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ECCSSafe methodological framework

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Methodological framework

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ECCSSafe methodological framework

  1. 1. 1       ECCSSafe  –  Exploring  the  contribution  of   civil  society  to  safety       Deliverable  1:   Theoretical  and  methodological   framework   19th February 2015 Authors: Stéphane Baudé (Mutadis, France) Gilles Hériard Dubreuil (Mutadis, France) Drago Kos (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) Nadja Železnik (Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe – Slovenia Country office) Zsuzsanna Koritár (EnergiaKlub, Hungary)
  2. 2. 2 Table of contents     1.   Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 4   2.   State of the art regarding contribution of civil society to safety......................................... 5   3.   Engagement of civil society in industrial safety issues as a tool for improving safety culture and safety: approaches in international standards and guidelines .............................. 8   3.1.   INSAG 1 report on the post-accident review meeting on the Chernobyl accident (1986)......................................................................................................................... 8   3.2.   INSAG 3 report on basic safety principles for nuclear power plants (1988)............... 8   3.3.   INSAG 4 report on safety culture (1991).................................................................... 9   3.4.   INSAG-15: Key practical issues in strengthening safety culture .............................. 11   3.5.   INSAG-20: Stakeholder Involvement in Nuclear Issues (2006) ............................... 11   3.6.   EC Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (October 2013)......................................................................................................... 12   3.7.   International safety standards in other fields of activities......................................... 13   3.8.   Conclusion................................................................................................................ 16   4.   Elements of theoretical background................................................................................ 17   4.1.   Epistemology (H. Simon, N. Luhmann).................................................................... 17   4.2.   Radical liberalism, Democratic culture (Dewey, Zask, Bourcier et al.)..................... 18   4.3.   Inclusive Governance (Rosenau, Stocker, TRUSTNET).......................................... 19   4.4.   Actor-Network Theories (Law, Latour, Callon) ......................................................... 20   4.5.   Commons, Common Good perspectives (Ostrom, Ollagnon).................................. 20   4.6.   Trust (Giddens) ........................................................................................................ 22   The reflexivity paradox ................................................................................................... 23   5.   Grid of analysis for the case studies............................................................................... 26   5.1.   Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case study.................................. 26   5.2.   Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety ....................................................................................................................... 26   5.3.   Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance.................................... 26   5.4.   Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders............................ 26   5.5.   Trust ......................................................................................................................... 27   6.   Short presentation of the possible case studies ............................................................. 28   6.1.   Case studies in the nuclear field .............................................................................. 28   The contribution of the French Local Information Commissions (CLI) and their national association (ANCCLI) to nuclear safety in France.......................................................... 28   Civil society and local actors engagement on the safety of the Asse II mine (used as a radioactive waste storage) in Germany through a citizen advisory group coupled to an expert group ................................................................................................................... 29  
  3. 3. 3 Influence of public participation in the site selection of Radioactive Waste (RW) repository Waste (RW) repository .................................................................................. 30   Contribution of civil society organisations to the re-assessment of copper canisters quality in the radioactive waste programme of SKB in Sweden ..................................... 31   6.2.   Case studies in other fields of activity ...................................................................... 32   The break of the barrier at the Aika bauxite mine near Kolontár, Hungary .................... 32   The role of the Local Information and Dialogue Committees (Comité Locaux d’Information et de Concertation - CLIC) in the development of Plans for Prevention of Technological Hazards (Plans de Prévention des Risques Technologiques – PPRT) in France ............................................................................................................................ 33   Engagement of the public on the safety of a hazardous waste incinerator at Dorog, Hungary .......................................................................................................................... 34   Management of risks of hydro power plant dam destruction at the hydroelectrical power station Golica in Austria (on border with Slovenia) on the Bistrica River........................ 34   7.   Selection criteria for the case studies ............................................................................. 36   8.   Method for the case studies and interview guidelines .................................................... 37   9.   References...................................................................................................................... 39    
  4. 4. 4 1. Introduction   From the 1990’s to now, the European context has been marked by the emergence and the reinforcement of reflections and research on the contribution of civil society to the quality of decisions concerning hazardous activities in risk governance studies (cf. TRUSTNET European research projects series, the works of O. Renn, the works of the International Risk Governance Council). It has also been marked by the development of various legal, institutional and regulatory arrangements aiming to organise participation of civil society and local stakeholders in decision-making concerning hazardous activities. The interactions between civil society and local actors on the one hand and institutional actors engaged in safety1 of industrial activities on the other hand are most often addressed either through the general issue of stakeholder involvement, perception studies, risk governance studies or through the more general issue of the exercise of democracy regarding technical issues. Social and human aspects of industrial safety are addressed through the analysis of human and organisation factors of safety that are focused either on the analysis of single organisations (e.g. operators2 ) and their safety culture or address a safety system where safety is the result of the actions and interactions of operators, regulators and experts. We can currently observe that some regulators and technical support organisations, in particular in the nuclear field (e.g. IRSN in France, SITEX network in Europe), are developing new approaches where civil society is incorporated in the safety system as an additional layer contributing to safety, moving from a 3-pillar safety approach (operators, regulators, experts) to a 4-pillar conception including civil society. In the same time, international organisations dealing with safety, in particular in the nuclear field, are evolving from a vision of engagement of civil society purely focused on the issue of acceptation of technological choices to an acknowledgement of a positive contribution of civil society to safety culture and to safety itself3 . In the field of radioactive waste management, the COWAM (Community waste Management) European research project series4 have emphasised the contribution of civil society to safety culture. In the nuclear field, empirical studies5 have also started to emphasise the role of civil society as a contributor to safety. However, this renewed role of civil society as regards safety has not yet been investigated from a theoretical point of view. In this context, the ECCSSafe (Exploring Civil Society Contribution to Safety) research project6 aims to further explore the contribution of civil society to industrial safety by providing a theoretical framework for the analysis of this contribution, analysing 3 concrete cases in the 1 The concept of industrial safety is defined as the set of technical provisions, human means and organisational measures internal and external to industrial facilities, destined to prevent accidents and malevolent acts and mitigate their consequences. 2 In this document, the word “operator” refers to the whole organisation that operates a hazardous facility (e.g. the electricity company operating a power plant). 3 See notably the report of the IAEA International nuclear safety group “INSAG-20: Stakeholder Involvement in Nuclear Issues” (2006), which states that the “involvement of stakeholders in nuclear issues can provide a substantial improvement in safety. 4 See the final reports of the European research projects COWAM, COWAM 2 and COWAM in Practice available on the COWAM website www.cowam.com 5 See P. Richardson, P. Rickwood, Public Involvement as a Tool to Enhance Nuclear Safety, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, 2012. The study notably concludes that “there are tangible benefits to be gained from a more frank relationship between the nuclear power industry and the public, … [which] appears to represent a possible untapped asset for enhancing and maintaining safety. 6 ECCSSafe is supported by the French Foundation for a Culture of Industrial Safety (Foncsi)
