Remedies and Commitments
in Abuse Cases
Dr. Anna Renata Pisarkiewicz
OECD Global Forum on Competition
Paris, 1-2 December 2022

Remedies and Commitments
in Abuse Cases
Dr. Anna Renata Pisarkiewicz
OECD Global Forum on Competition
Paris, 1-2 December 2022*

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Detecting an abuse of dominance will on its own do little good
for competition and consumers if
“ensuing remedy or sanction is too lenient, too late, not
administrable, or otherwise poorly conceived or implemented”
OECD (2006)

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Offered by the firms voluntarily
during an ongoing investigation
Commitments
Imposed by competition authorities on their
own initiative
Remedies vs
Similar measures can be used
Involves a formal finding of a violation No admission of guilt or finding of an abuse
Can be imposed together with a fine Typically there is no fine
Procedure Procedure
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03
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Percentage of abuse of dominance cases with settlements or commitment procedures
2015-2020
4

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What are the issues?
01 How to design optimal remedies?
• Have remedies and commitments used so far in abuse cases worked well?
• Has the complexity of remedies increased over time?
• Do competition authorities shy away too much from using structural remedies?
• Is a small number of fines for non-compliance due to a high level of compliance or
inadequate monitoring?
• Do competition authorities cooperate enough with sectoral regulators to avoid
conflicting remedies?
• Should they be carried out more frequently in abuse cases?
• What are the specific challenges raised ex post evaluations in abuse cases?
02 What is the optimal use of commitments?
• Is there a need for more cross-border collaboration?
03 Do competition authorities have adequate resources and expertise?
The (increasingly) complex task
of designing, implementing and
monitoring remedies and
commitments
The use of remedies and
commitments in regulated sectors
Ex post evaluations
The growing number of authorities
that can accept commitments
Alleged over-reliance /
value of precedents
Considering all the above…

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An effective remedy puts an end to both a harmful behaviour and its
distortive effects.
Parameters to take into account vary, and may include:
• Appropriate timing and duration: how long will it take for the remedy
to produce expected effects?
• Practicality: can the remedy be easily implemented, monitored and
enforced?
• Risk profile: does the remedy offer a high or low degree of certainty
that the desired effect will be achieved?
These and other potentially relevant parameters concern both:
• A remedy’s ability to put an infringement to an end
• The competition authority’s capacity to implement it.
What happens if a practical remedy cannot be identified?
Principles:
Effectiveness

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Principles:
Proportionality
Proportionality: a core principle of law, which implies that even if competition
law itself does not require a remedy to be proportional such a requirement
might nonetheless exist.
A proportional remedy addresses the identified competition concern, by
restoring the competitive situation that existed prior to the abuse, without
going beyond what is necessary (i.e. without seeking to improve the pre-
existing situation, a concern particularly relevant in regulated markets).
Proportionality determines a number of issues in the design of a remedy
• The type of remedy: structural or behavioural, what type of behavioural
(more or less intrusive)
• Duration of the remedy: for how long should it bind the dominant firm?
• Monitoring mechanism: i.e. how often should the dominant firm report
on its compliance?
To ensure truly proportional remedies NCAs should have the power to modify
the remedies and their application period, including the possibility to
prescribe an early cessation.

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Structural
Structural remedies require firms to divest or carve-out
certain tangible or intangible assets they own.
Main advantage: they move the very source of a
dominant firm’s ability and incentive to engage in an
anticompetitive conduct.
Main disadvantage: highly disruptive to a firm’s business
model, structural remedies may lead to inefficiencies.
Potentially irreversible in nature: their use may be
limited to a narrow set of circumstances prescribed by
law
• The source of competitive harm is inexorably
linked to a company’s structure
• Available behavourial remedies might be too
burdensome.
• Recidivism and a lasting risk of repeated
infringement.
Is hesitation towards and limited use of structural
remedies in abuse of dominance cases still justified?
Behavioural remedies alter how a dominant firm
conducts its business.
Main advantage: Flexibility - as they are tailor-made
they can come in various forms and be shaped
according to the needs of a specific case.
Main disadvantage: behavioural remedies do not
remove a firm’s ability and incentive to engage in
abusive conduct.
Different types of behavioral remedies:
• External vs internal: depending on whether the
implementation involves third parties, or not.
• Positive/declaratory vs negative/prohibitory
Is dominant firms’ informational, technological and
financial advantage over competition authorities
reflected in the final shape of commitments?
Behavioural
Types of remedies

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A need for a comprehensive approach to remedies: competition authorities
intervention should intelligently combine remedies, be it structural, behavioural or
both, that address competition issues on both the supply and the demand-side.
• The role of behavioural economics and heuristicis (cognitive
biases):effective remedies need to reflect the functioning of real markets,
with real consumers and real firms.
• A more compelling explanation of anti-competitive effects can help design
more effective remedies.
Types of
remedies:
Consumer-
oriented
Examples of behavioural biases:
• Present bias
• Reference dependence / loss
aversion
• Anchoring effects
• Framing effects
• Overconfidence bias
• Saliency bias
• Status quo / default bias
The use of behavioural economics
in the design of remedies
Microsoft
Google Android
Google Shopping (EU, Brazil)
The mere understanding of behavioural bias at play is in itself insufficient.

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Compliance
monitoring,
and
ex-post
evaluations
Effectiveness of a remedy in theory and in practice: the importance of the
authority’s track record in monitoring and compliance
Effective enforcement requires competition agencies to:
• Devise adequate monitoring mechanisms
• Commit sufficient resources to monitoring
• Have powers to act in case of non-compliance.
MONITORING: The choice between a monitoring trustee & reporting obligations
• Complexity of commitments and the ability to monitor compliance
• The cost of monitoring and who is going to cover it
• Adequacy of existing institutional structures: internal (within the
competition authority) and external (with other relevant authorities)
EX-POST EVALUATIONS:
• Currently are still sporadic in abuse of dominance cases but their more
extensive use could help determine the effectiveness of remedies overall
and in individual cases.
If resources are limited, what should be prioritised in the design of remedies?

Thank you!
Dr. Anna Renata Pisarkiewicz
anna.pisarkiewicz@eui.eu