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Competition and Inflation – SINGER – November 2022 OECD discussion

International Organisation à OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
2 Dec 2022
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Competition and Inflation – SINGER – November 2022 OECD discussion

  1. Hal Singer Presented to the OECD Competition Committee Nov. 30, 2022 Based on working paper with Jacob Linger and Ted Tatos
  2.   Capacitors’ Trial—CEO: Cartel functioned more effectively during bouts of inflation  “Softening the beachheads”—Consumer resistance to price hikes may soften with inflation because there now is a pretext for the price increase  “Focal point”—Solves coordination problem by providing a floor for future price increases The Mechanism 2
  3.   “Shelter,” comprised of “Rent of primary residencies” plus “Owners equivalent rents of residences,” contributes 32 percent to the total CPI and about 40 percent of core inflation  In 2022, rents were up almost 15 percent in the Miami/Atlanta metro area and by 21 percent in Phoenix  Per Zillow research, renters face growing housing affordability hurdles in the United States; renters in Miami, e.g., need to work 96 hours at the average wage to pay the typical rent  In ten U.S. cities, including Atlanta, Jacksonville, Tampa and Orlando, institutional investors, defined as entities owning over 100 properties nationwide, had previously acquired at least 15 percent of all single-family rental units.  Suggests a possible nexus between concentration (in levels) and rental inflation The Rental Problem 3
  4.   Hypothesis 1: “It’s the consumer’s fault”  Krugman: Remote work sparked demand for more space (but that fails to explain why one-bedroom rents also increased)  The Economist: Covid migration towards Sun Belt  Hypothesis 2: “It’s beyond the companies’ control”  Business press every day (but costs in network industries are largely fixed and thus likely don’t enter the pricing calculus)  Hypothesis 3: “Companies in concentrated industries are using inflation as a facilitating device” Who Is to Blame? 4
  5.   Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2020) found that purchases by institutional investors, as measured by the share of properties owned by all institutional investors collectively in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), increase the rent-to-income ratio generally, especially where the housing supply elasticity is high.  Using a database comprised of all multifamily real estate transactions of greater than $2 million, Tapp and Peiser (2022) estimated the distribution of HHIs across all Opportunity Zones within the US, showing that investors have grown to consolidate a growing share of the affordable rental housing market.  Analyzing the relationship between ownership concentration and rents in New York City, Watson and Ziv (2021) find that a ten percent increase in concentration is correlated with a one percent increase in rents.  Gurun et. al (2022) estimate that neighborhoods in which a merger permitted a single entity to control more than five properties realized an increase in rents by 0.51-1.62 percent. Prior Literature 5
  6.  Example of Clustering in South Shore Neighborhood of Riverview, FL, 2015- 2022 Note: Based on Florida Property Tax Roll data 6
  7.  Florida Census Tract HHIs in 2022 7
  8.  FLORIDA MONTHLY AVERAGE ZORI AND HHI BY CENSUS TRACT (2015—2022) Sources: Zillow Observed Rent Index; Florida NAL Property Tax Rolls (2015—2022). 8
  9.  Summary Stats 9
  10.   Dependent variable  Rent level in the census tract in the month  % Increase in rent in the census tract in the month  Explanatory variable  Use the annual HHI in the census tract itself  Use average annual number of units per property within a given Census tract as an instrument  As an alternative instrument, use average HHI across all other neighboring Census tracts within the same county, excluding the tract’s HHI itself Estimation Approach 10
  11.   The level of concentration is positively related to level of rents in a statistically and economically significant way, controlling for migration and other factors  The level of concentration is positively related to the rental inflation in a statistically and economically significant way, controlling for migration and other factors  Tables available in the Appendix Empirical Results 11
  12.   By raising interest rates, the Fed perversely steers demand away from single-family home ownership and towards multi-family rental properties increasing rental prices  Legislative bodies, at either the state or federal level, could impose limitations on the extent of ownership by a single institutional investor within a given Census Tract  Given nexus between concentration and rental inflation, support for stronger antitrust enforcement over longer time horizon  Prevent new mergers and unwind old mergers Policy Implications 12
  13.  Appendix 13
  14.  OLS AND IV REGRESSIONS OF RENT LEVELS ON HHI 14
  15.  OLS AND IV REGRESSIONS OF RENTAL INFLATION ON HHI 15
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