  5. 5. 5 nuclear field and in other industrial fields in Europe and identifying key issues to address in further research and proposing guidelines for a larger scale research. The objective of the present document is to propose a methodological framework for an empirical exploration of the contribution of civil society to industrial safety in the context of nuclear and non-nuclear activities. At first, it proposes a review of the existing approaches to the contribution of civil society to safety in international standards and guidelines, then it will point out a theoretical basis on which an analysis of the contribution of civil society to safety can be grounded. Finally, it proposes a grid of analysis to be used in the analysis of the 3 case studies considered in ECCSSafe. 2. State  of  the  art  regarding  contribution  of  civil  society  to  safety     Participation processes of civil society in connection to technology in general are ambiguous and even controversial. The reasons are many and mostly emerge from unclear role of civil society in the decision-making processes on general. Civil society defined as “non- governmental institutions that advocate the interests of citizens” are demonstrating the legitimation deficit of formal representative political institutions. The discussion started long time ago by Juergen Habermas (1975) was later developed in many theoretical variations. Probably the most known outcome of many attempts to diminish the legitimation deficit is “deliberation theory”, which stresses that the direct participation of many interest groups (civil society) in decision-making process is the most important tool to improve the legitimation of the decisions. Deliberation implies that: 1. actors listen to each other, 2. reasonably justify their policy positions, 3. show mutual respect and 4. reflect upon and evaluate their interests and needs from the point of view of their generalizability (Baechtiger & Steenbergen 2004, 1). As such, it presupposes: 1. a high level of rationality, 2. other-orientation, self-reflection, 3. impartiality on the part of the participants, 4. seeking out the best arguments as a basis for decisions (Reykowski 2006). The majority of the existing literature on democratic deliberation still has a philosophical orientation with an emphasis on the crucial role of rational argumentation. However, in line with more recent emphasis (e.g., Habermas 2003; Rosenberg 2002, 2005) on the necessity of moving from abstract ideals to conceptualizations considering human psychology, institutional frameworks, and patterns of social inequality, recent years have seen ever louder calls for 1. a broader conceptualization of deliberation (also called dialogical or relational) which includes in the conceptualization and analysis of deliberative processes the emotional, identity, value and interpersonal aspects and alternative communication forms (e.g., story-telling, bargaining, rhetorics, humour, personal experiences sharing) (Fraser 1992; Young 1996; Sanders 1997; Mouffe 1999; Bächtiger, Shikano, Pedrini et al. 2009; Mansbridge 2010 etc.); 2. the merging of deliberative and dialogical theories by emphasizing dialogue as an initial phase in order to bridge incommensurate, divergent ways of speaking and reasoning in deliberation, or dialogue as the central principle of deliberation – in the sense of openness to co-creating new perspectives (npr. Pearce & Littlejohn 1997; Bohman 1996; Barge 2002; Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw 2002; Ryfe 2006; Heidlebaugh 2008; Kim & Kim 2008; Black 2008; Escobar 2009); 3. the investigation of individual, psychological factors stimulating or hindering
  6. 6. 6 deliberation, and not only cognitive ones (Lupia 2002), but also personality, affectional, and motivational factors (e.g. Marcus, Neuman & MacKuen 2000; Lodge & Taber 2000; Gastil et al. 2008; Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy et al. 2008), and 4. the study of interpersonal and group dynamics in deliberative processes (e.g. Pearce 1989; Barge 2002; Rosenberg 2005; Reykowski 2006; Ryfe 2006; Gastil 2008; Ratner 2008; Escobar 2009). These conceptual shifts have been largely propelled by the increasing number of programs, organizations and initiatives undertaken in the name/spirit of deliberative democracy that aim to increase the quality of the public’s opinions or concrete political decisions through face-to- face deliberation on pressing policy issues (among best known and established are Deliberative Polls, National Issues Forums, Citizens Juries, Study Circles, Planning Cells, Consensus Conferences, Scenario Workshops, and there are plenty other citizens’ panels, citizens’ summits, town meetings etc.). Many deliberations are also run via the Internet (for example convened by meetup.org, moveon.org, e-thepeople.org; and even software such as UnChat has been designed to facilitate deliberations). In short, it seems that during the past few years the democratic countries of the west have been increasingly recognizing the importance of involving the public in attempts to improve communities and increase the quality of policy making. In the theory of democracy, face-to-face group discussions are considered an ideal setting for deliberation. In addition to various attempts to establish deliberation in the public sphere, the number of empirical studies on various deliberation-related aspects and evaluations of people's deliberative functioning in formal and informal public sphere have also been increasing. Especially pronounced has become the need to understand factors in outcomes of deliberative processes and to create as valid and as reliable as possible instruments for measuring the quality of deliberation. Black et al. (2009), giving the most exhaustive review of the existing methods of measuring various aspects of deliberative processes, emphasize that these research studies remain in the early stages, and expect “that future studies will refine considerably the measures” (Black et al. 2009, 4). Many other analysts (e.g., Bächtiger & Steenbergen 2004; Gastil & Levine 2005; Rosenberg 2005, 2006) also call for the (further) development of empirical measures of deliberation quality, informed by social science methodology. In short the participation of the civil society in the deliberation procedures i.e. inclusion of many non-governmental and “non-capital” interest gropus in decision making procedures is considered as precondition of risky technology legitimation as well. Three main benefits have for a long time been associated with increased participation in decision making on technological and risk issues: firstly, that it will increase the legitimacy of decision outcomes; secondly, that it will lead to better decisions as a result of enhancing the knowledge base, and thirdly, that it will help to secure democratic values and create ‘true democratic citizenship’ – instead of alienating concerned publics from decision-making that effects them in their daily lives (Fiorino, 1990; Renn et al, 1995; Stern and Fineberg, 1996). “But recently these approaches are developed further in upgrading participation of civil societies gropus by so called “sociotechnical combinations”. “Questions about participation are usually addressed by looking at social aspects, such as actors, processes, interactions, power and trust. A strong social and technical divide seems to be taken for granted, leaving out the technical aspects. Our starting point, however, is that we need to question this assumed division between technical and social aspects, and recognise that social and technical factors are always inseparable. Governing any technology and even controversial technology, such as radioactive waste management, is a task that is simultaneously technical and social. It is only presented, communicated as purely technical.” (see more in: Bergmans, A. et al. 2014) Therefore the established “division of labour” i.e. division of competences between technical interest groups and “social interest groups is under question. “The old technocratic, but still very strong framing of safety as a pure technical activity that should be reserved to the most competent experts to deal with is still alive and
  7. 7. 7 well, but according to our analysis this always means the concealment of social aspects and when finally presenting the results from these experts expectations on public acceptance will be framed as downstream engagement, which means the subordinating of social aspects” (Bergmans, A. et al. 2014). The civil society contribution to safety is therefore also in questioning the established sociotechnical divide, where civil society groups are considered as the one which should be informed, educated, and are only than perhaps generously invited to participate in formal decision making processes. The technical expert groups are there to help them to be able to participate competently in discussions and decisions about “high technology” safety controversies. The socio-technical divide therefore represents quite an obstacle in building of trust and search for integrated socio-technical solutions. The attempts which perpetuate and solidify the such partial solutions divide are instrumental, goal oriented PR approaches. As a contrast the other approaches which are much more comprehensive, oriented to support substantial communicative dialog on all safety questions remains to be developed. There are some pioneering innovative examples but are still marginal in comparison of the PR approaches which in fact only strengthen the established socio-technical divide.  
  8. 8. 8 3. Engagement  of  civil  society  in  industrial  safety  issues  as  a  tool  for   improving  safety  culture  and  safety:  approaches  in  international   standards  and  guidelines   Among hazardous activities, nuclear industry has been a pioneer in the development of human and social dimensions of safety. Until the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, reflections on safety were focused on technological and engineering issues, and the considered risk factors were essentially of technological nature. After the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, human factors start to be included in the reflections on safety, as the human- machine interface has been particularly flawed during the TMI accident. Human factors then become one key dimension in safety. After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the notion of safety culture was introduced together with the notion of organisational risk, and the reflection on safety then encompassed the dimension of organisations, beyond the human- machine interface. The notion of safety culture was then precisely defined in the IAEA INSAG-4 report on safety culture (1991) and different aspects were further developed in other IAEA reports. In parallel, the issue of the interaction of organisations responsible for safety (operators of hazardous facilities, operators) with civil society have been developed, at first as a condition for acceptability, then as a contribution to safety. Considering these two trends together, we can argue that the notion of safety culture can now be broadened from a perspective focused on one organisation (e.g. the operator or the regulator) to a systemic perspective encompassing the whole system of actors contributing to safety, composed of the operator, regulator(s), technical support organisations (TSOs) and civil society. 3.1. INSAG  1  report  on  the  post-­‐accident  review  meeting  on  the  Chernobyl   accident  (1986)   The concept of safety culture originates in the reflection on the return of experience of the Chernobyl accident In particular, the origins of the accidents were identified as both technological (the design of the reactor) and organisational (procedures). The IAEA INSAG-1 report first introduced the notion of safety culture as another factor of safety, beyond the mere existence of procedures: “A vital conclusion drawn from this behaviour is the importance of placing complete authority and responsibility for the safety of the plant on a senior member of the operations staff of the plant. Of equal importance, formal procedures must be properly reviewed and approved must be supplemented by the creation and maintenance of a ‘nuclear safety culture.’” 3.2. INSAG   3   report   on   basic   safety   principles   for   nuclear   power   plants   (1988)   The IAEA INSAG-3 report on basic safety principles for nuclear power plants (1988) highlights safety culture Safety Culture as a fundamental management principle. INSAG 3 advocates amongst others the following principle in paragraph 28: “An established safety culture governs the actions and interactions of all individuals and organisations engaged in activities related to nuclear power.” However, no precise definition of safety culture was yet developed.
