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Remedies and commitments in abuse cases – MAIER-RIGAUD – December 2022 OECD discussion

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Remedies and commitments in abuse cases – MAIER-RIGAUD – December 2022 OECD discussion

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This presentation by Frank Maier-Rigaud (managing Director, ABC Economics) was made during a discussion on Remedies and commitments in abuse cases at the 21st meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Competition on 2 December 2022. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at https://oe.cd/rcac.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.

This presentation by Frank Maier-Rigaud (managing Director, ABC Economics) was made during a discussion on Remedies and commitments in abuse cases at the 21st meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Competition on 2 December 2022. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at https://oe.cd/rcac.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.

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Remedies and commitments in abuse cases – MAIER-RIGAUD – December 2022 OECD discussion

  1. 1. A fewthoughtsonremedies inabusecases OECD – GFC 2022 Prof.Dr. FrankMaier-Rigaud 2nd December 2022 Paris*
  2. 2. A fewthoughtsonremedies inabusecases OECD – GFC 2022 Prof.Dr. FrankMaier-Rigaud 2nd December 2022 Paris
  3. 3. © ABC economics 3 Agenda 1.Remedies in merger versus abuse cases 2.Differences in remedies between digital and non-digital abuse cases 3.Some case examples in a nutshell a. Google Shopping (European Commission AT.39740 (2017)) b. Google Advertising (Autorité 21-D-11 (2021)) c. Facebook (BKartA B6-22-16 (2019))
  4. 4. © ABC economics 4 Why do we observe more structural remedies in merger cases? • • • • • Mergers are about changing the structure of a firm. • What about mix and match remedies in merger cases that affect the degree of vertical integration of the firm? Vertical concerns in merger cases are often very similar to concerns in abuse cases From a narrow economic point of view it is surprising to find that a suspected(!) substantial lessening of competition that may not even amount to dominance is presumably treated “more fiercely” and “rigorously” than the abuse of an already existing dominant position. Arguably Council Regulation 1/2003 does not imply a preference for behavioral remedies (or the subsidiarity of structural remedies), but the Commission still approaches remedies in abuse cases as if only behavioral remedies were at its disposal. Based on Council Regulation 1/2003, the structural or behavioral nature of a remedy is immaterial as long as they are not equally effective. Only in this highly theoretical case when indeed they cannot be distinguished by the very criteria set forth in Article 7, does the Article suggest a preference for behavioral remedies. (see Maier-Rigaud (2012) and (2016))
  5. 5. © ABC economics 5 Are there differences in remedies between digital and non-digital abuse cases? • Innovation Remedies are difficult to implement and may become obsolete or even problematic quickly • Role of interim measures risk of markets tipping renders intervention more pressing • Role of fines probably less relevant in large digital cases, notably when anticompetitive conduct is closely related to the core business • Ecosystem character of digital markets (e.g. Google Ads or Facebook) • Structural measures are often not a solution (platform markets). The case for regulation, beyond the typically narrow behavioral remedies, has been recognized for example with the DMA on EU level. • If remedies are intended to not only terminate the infringement but return the market to how it would have developed in the absence of the infringement, this is much more difficult in fast-paced markets
  6. 6. Proposed commitments © ABC economics 6 Abuse Today Google Shopping remedies in a nutshell European Commission AT.39740 (2017) Less can sometimes be more: Cease and desist order
  7. 7. © ABC economics 7 • Facebook must stop processing Data that is “Off-Facebook” i. WhatsApp, Instagram, other Facebook owned ii. Third Party Websites using “Facebook Business Tools” • Must give roadmap about the “How” in 4 months and implement in one year in after decision Facebook remedies in a nutshell BKartA B6-22-16 (2019)
  8. 8. © ABC economics 8 Google Advertising remedies in a nutshell Autorité 21-D-11 (2021) Behavioural commitments for 3 years: I. Commits to give to third party SSPs the same level of interoperability with DFP as AdX.  This should follow the modalities of header bidding (see slide before) instead of other modalities used by Google like Open Bidding.  Dynamic revenue sharing is also prohibited II. Commits to allow publishers using third-party ad servers to access demand from AdX  Both commitments aim at allowing competition on the merit
  9. 9. Publications on remedies Adam, Michael & Frank P.Maier-Rigaud (2009) The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC and the Commission Guidance Paper on Exclusionary Conduct, Journal of Competition Law (ZWeR - Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht), 1, 131-146. Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829076. Hellström, Per, Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.& Wenzel Bulst, Friedrich (2009) Remedies in European Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 76, pp. 43-63. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1830110. Lowe, Philip & Frank P.Maier-Rigaud (2008) Quo Vadis Antitrust Remedies. 2007 Fordham Competition Law Institute, Chapter 20, pp. 597-611. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1827669. Lörtscher, Benjamin & Frank P.Maier-Rigaud (2020) On the Consistency of the European Commission‘s Remedies Practice, chapter 4, pp. 53-72, in Damien Gerard & Assimakis Komninos (eds.) Remedies in EU Competotion Law – Substance, Process and Policy, Wolters Kluwer. Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450614. Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.& Benjamin Lörtscher (2020) Structural vs. Behavioral Remedies, Antitrust Chronicle, 1(1) Competition Policy International, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457594. Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.(2016) Behavioural versus Structural Remedies in EU Competition Law, in: Lowe, Philip, Marquis, Mel and Monti, Giorgio (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2013, Effective and Legitimate Enforcement of Competition Law, Hart Publishing. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457594. Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.(2012) The Idea of the Subsidiarity of Structural Remedies in European Competition Law, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, Vol. 5, pp. 485-500. Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1906335. © ABC economics
  10. 10. Contact Prof. Dr. FrankP. Maier-Rigaud Managing Director Tel: +49 (0) 30 403 611 480 (Berlin) Tel: +32 (0) 2 217 97 09 (Brussels) Tel: +44 (0) 20 4577 0910 (London) Tel: +33 (0) 1 857 347 80 (Paris) Fax: +49 (0) 30 403 611 499 Frank.Maier-Rigaud@ABCecon.com www.ABCecon.com 9 © ABC economics

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