Increased focus on business issues
Pre-configured easy to use phones
Education at sales point
Defend mobile termination fees
Increase share of termination on own
and partner networks
Reduce SAC by lower subsidies and
commissions
Utilize scale to reduce cost for terminals and
thereby subsidies
Reduce churn (brand, tariffs, quality, services)
Selective retention efforts e.g. for subsidies on
contract extensions
General: Reduction of G&A and labor costs
Synergies from alliances and acquisitions
Operational excellence
Outsourcing and hosting
Network sharing
Vendor selection/Cost of ownership
Reduced complexity of systems
Fewer sites
Own sites and transmission
Billing
Customer Care
Airtime Fees
197 BUSD (25%)
Network Operation
157 BUSD (20%)
Marketing and Sales:
220 BUSD (28%)
CoS&OPEX:
786 BUSD
Other: 31 BUSD (4%)
Subscriber Acquisition
and Retention
Sales, A&P
Call termination on
outgoing calls
Roaming fees
G&A
181 BUSD (22%)
Site rental, transmission,
power, O&M
Various
Reduce bad debt
Improve charging systems
Agreements, alliances
SAC is the biggest EBITDA influencer and subsidies will be in focus when reducing costs
44.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator44
Agenda – part 2
Translating Benefits in to
Monetary Values
– Total Cost of Ownership
– Revenue Generation
– Time To Market
– Quality Benefits
– Reduced Risk
45.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator45 20
Low Total Cost of Ownership
– Equipment?
– Installation?
– Transmission?
– Services?
– Software?
– Training?
– Selling?
– Others?
What types of costs do
an operator face with
implementing this
solution?
46.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator46 21
Revenue Generation
– New sources of
revenue?
– Differentiated charging?
– Network rental
– Subscription Fees?
– More Airtime?
– New Data Customers?
– Site and Tower Rental?
– New Applications and
Services?
– Improved Services?
– Better Coverage?
– Transmission Rental?
What are some
expected sources
of revenue for this
solution (Both
existing and new)?
47.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator47 22
Steps in Rolling Out Solution
(TTM)
– Ordering/delivery?
– Installation?
– Training?
– Construction?
– Implementation?
– Billing?
– Upgrade network
– Testing?
– Support?
What are the various
things that have to
be done in order to
successfully
implement this
solution?
48.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator48 23
Quality Impact
– Higher Voice Quality?
– Higher Call
Connection?
– Less Dropped Calls?
– Better In-Service-
Performance?
– Improved MTBF?
– Reduced Downtime?
– Support?
– Capacity/Congestion?
– Customer Care
– Billing?
What quality concerns
does the operator have
related to this solution?
49.
The Economics of Being a Mobile Operator49 24
Reduced Risk/Security
– Reliability of the vendor
– Obsolescence of the
solution
– Large Capital
Expenditure
– Poor market knowledge
– Poor support for the
solution
– Lack of local support
– Future proof
– Lack of products
(terminals)?
– Financial costs
– Not right competence
What are some of the
business risks that the
operator faces by
deploying this
solution?
The 20 largest operators by Net Sales represent ~ 62% of the global telecom operator revenues, depending on if e.g. NTT/NTT DoCoMo and TI/TIM are separated or not. With the consolidation of some of the major players the share is forecasted to increase. One major deal among this players will increase the concentration of revenues with ~1% (Global operators revenues ~1300 BUSD). The wireless players are climbing the list. In our analysis of the development of revenues, costs and margins in this document, we monitor the performance of the whole operator community, represented by 45 operators (all opcos consolidated) and over 85% of the global operator revenues.
This is a snapshot of the average revenue distribution 2003, according to Strategy Analytics. As you know voice still represents the major part of the revenues, over 80%. Of the voice revenues, please notice that 40% are the variable voice revenues generated by the own subscribers. A large part of the voice revenues are generated from business deals with other operators: INTERCONNECT on incoming voice is an important income source for mobile operators. There are also costs associated with IC (own subscribers making calls to subscribers belonging to another operator) and this is covered in the OPEX section. INBOUND ROAMING Data is increasing. Still it is mainly the SMS revenues here.
There is a lot of focus on the average revenue per user (ARPU) and how this will develop. We would like to put up a warning. 1. Different anayst and operators include different things in ARPU. Is it subscriptions or subscribers or active subscribers? Is it only revenues generated by the subscribers or are fees from other operators, like interconnect, included? 2. It may be a misleading indicator, hiding some of the underlying developments. The reason is that it is an average. Better would be to compare the same group of users from one year to another (same store growth), and to know which the good and the bad users are. With the recent influx of low usage customers (Late Majority users), the average has gone down. At the same time usage is increasing among the early Adopters. The figure shows how the three overall market segments EA, EM, and LM all have an increasing ARPU, but that the average decreases due to a high influx of LM.