  9. 9. 9 3.3. INSAG  4  report  on  safety  culture  (1991)   The IAEA INSAG-4 report on safety culture (1991) focuses exclusively on the concept of safety culture. It is the first international document that defines precisely this concept and develops it. The definition of safety culture given in INSAG 4 is the following: “Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.” INSAG 4 develops a view of safety culture centred on organisations and the individuals who compose them (see the illustration of safety culture extracted from INSAG-4 next page), and management, rather than on a safety system composed of multiple organisations, and governance of this system: “Safety Culture has two general components. The first is the necessary framework within an organization and is the responsibility of the management hierarchy. The second is the attitude of staff at all levels in responding to and benefiting from the framework.” In particular, procedures and good practices are not enough if practised mechanically: “Safety Culture requires all duties important to safety to be carried out correctly, with alertness, due thought and full knowledge, sound judgement and a proper sense of accountability.” A particular attention is given to operating organisations. However, we can note that the notion of safety as a common good already appears in INSAG-4: “the discussion extends to Safety Culture in all concerned, because the highest level of safety is achieved only when everyone is dedicated to the common goal.” Safety culture relates to intangible attributes. However, these attributes “lead naturally to tangible manifestations that can act as indicators of Safety Culture.” INSAG 4 also identifies characteristics that can be considered as measures of the effectiveness of Safety Culture.
  10. 10. 10  
  11. 11. 11 3.4. INSAG-­‐15:  Key  practical  issues  in  strengthening  safety  culture   The IAEA INSAG-15 report develops practical guidelines for the strengthening of safety culture in a given organisation. It makes no reference to society, or stakeholders at large, but only to regulator and workforce. However, some functions identified in INSAG-15 can be extended to civil society actors “Organizations typically go through a number of phases in developing and strengthening safety culture. IAEA Safety Report Series No. 11 identifies three stages: (1) Safety is compliance driven and is based mainly on rules and regulations. At this stage, safety is seen as a technical issue, whereby compliance with externally imposed rules and regulations is considered adequate for safety. (2) Good safety performance becomes an organizational goal and is dealt with primarily in terms of safety targets or goals. (3) Safety is seen as a continuing process of improvement to which everyone can contribute.” In section 3.6 “The learning organisation”, a notion of collective learning is developed: “If an organization stops searching for improvements and new ideas by means of benchmarking and seeking out best practice, there is a danger that it will slip backwards. A learning organization is able to tap into the ideas, energy and concerns of those at all levels in the organization.” In the views of INSAG-15, this conception of collective learning concerns a given organisation. However, it can also be extended to the whole safety system including operators, regulators, technical support organisations and civil society. This notion of collective learning is reasserted in the conclusion of the document: “Improvement is a continuous process. It requires self-critical, open and constructive comparison with others and ‘benchmarking’ against them. Involvement of the workforce is vital if areas for improvement are to be recognized, and then owned and sustained. Line management must also be seen to welcome scrutiny from peers and to be open to such scrutiny, as part of the process of actively promoting a learning organization.” Here again, the concepts of collective learning and improvement of the quality of safety through multiple layers of scrutiny can be easily extended to the whole safety system 3.5. INSAG-­‐20:  Stakeholder  Involvement  in  Nuclear  Issues  (2006)     The IAIE INSAG-20 report on stakeholder7 involvement in nuclear issues establishes links between issues of stakeholder involvement and safety that were previously disconnected. In effect, stakeholder involvement was previously considered essentially under he prism of the issue of acceptation of nuclear facilities, without links to safety. With the INSAG-20 report, the rationales for favouring stakeholder engagement in nuclear issues changes: this engagement is now considered as a contribution to safety. This is 7 The document defines the term “stakeholder” as follows: “Stakeholders are defined in this report as those who have a specific interest in a given issue or decision. The group can include the general public. There are normally two types of stakeholders: internal and external. Internal stakeholders are those involved in the decision making process, while external stakeholders are most often affected by the potential outcome of the project, either directly or emotionally. The involvement of both stakeholder groups can be essential to achieving project goals and objectives and can contribute substantially to safety.”
  12. 12. 12 asserted in the document as early as in the introduction: “Establish that substantive stakeholder communications contribute to the safe operation of nuclear facilities.” as well as in the conclusion of the document: “The active involvement of stakeholders in nuclear issues can provide a substantial improvement in safety.” A specific section (section 2) of the document is dedicated to “safety relevance of stakeholder involvement”. In this section, it is argued that “Operators and regulators confronted with questions and concerns from stakeholders may have to re-examine the basis for previous decisions. […] Investigating such questions provides clarity, prevents complacency, and may expose unforeseen problem areas.” “Timely stakeholder involvement may enhance safety […]. Stakeholder involvement may result in attention to issues that otherwise might escape scrutiny.” “Stakeholder involvement makes regulatory organizations and other authorities acutely aware that their actions are under public scrutiny. Transparency increases the motivation of individuals and institutions to meet their responsibilities […]. Transparency also […] reinforces [the] responsibility [of regulatory organizations] to ensure the safety of the installations under their oversight. Moreover, the involvement of stakeholders may result in more practical, relevant and coordinated administrative, technical and socially responsible decisions on safety issues.” “Stakeholder involvement compels the operators to be aware that plant operations, as well as their other actions to meet the rules and regulations, are under public scrutiny. This awareness serves to create strong incentives for achieving a high level of safety performance within the operating organization. Experience in many countries has shown that such transparency can be an extremely effective enforcement tool to enhance safety performance.” The INSAG-20 report clearly includes stakeholders in the contributors to safety, but do not explicitly extend the notion of safety culture to encompass stakeholders. However, if we put together the expected safety benefits of stakeholder engagement developed in INSAG-20 to the notions of collective learning and, and “comparison with others and benchmarking” developed in INSAG-15, we can argue that safety culture goes beyond the scope of one organisation (in particular the operator of a nuclear power plant) but can encompass the whole safety system composed of operators, regulators, TSOs and civil society. 3.6. EC   Proposal   for   a   COUNCIL   DIRECTIVE   amending   Directive   2009/71/EURATOM   establishing   a   Community   framework   for   the   nuclear  safety  of  nuclear  installations  (October  2013)   The EC Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (October 2013) gives a role to the public as an external scrutiny of how the directive is transposed at the national level. “It is important for the Commission and its monitoring of transposition and implementation to know which national provisions transpose the general principles and requirements that the amended directive lays down. For instance, the proposal introduces general safety objectives and requirements for all types of nuclear installations. Given the very broad scope of these new safety objectives and requirements, it is of utmost importance for the Commission but also the public to be able to ascertain how they are transposed at national level.”
  13. 13. 13 However, the proposal does not contain other references to the role of the public in safety, other than general requirements of transparency and information of the public (with notably reference to the Aarhus Convention). Art. 8 on transparency only contains general provisions like: “Member States shall ensure that up to date and timely information in relation to nuclear safety of nuclear installations and related risks is made available to workers and the general public, with specific consideration to those living in the vicinity of a nuclear installation.” “Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with applicable Union and national legislation and international obligations, provided that this does not jeopardise other overriding interests, such as security, recognised in national legislation or international obligations.” “Member States shall ensure that the public shall be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the licensing process of nuclear installations […].". 3.7. International  safety  standards  in  other  fields  of  activities   In non-nuclear fields of activity, the OECD has also developed safety guidelines. The issue of the contribution of civil society and local actors to safety is in particular addressed in two OECD documents: the OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident, Preparedness and Response (hereunder referred to as the OECD Guiding Principles), issued in 2003 and the OECD Guidance on Safety Performance Indicators issued the same year. The OECD Guiding Principles “contains guidance for the range of individuals, groups or organisations who are involved or interested in, or potentially affected by, chemical accident prevention, preparedness or response”8 . More precisely, the parties addressed by the OECD Guiding Principles are divided in four distinct categories (see figure below): industry (i.e. operators of hazardous facilities), public authorities, communities/public (encompassing the local communities potentially affected by an accident and the general public), and other stakeholders (including “labour organisations, other non-governmental organisations, research/academic institutions and intergovernmental organisations”). The OECD Guiding principles insist on the necessity of cooperation between these four categories of stakeholders. All these categories of actors share a common role to “make chemical risk reduction and accident prevention… priorities in order to protect health, the environment and property”9 . 8 See Introduction, subsection “Parties addressed” page 16 9 See section “Golden rules”, subsection “Roles of all stakeholders” page 21
  14. 14. 14 Stakeholders addressed in the OECD Guiding Principles In the section “Prevention of chemical accidents” of OECD Guidelines, contributions of several types of civil society actors or local actors (labour organisations, NGOs and local communities) to safety are more precisely described: • “The experience and understanding gained by labour organisations from their training and education programmes, and from their practical day-to-day experience, can be used to help improve prevention policies and activities.”10 • “Labour organisations should participate in international organisations that develop guidance on chemical safety and accident prevention.”11 • “NGOs (such as environmental, humanitarian and consumer groups) should … help to identify specific concerns and priorities regarding risk reduction and prevention, preparedness and response activities.”12 • “Members of NGOs could have the skills and experience which allow them to review technical information, legal documents and other materials needed for effective participation and for recommending possible solutions to identified concerns.”13 • “NGOs should participate, where appropriate, in legislative and regulatory processes by, 10 paragraph 4.b.1 page 81 11 paragraph 4.b.3 page 81 12 paragraph 4.e.1 page 81 13 paragraph 4.e.3 page 81
  15. 15. 15 for example, helping to identify public concerns that might effect policy objectives, providing analyses of information from a range of installations (e.g., concerning incident case histories), suggesting new policy directives, and facilitating learning from the experiences of other countries or regions.”14 • “Community representatives should be involved in debriefing and accident investigations, as well as reviews of investigation reports, as appropriate, to help reduce the likelihood of similar accidents occurring in the future and to help improve preparedness and response efforts.”15 The OECD Guidance on safety performance indicators also stress the contribution of civil society and local actors to safety as a potential partner of the industry and regulators to improve safety: “Prevention of accidents is goal for all relevant stakeholders from public authorities to industry to the public. These stakeholders, which include trade associations, labour organisations, environmental groups, universities and research institutes, community- based groups/communities, and other non-governmental organisations, have an important role in helping to improve safety at hazardous installations. These stakeholders are in a unique position to […] work with the industry on innovative ways to improve safety of hazardous installations and reduce risk. Therefore, it is important for public authorities to work co-operatively with these organisations to ensure useful information and guidance is provided to industry and the public and to avoid redundancy and conflicting messages being give, to industry and the public.”16 The OECD Guidance on safety performance indicators also includes guidance for communities/public, the communities being defined as “the individuals living/working near hazardous installations who may be affected in the event of a chemical accident”17 including local citizens, NGOs that are representative of the community, employees at the hazardous installations, industry neighbours, community advisory panels, business and political leaders, educators and community activists. As contributors to safety, the local communities are invited to develop a safety performance indicators programme. In order to facilitate the development and implementation of this programme; local communities are advised to “create a local committee or organisation concerned with the safety of hazardous installations that is representative of the community”18 . The contribution of local communities to safety is then developed through a set of targets set to the local communities, each target being associated to a set of precise indicators measuring the performance of the local community. In the field of accident prevention, 3 targets are set to local communities: • “For the community to participate actively in chemical risk reduction and to help resolve issues through a better knowledge and understanding of the risks concerning hazardous installations in their vicinity.” • “The community has effective input into audits, inspections and follow-up to ensure that the required prevention measures are in place and corrective measures following audits and inspections are taken.” 14 paragraph 4.e.4 page 82 15 paragraph 5.d.1 page 101 16 see section B “Guidance to Public authorities”, Chapter B3 “External co-operation”, paragraph B3.3 “Co-operation with Other Non-governmental Stakeholders”, page 132 17 Introduction to the Guidance for communities/public for Developing Safety Performance Indicator Programmes, page 157 18 idem
  16. 16. 16 • “To help decision makers reach appropriate decisions on land-use planning, siting and permitting so that new installations or modifications to existing installations do not create unacceptable risks to human health and the environment.” In the field of emergency preparedness, two targets are set to the local community: • “The potentially affected public understands what actions to take in the event of an accident involving hazardous substances.” • “Ensure the community takes an active role in the development of emergency plans.” In the field of response and follow-up to accidents, two targets are set to local communities: • “In the event of an accident, members of the community follow the preparedness and response instructions, to mitigate the consequences for human health and the environment.” • “Members of the community participate actively in debriefing and accident investigation and promote related improvements in risk reduction and emergency preparedness.” 3.8. Conclusion   The contribution of civil society to safety is acknowledged in international standards and guidelines on safety in the nuclear field and in the field of chemical activities. However, if the concept of safety culture has been thoroughly defined, conceptualised and developed in international standards and guidance document, it has not been the case yet for the contribution of civil society to safety and the inclusion of civil society in a broader understanding of safety culture. Though, different contributions of civil society to safety are identified in the different considered international standards and guidance documents can be divided in several types of contributions: • Stretching the industry and regulators to achieve a high level of safety and ensuring that the appropriate prevention measures are in place; • Providing an additional layer of vigilance, identifying safety issues that the industry and regulators could have missed and ensuring that proper attention is given to these issues; • Contributing to the identification of solutions to emerging safety issues; • Providing additional information relevant to safety in complement of information gathered by industries and regulators; • Contribute to the return of experience of accidents and near-miss situations; • Ensuring that corrective measures following accidents, near-miss situations or audits and inspections are effectively taken; • Improving the quality of decision-making processes for licensing, siting and land-use planning; • Improving preparedness of local communities to possible accidents and ensuring that effective, relevant emergency planning is done; • Informing the local communities and the general public. A comprehensive return of experience still needs to be done to identify more precisely the types of contribution of civil society to safety and safety culture. This return of experience should also be linked with a conceptual reflection both rooted in the academic thinking. ECCSSafe is gives first orientations for this reflection by developing connections between the issue of civil society contribution to safety and several fields of academic thinking.
  17. 17. 17 4. Elements  of  theoretical  background   We have observed in the previous section that the contribution of civil society to safety is now recognised in some international standards and guidelines. The objective of the current section is now to complement this overview of international standards by identifying several fields of academic thinking that can fuel the reflection on civil society contribution to safety. 4.1. Epistemology  (H.  Simon,  N.  Luhmann)   Industrial systems and associated safety issues are of increasing complexity as technological development unfolds. As we have seen in the previous section, this complexity is not only of technical nature but mingles technological, human, organisational and social aspects (e.g. the organisation of the civil society that is expected to bring contributions to safety). The management of this complexity is therefore a key issue when considering safety issues and the contribution of civil society to safety. Reflections on epistemology developed by Herbert Simon on the one hand and Niklas Luhmann give elements of academic thinking on issues of complexity management, trust as a mechanism for reducing complexity, processes, institutions and standards as mechanisms for reducing and managing complexity, and distributed and bounded rationality as means to address complexity within a social system. Niklas Luhmann defies complexity as follows: For all systems existing in the world, be they physical, biological,…, plants, animals, human beings “the world is too complex: there are much more possibilities than what the system can cope with, while maintaining itself. A system is positioning itself in front of an “environment” that is constituted in a selective manner. This “environment” breaks itself when confronted with contradictions that occurs between it and the world.“ (Niklas Luhmann) Social coordination mechanisms and governance are intended to enable the management of the complexity that is inherent to the world in which human existence unfolds. Complexity is a resource. As noted by Niklas Luhmann19 : "The social dimension of human experience increases the potential of man facing the complexity and, therefore, expands the human world." It is through a social response (not just individual) that are built structuring problems and modes of collective action that can deal with complexity and a way to take advantage of this complexity at varying degrees depending on the nature of situations and the patterns of coordination. These patterns of coordination opens up the possibility of social trust that allows itself a distributed share of knowing and acting (“bounded rationality“, Herbert Simon) in the social body. As Luhmann says: "Where there is trust, there are more opportunities for experience and action, the complexity of the social system increases, and therefore the number of possibilities that its structure can reconcile, as trust is a more effective form of reducing complexity". Trust, with other mechanisms such as law, organization, market, authority, democratic representation, are the structures that enable complexity reduction and the coordination of collective action. The complexity of the world is not static, nor is the method to deal with it: it is a dynamic process that goes through processes and procedures of reduction of complexity, and then re- complexification of the world. The most advanced societies are those that are able to deal with complex phenomena, however, the treatment of complexity requires a relationship of trust between members of the social body. In this perspective, the arising of complexity in the course of the management of safety is not necessarily expected to be dealt with by usual processes and routines. Nor is it necessarily expected that appropriate methods or procedures will be developed. The development of 19 LUHMANN Niklas, “La confiance, un mécanisme de réduction de la complexité sociale“ ECONOMICA, 2006 (free translation)