Just like markets are diverse, there are great differences within an operators subscriber base in terms of usage and spending. When looking at external reporting, from operators or from analysts, the usual way to segment the subscriber base is between prepaid and postpaid, which does not say much more than how you wish to pay the bill, or between business and consumer, which does not say more that who pays the bill. We made an indicative picture to the right of the difference in spending between EA, EM and LM subscribers. We imagine these as the main categories in CL’s Take 5 segmentation. (There are in total 9 segments). EA consist of 4 of these, and are the first ones to adopt a new service. There are differences in attitudes and values, willingness to spend and behaviour between these segments. This is how we would like to segment in this presentation material as well, but there is not such data to be found. Nor is there any data presenting the same store growth, the increase usage and spending in a certain segment over time. So in the remaining parts of the presentation, you will here a lot about postpaid and prepaid, and here we know as a fact that many of the late entrants, or Late Majority segments like Traditionalists, chose prepaid. Also some of the EA, like some of the teens are, use prepaid subscriptions, and we therefor refer to them as ”low users” here. This concludes my part of the presentation, but I will be back after the break to talk about OPEX. Paul however, has more he wants to tell you about the revenues.
What happens with the existing voice business? Competition has forced the rpm in the US to come down much lower than most other markets. Usage is also much higher as a result of this. I will come back with some analysis of the profitabitity per sub. in Europe vs. US. The picture to the right shows the development RPM per minute in US vs Europe postpaid over the same time period 1999-2004. As you can see the changes have been much bigger in US compared to Europe. Of course other things than price also affects usage such as cultural differences, penetration, GDP etc. Further increased competition in Europe could increase usage.
There is a big difference in profit per minute depending on who you call. Traffic within the operators own NW generates a very high margin because there are no interconnect costs. Some operators use this (3) to offer FOC traffic within own NW. They do this knowing that only a small portion of the traffic goes within their own NW as their market share is low. All calls terminated in other mobile or fix operators is charged with a termination rate, lowering the margin. Calls from other operators terminating in our NW generates an interconnect income In average every additional traffic minute generates 75 % margin if there is available capacity. Margins on additional data traffic is even higher thanks to less developed interconnect system ~20% of traffic ~100% margin ~10% of traffic ~65% margin ~25% of traffic ~95% margin ~45% of traffic ~100% margin
The mobile operators have less costs than revenues associated with the IC. Also, an operator with large market share, has a relatively larger share of traffic terminated in its own network compared to a smaller operator and therefore has a higher margin. The bars to the right show that there is a margin on IC as it represents a higher revenue than cost for mobile operators. Of course as IC fees are lowered this difference will even out.
There is an increasing trend for datarevenues. However only a few players in the world generate both high portion of revenues from data and a lot of money in absolute numbers. Most operators perform more or less in a similar way when it comes to data with a few exceptions.
This is a description of how an operator who offers flat rate hope to see the development and this is also the view from some analysts.
Landline voice traffic volumes turned in 2002. Having posted a 3.5% increase in 2001, these fell by 2.5% in 2002. Overall landline traffic volumes still rose by 1.2% in 2002 as dial-up Internet volumes made up the balance, but these are already tailing off in many W. European markets as high-use dial-up customers migrate to broadband and total landline traffic volumes are expected to begin their decline in 2003. Example (2004): Young Germans pick cell phones over fixed lines: Around 25% of under-25 households have no landline. OLD: The third factor is FIXED TRAFFIC SUBSTITUTION. In average, the mobile networks generated 25% of all outgoing traffic in 2002. But it was 43% of the total revenues. In Sweden about 15-20% of the traffic is over mobile traffics. Finland seems to be the highest in Europe. As an example, if 10% of the fixed traffic suddenly would be moved over to the mobile networks, the mobile traffic would increase by 56%!
The first picture shows that penetration varies between age segments Youth penetration likely to grow Subscription will be kept for life, leading to higher penetration in older segments? Another reason for this is new handsets easy to use for children and elderly people The nomber of subscriptions will contiue to grow even if the number of subscribers is saturated more than one SIM card per person non active subscriptions separate datasubscriptions
The previous slide was from an external source. Here is our own breakdown, based on experience. This is a generic example, and we have tried to break down the categories a bit further. The split is activity based, with personnel cost divided on each category. As you can see OPEX vs. CAPEX depreciation is roughly an 80-%-20% relationship. Within business operations costs one major cost item is the Subscriber Acquisition Cost (SAC), which includes subsidizing terminals and commissions to dealers. We will therefore focus more on SAC later in the presentation. As mentioned earlier in the presentation, maximising value of the customers, and reducing cost is important in the stage many European operators are in now. Examples are trying to lower subsidy leves, reducing churn in targeted segments and reducing the cost of operations. Outsourcing the network operation to a vendor has become a hot topic. If an operator outsources the network operation to a vendor, and the vendor is able to do this 20% more efficient, the operator would save appr. 4% of its cost (20%*20%). With the vendors margin, e.g. keeping 50% of the reduction, an operator would save 2% on the bottom line which is good news for the financial market and the shareholders.