  18. 18. 18 safety doctrine in the nuclear field (see here INSAG 20 in the working document) clearly demonstrates the existence of a continuous evolution of the understanding of the function of human beings (the “human factors”) in the nuclear safety and the respective role of the human beings and the machine in the maintenance of safety (human beings as a cause of failure or alternatively as a factor of safety). 4.2. Radical  liberalism,  Democratic  culture  (Dewey,  Zask,  Bourcier  et  al.)     Safety (of industrial systems, but also of other technological and human systems like the finance system) is a key public concern as both a concern for public institutions and a concerned for the public. However, the notion of public and its relationship to the governance of hazardous activities has to be defined. The thinking of John Dewey, further developed by Joelle Zask and by Danielle Bourcier et al. gives a fruitful understanding of the nature of the public. In effect, in this field of thought, the public is not a given, but is the consequence of the impacts of activities on the life of people. In this, there is a joint emergence and structuring of an issue and of the public related to it. From this reflection on the nature of the public and the definition of what are public affairs, a specific conception of “experimental democracy” is inferred tat gives a framework for connecting issues of civil society engagement and issues of safety. Democracy is a political regime in which the organisation and the exercise of political power within society are an outcome of the will and the control of the people. Democracy can be direct, or indirect (where the ideal of citizens’ participation in public affairs is often limited by a system of representation based on some constraining requirements e.g. competence, reputation, heredity). It appears that “real” democracies are in fact a combination of participation, deliberation and representation. An important element is the debate around the usual distinction of respectively “public” and “private” affairs. It is common to understand "public affairs" or "public sphere" as the scope of activities and issues covered by the state or by the political and administrative actors. In such a context, the governance of safety, like other risky activities, is mainly focused on the administrative and political sphere of action. In this approach, in fact, it is the political or administrative authority which questions and identifies problems and it is in relation to authorities that other actors can build their legitimacy to intervene (through participatory democracy, public debate centred on topics framed by public authorities, stakeholders involvement). Another approach is to understand public affairs primarily in terms of societal interactions. The “radical liberalism“ of Dewey emphasizes the fact that any activity acquires a public dimension from the moment it has implications for other individuals or groups that those who implement them (and more specifically as soon as they claim this activity to become public). From this perspective, public affairs are understood as a form of intermediate field in which actors meet or clash to address issues that affect them, be they negatively affected by the activity or conversely receiving benefit from it. The state administration and politicians, although having the prerogatives and special attributes, now appear as participants among others. The legitimacy is build through mutual recognition of players. This approach allows in particular the understanding of the framing processes of emerging issues and their subsequent institutionalisation. The concept of experimental democracy developed in TRUSNET IN ACTION is not far from the thinking of Dewey for whom democracy is less the political form of a regime than the method by which the people can deal with the consequences of actions; such consequences can be direct or indirect depending on whether people are associated, or not, with the initiating actors. On this basis, the public consists of “all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences cared of” (Dewey, 1927). The state then is a consequence of the will of the people; through their representatives, it takes care of the negative consequences of the
  19. 19. 19 others’ actions. A key tool in such experimental democracies are social inquiries which enable society “to bring conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and judged” (Dewey, 1935). TRUSTNET in Action has proposed an evolution of this concept into “cooperative inquiry” processes in which actors frame and investigate a complex public issue with the support of experts, who help the actors affected by a public activity (in Dewey’s sense) to build the appropriate skills, knowledge and know-how enabling them to grasp complex technical issues and reframe them to incorporate their concerns and claims. Archon Fung (Fung, 2003) identifies as an important factor of credibility the dimension of “counter-power”. He underlines that using counter-powers is often necessary for civil society to reach credibility and enable his actual influence on the processes and actors positions in the context of participatory and deliberative processes. One can also mention here the work Georg Simmel that would support the idea that conflict is an important component of the quality of societal coordination and democracy. 4.3. Inclusive  Governance  (Rosenau,  Stocker,  TRUSTNET)     Considering the issue of contribution of civil society to safety naturally leads to the question of the organisation of governance of hazardous activities that enables and favour the inclusion of civil society in the safety governance system. The thinking on “inclusive governance” developed by TRUSTNET on the basis of the works of Rosenau and Stocker about governance can be mobilised to give definitions of governance and characterise what can be an inclusive governance system. Governance is not a substitute for traditional ‘nation-state” government; rather it is an alternative regime applicable to a wide range of activities and organisations. As Rosenau says, “Governance is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organisations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfil their wants” (Rosenau, 1992). As for Gerry Stoker (Stoker, 1998), he identifies five aspects of governance: (1) Governance concerns a range of organisations and actors, not all of which belong to the government sphere (2) It modifies the respective roles and responsibilities of public and private actors as established in traditional paradigms of policy making (3) It involves interdependence between organisations and actors engaged into collective action in contexts in which none of them has the necessary resources and knowledge to tackle the issue alone (4) It involves autonomous networks of actors (5) A key principle is that actions can be pursued without necessarily having the power or the authority of the State. The aim of the inclusive governance processes in Trustnet In Action is to restore a capacity of influence to citizens in order to allow them to change things and to lead an enjoyable life, contributing to the sustainable development of their territoriality-based community. Through an inclusive participation, to be differentiated from the principle of subsidiarity, inclusive governance empowers concrete persons to become actors at the various local, national and European levels in the structures of where decisions are taken that will influence their life and future. The notion of reflexive governance suggests that one can distinguish a governance process that fosters the reflexivity of the actors from a governance process that takes the actors’ reflexivity for granted, or at least, for a direct effect of a procedure. But we assume that a reflexive procedure is not something that guarantees in almost a mechanic way a certain degree of reflexivity of all the actors.  
  20. 20. 20 4.4. Actor-­‐Network  Theories  (Law,  Latour,  Callon)   As we have seen in section 3, safety is the product of a system that is both technological (involving (technical equipment, measures, calculations, tools, texts, etc.) and human (human actors, relationships, norms, groups, values, etc.), and in which technological and human issues are intermingled. The Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as developed notably by Law, Latour and Callon provides some relevant powerful tools and instruments to analyse the dynamics of the actor’s networks proliferation. One of the characteristics of networks, especially in Latour, is the kind of ‘object/subject’ combination in which they operate to account for the dynamics of innovation, from the most material to the most intellectual aspects of it. The ANT describes the interactions between human and non-human entities understood as a network in which all human or non-human elements participate to a collective action. In this collective action, both human and non-human elements have the capacity to act on other elements of the network (e.g. traffic lights or traffic signs acting on drivers). This capacity to act of both human and non-human elements gives them a symmetrical role in the analysis of the network. The ANT gives a central place to the management of controversies as processes of collective construction of knowledge inside a network. Callon, Lascoume and Barthes (Callon, Lascoumes, Barthes 2001), propose to facilitate the development and resolution of controversies through hybrid forums, which are composite spaces of interaction associating scientists, experts, politicians, civil society and citizens. These expert forums notably mobilise dialogical expert/citizen procedures that are supposed to foster the process of investigation of complex entities and controversies mingling scientific, technical, economic, legal and moral aspects. In the case of safety, this notably leads to analyse how a heterogenous community of actors (including the industry, regulators, experts, civil society, local communities, …) can mobilise resources and interaction procedures to frame a safety-related socio-technical issue, enable the development then resolution of controversies and produce in this process useful knowledge and information that reinforces safety. The concept of experimental democracy in Trustnet in action (see section 4.3) means that the requirements of democracy in terms of the deliberation and participation of the citizens apply potentially to any field (science, technologies, morals, law etc) that can be of interest to the public. It involves in particular, as in Latour and Callon’s approach (Latour, 1999, Callon, Lascoumes, Barthes, 2001), cooperative mechanisms, gathering citizens and experts, through which citizens can stretch and influence socio-technical decisions. However, experimental democracy is not limited to technical issues, neither is it merely radical as in Habermas’ approach (Habermas 1962, 1996), because citizen engagement is not only experienced through social communication, but is also expected to be included within the institutional structure of power. 4.5. Commons,  Common  Good  perspectives  (Ostrom,  Ollagnon)   In the institutional reflections on safety culture, the notion of safety culture as a common good, within a given organisation and within the whole safety system is a key factor driving the efforts of all actors to continuously improve safety. Academic reflections on Commons can therefore bring theoretical elements for characterising this common good and the way the system of actors manages it. The rule of the Commons as regards property and governance is opposed to public or private property as well as to general and particular interests. The works of Elinor Ostrom have studied common-pool resources commonly used, managed and safeguarded by a community of actors. Taking as a starting point the empirical observation of numerous systems of common management of natural resources (e.g. water, fish stocks, pastures, …), she has developed a theory of Commons (Ostrom, 1990) which has then been expanded by numerous authors, including Ostrom herself (Ostrom, 2007) to immaterial resources like computer software, knowledge, culture, … A Commons can be defined as the combination of
  21. 21. 21 a resource (be it material or immaterial) a community, a set of practices, values and social norms (or, in other words, a governance system) that enables the community to manage this resource. These three elements of a Commons form a coherent and integrated set. The community that takes advantage of the resource can be larger than the community that effectively manages the resource. The governance of the Commons can be seen, from the legal perspective, and possibly further, as an alternative solution for managing future projects on common resources in common, which notably entails entail a personal moral commitment vis-a-vis the considered resource, in a long-term perspective. Here, safety can be considered as an immaterial resource that can be managed as a Commons by the set of actors that are affected by the safety of a given industrial facility. It is to be noted that the Commons are not exclusive of other types of management (markets, public regulation) or property (private or public property). They most often develop spontaneously in-between the existing institutional arrangements and ways of management, thus transforming their scope, finality and effective action. They are complementary rather than exclusive of other ways of management, although the effectivity or even the existence of Commons can be affected positively or negatively by institutional processes and arrangements (e.g. the patenting of living material like varieties of plants have strongly jeopardized traditional Commons of seed management in developing countries). A key feature of the governance of Commons is its capacity of the community of actors managing the commons to adapt the governance of the Commons through time in order to fit the evolution of their needs. This flexibility is made possible by the combination of formal and informal arrangements within the governance of the Commons. Finally, depending on the scale or size of the common resource, it can be subject to a management in common at multiple scales (e.g. locally, regionally, nationally, …) through multi-level governance arrangements. Henry Ollagnon has developed a theory of patrimonial management (Ollagnon, 1984) that describes in a systemic way how complex natural or “living” realities (water, species, biodiversity, …) are managed by the various actors that influence these realities. This views complement the commons by views on how a heterogonous set of actors influencing and influenced by a natural reality actually manage the quality of this natural reality. Henry Ollagnon differentiates three main types of management: individual management, collective management (where the management is delegated to a collective entity) and common management where the different actors use commonly negotiated rules to their individual and collective management of the considered natural reality considered (and managed) as a common patrimony. A key point in H. Ollagnon’s works is the consideration of the total quality of the common patrimony, composed of three dimensions: • The intrinsic quality of the common patrimony, i.e. its observable quality (chemical and biological content of waters, quantity, health, … of a population of animals, …) • The quality of the relationship of each actor to the common patrimony • The quality of the relations between the different actors as far as the common patrimony is concerned.
  22. 22. 22 Complementary views on the management of common good: commons (left) and patrimonial management (right) What is central in H. Ollagnon’s works is the complexity of both the reality at stake and of the system of action. Thus, these concepts can apply to any complex reality involving a multiplicity of actors, like industrial systems and heir safety. The notion of commons patrimony turns out helpful in order to analyse whether a Commons procedure and process necessitates a new type of governance, namely a ‘patrimonial governance’. In the perspective of the Commons and of patrimonial management, we can analyse how safety is emerging (or not) in a given situation as an actual or potential Commons, through formal or informal practices, processes, social relationships and the development of a common culture, what are the different mechanisms of cooperation at different scales from the local to the international level, how do the set of actors engaged in safety management manages the three dimension of total quality of safety, how the different categories of actors are capable (or not) to introduce evolutions in the governance of safety in order to fit emerging needs, … 4.6. Trust  (Giddens)   Science and technology systems are loosing an image of reliable knowledge. In general this is happening because “expert systems are disembedding mechanisms” (Giddens, 1990:38). They remove social relations from the context by impersonal nature of technical knowledge and by public critique of specialization of knowledge which is difficult to integrate with common sense (lay) understanding of “nature and culture”. As a consequence lay attitudes to science and technical knowledge are becoming more and more ambivalent one would even say that are “schizophrenic”. On one side expert knowledge organised and distributed as specialized aggregates is “alienated” from public, on the other side experts don’t know about how wide and deep this alienation is. In fact they don’t know how lay people perceive technical questions. It is not surprising that on general they even think it is not necessary to know how “safety of technological system is socially constructed”. These attitudes are in line with the modern subsystem autonomy as one of the basic Common resource Common patrimony Community Practices, values, social norms Quality of the relation of each actor to the common patrimony Intrinsic quality Quality of the relation between actors Total quality
  23. 23. 23 modernist developmental principles! There are a lot of reasons why lay people don’t trust to expert as they used to. The fatal technological accidents in a “global village” has quite dramatic effect on public. But speaking theoretically one of the most important and at the same time paradoxical reason is reflexivity at the individual and institutional level: is the expert/lay people divide in safety evaluations recognised as a problem or is this divide interpreted as “normal”, inevitable, or ignored … ? The  reflexivity  paradox   “The reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed (i.e. changed) in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character” (Giddens, 1990:38). Production and spreading of knowledge is circular, meaning that the reflection include reflection upon the nature of reflection itself (ibidem 38). Reflexivity in modern contemporary societies actually subvert reason, because it is constantly developed and revised. In fact “no knowledge under conditions of modernity is knowledge in the “old” (traditional) sense, where “to know” is to be certain (ibidem, 39). This is one of the most important difference between traditional and modern societies. In short, “institutionalisation of doubt“(ibidem, 176) is one of the most valuable, but at the same time also one of the most disturbing characteristic of very complex modern societies. As stressed by Luhmann complexity is opportunity (resource) but to make such complex systems stable enough to be operational, trust in modern social structures should be reinforces. In this respect it is extremely important to reinforce trust in expert systems. But paradoxically this is not entirely rational and transparent procedure since “trust is inevitably in part an article (i.e. object) of “faith” (ibidem, 29). The main reason is that public is mostly not in position to check or to evaluate complex technological systems which are supporting modern everyday life. This is the reason why modern societies are not that distant from traditional one. Even in the most modernised modern societies, tradition has an important impact on everyday life. Basic difference between predmoderne and modern society is the object of faith only. Instead of faith in gods who guarantee stability of social – nature relations, the faith in reliable man made system is in focus of modern societies. In this respect, according to Luhmann (1979, 1988) it make sense to distinguishes between confidence and trust. The first is supported by unconditional expectations while trust include different sort of information and knowledge! Anyway even these second modalities rely on faith in technology safety because it is unlikely to check all the necessary information and to get familiar with many specialised aggregates of knowledge necessary to understand condition of safe technology operation. To understand lay public or civil society evaluations of technology safety, general and specific trust building elements should be considered. According to Giddens (1990: 33-36) concentrated observations elements of trust are as follows: 1. The prime condition of trust requirements is not lack of power but lack of full information. 2. Trust always carries the connotation of reliability in the face of contingent outcome. 3. Trust is precisely the link between faith and confidence, although all trust is in a certain sense blind trust. 4. Trust in persons is always to some degree relevant to faith in systems. 5. Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system. 6. In condition of modernity trust exists in the context of general awareness that the impact of technology upon material world is socially created: human moral imperatives, natural causes and chance reign in place of religious cosmologies. 7. Danger and risk are closely related but are not the same. 8. Risk and trust intertwine. There is always a balance between trust and calculation of risk.