Difficult to present average picture on network OPEX split, here is our estimate. Reasons: Transmission may be CAPEX Power, labor costs, site rental very country specific. Affects the split! # sites drives network OPEX. Typically the main categories are: Transmission 30-40% O&M 20-30% Site rental and power 10-15%
The operators have a lot of information on their customers (call patterns and other behavior as well as preferences), but are not always able to use it. To maximise the value the retention budget must be spent in line with the preferences of the targeted segment. The lifetime value can be analysed like here, with a cash flow per subscriber analysis. The future cash in and out connected to a subscriber can be expressed in one simple value, the NPV. But then we must know how long the subscriber will stay. On contract subscriptions one must sign up for e.g. 12 or 18 months to get the subsidy. If the subscriber would stay shorter it would simply generate a negative value. This picture illustrates that due to the high SAC = investment in a new subscriber, it takes a long time before a subscriber is profitable. It usually takes 1 – 2 years in Europe for a sub to break even. In USA, longer. If not careful, the value of attractive high spending customers can be eroded by subsidies on contract extension. Those customers may be more loyal to handset vendors than operators. To consider: Dealer wants to sell subscription and quickly get rid of customer. Wrong business model? Invest in education for the sales force and dealer. Configure phones, personalize and show services. Increases SAC, but will generate higher revenues and possibly lower costs (customer care). E.g. MMS and GPRS SMS sent -> higher commission.
We have seen that a lot of money is invested in acquiring subscribers, and increasingly on retention efforts. It is very important to keep churn at a low level. This graph shows that (each dot is an operator) operators with high churn have lower EBITDA margins than those with low churn. To the right we see that the cost of churn for an operator with 10 million subs and 2% monthly churn (normal) is over 800 million USD per year in the US. Often the value of attractive end user services do not lie in the cash flow from the service itself, but in the improvement of relative churn in the market place. Price is an important churn factor, especially for consumers, and a handset can be the trigger. For business users capacity and coverage has high importance. Brand is important for the perception of quality.
Churn can be an indicator of increasing competition and we will therefor monitor this more closely. Churn has been overall stable at some 2% per month. However, there has been a sharp increase in some markets, e.g. Philippines (price war) and Indonesia. Japan and the US have had a slight decrease, which may be connected to the tariff plans.
CAPEX to SALES is one of the common quotes discussed in the operators business. The quote has to be analysed carefully to understand what the trend means. CAPEX is increasing 2004 but the quote is stable. CAPEX as % of sales has decreased also as a result of that building coverage has changed to building capacity.
The network equipment is usually the largest share of the CAPEX, but there are also other parts like cars, buildings and frequency licenses. Also note that services like installation and site establishment are included in the CAPEX (capitalized services). Deprecation rates varies between different CAPEX elements. Here are some common rates.
WE have the highest EBITDA margin. An explaination is slower subscriber growth, stable competitive situation, however the competitive situation is changing thank´s to some new green-fielders. US has the lowest EBITDA margins. An expaination is fierce competiotion leading to high subscriber aquisition costs. CE &APAC has not yet penetrated the lowest segments and also there is a limited number of players in each market.
Important for operators to invest in new revenue generating applications to maintain high gross margins. If operators decide to become a bitpipe and minimize investments they will see competition driving down margins to utility levels, because the service they offer the consumers will be to similar to the competitors. Without possibilities to differentiate, the churn and price pressure will be costly for the operators.
Looking again at the cash flow diagram, this picture describes the characteristics of being in different phases. In the early investment phase the expenditures are heavy, and risk is high. The operator may have a differentiation to competition and is looking for early adopters that may be attracted by its services. There may be a heavy dependence on a vendor for financing, turn key capabilities, integration of equipment and to keep timeplans for roll out. As business grows, the financial situation is stenghtened and the operator is looking to build brand and will become an interesting alternative for other market segments. The total revenues grow quickly and the operator is spending a lot of money on acquiring customers. In the so called consolidation phase, there is more focus on retaining attractive customers and maximising the value of the subscriber base. Reducing churn is important. There is also focus on reducing costs, both CAPEX and OPEX to maximise the return. The operator must have a clear and unique differentitation and value propostion and be best in class in order to survive. There is likely to be a shake out of under-performers and consolidation to achieve economies of scale and shareholder value. The business of the average European operator in this presentation material reflects an operator in the later stages (late growth – consolidation) of this technology cycle, rather than a green-fielder e.g. 3 which has been plotted in the late investment phase here.