  24. 24. 24 9. Risk is not just a matter of individual action. Some risks collectively affect large masses of individuals. 10. The opposite of trust is not simply mistrust. In its most profound sense, the antithesis of trust is thus the state of mind which could best be summed up as existential angst or dread (Giddens 1990: 100). From these observations it is possible to extract further research objectives in order to reinforce conditions of trust building in modern societies: “Trust relations are basic to functioning of any social system but localised social networks are not as important in establishing trustful social relations in modern societies any more (ibidem 87). Since disembedding mechanism are prevalent the prime task of trust building is to establish possibilities of reembedding safety evaluations. Although this is inconsistency since the modern social relations tend to evade specific local circumstances, practical patterns of reembeddement are developing. Perhaps the most promising but still partly inconsistent is participation of the civil society and locals in decision making. See deliberation! “Trust in systems takes the form of faceless commitments in which faith is sustained in the workings of knowledge of which the lay person is largely ignorant” (ibidem, 88). Therefore it looks normal and logical to improve the distribution of information and knowledge. But this is practically unachievable since the modern systems are too complex and very differentiated, meaning that there are a number of specialised subsystems and nobody is able to have full overview of the entire arrangements. It is not possible even to imagine, that every interested person would absorb all necessary knowledge to be competent in assessment of many technologies supporting modern societies. Although there are a number of public instances controlling different technological systems it is still quite unfeasible for lay people to do it permanently and in many interactions with (high) technology in everyday life. Therefore the “faith” in reliability of technology is one of the foundation stone of modern society stable operation. Civil inattention is fundamental aspect of trust relations in the large-scale anonymous settings of modernity (ibidem, 88). Civil inattention means that individual and institutions are peacefully functioning, are not upset and are not mobilising against technology negative side effects although it is more or less obvious, that a number of indicators proves problems in modern technology functioning. In fact civil inattention is result or consequence of individual and institutional reflexivity limits. Because it is unlikely that reflexive observations would “cover” all technological impacts on society and environment it is normal and in fact necessary that reflexivity is complemented by faith in technology reliability. “Trust in persons involves facework commitments in which indicators of the integrity of others (within given arenas of action) are sought” (ibidem, 88). In modern societies faceless unpersonal formal bureaucratic institutions are developing. Facelessness is quality which promises standardised procedures and prevents informal “familiarity” as breeding environment for corruption. As long as the trust in formal systems is high enough, the lack of trust in person is not an acute obstacle. The history of modern society proves that such faceless systems are developmentally successful. Nevertheless the formal rigid unpersonal ways of society management are problematic from beginning. In highly developed modern systems standardised unpersonal faceless operation become outdated and even non- operational and more personalized reembedded approaches are becoming popular. “Reembedding refers to processes by means of which faceless commitments are sustained or transformed by facework (ibidem, 88)”. This strategy of reembedding is partly successful and already implemented in many situations. But it is unlikely that faceless relations should be easily supplanted by more personalised approaches. Scepticism in such developments is based on criticism of public relation services for instance, where facework is easily recognised as fake instrumental driven strategy to reduce scepticism of those who don’t trust
  25. 25. 25 any more in unpersonalised formal management of social relations. In this respect new telecommunication technologies are “doubled sword option”. There exist many new possibilities to personalize communication procedures between people and institutions with the help of (new) technology, but for many the technology itself remain an obstacle which prevent “real” embedment of social relations. Access points are points of connection between lay individuals or collectivities and the representatives of abstract systems. They are places of vulnerability for abstract systems, but also junctions at which trust can be maintained or built up (ibidem, 88). Access points are crucial in situations where trust and consequent legitimacy of technology operation is critical. Abstract faceless systems don’t easily admit that the interaction between lay individuals, institutions of civil society and experts institutions and many other actors are necessary requirements to improve trust in technology operation and that because of that the access points should be established and maintained on permanent basis. Here at the access points facework relations are of basic priority to re/establish trust and legitimacy of the faceless social relations also. Therefore the access points are to be permanently developed, improved in direction to enable open access to all information and knowledge on specific technology. Since expert role in the trust building was crucial from enlightenment 18th century till the last third of the 20st century, It makes sense to deal with the role of expertise in trust building in particular. Science as the background knowledge source has “long maintained an image of reliable knowledge which spills over into an attitude of respect form most forms of technical specialism” (Giddens, 1990: 89). However, at the same time, lay attitudes to science and to technical knowledge generally, are becoming more and more ambivalent”. Recently, trust building involves increasing introduction of moral issues into the now largely “instrumental” relation between human beings and the created environment. This is one of the crucial question to be developed and implemented in the ECCSSafe project.
  26. 26. 26 5. Grid  of  analysis  for  the  case  studies   5.1. Understanding  of  safety  and  safety  culture  in  the  case  study   • What is the implicit understanding of safety in the case study? Is it a question of conformity with existing standards of safety? o Are there elements of safety culture and of understanding of safety shared between civil society actors and experts? • How does civil society contribute to safety and safety culture? o Identifying new questions that may impact safety that have been ignored or neglected by experts? o Questioning models and underlying hypothesis? o Stretching the experts and regulators? o Other? 5.2. Definition   of   safety   as   a   public   affair   and   definition   of   the   “public”   associated  to  safety     • Is safety meant to be addressed by operators and the authorities only? Or is safety understood as belonging to the affairs of the public for it can be adversely affected? o Is the expert/lay people divide in safety evaluations recognised as a problem or is this divide interpreted as “normal”, inevitable, or ignored …? • To what extent does “a public” exist as regards safety in the context of the case study? • What are the conditions for the public to develop its inquiries regarding safety? Are these conditions created by civil society? By public authorities? By the operators? • What is the statute of expertise? o To what extent does the public have access to existing expertise? To what extent does the public have the capacity and resources to develop its own expertise? o Are the players (and the public) in the position to make a distinction between facts (or lack of facts) and value options? 5.3. Governance  of  hazardous  activities  and  safety  governance   • What kind of governance is supporting the management of safety? Does it include explicitly or implicitly civil society as an actor in safety? • Does the governance of safety include interactions of several categories of actors with distinct and clear remits and deontological rules? • To what extent is safety perceived as a result of balanced and fair interactions of several public and private institutions together with components of the public? • Is safety recognised as a common good by civil society actors and other actors? What are the formal and informal arrangements used to manage in common safety as a common good and how is common good management articulated with public regulation and markets? How do actors contributing to safety adapt the existing formal and informal governance system to fit evolving needs and emerging issues? 5.4. Controversies  and  co-­‐framing  of  safety  issues  with  stakeholders   • What are the identified controversies in the process? What is the degree of polarisation of the participating public? Is the debate framed by a “pros and cons” implicit structure? To what extent do the several concerned parties in the case study regard safety as a common good beyond pro and cons positions? • Are controversies of purely technical nature or do they mingle scientific, technical,
  27. 27. 27 economic, legal and moral aspects? In this case, how is this mix dealt with? To what extent are the values ruling the expertise, the safety trade-off and the information gaps made explicit to the actors? o Is so called “social construction of technological safety” recognised in expert circles, activists and other stakeholders? • How do civil society actors access to information about hazardous activities and safety issues? For operators, authorities and experts, what are the rationales for making information available or conversely for concealing information? • Does the interaction with the public provoke some significant changes in the technical concepts as well as in the framing of the questions at stake? • To what extent does safety management take place in a larger perspective involving the justification of the activity? Do interactions with the public open the way to the reframing of the rationales that support this justification? • How is addressed the dilemma between “contributing to safety maintenance” and “avoiding the hazardous activity”? 5.5. Trust   • How rational and transparent are the conditions to establish trust in particular social situation? • Are there institutionalised possibilities to reinforce trust in industrial (technological) safety? • How much contingent outcome (unpredictable, undesirable events) are threatening trust in safety of particular technology? • How much this notion of trust as a link between faith and confidence is recognised and how much it is threatening the stability of technology operation? • How much trust in technology is dependent on trust in people who manage these technology (and vice versa)? • Is it possible to take “calculated risk” but be unaware of the dangers. How much these blindness is present in particular situation? • Is it possible to confirm this balance in particular social condition? • Is this “socialization” of risk recognised and accepted as normal, or is recognised and articulated as a problem? • The opposite of trust is not simply mistrust. In its most profound sense, the antithesis of trust is thus the state of mind which could best be summed up as existential angst or dread. Are such extreme qualifications recognised in expert and public discourses?  
  28. 28. 28 6. Short  presentation  of  the  possible  case  studies     The ECCSSafe project will focus on 3 case studies including 2 case studies from the nuclear field and one case study from the non-nuclear field. Through these case studies, the ECCSSafe research team will explore the different areas of interest identified in the previous section. This section gives a short overview of the 8 possible case studies among which the 3 final case studies of ECCSSafe will be chosen. 6.1. Case  studies  in  the  nuclear  field   The   contribution   of   the   French   Local   Information   Commissions   (CLI)   and   their   national   association  (ANCCLI)  to  nuclear  safety  in  France   In 2009, the French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) on the one hand and the Local Information Commissions (Commissions Locales d’Information – CLI) and their national association (Association Nationale des CLI – ANCCLI) on the other hands developed a cooperation process for the decennial safety assessment of French nuclear power plants. This cooperation took place as a pilot project within the framework of openness of IRSN to society (see above) and of cooperation between the IRSN and the CLIs and ANCCLI which was started in 2003 with the creation of an Internal unit for Openness to Society and the signature, the same year, of a memorandum of cooperation between the IRSN and the ANCCLI. This cooperation involved various pilot projects to test cooperation approaches and methods. The cooperation between the IRSN, CLIs and the ANCCLI on decennial safety assessment of French NPPs was developed in a regulatory context in which each nuclear reactor has to undergo every 10 years a safety review carried out by the Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire – ASN) and the IRSN. Between 2009 and 2020, 34 nuclear reactors have to undergo their 3rd decennial safety review. The cooperation process was developed on the basis of the Fessenheim reactors decennial safety review (2 reactors) within a national working group involving the IRSN, 4 CLIs including the CLI of Fessenheim, the ANCCLI, EDF (operator of the French NPPs) and the ASN. The objectives of this cooperation were: • to build upstream technical discussion with the Local Committees and experimenting procedures for the CLIs to access the operator’s safety reports; • to support capacity building for the CLIs in the perspective of the 3rd decennial safety review of nuclear reactors in France; • improving the IRSN’s knowledge of the expectations of the CLIs for the 3rd decennial safety reviews. The cooperation process took place between April 2009 and November 2010 and relied on 2 tools or forums of exchange: the above-mentioned national working group and a final seminar involving a larger number of CLIs and of participants. The IRSN took preliminary contacts with CLIs in April 2009. The national working group involved in the project was then formed. A second step in the cooperation process has the preparation of an independent review of the IRSN’s safety report by an independent expert group (GSIEN) commissioned by the Fessenheim CLI. The IRSN sent its safety report to the GSIEN on May 2009. In December 2009, the working group identified specific topics of interest for the CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety review process.