The growth of revenues 2004 was 5.4%, lower than in 2003, for the whole market. Some operators have slowed down a lot, e.g. Vodafone and DoCoMo simply by not being exposed to wireless high growth markets anymore. The margins are fluctuating over time, recently somewhat down, but has been stable at around 35%. The majority of operators seemed to have improving margins, but the effect of big players in US and Japan has slightly pressured margins. Growth markets, e.g. China, with higher market concentration and less competition, typically generate higher margins. However, reaching lower end segments in the market, even Chinese operators seemed concerned with decreasing margins and slower growth and have started to lower handset subsidies which could affect the growth in the market. Growth is poorer in US and Japan than for those who also are exposed to Europe. Margins are also somewhat lower. Telecom Italia: Performing well. TIM has high single digit revenue growth and comparably high EBITDA margin. Very high in Italy, lower in Brazil. Telefonica: Revenues boosted from overtaking BS Latin American operations. Vodafone: Well positioned to utilize economies of scale, but not exposed to growth markets. US, WE and Japan mainly. May look to acquire in Asia and brand to US. Is underperforming in Japan. Verizon: Best performance on revenues and margin development of the US operators in 2004.
Now when we have seen the importance of growth I will go into what happens in different areas where operators seek growth. This is a model to try to structure different ways of growing for the operators. X-axis we show organic vs. M&A and y-axis we show old vs. new business concept. Many things are happening in the first corner and it is not only about growing a business it is also about defending a high margin business and market shares against competition from alternative players. If operators see growth stagnating they will of course try to reach growth in alternative ways. It is of course a matter of definition if triple play and mobile TV as considered as new concepts or not. Many operators see M&A as a part of their core strategy to find growth. We have also seen activity in this are. When it comes to cross industry M&A we have not seen so much activity with some exceptions. I will now go into some more details in some of these areas.
This is the split of OPEX (786 BUSD) globally. The share of OPEX spent on network operation has increase for many operators due to running both 2G and 3G networks as well as legacy networks and NGN IP networks. About 80% of the OPEX is spent on business related expenses, e.g. the cost of call termination and roaming and the handling of subscribers. Operators are spending a large share of OPEX on acquisition and the more competition is intesified, the higher price of acquiring customers. Maximising customer value is the focus area when growth stagnates and competition intensifies. To the right there are areas of business development and cost/operational excellence for operators to respond to stagnation and competition.
.Low Total Cost of OwnershipHow does Ericsson’s Solution help the operator to control and/or reduce their cost of ownership. This should consider all life cycle costs from installation to operation to expansion and on to evolution such as equipment, transmission, operation and maintanance, service costs. How can Ericsson reduce the cost of owning an Ericsson solution with factors such as these (and others) in mind?
Revenue GenerationWhat new or expanded revenue generating opportunities are made possible with this solution? Can the solution address a new end user segment? Can it increase minutes of use? Can it enable new applications?
Fast Time to Market (TTM) (as seen from the operator´s perspective)Time is money and the ability to launch a solution quickly means increased opportunity for revenue. How does our solution help an operator get to market fast? Does it come pre-packaged and pre-tested? What are our production capabilities? What about services and support resources needed to install the system? What has been done to increase the speed of upgrades of new releases? What about expanding the solution to deal with new capacity needs? What contributes to getting an Ericsson solution up and running fast? Or faster than usual? This could be speed in an RBS delivery, easier O&M, or new services needed, now, and can be installed in secornds.. It could be Ericsson customer services that are packaged for cost-effective speed in installation or in building on to a network.
Excellent Quality How does the Ericsson solution address the quality concerns of our customers? Does this solution improve the voice or end user quality? Reduce drop calls? What about the In-Service-Performance of this solution? Individual component MTBF? What about system redundancies How does this Ericsson solution gurantee network excellent network quality. (Ericsson´s image, which could be linked to quality.)
.Reduced Risk (The security of the Vendor)What does Ericsson do to reduce the risks that an operator faces? Risk-revenue pricing? Leading the standards development? A past history of ability in a related solutions? Large R&D commitments? Do we share any of the risks? Future-proof product/solution, track record, local support etc How will this Ericsson solution help the operator to reduce their business risk?What makes Ericsson´s solution a safer investment?
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