  29. 29. 29 In March 2010, a presentation of the IRSN’s safety report on Fessenheim nuclear power plant was made available for the working group. The final step of the process consisted in preparing and organising the final seminar of the project. From May to June 2010, the national working group identified the topics to be addressed in the final seminar and prepared the programme of the seminar. The seminar was organised in November 2010 and gathered about 35 people, including participants from 10 CLIs as well as the ANCCLI. The programme of the seminar was organised along two topics of particular interest for the CLIs: • How to implement an independent expert assessment of a decennial safety review at site level? • How can the CLIs perform a follow-up of the facility after the decennial safety review? Civil   society   and   local   actors   engagement   on   the   safety   of   the   Asse   II   mine   (used   as   a   radioactive   waste   storage)   in   Germany   through   a   citizen   advisory   group   coupled   to   an   expert  group   In Germany, low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) was disposed of from 1965 to 1978 in the Asse II repository, which was at that time a research mine operated by the German Institute for Radiation Protection and Environmental Research (GFS - Gesellschaft für Strahlen- und Umweltforschung). From 1988, degradation of the repository was observed, including movements of the salt rock strata and influx of brine. From this time, stabilisation works were carried out by GFS. Due to danger of flooding and collapse, the closure of the repository was decided by GFS in 1997. However, criticism from local stakeholders, including local communities, has progressively developed as regards transparency of the process of closure of Asse II, but also as regards radiation protection issues. Public authorities at the local, district and county level officially adopted in March 2006 of a common resolution asking to develop a comparative assessment of possible options for closure, apply the legal framework for radioactive materials rather than the mining law and have the mine operated by a federal public entity. In response, the competent Federal Ministries (BMU and BMBF) and the Ministry for the Environment and Climate Protection of Lower Saxony (NMU - Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Umwelt und Klimaschutz) initiated a public participation process in the beginning of 2008. This public participation process was developed to enable local and regional stakeholders to exert close follow-up of the process of closure of the mine, to build trust in the decision-making process and to anticipate and prepare answer to legal requirements in terms of public participation. This public participation process combined 2 different bodies: • A Citizen Advisory Group (CAG), which is a regional forum for information sharing and discussions between regional and local elected representatives, civil society organisations, the operator of the mine and the concerned ministries. The CAG also plays the role relaying local concerns and problems of the local population and the Asse II employees. • An Expert Advisory Group (EAG), which has a role of information and advice for the Citizen Advisory Group. In September 2008, BMU, BMBF and NMU transferred ownership and operation of the mine to the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS). The mine also changed status and became subjected to the legal procedure applying to radioactive waste repositories. BfS created a specific legal entity for operating the closure of the mine: Asse GmbH company. During the year 2009, BfS carried out the first step in the decision-making process, which is
  30. 30. 30 the comparative assessment of the 3 different possible options for Asse II closure: backfilling, waste retrieval or internal relocation of waste packages. At the end of this step, BfS took the decision, supported by the stakeholders, to retrieve the waste. Influence  of  public  participation  in  the  site  selection  of  Radioactive  Waste  (RW)  repository   Waste  (RW)  repository     In Slovenia local partnerships (LPs) were established from 2006 until 2010 to serve as the organizing framework for citizens’ participation and communication in RW repository site selection. Two very different LPs were established in two local municipalities to provide the base for public information and participation, as well as a mode for consultation and verification, additional independent studies and other activities. The LPs were formally working according to agreements between implementer ARAO and each of the municipalities, but they provided a framework for the participation and cooperation of all interested citizens and other groups in the site selection process. The LPs participation was formal in administrative procedures, like the preparation of National spatial plan for LILW repository and in EIA process, and informal with discussions on field investigation, design solutions, safety assessments, and development possibilities due to compensation in local area, societal and health issues. LPs serve as a point for organization of broader discussion in municipalities, forming the working groups and committees, informing of public, ordering independent expert opinions and work with media. Although the decision making process on acceptability of site stayed with local council and other bodies of local autonomy, LPs had advisory role. For their work the LPs obtained also the funds which they could use according to the yearly work programme and their own procedures of decision adoption. The most typical activities of LPs functioning were: • presentations of site selection process and topics on radioactivity, radioactive waste and repository for local community and citizens groups, committees and working groups, • visits to the national information centres, storages and other nuclear facilities for specific groups of local residents, visits to international examples of operation repositories, • establishments of information points in the local community with printed materials and LPs web pages for dissemination of information and collection of positions, opinions,…, • cooperation with local media and journalists with 3 to 4 articles per month in local newspapers, • involvement in international projects which cover the RW topic (CIP, CARL, OBRA) with the aim to exchange the views, • public presentations of requested independent studies: o Expert opinion on assumptions about the presence of radioactive waste in closed mine Dečno selo, analysis of samples, o Occurrence of cancer in municipality Brežice compared to the rest of Slovenia, o Measurements of specific radionuclides in food samples harvested on the area of municipality Brežice and environmental radioactivity measurements, o Legal aspects and regulation restrictions regarding the RW repository and use of compensation. o Types of compensation and other financial incentives for local communities with nuclear facilities, o Assessment of RW repository impact on local community developmental potential. After several years of discussion and functioning of LPs, in parallel the implementer
  31. 31. 31 succeeded to elaborate all necessary documentation. In January 2010 the Government of Slovenia adopted the Decree on Spatial plan of national importance for RW repository in Krško municipality on Vrbina site after which all activities of LPs were terminated. The role of the LPs was to enhance social acceptability of the RW repository, not to make a decision on the site. Through the LPs local people obtained all necessary information and knowledge about the repository and broader about nuclear technology. They could also communicated with experts, investors, other stakeholders and also with local people in other countries who lived near repositories. Local people were involved in the decision making process and they suggested several proposals to draft documents also linked with safety issues like: influence on field investigations and program, new location proposal, background radiation measurements and inclusion of local knowledge, health studies and improvement of situation, assessment of new scenarios for repository safety evaluation and small changes of repository design. Through the LPs the citizens influenced on the improvement of safety of the proposed design of repository as well as on the improvement of administrative conditions. The organised participation of citizens also gave other results which are assessed in the SWOT analyses performed by different stakeholders and groups involved in LPs. Contribution  of  civil  society  organisations  to  the  re-­‐assessment  of  copper  canisters  quality   in  the  radioactive  waste  programme  of  SKB  in  Sweden   In Sweden, the operators have the responsibility of dispose and final disposal of nuclear waste. In order to fulfil this responsibility, the operators have created a joint company, SKB (Svensk Kärnbränslehantering) in 1972. The Swedish nuclear safety system for nuclear waste management is characterised by an independent nuclear safety authority (SSM) but also by the existence of an independent NGO office (MKG – Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review), established in 2004, which receives public funding and performs independent scrutiny of the works of the industry and the regulator. Investigation of high-level radioactive waste disposal solutions in Sweden are based on the KBS-3 concept proposed by SKB in 1983. This concepts lies on the encapsulation of the spent fuel inside of a natural rock formation and further protection of the waste by additional engineering barriers like Bentonite rings. The technical solution proposed by SKB is to encapsulate the high-level radioactive waste in copper canisters with cast iron inserts and depositing the canisters at a depth of about 500 metres in the bedrocks. The copper canisters are embedded in bentonite clay. Here, the safety of the repository is based on three barriers: the canister, the buffer and the rock. As one of the three barriers, long-term physical and chemical stability of copper in water environments is required. However, corrosion resistance of copper is put into question by some scientific results, and concerns were raised on this issue by civil society organisations and politicians. On 16 November 2009, the Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste has organized a scientific workshop on copper canister corrosion issues. One of the conclusions was that SKB should repeat experiments done at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm in the 1980s that indicated that corrosion in oxygen-free water might be possible. In March 2010, SKB initiated a new scientific project on copper canister corrosion. A specific feature of this project was the creation of a pluralistic reference group with participants from KTH, Swedish Environmental organizations (including MKG), the Municipality of Östhammar (where is final repository for spent nuclear fuel in planned for by SKB), the Municipality of Oskarshamn (where an encapsulation facility is planned for), and the Regional Councils of Uppsala and Kalmar (the regions where Östhammar and Oskarshamn respectively are situated). This reference group was aimed to giving stakeholders and the public full insight